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Systematic-dialectical exposition by chapter
Chapters 1–5 set out an increasingly concrete exposition of the capitalist eco-
nomy: first its conditions of existence and next its manifestations. The same
applies to Chapters 6–10 for the capitalist state.
The reader may wish to read the book in this order. However, Chapter 6
equally provides the grounds of Chapter 1. As does Chapter 7 for Chapter 2, and
so forth. The book has been written in such a way that the reader might also
read the book in this zigzag order [1;6], [2;7] and so on. This is further ampli-
fied on in the General Introduction.
The systematic core of the text makes up about half of the book. The rest
consists of ‘explications’, ‘amplifications’ and ‘addenda’ of/on the core text, vari-
ously serving the less advanced and the advanced reader in a field – these can
be read according to the reader’s requirements, or skipped without losing the
main thread of the core text.
Preface
This book provides a systematic outline of the constellation and functioning of
the capitalist system. It is an exposition of the relations, institutions and pro-
cesses that are necessary for the continued existence of the capitalist system –
that is, the capitalist economy as interconnected with the capitalist state.
In its systematic character, the book is inspired by Marx’s incomplete syn-
thetic outline of the capitalist system in his Capital – incomplete because that
work did not reach the capitalist state. The latter is dealt with in Part Two of
the current book. Part One, on the capitalist economy, is the result of a critical
appraisal of current orthodox and heterodox economics, and of the systematic
problems and gaps of Capital – the latter especially in hindsight of the devel-
opment of the contemporary monetary and financial institutions.
Without underestimating the merits of analyses of partial components of
the capitalist system (such as those regarding the labourmarket, infrastructure
ormonetary policy), the writing of this book derives from the insight that com-
prehension of the capitalist system is (also) gained from a full synthetic outline
of the system by interconnecting all of its main components. Such a synthetic
approach also sheds light on the components that are often obscured by a par-
tial analysis.
The book is addressed to scholars who share this insight, or are at least curi-
ous about it. More specifically, it is written for scholars and advanced students
in the social sciences (political economy, economics, political science, social
geography, sociology, and the philosophy of these sciences).
Geert Reuten
June 2018
© Geert Reuten, 2019 | doi:10.1163/9789004392809_002
This is an open access chapter distributed under the terms of the prevailing CC-BY-NC-ND License at
the time of publication.
General introduction
Contents
A Aim and outline of the book 2
General aim and outline 2
The starting point of the book: dissociation 3
Chapter outlines 3
B Intellectual inheritance 8
C Systematic dialectics: methodological introduction 10
C§1 Limitations of mainstreammethods 11
C§2 ‘System’ 13
C§3 Presumptions and pre-positions (contrary to assumptions) 13
C§4 Systematic-dialectical exposition 15
Two reading strategies 17
The empirical domain of the book 17
C§5 Systematic order versus historical order 18
C§6 Immanent critique 19
D A note on mathematics and the readership 19
E Format of the book and internal references 20
Appendix. A note on historical dialectics: ‘historical materialism’ 21
Acknowledgements 22
2 general introduction
A Aim and outline of the book
General aim and outline
Much of the conventional research in economics focuses on partial aspects of
society, such as its labour market or financial markets – often also in abstrac-
tion from the state and its policies. The aim of this book is to systematically
identify the interconnections andmanifestations of the full range of those eco-
nomic and political relations, institutions and processes that are necessary for
the continued existence of the capitalist system – that is, the capitalist eco-
nomy togetherwith the capitalist state. In doing so, the readerwill be equipped
with an outline of the constitution and functioning of the capitalist system.
Any science, and any scientific project, begins with certain presumed facts
and questions. I will briefly outline some of my questions. To some extent this
is of limited relevance, because the results of scientific investigation often have
repercussions and implications that go beyond their initial remit. Within cap-
italist society we observe social divisions along the lines of:
• rich – poor
• powerful – powerless
• employed – unemployed
• satisfactory work – unsatisfactory work.
These evoke three questions. First, why are these divisions apparently enduring
characteristics of the capitalist system? Are they conditions for the contin-
ued existence of the capitalist system? Second, if so, how do these relate to
other conditions that are required for the continued existence of the system?
Third, how does the actual institutionalisation of these conditions determine
the actual functioning of the system such that it reproduces these divisions? In
brief the challenge is to comprehend the capitalist system. Conscious change
within and beyond the capitalist system requires its comprehension – in this I
am an ardent pupil of Marx.
To answer these questions, we need to investigate the interconnection be-
tween a wide range of elements that constitute that system. The method that
I adopt in this book, ‘systematic dialectics’ (see section C), is well suited to the
comprehension of complex systems composed of many interdependent con-
stituent parts.
Part One of the book presents the ‘capitalist economy’, and Part Two the
‘capitalist state’. Part Three considers the international constellation of capit-
alist economies and states. Each of the subsequent chapters of Part One has its
counterpart in each of the subsequent chapters of Part Two.
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The starting point of the book: dissociation
As we will see below in the methodological section C, the starting point of the
book (the first section of Chapter 1) has a special status. It sets out an encom-
passing concept of the capitalist system which essentially characterises its
problematic. This is the institutional separation, unique to capitalism, between
households and enterprises, which I will refer to as ‘dissociation’. In itself this
separation is not controversial, and in fact many mainstream approaches to
capitalism start with this separation. The difference here is that I immediately
pack into it specifically capitalist property relations: enterprises claim owner-
ship of much of the earth, and they claim ownership of the means of produc-
tion other than the earth.
The rest of Chapter 1, and indeed the entire book, sets out how this separa-
tion is bridged within capitalism, and how the ways of bridging it often create
new problems that require new solutions.
Chapter outlines
As indicated, Part One (Chapters 1–5) is an exposition of the capitalist eco-
nomy.
Chapter 1 starts with the ‘dissociation’ just mentioned, before establishing
how trade – in terms of the ‘monetary-value dimension’ – constitutes the ele-
mentary ‘bridge’ of the separation. This engenders the commodification of
goods; along with it the property of enterprises takes the monetary form of
the property of capital. Foremost, however, it engenders the capitalist ‘com-
modification of labour-capacity’. The existence of a generalised labour market
distinguishes capitalism from previous modes of production. The subsequent
focus of the chapter is on the capitalist production process. ‘Full-fledged capit-
alism’ is not only predicated on the trade of commodities and labour-capacity
in terms of the ‘monetary-value dimension’. We will see how the monetary-
value dimension pervades the activity of production itself – which again dis-
tinguishes capitalism from all historically prior modes of production – and
how the enlargement of capital via the production of surplus-value (or profit)
becomes the motivating force of capitalist production.1 We will see why and
how labour is the only source of profit. (This thesis is not new – we find it, for
example, in Adam Smith’s (1776) analysis of the capitalist system).We will also
discover why enterprises can nevertheless appropriate these profits, and how
1 There is a distinction between ‘surplus-value’ and profit that will be neglected in this outline.
In brief the production of surplus-value includes the production of any interest equival-
ent.
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capitalist production takes the – simultaneously abstract and concrete – form
of the production of capital by labour.
Chapter 2 starts by outlining that the logic of the one-dimensional pro-
duction of profit for the sake of production of capital is ‘more of the same’.
This is reached by the continuous investment of profit and so the continuous
accumulation of capital, its corollary being economic growth. There are two
main conditions for the generalised accumulation of capital: first, a continuous
expansion of profit and hence an expansion of labour-capacity; second, a con-
tinuous expansion of the quantity-flow of money. Money is created by banks –
and given that this chapter abstracts from a Central Bank, which is introduced
in Chapter 7 – money is inevitably created by commercial banks (as is in fact
also the case when there is a central bank). We will see how the tuning of the
continuous creation of money by banks and of the continuous (re)creation of
labour-capacity in the household sphere, is essential to the system. By then we
will have revealed thatmoney and labour arenot only necessary to the accumu-
lation of capital; they are also central vulnerabilities of the capitalist economy.
The creation of, andmarkets for,money and labour-capacity are unlike the pro-
duction of commodities in enterprises and their markets. Regarding labour we
will see, for some perhaps paradoxically, that continuous accumulation of cap-
ital requires continuous unemployment.
We will further note that the continuous accumulation of capital is en-
hanced by the tendency to the incorporation of enterprises. This entails a
layered form of the enterprises’ ownership and its management.
Chapter 3 will demonstrate that an initial financing of enterprises by banks
is a necessary condition for the accumulation of capital. Banking finance is a
pre-condition for any other form of finance. Only after the initial financing
by banks of the investment and production by enterprises can other financi-
ers take the place of banking finance. Thus ‘investment’ must precede ‘saving’,
saving being a ‘result’ of investment in the first place. Once such savings res-
ult, other forms of finance out of these savings may ex-post act as a substitute
for the initial banking finance. Hence these other forms of finance inevitably
‘derive’ from banking finance. (This opposes mainstream economic theory,
which views the causality as flowing the other way – savings are seen to lead to
investment. This leaves unexplained how and why the quantity flow of money
would grow). Finally, Chapter 3 shows how macroeconomic expenditure con-
ditions the validation of production, and hence the continuous accumulation
of capital.
This completes the necessary ‘economic’ (or economy-immanent) ‘condi-
tions of existence’ of the capitalist economy. The following two chapters pre-
sent its implications and manifestations in the market interaction between
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enterprises (Chapter 4) and in the cyclical over-accumulation and destruction
of capital (Chapter 5).
Chapter 4 is an exposition of the main forms of market interaction between
enterprises: namely those of competition, cartel formation, oligopolisation and
monopolisation. (The introduction of these phenomena only at this stage of
the exposition is indicative of how this book’s approach diverges from that of
mainstream economics. The latter would usually start with the idea of com-
petition).Wewill see how the technique of production, as well as the degree of
technical change and innovation, affects the form of market interaction. It will
also be shown that for sectors dominated by competitive interaction, much of
the dynamic between sectors of production (capital flowing from one sector to
another) is predicated on a tendency towards equalisation of average rates of
profit between sectors. However, it will also be shown that within such sectors
the rates of profit tend to be stratified.
Chapter 5, the final chapter of Part One, outlines the cyclical movement of
the accumulation of capital (the business cycle). It will be shown how this
results from capital’s tendency to over-accumulation, which accompanies a
decline in the rate of profit (in the upturn). This over-accumulation is redressed
(in the crisis and downturn) by a partial annihilation of the capital accumu-
lated along with lay-offs of labour; through this activity, the rate of profit is
restored. The bulk of the misery caused by this recurrent process is heaped
upon those expelled into unemployment. However, the same recurrent pro-
cess of over-investment and annihilation of productive capacity damages the
climate and destroys applied natural resources.
The exposition in this chapter synthesises the earlier exposition (including
many of the thorough aspects that the outline above has not touched upon).
Along the way – because actual economic reality is inevitably always in some
phase of this cyclical movement (one phase of the business cycle) – the expos-
ition in this chapter sets out the concrete mode of existence of the earlier
exposition (Chapters 1–4).
So far, this book apparently covers much of thematerial dealt with bymain-
stream economics, and indeed all of the main economic concepts will be sur-
veyed. However, the book is significantly different in respect of both its content
and its methodology. Because of the specific interconnection posited between
concepts, the latter will ‘shift’ for the reader educated in mainstream econom-
ics, giving way to a different view of the science of economics.
Until this point, themethodological strategy of the book is to detect to what
extent it is possible to present the capitalist economy in abstraction from a
‘state’. While this might appear somewhat strange to social scientists, econom-
ists will be aware that this is howmostmainstream economics textbooks begin
6 general introduction
and end. Through Chapters 1–5, the need to regulate economic institutions
and processes is often apparent. In these chapters this need is often dealt with
(implicitly or explicitly) via modes of self-regulation, thus drawing out the lim-
its of such self-regulation.However, by the endof Chapter 5, theneed topresent
the ‘state’ is unavoidable.
Part Two (Chapters 6–10) makes explicit what has thus far remained impli-
cit: namely the necessity of a state and the necessity of economic policy for a
capitalist economy. Here the aim of the presentation is analogous to the earlier
aim: to identify what relations, institutions and processes are necessary for the
continued existence of the capitalist system–only nowwith regard to the state.
The reference is to ‘the state’ as an institutional continuity, rather than to gov-
ernments that come and go.2
Chapter 6 sets out why the capitalist system inevitably requires a capitalist
state. Its starting point is again the ‘dissociation’ described in Chapter 1. That is,
the encompassing concept of the capitalist system, which essentially charac-
terises its problematic.Whereas Chapters 1–3 set out its ‘economic’ conditions
of existence, we nowmove on to the politico-juridical conditions of existence.
The exposition in Chapter 1 (and all of Part One) was implicitly based on the
economic actors’ claims of being entitled to act as set out. The core of these are,
firstly, the enterprises’ claims of entitlement to the private property of much of
the earth; secondly, their claims of entitlement to private property in means
of production other than for production by the claimant; thirdly, their claims
of entitlement to employ labour as combined with the appropriation of the
surplus-value (profit) produced by that labour. The state as an extraordinary
institution grants these claims in the form of legal rights. Because and to the
extent that the state grants these rights in particular, it is identified as a ‘cap-
italist state’, which constitutes a unity with the capitalist economy. The state’s
legal formulation of these granted rights, as well as theirmaintenance, requires
structures of law that are often inherently conflictual in a variety of ways. These
are presented in Chapter 6.
Chapter 7 first sets out how these structures of law require taxation, which
inevitably overrides economic actors’ property claims – thus the state’s defence
of such claims inevitably requires some degree of neglect of these property
claims. This is followed by an outline of the ‘action radius of the state’, which
determines what it can do, given the constraint of feasible taxation. The latter
is determined by the prevailing vigour of the accumulation of capital. To the
2 In addition: the term ‘state’ is used in reference to a ‘central state’. Some central states result
from a union or federation of (what I call) ‘subordinate states’ in terms of full jurisdiction.
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extent that this vigour is not sufficient for the state’s necessary action radius, it
must improve that vigour and thus further the conditions for capital accumu-
lation and economic growth.
Themain body of this chapter consists of the exposition of these conditions:
regulation of monetary and financial institutions; regulation of the labourmar-
ket as well as public education; and the state’s engagement in infrastructural
requirements. This chapter also sets out why social security transfers are inev-
itable for the legitimation of the capitalist state, and hence for the capitalist
system.
Chapter 8 provides an exposition of the state’s activities (as presented in
Chapters 6 and 7) in terms of the monetary expenditure of the state and their
finance. Analogous to the exposition in Chapter 3, it is shown how the state’s
macroeconomic expenditure conditions production and the validation of pro-
duction, and hence the continuous accumulation of capital. One of the main
areas of focus is on the various forms of taxation – where these are levied
(enterprises, capital owners, labour) – and their associated tax rates, as well as
their effects on the net profits of enterprises and on the distribution of income
and wealth more generally.
Analogous to the exposition of the first three chapters of Part One for the
economy-immanent ‘conditions of existence’ of capitalist production, Chap-
ter 8 completes the exposition of the state’s legislative, regulative and taxation
frameworks that are necessary ‘conditions for the existence’ of the capital-
ist economy and for the state itself – and so for the capitalist system. The
following two chapters present the state’s ‘manifestation’ in its imposition of
competition (Chapter 9), and in its general reach on the capitalist economy
(Chapter 10).
Chapter 9presents the state’s concretemanifestation in its imposing a frame-
work of constraints on the modes of market interaction of enterprises and
banks, and of constraints on the outcomes of such interaction. The first con-
straint is a general one: in the form of ‘competition policy’, the state imposes
on enterprises and banks its view about ‘proper’ competitive interaction. The
second constraint regards the competitive constellation that would result in
(potential) generalised price deflation and stagnation, whence the state adopts
amonetary policy engendering ‘creeping inflation’. The third constraint relates
to a phenomenon that was only thrown into relief with the emergence of the
2007/08 financial crisis, that is, entities, especially banks, that have grown ‘too
big to fail’, as a result of which the state is enforced to impose (highly conflict-
ing) limits on the functioning of such entities.
Chapter 10 sets out three main manifestations of the reach of the state –
implied by the exposition in Chapters 6–9. First, whereas capital accumula-
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tion is necessarily manifest in cyclical movements (Chapter 5), the degree of
state expenditure affects the degree of the amplitude of these cycles (struc-
turally increased expenditure moderates the amplitudes). Secondly, it will be
shown that thedynamics of the capitalist economy, togetherwith thenecessary
regulation by the state (Chapter 7), inevitably result in not only an increasing
quantity of regulation, but also an increasing complexity of regulation. Thirdly,
it will be outlined why increasing social security transfers (increasing as a per-
centage of GDP) are inevitable.
The chapter concludes that even if the two main problems of ‘too big to
fail’ banks and environmental damage could be resolved (again by complex
regulation), both the continuously increasing social security transfers and the
continuously increasing quantity and complexity of regulation are inevitable
and impossible for the capitalist system.
Part Three (Chapter 11) presents the international mode of existence of the
capitalist system. As with Chapters 4–5 and 9–10, this chapter does not set
out the capitalist system’s conditions of existence, but rather its manifesta-
tions. It focuses on the two main forms of international economic relations:
namely international trade and the international migration of capital as mani-
fest in the international migration of production. International trade is not
fundamentally different from intra-nation regional specialisation and trade.
However, the effects of international migration of production are potentially
far-reaching (when I finished the typescript for this book, the scale of this
migrationwas yetmodest). To the extent that thismigration is left uninhibited,
it evokes themutually reinforcing combinationof a gradualmovement towards
international convergence of average wage structures on the one hand, and a
gradual movement towards internationally similar structures of regulation on
the other. The chapter sets out a variety of conflicting interests that are associ-
ated with these movements.
B Intellectual inheritance
As the book covers a wide range of subjects, it is not feasible to review all
of the existing literature on each of those subjects. Instead, references are
mainly restricted to tributes and acknowledgements. Therefore, a few words
on the intellectual inheritance on which I build are also appropriate. Like
most current economists I was educated in neoclassical theory. Dissatisfied,
I became acquainted with Marx’s and marxian political economy of capital-
ism, and later Post-Keynesian and Institutionalist theory. Thus, after my ini-
tial orthodox background, I became what is now called a heterodox econ-
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omist, and it is generally heterodox theory that I build on, although that is prob-
ably too broad a label.
Marx (1818–83) and to a lesser extent Hegel (1770–1831) have been my pri-
mary sparring partners, with whom there is a continuous dialogue of ideas.
There is a great advantage in having studied one or, for that matter, two great
thinkers closely. Often the study of such great thinkers begins with a certain
respect for their aims, but once one is able to critically reflect on the theoret-
ical content (different for each) – to see each author’s limitations and short-
comings, and yet still learn from them – one’s relationship to such thinkers
matures.
Hegel and Marx also produced the chief paradigmatic examples of a social-
scientific systematic dialectic, that is, the method that is adopted in this book
(see section C). Although the systematic-dialectical method used here some-
times deviates significantly from that of Hegel and Marx, I nevertheless pro-
ceed in their scientific tradition and am greatly indebted to these authors.
In this tradition, I am also indebted to some living authors. First of all
Michael Williams with whom I wrote my first comprehensive systematic-di-
alectical work:Value-form and the State; the tendencies of accumulation and the
determination of economics policy in capitalist society (1989). Although the con-
tent of the current work often substantively deviates from our joint work, it is
unsurprising that the methodology and systematic structure of the two works
share much in common. In hindsight, I think that this joint work was a great
methodological achievement as, to my knowledge, this was the first compre-
hensive systematic-dialectical work in political economy written since Marx’s
Capital.3 In the period since the late 1980s, quite a few authors have written on
the method of systematic dialectics.
Further, I am also much indebted to the members of the International Sym-
posiumonMarxianTheory (ISMT).4This small groupof philosophers andpolit-
ical economists has met for a summer week every year from 1991 to 2014, for a
thorough discussion of each other’s work on the writings of Marx and develop-
3 In 1984 Michael Eldred published a systematic-dialectical account of economic competition
and the capitalist state. Awider project of his, together with Kleiber, Hanlon and Roth, unfor-
tunately stagnated after their 1982–85 articles on value-form theory.
4 This group has generally consisted of eight to ten members: Christopher Arthur, Martha
Campbell, FredMoseley, PatrickMurray,Geert Reuten,Tony Smith (all 1991–current), Gugliel-
mo Carchedi (1991–93), Paul Mattick Jr. (1991–2000), Riccardo Bellofiore (1996–current), Nic-
ola Taylor (2001–03), Roberto Fineschi (2004–current), Andrew Brown (2006–current) and
Guido Starosta (2009–current). Between 1993 and 2015, nine books have been published fol-
lowing ISMT conferences (with several translations in Chinese, Italian and Spanish).
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ments thereof, with a focus on hismethod especially in relation to its (variously
judged) roots in Hegel. The present book has benefited greatly from these dis-
cussions.
As an inheritance in another sense, I have been helped (particularly in Part
Two)by the intellectual andpolitical experienceof having served for the Social-
ist Party in the Senate of the Parliament of the Netherlands from 2007–15. I
especially learned and experienced, first, how the (that) state’s view of ‘the gen-
eral interest’ – often implicitly – is identified with the ‘unquestionable’ exist-
ence of the capitalist system (Chapter 6); second, how feasible tax rates are a
perennial concern for the (non-)doing of the state (Chapter 7); third, to what
extent the state and the capitalist system tremble when the banking constella-
tion trembles (Chapters 7 and 9); fourth, how the state tries to avoid conflict by
delegating the most conflicting issues to semi- or quasi-independent institu-
tions of the state (Chapters 7–9 passim); and fifth, why legislation and other
regulation inevitably increases in size, and especially why it becomes more
complicated and complex (Chapter 10). Generally the second part of the book
has benefited significantly from debates with three different ministers of fin-
ance, three different secretaries of state for taxation, and spokespersons for
finance and economic affairs during those eight years.
C Systematic dialectics: methodological introduction
Through the experience of teaching the material of this book, I have learned
that it is not very instructive to begin with a comprehensive methodological
account. Nevertheless, it is helpful for the reader to at least have an outline
of the method in mind while absorbing the content of the book. In terms of
the methodology, I therefore proceed in three stages. Firstly, in this General
Introduction I present a number of general notions concerning the method of
systematic dialectics. Secondly, details of the method are introduced, as the
content requires, at several points throughout the chapters. Thus, I expand
on the methodological notion of ‘tendency’ when I introduce tendencies for
the first time. A general methodological appendix, at the end of the book, is
the third, most comprehensive treatment and presents an interconnected out-
line of systematic dialectics. For most readers, it is probably best to read the
appendix last. However, for readers who prefer to have expanded methodolo-
gical information earlier on, I refer below to sections of the appendix as A§1,
A§2, and so on.
Although this General Introduction outlines the systematic-dialectical
method – and hence will use some dialectical jargon – in the chapters to come
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I have tried to reduce such jargon to aminimum. For Chapters 1 and 6, however,
a somewhat heavier load is unavoidable.
A Glossary of field-specific terms (regarding the method as well as the con-
tent) is included at the end of the book.
C§1 Limitations of mainstreammethods
The systematic-dialectical method that I adopt in this book is appropriate to
the theorisation of a system or a structured totality. It is especially an adequate
scientific method for the synthesis of knowledge about a social system (this is
the subject of the following sections). However, onemust have good reasons to
deviate from the common or established research methods, so it will be useful
to first sketch out the limitations of mainstreammethods.
Much of the mainstream science proudly casts its endeavours in terms of
‘analysis’, whereas systematic dialectics proceeds by way of ‘synthesis’. The fol-
lowing brief descriptions of these terms will suffice for now. Analysis: to scru-
tinise by way of the division of wholes into their elements, or the deconstruc-
tion of initial knowledge. Synthesis: to connect, assemble, or unite knowledge;
the combination of often diverse concepts into a whole by indicating their
interconnections.
Current mainstream methods are generally founded on the philosophical
tradition of positivism. Their aim is to describe and explain the outward appear-
ances of the institutions of the status quo.Whereas in economics the professed
method is generally an empiricist positivism, the practice is usually a rational-
istic positivism, ormore precisely, an axiomatic positivism forwhich axiomatic
mathematics is the prototype.5
Themodernpositivist traditionmaybe tracedback to the early seventeenth-
century writings of Francis Bacon and René Descartes. Central to this is the lat-
ter’s subject–object dualism, or the division between thought and being (‘cogito
ergo sum’; ‘je pense donc je suis’). This division gave rise to the two main
methodological-philosophical frames of rationalism and empiricism. (For the
object–subject dualism I also use the modern pair of entity and discourse).
These two frames – rationalism and empiricism – stood in a dualist opposi-
tion (separation) to one another. Phenomena were variously reduced to one or
the other pole (reductionism). In mainstream economics we see this exempli-
fied in:
5 Empiricism understands sensual experience to be the source of knowledge. Rationalism
stresses the role of reason in understanding phenomena. Axiomatic positivism is examined
further in Reuten 1996, esp. pp. 40–1.
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• axiomaticanalytical approaches (as in themodels of muchof microeconom-
ics);
• empirical analytical approaches (as in themodels of muchof macroeconom-
ics, and especially those applied by National Research Bureaus and Central
Banks).
Frommy perspective, the first major limitation of these models is that notions
of structure and systemare alien to them, or simply ignored.Usually thesemod-
els proceed and expand from partial problems (this is not problematic when
the aim is the solution of a partial problem from some specified perspective).6
The difficulty of restricting oneself to partial terrains is ‘solved’ by the use of
various assumptions, notably ceteris paribus conditions, about ‘the rest of the
world’. Students of thesemodels (should) knowhow crucial these assumptions
are, casting the problem at hand in terms of caricatures (think of the stylised
‘rational behaviour’ approaches in economics), and also how these assump-
tions often lead to caricatures of the rest of the world.
This first limitation is related to two others. The second limitation is that
models are in fact complex sets of definitions.7 This is indeed useful for ana-
lysis and for tackling partial problems. However, setting out fixed definitions
inhibits conceptual development, thus impeding broad scientific development
to which conceptual change is central.
These two limitations are epistemological in kind. The third limitation con-
cerns the particular road taken by mainstream economics (i.e. neoclassical
economics), which tends to cast thesemodels in terms of individual behaviour.
This is called ‘methodological individualism’. Rigorous methodological indi-
vidualists deny the existenceof ‘social structures’ and ‘social forces’ – this leaves
references to ‘market forces’, ‘market structures’ or indeed the ‘capitalist sys-
tem’ (commonplace terms within orthodox economics) rather unintelligible.
For those that do not deny the existence of structures, methodological indi-
6 A simple example of positing a problem as a partial one can be seen in the reduction of
unemployment to characteristics of individuals (sometimes this might be part of a specific
problem), rather than, for example, linking unemployment to the command of one section
of society over the means of production (vested in enterprises), the incentive structure of
that layer, and so on. An endeavour that links problems such as that of unemployment with
other problems, and with general structures, posits ‘interconnection’. Anticipating a point
to be introduced later, it may be added that such a (common) reduction of problems to the
characteristics of individuals apparently absolves the researcher of taking into account inter-
connected structures. Note that I am not arguing that all problems can be cast in terms of
interconnected structures, nor that all problems necessarily should be understood or solved
in those terms.
7 Hausman 1992, pp. 75–82.
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vidualism operates as a self-imposed restriction – it is not at all clear how we
can ascend from individual behaviour to these structures (at least not in a the-
oretically informed way).
More far-reaching than ‘methodological individualism’ on its own is its com-
bination with the idea of ‘ontological individualism’. That is, the idea that (in
the event that structures are ‘assumed’ to exist at all) social structures are seen
to be entirely determined by individual behaviour, instead of the other way
around (‘ontological structuralism’), or instead by some interdependent or dia-
lectical interconnection between individuals and social structures.8
These limitations are not sufficient reasons for not taking mainstream sci-
ence seriously, or to entirely ignore its results; the point is rather that any
method is limited by its self-imposed or internal constraints, and those lim-
itations must be clearly understood and kept in mind when looking at the
results. The systematic-dialectical method goes quite some way in tackling
these problems. Generally it is possible to incorporate the accomplishments
of mainstream methodologies into the dialectical method, but movement in
the opposite direction is not so straightforward. (A§3 sets out how systematic
dialectics makes use of mainstream accomplishments).
C§2 ‘System’
So far I have referred to the capitalist ‘system’. Is capitalism actually a sys-
tem, that is, a self-reproducing integrated whole consisting of interdependent
constituent parts? If we are not content to settle for journalism and history
telling – without doubt both meritorious activities – then for science and sci-
entific explanation to be an intelligible activity itmust be presumed that the con-
stellation we study is both systematic and, in principle, comprehensible.9 Thus
some structured totality will be presumed.
‘Systematic dialectics’ refers to themethod of a dialectical investigation and
exposition of such a system.
C§3 Presumptions and pre-positions (contrary to assumptions)
Systematic dialectics eschews assumptions. However, the exposition in this
book adopts three ‘presumptions’. Firstly, a culturally determined language (in
8 On the latter see especially Hollis 1994; cf. Reuten 2003c, ch. 10.
9 In this book the term ‘constellation’ has the following meanings: interconnected organisa-
tional units and/or interconnected processes and/or structures (often called configurations).
The termmay also refer towhat in ordinary language is called a ‘subsystem’ (such as the ‘bank-
ing system’). Most often the term is used when, for methodological and sometimes stylistic
reasons, I want to avoid the term ‘system’.
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our case, specifically, ‘English’). Along with this goes an episteme.10 We can, in
degree, be conscious of this, but no scientific endeavour can escape this broad
presumption. (It is sometimes believed that mathematics escapes it. However,
mathematics requires at least ‘initial translations’ from cultural language into
mathematics). Secondly, it is presumed that the object of investigation exists.
That is, capitalist social formations and especially capitalist economies and
states. Empirically these are exemplified in, at least, OECD countries (see C§4,
subsection ‘empirical domain’).Thirdly, it is presumed that this object of invest-
igation is systematic (C§2 above). This is, as indicated, a precondition for any
scientific study of an object of investigation beyond mere description.
Next to these three presumptions I will adopt ‘pre-positions’ in Chapters
1–3 and 6–8. I adopt these merely because all the constituent elements of a
‘system’ cannot be presented at the same time. I use the term ‘pre-position’
(instead of ‘assumption’) so as to indicate that these have a temporary status.
(In modelling approaches many ‘assumptions’ have a permanent status). Thus
in the course of the dialectical exposition, I will introduce entities that at
the stage of their introduction are not (fully) ‘grounded’. (For example, when
I introduce ‘money’ in Chapter 1, the creation of money by banks, which is
only introduced in Chapter 2, is pre-posited). A major difference between
systematic-dialectical pre-positions and the assumptions of a standard model
building approach is that systematic-dialectical pre-positions must always be
grounded within the exposition – a systematic-dialectical exposition is never
complete until all determinations relevant for the object realm have been
determined endogenously, that is, when no pre-positions (or assumptions) are
required, and all earlier (temporary) pre-positions have in fact been elimin-
ated. In the main systematic text of this book I will never use assumptions
(in an Explication I may sometimes use an assumption, merely to simplify an
example).
When in a modelling approach some assumption is dropped, earlier state-
ments (based on the dropped assumption)may no longer hold. This is different
for pre-positions. All the statements formulated at each level (e.g. at the expos-
itional level of Chapter 1 or 2) are claimed to be true, and still held to be true
when we have reached Chapter 5 or 11.
10 Foucault (inTheOrder of Things) uses the term épistème to refer to the ‘unconscious’men-
tal arrangements that underpin the production and the possibility of the production of
scientific knowledge over an extended time period (think of theMiddle Ages versus ‘mod-
ernity’). An épistème is far more comprehensive and inescapable than Kuhn’s notion of
paradigm.
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All the foregoing remarks about pre-positions concern the object realm we
study here. Although capitalism cannot exist in a void, it is hardly opportune to
begin this book by offering a dialectical exposition of natural scientific entities
(if I could).
C§4 Systematic-dialectical exposition [A§10-A§14]
Systematic dialectics examines the constellation of a particular socio-eco-
nomic system, such as capitalism – not its historical emergence (see also the
Appendix on historical dialectics). Systematic dialectics (SD) is comparable
to other scientific methods insofar as it seeks to reliably know what can be
known. However, SD differs from most other approaches in its claim that the
key to the reliability of such knowledge lies in the interconnection of all relevant
knowledge about some object totality. SD is sceptical of any partial knowledge,
including model building, although it does not dismiss this knowledge a pri-
ori (C§1) [A§3, A§8]. However, wider perspectives can show the limits, or the
falsity, of partial knowledge.
A second major distinction between SD and all other approaches is the
method through which the interconnection of the relevant knowledge is
gained. Using themetaphor of a pyramid, as shown in Figure 1, will help in out-
lining the method.
figure 1 Systematic-dialectical exposition
In seeking to grasp a systematic object totality (capitalism), the beginning
requires a concept that captures the essence of the entire system. This starting
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point is denoted in the figure by ‘α’. (Cf. ‘commodification’ for Marx’s Capital,
and ‘dissociation’ in the current book). We will see in Chapter 1 that, once pos-
ited, such an encompassing starting point may seem obvious – as it should.
However, I know form Marx’s intellectual struggles, and those of myself, that
the intellectual process of getting to an appropriate starting point is far from
simple.
The next layers, denoted by β1 … βn, set out the interconnected conditions
of existence of the starting point. These layers are called ‘moments’. More spe-
cifically, beginning with the starting point, a SD expositionmust pose the prox-
imate condition of existence of amoment, that is, the immediate requirements
necessary for the existence of that moment. To the extent that this ground-
ing moment cannot exist in isolation (that is, to the extent that it is yet non-
endogenous), that moment requires new proximate grounding moments. For
example, the first necessary moments to bridge ‘dissociation’ are money and
the commodification of goods, labour-capacity, and the production process
(Chapter 1). Money is conditioned by the existence of banks (Chapter 2). Much
of the SD investigation consists in determining the proximate order of these.
(In this case: rather than introducing banks immediately after the introduction
of money, to ‘pre-posit’ these and to postpone their introduction).11
The connection of two or more moments has a synthetic character, and the
more we move down the pyramid, the greater the synthesis obtained. Because
necessary conditions of existence – and again their necessary conditions of
existence – are a leadingmethodological principle, we in fact get to the exposi-
tion of the interconnected totality of the capitalist system. For the same reason
it is essential to abstain from assumptions because these would open the way
for gaps.
For thisGeneral Introduction I neednot saymuch about the final layer of the
pyramid: concretemanifestations (γ). This can be postponed until the relevant
chapters. Here I merely mention that manifestations pertain to implications of
the previous exposition, culminating in a synthesis of the (or several) threads
of the previous exposition.
Along the process of the exposition (from starting point to manifestations),
we each time extend our comprehension of the capitalist system. In the end,
this will be appropriate to fully comprehend its essential working as appearing
in empirical reality.
11 Readers familiar with Marx’s Capital will recall that he introduces money in Chapter 1 of
the first volume, only systematically dealingwith banks in Chapter 22 of the third volume.
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Figure 2 shows this process in terms of each chapter throughout the book
(the chapter numbers are placed inside the pyramid of this figure).
Figure 1 figure 2 Systematic-dialectical exposition by chapter
Note: ‘c.o.e.’ abbreviates conditions of existence and ‘manif.’ manifestations.
Two reading strategies
Refer to Figure 2. The reader can read the book in its chapter order (1–11). In this
order it is perhaps easiest to digest. However, the text has been written in such
a way that the reader might also opt for a zigzag reading, that is, in the chapter
order 1, 6, 2, 7, and so on. From the point of view of the method, the exposition
in Chapter 1 is proximately grounded in Chapter 6 asmuch as in Chapter 2, and
so forth.
The empirical domain of the book
Full-fledged capitalism emerges when not merely trade but also – predicated
on a labour market – the production process is dominated by the monetary
dimension and profit. This started in Britain and France around 1800. When
capitalist production is dominant in a country I typify it as ‘capitalist’ (when
the context requires it, I use the term ‘full-fledged capitalist’).
In 1961 the then capitalist advanced countries organised, loosely, in theOECD
(Organisation for Economic Development and Co-operation). At the time the
OECD had 20 member countries; as of 2016 it has 35.12 When I use the term
12 1961: Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy,
Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, United
Kingdom, United States of America (20).
1964: Japan. Around 1970: Australia, Finland, New Zealand (24).
1994–96: Czech Republic, Hungary, South Korea, Mexico, Poland (29).
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‘capitalist system’ I have the institutional economic and state structure of these
countries inmind, as well as that of all other countries with a similar structure,
independently of their level of development in terms of GDP per capita and
state expenditure. This then is the empirical domain of this book (i.e. the start-
ing and endpoint of Figure 2).
In various chapters of Part Two I will refer to the averages of empirical data
of a selection of these countries. For Part One – the outline of the capitalist
economy as if there were no capitalist state – there are no clear empirical data,
as a capitalist economy can have no existence without a capitalist state.13
C§5 Systematic order versus historical order
The actual history of humankind has determined the constellation of the cur-
rent capitalist system through the decline of previous modes of production
(such as feudalism) to its current form.However, the historical emergence (and
the order thereof) of a particular entity, institution or process might bear no
relation to its ‘systematic importance’. For example, the fact that commodity
markets developed before labour markets does not imply that a commodity
market is more important than a labour market in terms of the functioning
of the capitalist system – both are absolutely necessary. The fact that forms of
commodity money (such as gold) evolved long before ‘bank account money’
does not imply at all that a systematic treatment of money should start with
commodity money, or even refer to it. The systematic order in this book bears
no relation to historical order. (History, to be sure, is very important. However,
systematic dialectics is no historical science. And, for that matter, a historical
dialectical approach – such as that of Hegel orMarx – has little to dowith their
or my systematic dialectics).14
2010: Chile, Estonia, Israel, Slovak Republic, Slovenia (34).
2016: Latvia (35).
13 Rigorously, the exposition of Part One pre-posits that of Part Two whence I could present
empirical data in Part One. I refrain from doing so as this would require continuous elab-
orations.
14 Both Hegel and Marx devised a historical dialectic – that is, for the study of history – as
well as a systematic dialectic – that is, for the study of one phase, one particular system,
in history. These dialectics are very different. Because their historical dialectic is relatively
easy to explain, popular accounts of dialectics most often limit themselves to the histor-
ical dialectic and neglect the systematic dialectic. Marx, for example, was engaged in a
historical dialectic until about the age of 30 (in 1848, the year in which The Communist
Manifesto was published). For the rest of his life he was engaged with the systematic dia-
lectic of the capitalist system. (See Reuten 2003a). For a succinct comparison between
historical dialectics and systematic dialectics see Murray 2003, pp. 150–8.
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However, a distinctionwill bemadebetween trans-historicalnecessities (uni-
versal) and system necessities (general). One trans-historical necessity is, for
example, that we need food and shelter in order to survive. While all trans-
historical necessities are also system necessities, it is not necessarily the case
that all system necessities are also trans-historical necessities. Money, for ex-
ample, is a necessity for the capitalist system, but money is not a trans-his-
torical necessity. In order to maintain this crucial distinction, when the term
‘necessity’ is used it always refers to ‘system necessities’, whereas the term
‘trans-historical necessities’ appears in full.
C§6 Immanent critique
Through themethod of systematic dialectics emerges another methodological
principle that stems fromMarx, that of ‘immanent critique’. Immanent critique
(in brief critique) is distinguished from ‘external criticism’ (in brief criticism).
Criticismadopts a normative external criterion (be it ethical, aesthetic ormeth-
odological) to evaluate society or social productions as artistic and scientific
endeavours. The method of critique evaluates society and social productions
on the basis of the norms and standards of the object of inquiry itself.15
Thus this book aims to present the capitalist system in terms of its own
logic, norms and standards. In this sense, it is presented from within itself.
However, this does not imply the absence of any evaluation or assessment.
Firstly, presenting the capitalist system in terms of its own norms and stand-
ards does not imply that the depiction of those norms and standards and of
their results (for example, profit-driven lay-offs of workers) must be presented
‘in rosy colours’. Secondly, when the capitalist system’s norms and standards
are taken to their internal logical conclusions, we can detect possible incon-
sistencies and contradictions – as when capitalist business lauds ‘market com-
petition’ while at the same time seeking to eliminate competitors and secure
a monopoly position. Immanent critique makes such inconsistencies expli-
cit.
D A note onmathematics and the readership
This book is written for scholars and advanced students in the social sciences
(political economy, economics, political science, social geography, sociology
and the philosophy of these sciences). In order to be understandable to people
15 This is briefly expanded upon in Reuten 2003a, pp. 152–3.
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of various backgrounds, I have minimised the use of mathematics. Formulas
are generally merely used as shorthand (such as A+B = C). I also use simple
ratios (X = Y/Z). I have evaded calculus and instead limit the representation
of quantitative change to simple notation such as x↓ (decrease), x↑ (increase)
or x′↑ (growth of x increases). When I introduce a functional relationship (X
depends on Y) I start by Y→X.
E Format of the book and internal references
Systematic dialectics requires a systematic format. The two main parts of the
book set out the twobroad ‘parallel’ axes of economyand state (Figure 2).These
parts are then structured into three levels, which also relate to distinct concep-
tual levels or stages: Chapters, Divisions and Sections.
• The parts are divided into Chapters (all chapters are consecutively num-
bered 1 through 11).
• These chapters are further divided into Divisions.
• Divisions are the main structure for the various conceptual levels.
• In internal cross-references Chapter 1, Division 1 is abbreviated as 1D1 and
so on.
• Divisions are divided into Sections (these are consecutively numberedwith-
in each chapter).
• The Sections are the main text, and only Sections contain the systematic
argument (these texts have been shaded).
• In internal cross-references Chapter 1, Section 1 (§1) is abbreviated as 1§1.
In order to keep the systematic argument of the sections concise, the main
sections text is usually followed by explanatory or expanding texts that may
be read according to need. There are three types of the latter:
• Explications serve to clarify the main section for diversified readerships.
These expand on the systematic argument, most often with minimal jar-
gon and a looser style. Sometimes these will also set out some analysis,
in the case that received mainstream views are inappropriate. Explica-
tions may also refer to later sections and chapters. When required these
explanations also expand on the dialectical method (this should be clear
from the brief title of the Explication). In principle, Explications can be
skipped if the main text is sufficiently clear or uncontroversial to the
reader.
• Amplifications. These expand on the main section, though in the form
of an aside. The reader can skip these without losing the thread of the
systematic argument.
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• Addenda go into details of the argument or locate the argument in the
literature. Addenda are for specialists and may be skipped by the non-
specialist.
• Explications, Amplifications and Addenda are consecutively numbered
by section as a, b, c, etc. An internal cross-reference to Chapter 1, Section
1 (§1), Explication (a) will read 1§1-a – the same system applies to Ampli-
fications and Addenda.
Inmost chapters the systematic argument of themain sectionsmakes up about
50% of the total text, the other 50% being Explications, Amplifications and
Addenda.
Appendix. A note on historical dialectics: ‘historical materialism’
Systematic dialectics is the dialectical method pertaining to the study of a
particular socio-economic system, such as capitalism. This should be clearly
distinguished from historical dialectics, whose aim is to comprehend the driv-
ing forces of historical development and the transitions between those sys-
tems. Thuswhereas a historical dialectic considers the diachronicdevelopment
between socio-economic systems, systematic dialectics considers one particu-
lar socio-economic system synchronically.16
Students aremost often introduced to dialectics by way of the historical dia-
lectics of Hegel and Marx. Whatever their merits in this field, a focus on this
aspect of their work does not do justice to their main dialectical work. Hegel,
having been engaged most of his lifetime with systematic dialectics, delivered
towards the end of his life five series of lectures on a historical dialectic. He did
not publish this material; rather his students posthumously published notes
from these lectures.17 Marx, on the other hand, began his scientific work with
the development of a historical dialectic, but he published few of those works.
Together with Engels, Marx was the originator of a dialectical materialist
conception of history (often called ‘historical materialism’, although the label
is not Marx’s). The following is a brief summary.18
Analytically and institutionally, any society can be seen as a number of
domains – political and legal, cultural (including education), and economic.
For Marx, the economic domain takes a central place – production is central,
16 Murray 2003, p. 156. Murray’s article concisely sets out the distinction between the two
dialectics – see especially pp. 150–8.
17 Hegel 1984 [1837].
18 Most of the following paragraphs have been taken from Reuten 2003a, p. 152.
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but has a dialectical interaction with all the other domains. It does not assume
a fully deterministic or mono-causal role, as is sometimes asserted (such an
interpretation was particularly prevalent in the first half of the twentieth cen-
tury).19 More precisely, the relationship between the ‘productive forces’ and
the social ‘relations of production’ play the central role in the development
of a society at large (a whole ‘social formation’, such as a feudal or a capitalist
society).20 That is to say, what happens in the ‘superstructure’ – the juridico-
political and cultural domains – is largely conditioned by the economic ‘base’.
When at a certain stage the relations of production become fetters for the pro-
ductive forces, an era of social revolution leads to the transformation of society
such that the formsof (social) property relations are re-shaped to suit thenewly
developed (or more accurately, ‘developing’) character of the forces of produc-
tion. This schema is especially significant for comprehending changes between
structures, particularly the dynamics of uneven development. ‘Grand’ history
can be seen in terms of revolutionary transitions – ‘restructuring’ of social rela-
tions into forms that ‘fit’ the forces of production more closely.
Marx developed these ideas between the ages of 25 and 30, and they can
be clearly discerned in The Communist Manifesto of 1848. From that year on,
Marx undertook investigations in political economy, culminating in his mag-
num opus Capital, which can be seen as a systematic-dialectical exposition of
the economic base of capitalism. Further, even if there are a few, mostly spec-
ulative, references to transitional elements within capitalism, transition is not
the focus of that work.
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1. the capitalist mode of production 29
Introduction
As indicated in theGeneral Introduction, this book aims to set out the capitalist
system. Because a social system is inherently a series of interconnected institu-
tions, relations and processes, it is not obvious at the outset of the investigation
what should be the appropriate starting point of its exposition. The idea of a
systematic-dialectical methodology is that one can best present a system in a
layeredmovement that begins with general-abstract concepts of the (putative)
system, gradually developing these into more concrete complex ones.1 At the
same time, the starting general-abstract concepts should capture key charac-
teristics of the system as a whole. In the systematic-dialectical methodology
adopted in this book, the exposition also moves from absolutely necessary ele-
ments of the system to proximate necessities.
Given that I will be setting out a system, the status of the starting point in
Division 1 is a relative matter. Chapter 1 in its entirety may be considered as
the starting point. Given that production is absolutely indispensable for the
material survival of any society, and considering that the historically specific
form of production is a chief determinant of the totality, the exposition in this
chapter starts with the specific capitalist form of production. This exposition
is reached in the chapter’s final Division 5, where we will see that capitalist
production essentially takes on the form of ‘production of capital’. The earlier
divisions provide the arguments as to why it takes on this form.
Apart from some preparatory ideas that are introduced in a Division num-
bered ‘0’ (on ‘sociation’), the formal starting point of this chapter is Division
1 (on ‘dissociation’), which establishes that a key characteristic of the capit-
alist system is its structural-institutional separation between households and
privately owned enterprises.
All of Chapter 1, and indeed the entire book, sets out how this separation
is bridged within capitalism, and how the ways of bridging it often create new
problems along the way. The first andmajor institution for resolving the separ-
ation is the market, a key element of which, as we will see, is that it homogen-
ises heterogeneous products as one-dimensional monetary value (Division 2).
The commodification that accompanies this process applies not only to non-
human entities (‘goods’), but also to the capacity to labour (Division 3). It is
this two-fold trading – of commodities and of the capacity to labour – that
1 ‘Putative’: although I will not repeat this term, the eventual proof that a ‘system’ is being
presented is only delivered when all of the system has been presented – i.e. at the end of
the book.
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scheme 1.1 The capitalist mode of production (outline
Chapter 1)
Legend
(the further meaning of the signs is explained throughout the chapter)
·×· continuity impediment
↓º↓ sublated in (partially resolved in) *
↡ grounded in (conditioned by)
⇆ dialectical mutuality **
* If at all, a full resolution is reached only at the book’s end of the exposition.
** Dialectical mutuality: moments (here divisions) that presuppose each other.
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determines the particular capitalist drive for profit (Division 4), but foremost
the profit-driven production process (Division 5). See Scheme 1.1 for the outline.
The starting point of this chapter will not prove to be difficult. Neverthe-
less, the first chapter will be the most demanding one for the reader. First of
all it will be seen in Divisions 2–3 that although (or rather ‘because’) ‘market
trade in termsof monetary value’ is an everydayphenomenon, adequately com-
prehending it is far from easy. Second, these same divisions, which are already
difficult qua content, also constitute the reader’s first significant acquaintance
with the systematic-dialectical method adopted in this book.
Recall from the General Introduction that the text’s systematic argument is
offered in itsmain sections (shaded). Themain text is usually followedby one or
more ‘Explications’ that may be read according to need. Next to these there are
‘Amplifications’ and ‘Addenda’ that go into further detail or locate the argument
within the wider literature. These are not part of the systematic argument and,
in principle, the reader may forgo them if the main text is deemed sufficiently
clear or uncontroversial.
For an explanation of field-specific and uncommon terms, the reader can
refer to the Glossary at the end of the book.
Division 0. Sociation – preparatory trans-historical notions
This Division sets out very general and abstract necessary socio-economic
requirements that must be fulfilled for any imaginable society to be a poten-
tially continuous constellation – be it a society organised along familial, com-
munal, feudal, capitalist, socialist, cooperativeor anyother lines.These require-
ments are also what all imaginable societies have in common. It is possible to
imagine a society in which the birth rate falls to zero, but such a society would
no longer be continuous, and as such it does not fit the category of potentially
continuous societies.
1§0 Sociation: abstract conditions for social continuity
‘Sociation’ refers to the abstractminimumconditions that any imaginable soci-
ety must meet in order for it to be a ‘potentially continuous’ social whole. Thus
these conditions are trans-historical in that they apply to any concrete histor-
ical society.
Any such constellation requires social-human activities of creation, use and
care of entities.2 The entities necessarily include food, shelter and clothing. The
2 Throughout this book the term ‘entity’ will be used in reference to ‘a something’ that has not
yet been (fully) identified conceptually.
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potential continuity of the constellation requires that these activities include
the procreation and socialisation of children.3
The creation of the entities entails a transformation of physical inputs into
qualitatively divergent physical outputs. This transformation requires some
combination of four elements:
• nature;
• human activity itself (the act of the transformative creation); this is predic-
ated on the heritage of social knowledge, both formal and informal (tacit);
• cultivated nature;
• previously created entities as instruments.
All these conditions are abstract on two counts. First, in that these are formu-
lated in terms of general concepts (trans-historically abstract). Second, in that
these conditions do not set out the social relations through which these condi-
tions are actualised (these are unique to a historically specific society).
1§0-a Explication. Sociation as a general and abstract trans-historical
concept
Sociation refers to an abstract socio-economic totality. It merely posits the
abstract concept of a system without showing how it is a system, that is, a
potentially continuous social whole.What is more, the purpose of the concept
of sociation is merely to refer to the historical phenomenon of systemic eco-
nomies – or, in the terminology of Marx and Engels, ‘modes of production’.4
For example, ‘communal’, ‘patriarchal’, ‘feudal’ or ‘capitalist’ economies. The
concept of sociation is trans-historical to the extent that it may be a prelim-
inary entry point to the exposition of any systemic economy.
Herewith it should also be emphasised that the subject matter of the rest
of this book – the capitalist system – is a historically specific, and therefore
potentially finite, system. Early communal societies came to an end, systems of
slavery came to an end, and feudalism is now, in the early twenty-first century,
coming to an end throughout the world. It would be surprising if capitalism –
in some form – were to last forever. Nevertheless, much as a naïve university
student may believe that today’s knowledge will also be that of tomorrow, so
naïve social actors may also believe that social history ends with capitalism.
This could come to pass, but historically there are more reasons to believe that
it will not.
3 Socialisation: the acquirement of language, skills, knowledge and norms.
4 The German Ideology, 1976 [19321, 1965/662] {ms.1845/46}.
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Some elements of capitalism emerged many centuries ago in one antedi-
luvian shape or another. Key to capitalism as a system, however, is capitalist
production, as combining monetary profit criteria for production and wage-
labour as an input to production, which requires the existence of a labour
market (systematically outlined in the current chapter). Capitalist production
only gradually emerged from the end of the eighteenth century in England,
Scotland and France, and at that time it existed alongside feudal production,
which dominated inmost countries of the North-West of the globe throughout
the nineteenth century. However, in respect of Britain, the year 1846 (which
saw the repeal of the 1815 Corn Laws) may be used as benchmark for the eco-
nomic and political dominance of the capitalist over the feudal mode of pro-
duction.
As indicated in the General Introduction, this book is not concerned with
historical transitions. The empirical reference for the object of inquiry, and
hence for Division 1 and the rest of the book, is roughly the type of econom-
ies as organised presently in the OECD, andmore precisely those current OECD
countries for which we have a reasonable amount of averages data from 1870
onwards.
Division 1. Dissociation – outward bifurcation into households and
privately owned enterprises
Capitalist dissociation is conceptualised by four sets of ‘bifurcations’ (separ-
ations), each presented in this chapter. The first section presents the most
encompassing one from which, as we will see, the other bifurcations derive as
their conditions of existence.
1§1 Dissociated outward bifurcation into households and privately
owned enterprises
1 Outward bifurcation into households and privately owned enterprises
In capitalist society the ‘activities’ that are required for any sociation (1§0)
are generally institutionally separated, or outwardly bifurcated, into ‘households’
and ‘privately owned enterprises’. In addition, these households and enterprises
are generally non-self-sufficient and mutually dependent, whilst the enter-
prises between them are also dependent on one another.
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2 Particular forms of activities along with the outward bifurcation
Alongwith this bifurcation, the ‘activities’ take on particular forms – forms that
are specific to the historically specific capitalist system.
The creation of entities (1§0) takes on the form of production at the site of
enterprises. Regarding its requirements, the act of transformative creation of
entities (1§0) takes on the form of ‘labour’ as the distinctive activity of produc-
tion.Of the other requirements, cultivatednature (1§0) takes on the formof the
privately appropriated earthwhereas previously created instruments (1§0) take
on the form of privately appropriatedmeans of production – each appropriated
by enterprises. Only free nature, that is, the part of nature that is not privately
appropriated, does not take on a particular form (in the end, free nature is
nature that cannot (yet) be appropriated – such as, hitherto, the sun, rain and
wind).
The form of labour as the distinctive activity of production implies for work-
ers that ‘non-labour’ takes the form of revitalisation and recreation at the site
of households. (Revitalisation includes not only passive rest, but also various
non-occupational individual or communal activities.)
Apart from formal education, all the other sociation requirements are loc-
ated in households, where they take the forms of consumption or of house-
work, whilst the procreation of children has not generally taken on a capitalist
form.
These forms are summarised in Table 1.2.
3 Particularly capitalist outward bifurcation
In capitalist society another major feature of the outward bifurcation is that in
general enterprises are not owned by the labourers who carry out the produc-
tion. Hence capitalist society is characterised by an extended outward bifurca-
tion into the owners of private enterprises on the one hand, and the – generally
non-overlapping – labourers carrying out the production on the other. Hence
this outward bifurcation – rather than being an already far-reaching matter of
‘mere’ forms and locus of activities (Table 1.2) – is characterised by particular
private property relations.
Along with these private property relations, the enterprise appropriates the
product produced by labour – in whatever way, for what, and to what extent,
labour receives a ‘compensation’ for its production.
4 ‘Dissociated outward bifurcation’ – reflection and preview
The starting point of the exposition so far (1§1 above) reveals nothing spectacu-
lar, because itmerely sets out condensed-abstractly how the capitalist economy
[continued]
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table 1.2 Particular forms of activity pertaining to the outwardly bifurcated
capitalist economy – specific to its mode of production
Trans-historical sociation (1§0) Dissociated outward bifurcation into households and privately owned
General concepts enterprises (1§1)
Particular forms pertaining to the capitalist economy
Site of privately owned enterprises Site of households
1. creation of entities
(transformation)
form of production
(here and below, for ‘form of …’ read:
‘takes on form of …’)
requiring:
• nature (free nature: no particular form)* (free nature: no particular form)
• act of transformative creation form of labour form of non-labour: forms of
revitalisation and recreation†
• cultivated nature form of privately appropriated nature
• previously created instruments form of privately appropriated means
of production
2. use of entities form of consumption
3. care of entities form of housework
4. procreation of children procreation
(no particular form)‡




* Nowmainly restricted to elements such as the sun, rain and wind.
† Much of the recreation increasingly takes on the form of commodified consumption – row 2. (The term
commodification is systematically introduced in 1D2.)
‡ When this book was completed, the procreation of children had not generally taken on a particularly
capitalist form (even if various forms of commodification were emerging).
†† Part One yet abstracts from the State, hence also from state-provided education. Next to the form of
apprenticeship, any other formal education then takes on the form of producing this education.
‡‡ Much of the early education increasingly takes on the form of production (row 1) and consumption
(row 2) – e.g. ‘day care’.
Later on the terms of ‘increasingly’ (under † and ‡‡) will be conceptualised as ‘tendencies’.
1§1 Continued
appears in empirical reality. However, the starting point does not reveal how
it can have ‘existence in’ concretely interconnected relations between these
households and enterprises. (For example, via what relations does labour get
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from households to enterprises, via what relations is production carried out,
and via what relations does the product of enterprises reach households?)
Given that a form of material ‘production’ (generally: transformative activity)
is indispensable for the survival of any society, the capitalist outward bifurc-
ation into households and privately owned enterprises appears as dissociated
and hence highly problematic.
This constellation is posited as dissociated, even if we know that in reality
the bifurcated poles are in some way bridged. The object of the exposition in
this book is to comprehend both the range of this dissociation and the extent
of its actual resolution.
Therefore, the remainder of this chapter presents the first and elementary
stages of the conditions of existence of the starting point outlined above. To this
end, it presents the first stages of the capitalist economy’s way of ‘sublating’
the outward bifurcation (that is, stages of partially resolving the bifurcation
without the bifurcation itself being undone – see Explication 1§1-a).
Pending the complete exposition of these conditions of existence, the en-
tirety of the outward bifurcation presented above – including its forms and
property relations – is referred to as ‘dissociated outward bifurcation’. Pending
the complete exposition, this bifurcation is as yet an ‘impediment’ to the con-
tinuity of the capitalist economy.
1§1-a Explication. The terms ‘sublation’ and ‘grounding’
The term ‘sublation’ refers to the (initially) partial resolution of amajor imped-
iment, without that impediment itself being undone. In this book this is the
impediment posed by dissociated outward bifurcation. These partial resolu-
tions, though increasingly less partial, are presented in the rest of this chapter,
and the several stages of this book in its entirety. A full resolution is only
reached, if at all, at the end of the exposition. The term sublation is mainly
used in Chapters 1 and 6. For the rest (and already in these chapters) I simply
use the term ‘grounding’ (a series of grounding throughout the book), that is,
the grounding of the outward bifurcation posited at the starting point (1§1).
Grounding is the same as the determination of a (partial) condition of exist-
ence of the outward bifurcation.
1§1-b Explication. Logical systematic exposition
Systematic dialectics investigates systemic constellations, in our case that of
capitalism. It does not investigate transitions towards that constellation from a
previous one (as in a historical dialectic). Therefore the bifurcation and disso-
ciation posited in 1§1 should be understood as logical, not historical. (A similar
remark applies to all the sections to follow in this book.) This bifurcation is
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posited as the general-abstract reference to the current capitalist system, and
its economy in particular.
1§1-c Explication. ‘Dissociated outward bifurcation’ and the initial
reference to the capitalist totality
Although dissociation refers to the capitalist totality, it is no more than an
initial reference. As we will see, it is the mode of resolving (i.e. sublating) this
bifurcation, and the contrarieties deriving from it, which characterises the cap-
italist system.
The outward bifurcation as posited in 1§1 is both simple and complex. It is
simple insofar aswe all know that there is this institutional separation between
households and enterprises (this is also the first lesson of mainstreammicroe-
conomics). It is complex, as we will see, because the ways of resolving this sep-
aration are far from evident. Even if we ‘know’ the constellation in terms of this
separation, it cannot exist without amode of sublating that bifurcation. Hence,
posited as such, that is, without any connections between the bifurcated poles,
it is an impossible constellation because it (still) lacks the conditions for its
existence, the grounds for its existence.
We will see that each effort at sublation (at least until we reach the end of
the exposition) poses new problems, thus revealing this sublation as being yet
insufficient and so requiring further sublation.Hence, each time the exposition
of the system is driven forward by the ‘insufficiency’ of themoment or moments
posited at the earlier level of the exposition. (See 1§1-d for the term ‘moment’.)
1§1-d Explication. The meaning of ‘moment’
Consider Scheme 1.1. Each division of the current chapter and of later chapters
is indicated as a ‘moment’ (sometimes the term also applies to the separate sec-
tions of a division). A ‘moment’ is amore or less cohesive institutionalmake-up
(at a more concrete plane one may think, for example, of ‘the labour market’
or ‘banking’), or a more or less cohesive set of entities, that can be analysed by
itself (sometimes like a model) but that nevertheless derives its full meaning
from its interconnection with other moments, and ultimately from its inter-
connectedness within the whole exposition. Thus moments derive their full
meaning through synthesis.5
In respect of the current chapter, for example, the moment of outward
bifurcation (1D1) is first sublated in the moments of monetary value and com-
modification (1D2–1D4). Their insufficiency prompts the introduction of the
moment of capitalist production (1D5) into the exposition.
5 See also Reuten andWilliams 1989, p. 22, where this is framed rather more dialectically.
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1§1-e Amplification. The term ‘general’ in 1§1: the general and
predominant character of the capitalist dissociation
I always adopt the term ‘generally’ to refer beyond contingencies that are com-
patible with capitalism, whilst, if those current contingencies were to be gen-
eralised, there would no longer be capitalism. (Take two simple examples: con-
tingently a pair of people may not be able to have children; however, if this
were generalised, then humanity would come to an end. Similarly – in refer-
ence to the end of this chapter – contingently capitalist enterprises may not
make profits, but if this were generalised, then capitalism would come to an
end.)
The capitalist economy is characterised by the outward bifurcation between
households and privately owned enterprises. In 1§1 I used the term ‘generally’
on a number of occasions in reference to the outward bifurcation between
households and privately owned enterprises that characterises capitalism.
However, this does not exclude the fact that, contingently, there are households
to which the separation does not apply – even if the non-dependence on other
units (i.e. enterprises) is rare within full-fledged capitalism. Similarly, regard-
ing the property relations it is far less rare, though again contingent, that – now
within the outward household–enterprise bifurcation – one or moremembers
of a household run a business (in economics this is often called ‘independent’
or ‘self-employment’) without employing labour.
In this book I refrain from characterising the type of economy that would
exist if therewere amarket economywith generalised self-employment or gen-
eralised workers’ cooperatives or a combination of the two (Smith 2017, ch. 12,
is very thought-provoking on this).
1§1-f Amplification. The terms private ownership and possession
The full meaning of ‘private ownership’ will only become explicit in Chapter 6
(that chapter introduces the state’s granting of ‘legal property right’, which is
a major condition for the dissociation). In Part One (still abstracting from the
State), ‘possession’ (actual physical control of an entity) and ‘ownership’ are
used in a broad sense. In this usage, the term ownership in particular bears no
explicit or implicit reference to ‘title to legal right’ and thus a possible legally
recognized ownership.
1§1-g Addendum. Separation, dissociation, labour: references
The separation of the units of production from the units of consumption is
also stressed by Weber (1968 [1920], p. 21): ‘The modern rational organization
of the capitalist enterprise would not have been possible without … the sep-
aration of business from the household, which completely dominates modern
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economic life …’. The insight of the separation of ‘activity’ into productive and
consumption activity derives from Himmelweit (1984). The term ‘dissociation’
is also used by De Vroey (1981, p. 176) Eldred, Hanlon, Kleiber and Roth (1984,
p. 354), Reuten (1988), Reuten andWilliams (1989) and Smith (2017).
1§1-h Addendum. Marx’s starting point in Capital
In Capital Marx’s starting point is ‘the commodity’ (Volume I, Chapter 1). On
the one hand, this refers to everyday perception. (‘The wealth of those societ-
ies in which the capitalist mode of production prevails, presents itself as “an
immense accumulation of commodities” ’ – the opening of Marx’s Capital). On
the other hand, the commodity is the initial abstract resolution of the dissoci-
ation problematic – as we will see in 1§4–1§7. Thus, in a way, Marx starts with
the ‘abstract perception’ of the initial resolution. If so conceived, Marx’s start-
ing point may not be fundamentally different from the current one.
1§1-i Addendum. Dissociation: no ‘falling apart’ vis-à-vis sociation
This book adopts a development from aHegelian-Marxian systematic dialectic.
Both Hegel and Marx also adopted a historical dialectic (General Introduc-
tion, Appendix).6 From a Hegelian historical dialectic point of view it might
be tempting to conceive the ‘dissociation’ in terms of a ‘falling apart’ vis-à-vis
‘sociation’ (see Plant 1977, on ‘falling apart’ and reconciliation). For the current
systematic dialectic, however, ‘sociation’ is not an ideal but rather an abstract
concept, of general requirements, without the social relations through which
these conditions are actualised. Hence ‘dissociation’ cannot be a falling apart
relative to ‘sociation’. The dissociated outward bifurcation just aims to refer to
the totality of the capitalist system.
1§1-j Addendum. ‘Contradiction’ – dissociation as a contradictory
constellation
In the main text I have avoided – and will avoid henceforth – the dialectical
term ‘contradiction’ mainly because expounding it would require a dispro-
portionate amount of space relative to the insight that it might provide. For
the purposes of this book I can do with the term ‘continuity impediment’.
Here I nevertheless provide a brief inkling. The dissociated bifurcation as pos-
ited in 1§1, that is, without particular interconnections between households
and privately owned enterprises, it is apparently impossible, it can have no
existence, it is in itself contradictory. Hence, posited as such, it is a contra-
6 See also Murray 2003.
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dictory constellation because it (still) lacks the conditions for its existence,
the grounds for its existence. Thus a contradictory entity or a contradictory
constellation is one that cannot exist in the absence of particular conditions
or grounds. In systematic-dialectical works these are most often referred to
as sublations, which each time reveal new defects that require further sub-
lation (see Inwood 1992, pp. 63–5, 283–5 and 115–16, for a brief expounding
of the terms of ‘contradiction’, ‘sublation’ and ‘ground’ in reference to Hegel’s
works).
Division 2. The monetary-value dimension
This division presents the first moment of the particular way in which the cap-
italist economy resolves the dissociated outward bifurcation.
1§2 The trade relation
The continuity impediment of the dissociated outward bifurcation (1§1) is
apparently resolved in trade relations. Trade potentially connects households
and enterprises.
In the current division, trade is considered from the perspective of enter-
prises. It is pre-posited that enterprises dispose of labour-capacity (presented
in Division 3). The production process is also pre-posited (presented in Divi-
sion 5). Hence the current division considers trade in terms of the inputs and
the outputs of production.
1§2-a Explication. Abstract trade
The idea that dissociated outward bifurcation (1§1) – in whatever particular
type of conceptualisation – requires some form of trade is nothing new. It
has been a key issue in political economy and economics from Adam Smith’s
(1776) ‘invisible hand’ to the Arrow and Debreu’s (1954) ‘general equilibrium
theory’.
However, the trade relation posited in 1§2 is utterly abstract: especially the
formof the trade relationhas not beendetermined.The trade relation ismerely
the first condition of existence of this dissociation. However, this cannot be
turned around: trade does not necessarily imply capitalist relations. Generally,
trade in the abstract is compatiblewith a multitude of trade criteria, including,
e.g., quid pro quo labour time, and reciprocal need.
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1§2-b Explication. Note on the following sections (1§3–1§5)
The following three sections posit ‘value’, ‘money’ and the ‘commodity’. Clas-
sical Political Economy (Smith, Ricardo, Mill), as well as Marx, start their treat-
ment of value by observing that in practice we have the duality of ‘use-value’
(usefulness) and ‘exchange-value’ (the latter is what they call, in brief, ‘value’).
Instead of just observing this, the following three sections ground this duality.
While these sectionsmight prove difficult, the reader is advised to keep inmind
that this duality is just grounded. It must be grounded because this duality is
crucial to the capitalist system, and decisive for much of what follows in the
chapters to come.
1§3 The value dimension: abstract general one-dimensional value
Theoutwardbifurcation (1§1) not only requires the trade relation (1§2), but also
determines the latter’s character, that is, the capitalist social form, the social
dimension, of the trade relation.
Physical inputs to processes of production qualitatively diverge from the
physical outputs. The dissociated outward bifurcation (1§1) entails that the
physical product of enterprises is generally not destined for its producers. If
enterprises and households were not bifurcated, then the physical divergence
might generally be the aim (food, shelter, clothing, etc.). However, when an
enterprise produces, e.g., laces only, then the use of laces by the producers is
not the immanent aim. The dissociated outward bifurcation entails that the
driving force of enterprises must be an aim other than the physical entity pro-
duced – an aim external to the physical product.
Hence the processes of production and trade necessarily require inputs and
outputs to be reduced to a homogeneous common denominator. Therefore the
capitalist social form of the trade relation is necessarily one of absorption
into and reduction to a common denominator.One-dimensional abstract value
is the sui generis of this homogeneous common denominator. Value must be
constituted as general value as opposed to the particularity and specific useful-
ness, or specific multifaceted characteristics, of the physical input and output.
Thus abstract generality, one-dimensional general value, absorbs concrete spe-
cificity. In other words, the particular products of particular labour necessarily
have to take on the general formof value; without thembeing validated as such,
they are socially non-existent.7 As such, value as social form is the necessary
dimension of the entities produced by labour in a dissociatedmode of produc-
tion.
7 At this point ‘validation’ just refers to ‘valid’. From 1§4 onwards it will, more specifically, mean
the turning of outputs into money.
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Henceforth the term ‘value’ is used as shorthand for ‘abstract general, one-
dimensional, value’.
1§3-a Explication. Value as social dimension
In everyday language ‘value’ oftenhas amultifacetedmeaning.8Within the eco-
nomic domain it has one-dimensionalmeaning. One-dimensional value is tied
to specific social constellations, thus it is a historically specific social concept.
As a social dimension ‘value’ is not an a priori (in Kant’s sense) natural-physical
dimension nor is it universal (space and continuity), although value is a cat-
egory as abstract as space and continuity. Note that at the current level of the
exposition (1§3), the concept of value is near to empty. Concepts such asmeas-
ure of valuewill be introduced in the next section. The point is that the positing
of any form or dimension (in this case that of value) should precede that of its
measure(s) and standard measure(s).
1§3-b Amplification. Specific usefulness
The main text states: ‘Value must be constituted as general value as opposed
to the particularity and specific usefulness, or specific characteristics, of the
physical input and output’. Up to this point in the text it may have seemed that
‘one-dimensional abstract value’ might include the Marginalist and Neoclas-
sical concept of ‘utility’. However, that concept is meant to capture subjective
‘use-value’, which is the opposite of the concept of value at hand. The latter
connects rather with the Classical concept of ‘exchange-value’ – one that these
economists indeed opposed to ‘value in use’. (Cf. Smith 1776, Book I, Ch. 4, sec-
tion 13). This issue will be further articulated in sections 1§4 and 1§5.
1§3-c Addendum. Value and measure of value in marxian theory
Within the marxian tradition to this day, there has been quite an important
penchant for turning ‘immediately’ from the concept of value to a, or ‘the’,
measure of value, and to take the two as identical. Labour-time is often sup-
posed to perform this two-in-one job (in fact this error of moving too fast stems
from Ricardo 1981 [18171; 18213]). More details are set out in Reuten (1999a).
8 When the Dutch poet Lucebert wrote: ‘Alles van waarde is weerloos’ (everything of value is
defenceless – in ‘De zeer oude zingt’, published 1974), he obviously did not refer to stocks or
similar financial assets. The nineteenth-century philosopher Rudolf Lotze imported the ‘eco-
nomic’ concept of value from political economy into philosophy (Stirk 2000, p. 160; Nauta
1980 [1971], p. 104). From there the term was imported into sociology where it is key to the
conceptualisation of social formations.
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Note: The readermay bewarned that the next twomain sections (1§4 and 1§5) aremore demand-
ing than any other in this chapter and, indeed, in the entire book.
1§4 Themonetary-value dimension –market trans-abstraction and the
requirement of money as the union of measure andmedium of value
The interplayof the trade relation (1§2) and the reduction to a commondenom-
inator, i.e. the absorption into abstract general, one-dimensional, value (1§3) is
constituted in the market.
1 Actual market trade: commensuration as abstraction in practice
Prior to the trade act in the market, the buyers assess the heterogeneous use-
ful characteristics of the entities brought to market, whilst the sellers sing
their praises (and perhaps try to hide an evil trait). In the end, however, upon
the actual market trade, heterogeneous entities are made commensurate in
terms of something that is no part whatsoever of their concrete physical bodily
form or concrete constitution.We have a trans-abstraction in practice: the alien
dimension of ‘value’ is ascribed to the entity, or rather it is vested in the entity.9
2 Money as measure of value
So far (1§3) the conceptual focus on value has been qualitative, dimensional.
Market trade of entities, however, takes place in specific quantities of the
quality posited. This necessarily requires measurement and a measure for the
quality of value. The value trans-abstraction at the market operates through
money. Put more strongly, money is a necessary condition of existence of one-
dimensional value. The first requirement for something to be money is that it
can be ameasure of value.
3 Money as medium of value
Nevertheless, themeasurement in terms of money (perhaps in a value-assaying
procedure between seller and buyer establishing that some price is appro-
priate) does not determine the value quantity of the entity. Value, a fortiori
value quantity, does not exist without actualmarket trade, andmoney as actual
medium of quantity of value. With the actual market trade the value assaying
procedure, the measurement, is no longer without commitment. Thus actual
market trade is the value salto, the value leap– the telling (hic est) is not enough:
9 The term ‘trans-abstraction’ is expanded upon in 1§4-b. In brief: a trans-abstraction in prac-
tice is not an abstraction of the mind that sorts or grasps sensuous phenomena, but rather
the result of action, i.e. of social intercourse.
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hic saltus.10 Hence the second requirement for something to be money is that it
is a quantitativemedium of value.11
4 Money as unity of measure andmedium of value
Because, and to the extent that, (some) money acts as medium of value in
market trade, and so proves and reproves itself, it can be an effective measure
of value.12 Thus money is the necessary unity of measure and medium of one-
dimensional value.
5 Standard measure of money
So far the matter of standard measure has not been alluded to. In comparison
with the issues presented so far, it is secondary and uncomplicated. Suffice it to
posit that generalised market trade requires a standard or convertible stand-
ards of money (e.g. dollar, yuan or euro). Then, in terms of some standard
measure (e.g. €), entities are grasped in terms of a number (e.g. €12) that we
call price. Thus the price of an entity is its monetary value as expressed in a
particular standard.
6 Money: no inherent content, no inherent value
Unlike the entities that money measures, money has no inherent content –
neither bullion, nor paper, nor electronic pulses; even if some particular shape
of moneymaybemore adequate than another (amplified in 2D4). Consequent-
ly, money has no inherent value. Money is inherently merely a quantifier of
one-dimensional value.13
10 Salto (jump) refers toMarx’s phrase about the crucial ‘jump’ in exchange of the commod-
ity into money (Capital I, Ch. 3, Section 2-a); the hic est (this is; ‘this is my body’) refers
to the consecration in the Catholic Mass (a much neglected metaphor used by Marx in
a similar context – see Reuten 1993, p. 97); the hic saltus (thou should jump here) refers
to Hegel’s phrase in the Preface to his Philosophy of Right (1967 [18211]) in reference to a
boastful person who is invited to demonstrate his tricks here and now.
11 This is notably different from themisleading neoclassical notion of money as ‘medium of
exchange’ (see 1§4-c).
12 To the extent that money proves to be an effective medium of value in market trade, it is
reinforced as an effective measure. The two are mutually reinforcing.
13 Moneymeasures andmediates value but it has no value in itself. This applies for capitalist
money (as further grounded in 2D4). (For the time being, the followingmay perhaps help.
Ametre-stickmeasures length and has itself relevant length. However, an electronic scale
or a spring may measure weight without them having the relevant weight.)
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7 Value and the Monetary-Value Dimension
Because value is a super-sensuous dimension and, as such, utterly abstract –
that is, abstract in practice – and because it is in daily practice known only
through the money medium, it is in daily practice identified with ‘value as
measured bymoney’. That is, value is inmundane practice identified with ‘mon-
etary value’ as a hypostatic union of dimension and medium.14 Even further, in
mundane practice money may not be perceived as ‘medium’ but, hypostatic-
ally, as being value itself.
Nevertheless, even in that perception value and money are not seen to be
identical (as in ‘value ≡money’). Something may be ascribed ‘monetary value’
without being money. Indeed this is what happens outside the market when
somemonetary value is ascribed to entities (for example, a building, amachine
or a pen). Again, as with abstract value, this monetary value is super-sensuous
in that it is no sensuous characteristic of the entity (amplified in 1§10).This con-
ception in practice is captured by the term Monetary-Value Dimension (MVD).
1§4-a Explication. Pre-posited money creation
The main text posits the abstract concept of money – that is sufficient for the
rest of this chapter. It pre-posits the actual creation of money by banks, which
is presented in Chapter 2 (2D4).
1§4-b Explication. Abstraction and ‘trans-abstraction in practice’
Generally an abstraction is considered to be amental act. There are at least four
types of mental abstraction, of which the first three have overlapping aspects.
The first posits abstract generality as opposed to concrete specificity (this is the
common usage of the term in this book – see the Glossary for further explana-
tion). In the second type, various elements of reality are (temporarily)neglected
so as to focus on one or several elements that are thought to be key to a cer-
tain realm of reality, or perhaps all of reality. In the third type, the same aim of
focusing is reached by way of the reduction of the various elements of reality to
known common elements or categories. In the fourth one, we have a reduction
to hitherto unknown common elements or categories. Although processes of
abstraction are engrained in our common language, they are part and parcel of
the sciences in particular.
14 The term ‘hypostatic’ is ametaphorical reference toChristianity forwhichGod ismuch too
abstract, so that a humanbeing, Christ,mediates betweenGod and (other) humanbeings.
Nevertheless thehumanbeingChrist acquires divinity.This double identity is calledhypo-
stasis. By analogy value is too abstract, and as such it must be mediated by money; even
further: in everyday practice money and value are often seen as identical.
46 part one – the capitalist economy
However, there are also abstractions that do not (primarily) evolve as men-
tal acts but rather in the practice of life – and especially in economic life. The
exemplary case is the actual reduction of entities at the market to a monetary
denominator. I call these abstractions in practice (cf. Reuten andWilliams 1989,
pp. 62–4). (In fact one reason why economics, in comparison with other social
sciences, has a much easier job in quantifying elements of its domain is that
the domain itself produces key abstractions as well as keymeasures for them –
compare, for example, ‘power’ in political science for which the scientist has to
devise measures.)
The main text of 1§4 states: ‘upon the actual market trade, heterogeneous
entities are made commensurate in terms of something that is no part what-
soever of their concrete physical bodily form or concrete constitution … the
alien dimension of “value” is ascribed to the entity, or rather it is vested in the
entity’. If the dimension of value, like perhaps that of mass, were one physical
aspect of the entity, then we would have an ‘actual abstraction in practice’ –
which already would be remarkable enough. However, it has been emphasised
that value is in fact a dimension alien to the entity. Thus the abstraction that is
performed in themarket is in fact super-sensuous, or transcendental – whence
I adopt the term trans-abstraction. In the market, at the point of trade, sensu-
ousness is installed by the money mediator. But beyond the point of trade this
sensuousness vanishes into super-sensuous monetary value.
As we will see in Division 5 and in Chapters 2–3, the sensuousness of the
money mediator does not absolve us from the concept of value: most of the
time, especially during production, and always when non-money assets are at
stake, economic entities are supposed to ‘have’ value – that is, super-sensuous
monetary value – in the absence of the money mediator’s act. When money
comes in – in acts of trade – money makes us at least nearly touch on value,
much like in various religions wherein the prophets allow believers to feel
closer to God.
Weneed an uncommon language (trans-abstraction in practice) becausewe
are dealing with – as far as I can see – the most complicated part of the capit-
alist economy and of all of the sciences of political economy and economics.
1§4-c Explication. The misleading notion of money as ‘medium of
exchange’
The readermay have noticed that from 1§2 onwards I have used the term ‘trade’,
not ‘exchange’. The latter has often (also) a connotation of barter. Indeedmany
discourses of the capitalist economy start with notions of barter (and some
remain somewhat enmeshed in it). Themain text (1§4) introduced the concept
of money as ‘medium of value’ (Ci↔M, where Ci indicates commodity i, M
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money and ↔ transfer). Herewith I distance myself from the orthodox eco-
nomic concept of money as ‘medium of exchange’ (which would be Ci→M→Cj,,
where Cj indicates commodity j). The latter term carries implicit or explicit
notions of barter exchange (Ci↔Cj), with just the non-coincidence of wants
evaded.15 In that orthodox view money is of subordinate importance: money
asmediumof exchange ismerelymore efficient. However, no systematic barter
exists in capitalism.Market trade always takes the form of Ci↔M; somoney is a
medium of value and never a medium of exchange.16 The watershed between
the two concepts (medium of value and medium of exchange) is the value-
dimension (i.e. the value-form). The orthodox terminology implicitly neglects
that there might be a dimensional problematic at all.
1§4-d Addendum. The term ‘actual’
Throughout this book I use the term ‘actual’ not in Hegel’s sense, but rather in
reference to existence.
Division 3. Commodification – the inward bifurcation of
commodities
As indicated, Divisions 2 and 3 are posited at the same level of the exposition
and presuppose each other (dialectical mutuality).
Note: From the next section onwards, the sections will often start with a brief summary state-
ment that is indented.
1§5 Commodification of goods through their market transformation
Trade (1§2) concretised as actual market trade in terms of money – the
unity of measure and medium of one-dimensional value (1§3–1§4) –
potentially constitutes the inputs and outputs of enterprises (1§1) as a
determinate magnitude of one-dimensional monetary value (1§4).
15 The motive for a bicycle producer might perhaps be the purchase of a car or perhaps to
make a saving. None of these motives makes money a medium of exchange.
16 A term that is at least on the edge of being problematic is that of ‘medium of circula-
tion’, one that was unfortunately also used in Reuten andWilliams 1989 (for which I take
responsibility). It may be noted at this point that for Marx (1867, Ch. 3) money’s twomain
‘functions’ are that of ‘measure of value’ and ‘medium of circulation’ (alongside means
of hoarding and means of payment). Medium of value versus medium of circulation is
not just a terminological difference; the former posits a concretisation of value that is (at
least) less obvious for the latter.
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The actual market trade operates through the discrete money medium as
quantitative medium of value. Money is the quantifier through which value
appears, and is perceived as reflected onto entities. Through the money me-
diumthe trans-abstractionof value at themarket concretely appears as a reflec-
ted transformation of entities – henceforth the ‘market transformation of entit-
ies’.17 Hence the entities appear in a dual guise, an inwardly bifurcated guise:
that of their physical shape and that of reflected value. This inward bifurcation
constitutes entities as commodities. Thus commodities have a dual character:
their physical make-up and their value reflected through money. This trans-
formation and hence this duality applies to goods, including good-like services
(services that for their production require material inputs).
1§5-a Explication. The market and monetary value as ‘too normal’
phenomena
The main text of 1§3–1§5 is key to this book. Implicitly it aims to answer the
question ‘what is value?’. Note first that an answer along the lines of ‘costs’ is
circular insofar as costs, presumably, are in the same dimension. If costs were
in a different dimension – as in classical labour theories of value – we would
run into a regress because we would still have to make a jump, a transforma-
tion, from, say, labour-time to value. (In some varieties of marxian theory – but
not in Marx’s – the problem is polished away by just reducing value to labour-
time – I briefly return to this in 1§5-d and e). If the answer were given in terms
of heterogeneous ‘preferences’ (as in neoclassical theory), equally we would
encounter a regress to the extent that preferences have to be transformed into
the value dimension.
It is not obvious that entities acquire a social dimension that is alien to their
physical make-up. At the same time the problem of comprehending market
trade in terms of value, and of responding to the question of ‘what is value’, is
so complicated because we are hindered by the fact that it is overwhelmingly
part of our everyday experience and so it seems ‘too’ familiar. Each day the sun
rises in themorning and sets in the evening.Why think about it?Well, we know
that this rising and setting is a false appearance, even if we ignore this in our
language and experience. You buy a loaf of bread in the morning and a beer in
the evening by tossing some coins on the counter or inserting a smart card in a
slot. It happens every day. Why ruminate on this further?
17 This complex ‘reflected transformation’ is to be distinguished from the so far relatively
simple ‘transformative creation of physical entities’ (in capitalism taking the form of pro-
duction) – as alluded to in 1§1.
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The point is that the forces engendered by the monetary-value dimension
overwhelmingly determine our lives. At the same time these are not inevitable
facts of nature, but rather the result of our own political-economic doing.18
1§5-b Addendum. Inwardly bifurcated commodities: notes on the history
of economic theory
I have dedicated quite a lot of space (1§2–1§5) to the task of positing the inward
bifurcation of commodities. Classical political economists (CPE) such as Adam
Smith (1776, Book I, Ch. 4, section 13) and David Ricardo (1981 [18171], Ch. 1, sec-
tion 1), without much ado, simply mention the duality (internal bifurcation)
as a fact of life, merely to delineate that political economy is about ‘value in
exchange’ rather than ‘value in use’. Thus although these economists are aware
of the two aspects of the commodity, they do not problematise it and reduce
their discourse de facto to exchange-value (in short, also for them, ‘value’).
Neoclassical economists neglect the issue by reducing value to use-value
(utility). As a consequence they are forced to treat money as some strange
appendix to the science of economics: prices are utility determined (or pref-
erence determined) barter ‘prices’ (in fact barter ratios). Then, via the ‘good’
that happens to be a handy medium of barter exchange, i.e. ‘money’, the gen-
eral price level is determined by a Quantity Theory of Money. Apart from the
determination of the price level, money does not matter.19|20
Although Keynes (1936) – as well as current post-keynesian economics – is
a leading critic of the neglect of money in neoclassical economics, his point of
application is not – what we now call – microeconomic issues and the market
as such, but rather the macroeconomic aspects of money. When dealing with
these in Chapters 2–3, I will return to Keynes.
18 More specifically, our own political-economic doing in the sense that Marx expressed it:
‘Men make their own history, but they do not make it just as they please; they do not
make it under circumstances chosen by themselves, but under circumstances directly
encountered, given and transmitted from the past. The tradition of all the dead gener-
ations weighs like a nightmare on the brain of the living’ (Marx 1979 [18521], p. 115).
19 It is rather impractical todeliver auniversity diploma in economics stampedwith themes-
sage that money does not matter; so economics departments deliver an appendix course
on ‘money, credit and banking’ setting out some nasty details of the matter – the main
economics courses can do without this. (In a critical essay, Frank Hahn (1981), a promin-
ent proponent of General EquilibriumTheory, set out the limitations of (this) neoclassical
economics.)
20 Twisting the matter Milton Friedman (e.g. 1959 or 1968) argued that ‘money matters’
because it determines the price level.
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What Marx calls the two-fold character of the commodity is key to his Cri-
tique of Political Economy [1859] as well as to the first 100 pages or so of the first
Part (Chs. 1–3) of Capital, Volume I [18671]whereheuses the terms ‘double char-
acter’, ‘two-fold character’ and ‘duality’ of the commodity as synonyms. Marx’s
way of proceeding is somewhat different from the one presented above. He
starts from the commodity and commodity trade (exchange) and derives the
commodity’s duality from it, before expanding on value and finally arriving
at monetary value. Above I started with the dissociated outward bifurcation
(which remains implicit at Marx’s starting point), then introduced the trade
relation, value and monetary value and finally arrived at the commodity and
its duality that I posited as an inward bifurcation (1§5). (Bifurcation is a trans-
lation of the German ‘Entzweiung’).21
1§5-c Addendum. Marx on money as the measure of value
Because Marx’s Capital – as much as the current book – adopts the method
of systematic-dialectical immanent critique, it is not surprising that when dis-
cussing the concept of value in the first chapter of that book, he starts off from
the received view of his day. Namely that of Classical Political Economy, which
posits – in several varieties – a ‘labour theory of value’ (in brief: labour is the
source of value – see e.g. Reuten 1999a and 2018a). He assumes that the reader is
familiarwith this (at the time)mainstreamview.However, a present-day reader
might believe that Marx, in setting out how labour is the source of value –
without, however, calling his own theory a ‘labour theory of value’ – is describ-
ing something new (in fact this problem has played a role even throughout the
twentieth century).22 Such a focus completelymisses the really innovativemes-
sage of the text, namely that it is not labour but rathermoney that constitutes the
dominantmeasure of value, themeasure and the criterion for what is (not) pro-
duced.
Classical Political Economy posits that labour is the source of profit (Marx
agreeswith this, as do I, as is set out inDivision 5). However, the defect of CPE is
that it simultaneously takes ‘labour’ (in different varieties for different authors)
to be the measure of value. In Reuten (1999a) I set out the similar confusion
within some strands of current marxian economics. In Reuten (2005) I show
how this confusion is also related to an inappropriate reading of the first three
21 In Capital Marx does not use the term ‘Entzweiung’ (literally ‘splitting in two’). However,
it is a term that Hegel (sparingly) used – see Benhabib 1986, p. 23 and Inwood 1992,
p. 36.
22 For Marx, labour is the source of value; however, he is far from proposing that ‘labour is
value’ (which was Ricardo’s view).
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chapters of Capital (where the term ‘abstract labour’ in the first two sections of
chapter 1 is a placeholder for money, prior to the introduction of money).
1§5-d Addendum. Value-form theory: from value-form to monetary-value
dimension
Since 1988 I have been a fierce proponent of ‘value-form’ theory. Nevertheless,
to this point I have abstained fromusing the term ‘value-form’.This is an issue of
how to phrase the matter, rather than making any fundamental changes to the
content. Value-form theorists, including myself, took on Marx’s term of value-
form (Capital I, Ch. 1) in their breaking away from value-theoretical ‘labour
embodied’ interpretations of Marx’s work (appraised in e.g. Reuten 1993 and
2004a) as well as from analogous currents within contemporary marxian the-
ory (appraised in e.g. Reuten andWilliams 1989; Reuten 1988 and 1995). This is
clear for the theoretical experts. The expert knows that the term ‘value-form’ –
in one of its main focuses – is used to emphasise that ‘value’ is not a natural-
istic concept, but rather one that is always specific to and ‘determinate’ (Murray
1988) for particular social formations (suchas capitalism); furthermore, for cap-
italism value’s main determinate form is monetary. However, the term ‘value-
form’ by itself leaves the latter unspecified. In short, I have mainly substituted
the term ‘monetary-value dimension’ for ‘capitalist value-form’, even if the con-
notations of the two terms are somewhat different.
1§6 Commodification of labour-capacity and commodified consumption
As labour is required for production (1§1), it now becomes manifest that –
with the trade relation, the monetary-value dimension and the commodifica-
tion presented so far (1§2–1§5) – the existence of enterprises generally requires
them to purchase the capacity to labour during production, in which sense they
are employers of labour.
Correspondingly, to the extent that labourers lack means of production,
their existence compels them to sell their labour-capacity, to be employed for
part of the day (thus their existence is grounded in that sale). Depending on
their skills, they are not forced to sell their labour-capacity to a particular enter-
prise; however, they are forced to sell it to some enterprise. Thus the dissociated
outward bifurcation requires that labour-capacity is traded on a market.
Because in capitalism the capacity to labour is not traded in its entirety (as
is the case in systems of slavery), but rather for a stipulated amount of time, its
trade occurs in terms of hiring and renting out (i.e. time-constrained buying
and selling).
As with the outputs of production and the other inputs to production, the
capacity to labour is assessed at the market such that heterogeneous capacit-
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ies are made commensurate in terms of one-dimensional monetary value –
a dimension alien to the physical capacity to labour (cf. 1§4). Thus we have
a commodification of labour-capacity – it is traded on a market like a com-
modity. Similarly, it is through themoneymedium that the trans-abstraction of
value concretely appears as reflectedmarket transformation of labour-capacity
(cf. 1§5). Hence the latter appears in the inwardly bifurcated guise of ‘capacity’
and ‘monetary value’, which constitutes it as ‘commodified’ (cf. 1§5). More spe-
cifically, the commodified labour-capacity is bifurcated into ‘capacity rented
out for a certain amount of time’ and ‘rent in monetary value for a certain
amount of time’, the name for the latter being the ‘wage for a certain amount
of time’ or, in short, the ‘wage rate’.
Along with this commodification and the wage income deriving from it, the
households’ acquirement of production outputs of enterprises takes the form
of commodified ‘consumption’.
1§6-a Explication. The ‘too common’ market for labour-capacity
Without the ‘mirror’ of other, different, societies it is notoriously difficult to
analyse themost common aspects of one’s own society. Themarket for labour-
capacity (usually called the ‘labour market’) is a case in point. Our psycholo-
gical need for concordance forbids us to even remotely compare the trading of
labour-capacity with the trading of slaves. These are not the same; neverthe-
less, if we consider the matter in terms of selling and renting labour-capacity,
this trading is something of a remnant of slavery trading. That is, with the qual-
ification that labourers are free to choose an owner (of means of production) –
they are, generally, not free to not choose an owner.23 It may well be that the
people of a few generations hence will look back on this in horror, just as we
look back in horror at slavery.
1§6-b Explication. Contingency of ‘self-employment’
The main text states: ‘the existence of enterprises generally requires them to
purchase the capacity to labour during production, in which sense they are
employers of labour’. The term ‘generally’ implicitly refers to the contingency
of small enterprises that do not hire any labour-capacity. Contingently a layer
of self-employed labour is compatible with capitalism, which is conditioned
23 Again, as in themain text, this is predicated on the lack of means of production as includ-
ing the capacity for borrowing these. (Hence the ‘not being free’ is a general statement; it
does not rule out that somemay be able to gather themeans for being self-employed or to
start up an enterprise; however the ‘not being free’ in this respect is a systemic statement;
a society in which everyone were self-employed is definitely not capitalist.)
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on these labourers having ownership of their means of production. As indic-
ated in 1§1-e, in this book I refrain from characterising the type of economy we
would have if this were no longer a mere compatible contingency, and instead
pure self-employment had become generalised.
1§6-c Explication. ‘Labour-capacity’ versus ‘labour’
I follow the marxian tradition which – contrary to mainstream economics –
makes a strict distinction between the concepts of ‘labour-capacity’ and ‘la-
bour’. It is the labour-capacity, or labour potential, that is traded at the market.
In contradistinction, the activity of ‘labour’ (some manifestation of the capa-
city) ensues in production at somepace and intensity (expanded on in 1§14 and
2§2). Note that Marx considered the distinction as one of his main conceptual
advances. The reason is that it articulates his particular exposition of the inter-
connection of the capitalist production process and the labour market, which
is vital to his main work Capital.
1§6-d Addendum. The terms ‘labour-capacity’ and ‘labour power’
Within the marxian tradition the common term for ‘capacity to labour’ is
‘labour power’. The latter is a translation of the German ‘Arbeitskraft’ thatMarx
uses in his mature work. Capacity to labour is rather equivalent to ‘Arbeitsver-
mögen’, the term that Marx adopts in his early work and his drafts for Capital
(until about 1865). One reason for adopting the term ‘capacity to labour’ is that,
in my view, the term more appropriately covers the concept (i.e. of potential
activity). Another reason is that I will introduce later on (1§14) the term ‘pro-
ductive power of labour’ (a refinement of labour productivity) and I would not
want to have this term confused with ‘labour power’.
1§7 Inward bifurcation of commodities: the commodification of inputs
and outputs ‘in total’
The capitalist commodity-form of entities – resulting from their reflectedmar-
ket transformation through the money medium – reveals the commodities’
duality in their inward bifurcation into ‘use-value’ (usability) and ‘monetary
value’. With the exposition so far (esp. 1§5–1§6) the near total commodifica-
tion of the inputs and outputs of enterprises has been presented. I say ‘near’
because free nature (1§1) does not take on the form of monetary value, and
hence does not appear as input costs for enterprises. (Later on it will be made
explicit that this can be seen as a curse rather than a blessing.)
Herewith, the exposition has reached the point where elements for a poten-
tial solution to the ‘dissociated outward bifurcation’ appear (1§1). However,
whereas the dualities positedmay seem surmountable (if not straightforwardly
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so) for households, dual measures deliver no determinate criterion for the pro-
duction within enterprises – so far the trade of specific inputs and outputs.
Hence the exposition must be expanded (1D4 below).
Division 4. Profit – duality dominated by the monetary-value
dimension
1§8 Profit as themonistic driving force of enterprises
The dissociated outward bifurcation entails that the physical product of
enterprises is generally not destined for its producers; hence the driving
force of enterprises must be an aim external to its physical product (1§3).
Withmarket trade, both the inputs and outputs of enterprises are consti-
tuted as dual entities: inwardly bifurcated commodities that are qualitat-
ively homogeneous in terms of monetary value (1§4, 1§7).
The non-physical external driving force of enterprises engenders monetary
value as the dominant moment of the duality. Hence the external driving force
of enterprises is a positive quantitative difference between themonetary value
of the commodity inputs and the commodity outputs. This difference is called
profit, which is – within the duality – the dominating monistic driving force of
enterprises.
Whereas incidental profit can be explained on the basis of market trade
(selling a commodity at a higher price than that for which it was bought), gen-
eral, or macroeconomic, profit cannot be explained on the basis of the trade of
goods in the form of commodities, since trade-gains would be cancelled out by
trade-losses.
Thus, although we can comprehend the significance of the drive for profit,
profit itself cannot be explained at the level of the moment of market trade
(1D2–1D3). Hence the exposition is still enmeshed in an ‘impediment’ to the
continuity of the capitalist economy (cf. 1D1), whence it must expand to a new
moment, which is production (1D5 below).
1§8-a Explication. Dominance of one-dimensional profit
So far the exposition has moved from outward institutional duality (outward
bifurcation) to inwardduality (commodificationof entities). Eachof thedualit-
ies is engrained in everyday capitalist life (as to the second: ‘beautiful furniture
you have, must be expensive’). Even if one-dimensional monetary profit drives
enterprises, this is the dominant pole of the commodification. Dominance
implies that the moment that is dominated (usability and physical andmental
capacities) remains a moment albeit one shaped by the dominant moment.
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1§8-b Explication. Profit, trade and general equilibrium theory
The argument that within a (national) economy, trade surpluses and deficits
cancel each other out – and hence that a macroeconomic surplus (i.e. macroe-
conomic profit) cannot be explained by pure trade (1§8) – is analogous to the
cancelling out of international trade surpluses and deficits.
In neoclassical General Equilibrium Theory, ‘net profits’ (profits after inter-
est payment) reduce to zero due to competition. This seems to absolve that
theory from the explanation of the net profits (see also Naples and Aslanbeigui
1996). However, it does not relieve the theory of the task of explaining ‘gross
profits’ (profits before interest payment). This fails to set out if and how general
equilibrium, or anything even close to it, could be a feasible capitalist con-
stellation, because zero profits, in each of these definitions, would presumably
paralyse investment. (It is quite another issue that apart from periods of severe
recession, macroeconomic profits are robustly positive.)
Division 5. The capitalist production process
Labour’s productive power and the appropriation of surplus-value
In this division the expositionmoves fromthemarket and the commodification
of the inputs and outputs of production (1D2–1D4), to the production process
of the outputs of enterprises – part of these serving again as inputs for other
production processes.
Subdivision 5A. The general form of the capitalist production process: duality of
the production process and dominance of the monetary valorisation process
1§9 The production process as technical process
In the exposition of abstract sociation, I used the phrase the creation of
entities (1§0), which, with the outward bifurcation concomitant on disso-
ciation, was particularised as production (1§1). Alongwith this, the activity
of creation of entities (1§0) was particularised as labour (1§1).
Like the activity of creation, the capitalist production process in its technical
aspect is in essence a metabolism of human beings – more particularly ‘la-
bour’ – with nature. The ‘gift’ of freely available nature is worked up by labour
into means of production as products, and these together are worked up by
labour into final products to be consumed.
With privately owned enterprises, means of production are privately owned
(1§1). Then we may distinguish between the (still) freely available nature, such
as sunshine, and appropriated nature, such as the majority of land. Appropri-
56 part one – the capitalist economy
ated nature is subsumed under the category of ‘means of production’ because
it is traded like commodities, and functions like commodified means of pro-
duction. Thus physical production entails some combination of :
• Freely available nature worked up by labour →
• Means of Production or
• Final Product
• Freely av. nature and
worked up by labour →
• Means of Production or
means of production • Final Product
The working up by labour of nature, or of nature and means of production,
is called the physical production process, or the technical production process
A technique of production refers to a qualitatively and quantitatively specific
combination of nature, means of production and labour alongside a qualitat-
ively specific labour process.
1§10 The production process asmonetary valorisation process: ‘ideal pre-
commensuration’ and the inward bifurcation of the production
process
Through themoneymedium in themarket, the trans-abstraction of value
concretely appears as the reflected transformation of entities into dual
commodities (1§7).
Because trade in themarket is not accidental but systematic, the abstraction of
the equationof a product to somedefinite amount of money canbe anticipated
prior to market trade. Before the actual market trade, stocks ideally represent
an amount of monetary value.The sameapplies for the commodities that are in
the process of production, i.e. for the inputs that are beingworked upby labour.
Thus the actual commensuration in the market (1§5) is anticipated by an ideal
pre-commensuration, and the transformation in themarket is anticipated by an
ideal transformation.
Or, to put it in slightly different terms: Only by way of the actual trade in the
market do commodities show their actual value in terms of money (in that split
second, so to speak). At all other times, commodities and commodities in pro-
cess of production merely have an expected, or anticipated, value (i.e. value in
theminds of the owners of the enterprises and themanagement), that is, ‘ideal
value’.24
24 Here and in the following section, ‘management’ is referred to in passing. It will be sys-
tematically introduced in Chapter 2. At the current stage of the exposition, the owners of
enterprises can also be considered as the management.
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Hence the multifaceted physical technical labour process is inwardly bifurc-
ated into the technical labour process and the one-dimensional idealmonetary-
value-producing process, or, in short, the ideal valorisation process, the produc-
tion of ideal value.
Given the value of the material inputs (means of production), this ideal
valorisation process thus regards the production of new, additional value, com-
monly called ‘value-added’ (expanded in 1§12).
(Generally, ‘valorisation’ is the production of monetary value; its production
is actually validated when the output is sold on the market – ‘validation’ being
the turning of the output into money.25 Having made explicit, first, that val-
orisation always refers to monetary valorisation, and second, that during pro-
duction valorisation is always ‘ideal’ valorisation, the remainder of this chapter
uses the shorthand ‘valorisation’ or ‘valorisation process’, unless the adjectives
monetary and/or ideal require emphasis.)
1§10-a Addendum. Ideal pre-commensuration
The concept of ideal pre-commensuration of production was first outlined in
Reuten (1988, pp. 53–5) and Reuten andWilliams (1989, pp. 66–8). This concept
is of great importance for the appraisal of the capitalist production processes,
because it is denied that the latter are pure technical processes of ‘neutral pro-
gress’.26 A notion of putative neutrality applies to all of mainstreameconomics.
Viewing ideal pre-commensuration in terms of inward bifurcation – one of the
major themes of the present book – makes this even more explicit.
Positively, pre-commensuration is key to the intervention in one variety of
marxian theory, i.e. one that casts the production process in physical ‘labour
embodied’ or similar terms (see Reuten 1993). Pre-commensuration clears the
way for the analysis and synthesis of production in terms of monetary value.
25 Addendum 1§12-b offers a brief comparison of Marx’s and my delineations of the term
‘valorisation’.
26 When Arthur (2001, p. 22) uses the term ideal pre-commensuration, he focuses on an
aspect that is alien to my meaning of the term. He writes: ‘Of course it is convenient
for capital if the concrete forms of labour are simple enough to make an ideal ‘pre-
commensuration’ of the labour time determining the value it hopes to realise on the
market’. This is not the point of 1§10 above, where the pre-commensuration is in terms
of the monetary value realised on the market; the (non-)complexity of the physical pro-
duction does not affect this.
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1§11 Dominance of themonetary valorisation process over the technical
process: the inwarded drive for profit
The production process as yet being bracketed (abstracted from), profit
has so far been posited as the (within the commodity duality, dominant)
monistic external driving force of enterprises, aiming at a positive quant-
itative difference between the monetary value of the commodity inputs
and the commodity outputs (1§8).
With the inward bifurcation of the production process into technical labour
process and valorisation process (1§10), the external driving force of profit
(1§8) is homogeneously connected to the process of production. More pre-
cisely, the connection lies in the production process being dominated by one
of its two bifurcated poles, that is, the valorisation process.27 Thus through the
monistic driving force, the dual production process is dominated by the pro-
duction of ideal monetary value. Herewith the profit as external driving force
(1§8) is ideally inwarded within the enterprise as unit of production. In other
words, the external profit drive in terms of inputs and outputs (1§8) trans-
forms into an inwarded driving force of production: the production of ideal
profit.28
The inwarded drive for profit, a surplus of one-dimensional monetary value,
is essential to the capitalist system. However much the market trans-abstrac-
tion (1D2, 1§4) and the market transformation and inward bifurcation of the
commodity (1D3) are constituent for the inward bifurcation of capitalist pro-
duction (1§10), it is the latter bifurcation together with the inwarded drive for
profit that is pivotal to the capitalist system. The trans-abstraction in the mar-
ket reflects on ready entities. However, the inward bifurcation of production,
together with the inwarded drive, is much more far-reaching, to the extent that
valorisation-driven production affects the human creation of entities, that is,
their material make-up, their material constitution; in this way the technical
labour process (1§9) is instrumental to the valorisation process.
Thus it is not the case that merely a ‘pre-given’, neutral, technical labour
process is denominated in terms of ideal monetary value; rather the technical
process is devised andmanaged as a valorisation process and so affects the tech-
nical process. Thus with the inwarded driving force, the commodity that was
presented in 1D3 is ‘not innocent’, so to speak. Rather, the output of enterprises
that was presented as actually trans-abstracted and transformed on themarket
27 Valorisation is the generation of monetary value (cf. 1§10).
28 It is ideal because prior to the actual sale of commodities, we have nomore than an expec-
ted value as including an expected profit (cf. 1§10).
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(the value leap referred to in 1§4) – as indeed it is – is preceded by the capitalist
profit-driven production as production of commodities, that is, production of
ideal commodities (‘ideal’ before the actual leap).
Hence the necessary requirement for the production of multifaceted entit-
ies (1§0) is overarched by the driving force of production for one-dimensional
monetary value: profit. Therefore, first, that which can be perceived – in pro-
duction plants or on retail shelves – is pre-selected on the basis of the profit
criterion; entities that cannot be produced profitably are simply not on offer.
Second, the quality of the entities (in terms of nutrition, health, durability,
environmental symbiosis) is subordinate to the quantity of one-dimensional
profit.
1§11-a Explication. Potential threat of inward bifurcation of production
The main section just presented is one core of this chapter. In brief: the com-
bination of the inward bifurcation of the commodity with the pre-commen-
surationmeans that the (now ‘merely’) external profit drive, in terms of inputs
and outputs, transforms into an inwarded production drive, whereby produc-
tion itself is affected by the monetary-value dimension.
This poses a potential threat to a continuous social whole (the subordination
of quality in terms of nutrition, health, durability and environmental symbiosis
referred to). Because it is ‘merely’ a potential threat, I methodologically absolve
myself from providing a solution to it at the current level of the exposition.
What is more, the (potential) problem cannot be resolved at the level of the
capitalist economy pure (i.e. Part One of this book). I will return to this issue
when the exposition can deal with it, that is, when the state has been intro-
duced in Part Two (see Chapter 6).
1§11-b Explication. Linear exposition along with reinforcing simultaneity
of moments
The exposition in the text of a book is inevitably linear (see themiddle column
of Scheme 1.3). In fact we have a reinforcing simultaneity of the moments as in
a circuit (the dotted lines in that scheme). Similar schemes can be made for
other parts of the exposition.
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scheme 1.3 Linear exposition along with reinforcing simultaneity
of moments: 1D3–1D5A (1§5–1§11)
Legend
↡ grounded in (conditioned by)
⥥ implicit herein
← → reinforcing simultaneity
Subdivision 5B. Measures and determinations: surplus-value, capital as time-
grasping investment, and the production of capital
1§12 The articulation of value-added and surplus-value (integral profit)
The result of the enterprises’ valorisation (1§10) is the value-added in en-
terprises, which is the sum of all the income categories generated in enter-
prises. In brief, these income categories are the sum of wages and surplus-
value.
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So far the term ‘profit’ (1§8) has yet to be delineated – it was used in a
rather general everyday sense of the term. This is amatter of exposition, simply
because all the relevant interconnected concepts cannot be introduced at the
same time.The term ‘surplus-value’ is the genus term for the two sub-categories
of profit (retained and distributed) and interest. The latter applies to the extent
that enterprises use external finance. This sub-division of surplus-value is sys-
tematically introduced in Chapters 2–3.
Next to wages the remainder of the current chapter focuses on the produc-
tion of surplus-value because surplus-value is independent of the contingent
ways in which particular enterprises finance the production.
Throughout this book the term surplus-value will be used interchangeably
with the term ‘integral profit’ (with exactly the same meaning). The reason is
simply that I need the concept of the ‘rate of integral profit’ (introduced in the
next section), whereas for theory-historical reasons the term ‘rate of surplus-
value’ would be confusing.29
Returning to the first sentence above, the result of the enterprises’ valorisa-
tion is the value-added in enterprises. The latter is the starting point for what
follows in this division. Thus we have:
Surplus-value 🢔 = Value-added – wages
(where the sign 🢔 denotes right to left hand determination).30
In this chapter the level of thewages is pre-posited (presented in Chapter 2).
Hence given thewages level, the level of the surplus-value is determined by the
value-added, that is, the valorisation. Thus, for now, the main question is the
explanation of value-added (presented in 1§14), which we arrive at after the
introduction of the concept of capital (1§13).
1§12-a Amplification. The concept of surplus-value and the SNA concept
of ‘operating surplus’
The current System of National Accounts 2008 (UN 2009) adopts the macroe-
conomic surplus concept of ‘operating surplus’. The SNA starting point is out-
putminus intermediates (purchases and sales between enterprises) andminus
wages. That starting point for the operating surplus (OS) would be equival-
29 Iwould have preferred to evade the term integral profit. However, the term ‘rate of surplus-
value’ has ineradicably been coined byMarx as ameasure for the capital–labour distribu-
tion of income (more precisely, the rate of exploitation).
30 In common macroeconomic terms (SNA) the domestic value-added is defined as Y =
operating surplus + wages. See 1§12-a on the distinction between operating surplus and
surplus-value. Definition (=) is not the same as order of determination, for which I adopt
the sign 🢔 =.
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ent to our concept of surplus-value. However, the SNA also adopts a number
of arbitrary imputations, which cause the two concepts to deviate (expanded
in 8§6-d).
1§12-b Addendum. The term ‘valorisation’ in comparison with Marx’s use
of the term
In 1§10 I introduced the term ‘valorisation’. Now that the term ‘surplus-value’
has been introduced (1§12), I can properly comment on my usage of the term
‘valorisation’. In Das Kapital I, Marx makes a distinction between the Wert-
bildungsprozeß (which refers to the production/creation/generation of value)
and the Verwertungsprozeß (which refers to the production/creation/genera-
tion of surplus-value). For the latter Marx also uses the term Bildung vonMehr-
wert.31 The term Verwertung is now commonly translated by ‘valorisation’ (fol-
lowing Fowkes; see the previous footnote).
For the purposes of the current chapter I use the single term ‘valorisation’
for value creation (that is, the production of ‘value-added’), making clear when
I specifically refer to surplus-value. My main reason for this usage is method-
ological: in capitalism the production of surplus-value is a necessary moment;
capitalist value-production is generally value-production as including the pro-
duction of surplus-value (only contingently may this not be the case).32 From
this point of view,Marx’s two terms coincide (or rather the one is sublated into
the other).
1§13 Capital and time – the rate of integral profit and standard time
Both the inputs andoutputs of enterprises are constituted as dual entities:
inwardly bifurcated commodities that are qualitatively homogeneous in
terms of monetary value (1§4, 1§7). The enterprises’ driving force of profit,
aiming at a positive quantitative difference between the monetary value
of the commodity inputs and the commodity outputs (1§8), is constituted
as an inwarded production of ideal profit (1§11) further specified as integ-
ral profit, or surplus-value (1§12).
31 Marx’s German terms are somewhat idiosyncratic and for each of these terms there is no
simpleEnglish translation.Here are somepage references.Marx,DasKapital I (1962 [18671;
18904]), p. 171 and p. 209; Fowkes translations: Marx, Capital I (1976 [18671; 18904]), p. 259
and p. 302.
32 Marx in fact introduces the capitalist necessity of surplus-value via its contingent nega-
tion.
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1 Capital and time
On the basis of divisions 1D2–1D5Awe can now identify the enterprises’ inputs
to production under their common empirical names of ‘investment’ and ‘cap-
ital’. One aspect of active ‘capital’ is the monetary value of the enterprises’
investment in physical inputs for production – inputs that themselves are con-
stituted as dimensionally dual inputs. However, the developed concept of cap-
ital also incorporates ‘time’, that is, the duration of the production process and
so the duration of investments. Thus capitalist production entails not ‘merely’
its grasping of ‘usability’ under the dominating monetary value-form; it also
entails its grasping of time under ‘production time’. Efficient process manage-
ment in terms of valorisation (as quantity of value) is twinned with efficient
process management in terms of production time, as distinct from any other
time. (When a feudal farmer, after much hard work, takes the corn harvest to
the miller during a quiet three-hour horse and carriage ride, this activity is not
obviously perceived as work rather than rest.) In the economics discourse ‘effi-
ciency’ is often something of a catch-all term. Unless otherwise stated I use the
term to mean ‘profit-geared efficiency’.
2 Contingent time span of physical-technical production processes
Given this production process efficiency in its twinned aspects (quantity of
monetary value and duration), production is nevertheless chained to the mo-
ment of a physical-technical production process and its duration. In particular,
surplus-value is gained on the investment of inputs for the specific technical
length of time of various particular ‘singular production processes’ (of wheat,
computers, pens, etc., taking anumber of months,weeks or less than anhour, as
the casemaybe).That is, surplus-value seems chained to the contingent pace of
physical-technical production, even if this is subsumed under valorisation. In
principle this ‘singular-process-integral-profit’ (spp) can be calculated per the
amount of ‘singular-process-inputs’ (spi) at some rate – that is, (spp)/(spi).33
However, the different duration of the singular processes in different branches
of production (or perhaps also within the same branch)means that (spp)/(spi)
is insufficient as ameasure for the comparison of achievements between enter-
prises. Thus this measure provides no criterion for what physical commodities
are most profitable to produce.
33 This is how Marx initiates his exposition of the production of surplus-value in Capital I,
getting to turnover times of capital in the second part of Capital II. What I present in the
next subsection (3) is what Marx, qua field of exposition, presents in the second part of
Capital III.
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3 Capital and surplus-value as constituted relative to standard time
The total ‘active capital’ (K) consists of, first, the enterprise’s investment in
inputs for production and, second, the running valorisation – the latter being
co-materialised in the ideal monetary value of half products and not yet valid-
ated output stocks. This capital can, in principle, be measured at each point in
time, as reported on an enterprise’s balance sheet (see explication 1§13-a). The
latter is captured in the notion of ‘active capital’ adopted henceforth, which,
to be sure, is a sum of one-dimensional monetary value. So as to overcome
the insufficiency alluded to under point 2, the duration of capital investment –
instead of measuring it relative to the rhythmof physical production – is estab-
lished relative to a conventional standard time: the calendar year (fromnowon
indicated by subscript t).
Then the standardised total integral profit (pi, Πt) is the summation over a
year of the integral profits gained in each singular production process during
the year.
Along with it, the integral-profit-driven production is purified in the meas-
ure of the integral-profit-rate of capital as unchained from the rhythm of phys-
ical production. This is the rate of the integral profit gained during the year, and
measured at the end of the year, over the capital invested at the beginning of
the year (omega, ω):
ωt = Πt / Kt′ (1.1)
(where the subscript t indicates the end of year t, and t′ indicates the beginning
of year t). Note that Πt is a flow and Kt′ a stock.
Thus capital and the production of integral profit (i.e. surplus-value) is con-
stituted as unity of investment, valorisation and standard time. The rate of
integral profit per standard time (ωt) is the purified criterion for what, and
how, physical commodities are most profitably produced. Ultimately each of
the particular commodity that is produced, and how it is produced, is merely
instrumental for the generation of the thus measured optimal rate of integral
profit.
1§13-a Explication. Active capital: simplified balance sheet of enterprises
Whereas capital has themonetary-value dimension, it isnotmoney.Most of the
time, i.e. during production, it exists in a state of ideal value (cf. 1§10). This is
revealed on the enterprises’ balance sheet (Figure 1.4), which in fact expresses
the ‘state’ of capital at the point in time of the report.34
34 This value ideality of capital poses a major problem for enterprises, statistical bureaus,
the science of economics, and the business press. The values stated are book values. This
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figure 1.4 Simplified balance sheet of an enterprise (per some specific date)
Assets (active side) Liabilities (passive side)
Plant and fixed equipment …. Capital‡ ….
Rawmaterials and current equipment
(‘floating’ means of production) ….
Production in process ….
Ready product ….
Bank account (+/–)† ….
Total active capital K Total passive capital K
† Introduced in Chapter 2. (In fact this entry is no active capital; generally it cancels out when
bank loans are taken into account, also introduced in that chapter).
‡ This entry abstracts from the way of finance – introduced in Chapter 3. (Provisionally
the entry may be conceived of as one in which all finance is internal finance, as might
contingently be the case).
1§13-b Explication. Equalities and equality signs in this book
An equality is always an equality in terms of a particular dimension and stand-
ard (this applies for any applied mathematics generally). Let euro (€) be the
monetary standard. Then the monetary-value dimension in terms of € may be
denoted asmv€. Precision requires that we always write, for example:
M =mv€ C
i.e. M is equal to C ‘in the monetary-value dimension with the standard meas-
ure of €’ (see Ellis 1968, p. 25). Henceforth in this book, and unless otherwise
indicated, the symbols of > of = and of < always mean, respectively, ‘greater in
mv€’, ‘equal in mv€’, and ‘less in mv€’ (or any other monetary standard).
1§14 Appropriation of the productive power of labour
The generalised explanation of (integral) profit requires the movement
from themarket to production (1§8). Regarding production as a physical-
technical process, labour works up freely available nature as well appro-
priated means of production – the latter including appropriated nature
(1§9). The next sections show how production itself takes on the monet-
issue will be amajor theme throughout Part One of this book, and especially in Chapter 3.
This will also be crucial in further, more concrete, determinations of the relation between
Finance Capital and Production Capital (Ch. 3) and of economic crises (Ch. 5).
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ary value-form and how the technical process is dominated by the valor-
isation process and the profit drive (1§10–1§11), ‘the rate of integral profit
over capital invested’ being the quantitative criterion for the achievement
(1§13).
On this basis I now return to the question of the explanation of valorisation,
that is, the explanation of value-added and the surplus-value accruing to enter-
prises (1§12). In short, this section provides the grounding of the existence of
value-added and of surplus-value. I note that until subsection 7, the equations
in this section are microeconomic (referring to an average enterprise).
1 Costs of production and output
Production is the transformation of inputs into outputs. The capitalist produc-
tion process is accounted in terms of monetary value quantities and quantit-
ies of labour. I consider first the following main input and output quantities
and quantitative relations. (Note that this subsection is somewhat tedious on
account of the introduction of a number of new symbols).
• Lt denotes the average number of workers employed during the year (in
terms of the going full-time equivalent). The labour process, and hence Lt, is
considered as a whole and includes the work around purchases and sales.
• Lt is hired against a wage rate w. Hence wLt is the wages sum.
• Kt denotes the yearly average amount of capital in terms of monetary value,
measured as the assets of the enterprise’s balance sheet (see 1§13-a, Fig-
ure 1.4). The assets include the fixedmeans of production, the floatingmeans
of production (as including input stocks – raw materials) and output
stocks.35 In this chapter I pre-posit the existing amount of capital as pre-
viously accumulated and invested in production. (This pre-position will be
grounded in 3D4.) Kt is the amount of capital that can, on average, be oper-
ated by labour at each point of labour-time during the year.
• δKt is the value of the fixed assets used up during the year. These are ex-
pressed as a fraction (δ, e.g. ⅕) of the total assets K. Fixed assets are those
that last for more than one year. (Usually these used up assets are also
replaced during the year.)36
• μKt denotes the value of the floating means of production used up during a
year. These are expressed as a coefficient (μ) of the total assets K. Floating
means of production last less than one year, and these are purchased during
35 In the literature, the floatingmeans of production (including input stocks) and the output
stocks are also called ‘working assets’ or ‘current assets’.
36 Replacement, non-replacement and depreciation are expanded on in Chapters 4 and 5.
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the year. However, a part of these also appears on the balance sheet as stocks
(used and replaced) as a continuous investment. (Therefore, and unlike δ, μ
is usually not a fraction of K.However, μ is like δ a ‘technical coefficient’, their
sizes being determined by the technique adopted.) Macroeconomically μK
is also denoted as the ‘intermediate inputs’.37
• δKt and μKt are more precisely to be measured as coefficients of the begin-
ning of the year total assets Kt′. In what follows I neglect this, as it would
make the notation of the equations below cumbersome.
• Πt (pi) denotes the surplus-value produced during the year.
• Xt denotes the year’s output of production.
• Except the stock of Kt (or Kt′) all these variables above (including δKt and
μKt) are flows.
Taking these together we have:
Xt 🢔 = [(δ +μ)K + wL + Π]t (1.2)
(Where the sign 🢔 denotes that the determination is from the right hand side
to the left hand side.)
This (1.2) is a costs and revenue equation, after production has taken place.
The question is how the surplus-value (Π) emerges. Before we have this res-
ult (1.2), in the early mornings so to speak, there is the enterprise that has yet
to open its gates, at value ‘K’. At the gate of the enterprise we merely have the
labour-capacity L. When the gate opens, and the production process begins,
this labour-capacity is exerted as actual labour, which I denote as Lα, as further
explained below.
2 Means of production in the form of capital
Production considered purely technically is the working up of nature and
means of production by labour (1§9). Although freely available nature contrib-
utes to production, it has no price; it is freely available to all enterprises and
therefore does not enter production prices, hence it is neglected in capitalist
practice: it has nomonetary value.38 Considering nature, it is only appropriated
nature that, commodity-like, is traded and so has a price. Because for enter-
prises the distinction between appropriated nature and produced means of
production is immaterial, I subsume the former under the latter.
37 The latter is the term usually adopted in macroeconomic accounts (cf. UN 2009, SNA
2008).
38 Perhaps the policy of the state might somehow enforce enterprises to mimic a price for
the use of non-appropriated nature. However, the state has not yet been introduced into
the exposition (see Part Two).
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Means of production derive their value from the process of production inwhich
they were produced.39 They provide no value-added; rather they represent pre-
vious value-added, namely from the valorisation processes in which they have
been produced previously.40 At the current level of the exposition, the input
prices of means of production are taken as given (amplified in 4D2 and 4D3).
3 Labour-capacity
In contradistinction to means of production, ‘labour’ is not produced in the
past, as it is the activity of production itself. If anything, it is labour-capacity
that is “produced” previously. But the key point is that whilst labour-capacity
is grasped by the monetary-value dimension (the wage), it is not ‘produced’
within the capitalist sphere of production as a commodity. Rather, it is cre-
ated within the sphere of households (1§1). The price of labour-capacity (i.e.
the wage) does not represent previous value-added and it has nothing to do
with the ‘price of production’ of labour-capacity.41 At the current level of the
exposition, I take the wage, the price of labour-capacity, as given (its determin-
ants are amplified in 2D2).
4 Production: exertion of labour
In terms of valorisation (the production of value) themain distinction between
means of production (K) and labour-capacity (L) is that the former is inher-
ently a static element in the production process in which it functions, whereas
labour-capacity in operation, i.e. labour (Lα), is the active element. Means of
production can merely be operated or not be operated. Within the agreed
amount of labour-time, labour-capacity operates means of production, and
so exerts labour at some productive power (α), including a component of the
intensity of labour. At zero intensity (in effect a strike) there is no production
of value. Hence only labour potentially generates value-added.
39 Quite another matter is that the property of, or the command over, any (temporarily)
absolutely scarce element of production can always give rise to rent. I return to rent in
Chapter 3 (Appendix 3c).
40 Nevertheless, it is the current ideal value of means of production (as related to the cur-
rent cost price of similar means of production) that is in all or in part transmitted in the
current production process (cf. 4§7).
41 Labour-capacity is created in the private sphere of the household; what is involved is
the activity of procreation – it is not produced with a view to sale. It is created within
the household sphere, and used (exerted labour) in enterprises; (final) commodities are
produced within enterprises and used within households. The fact that skilled labour-
capacity may have a higher price than the non-skilled is besides the main point that
children are not produced for sale and hence do not have an actual price of production.
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Take the case of a (nowadays apparently fascinating) ready-made robot
as means of production, and imagine that it requires hardly any oper-
ation by labour. That robot (as with any other means of production, as
indicated under 2) derives its value from the process of production in
which it was produced. Assuming for the sake of simplicity that the robot
would require no current inputs at all, then the output value of the robot
(XR) reduces to its purchase costs, whence there is no value-added. If
the robot is not ready-made (and so requires adaptation within the cur-
rent process of production), then the current operation by labour comes
in again.42 (With some amendments about current costs, in respect of
value there is no fundamental difference between robots and the early
nineteenth-century use in production of horses – with apologies to the
horses – and indeed between robots and any other means of produc-
tion.)
Fascinating, generally, is not so much the actual use of ‘K’ in current produc-
tion, but rather thepreviousproductionof newmeansof productionandhence
the human creation of new technology and new technical applications of it –
which are creations by labour.
5 Production: components of the productive power of labour
I just mentioned the productive power of labour and the intensity of labour. I
make a distinction between the actual labour as exerted at some technique-
associated productive power (ά), and the actual labour as exerted at some
intensity of labour (ϊ, iota). As such we have α = (ά)*(ϊ) and
Lα = Lάϊ (1.3)43
Note that α, ά and ϊ are exponents (not indices). Thus α is, qua content and
mathematically, the power to which L is raised.44
6 Technique of production, the ‘productive power of labour’, the ‘unit
monetary value of labour’ and the rate of integral profit
A technique of production refers to a qualitatively and quantitatively specific
combination of nature, means of production and labour together with a qual-
42 The same applies if the sales and transport of the robot output are themselves not robot-
ised – that would again involve a production process.
43 This concernswhatMarx, inCapital I, chapter 1, calls ‘concrete labour’ (1976 [18671, 18904],
p. 128).
44 Mathematically this implies decreasing returns to scale. The economic rationale is that
given a technique of production and the associated α and ά, there are increasingly lim-
its to the potential intensity of labour: at some point the intensity of labour cannot be
increased any further.
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itatively specific labour process, resulting in an output (1§9). For different com-
modities this physical output is nomore than an intuitive notion because these
cannot reasonably be added up (1D2–1D3 and 1§10).
At the start of the production process ‘K’ is the value of the production plant
and equipment when workers have just entered the premises’ gates, without
yet having worked. Even if the production process is dominated by monetary
value and valorisation (1§11), it necessarily also remains a physical-technical
process. In the actual production process, labour physically works up the plant
and equipment to something qualitatively different (the physical output). This
qualitative transformation is one aspect of labour’s power. The other aspect is
thequantitative valorising transformation.Alpha (α) is the ‘parameter’ of trans-
formation: the productive power of labour in both these respects.
On the basis of the previous argument (points 2–5), equation 1.2 can now be
concretised into:
Xt 🢔 = [(δ +μ)K + mLα]t (1.4)
wheremLαhas thedimensionof homogeneousmonetary value.45 I callmLα the
actual monetary value of labour, with ‘m’ being the actual unit monetary value
of labour. (Practically ‘m’ measures the validation, the sale, of the net product
of labour).46 Note that mLα includes the equivalent of the wages component
wL.
Thus given K and the implied (potential) technique of production, with the
technical coefficients δ and μ, the net value-added (mLα) is determined by the
productive power of labour (α) as resulting in the actual monetary value pro-
duced by labour. So we have for ‘surplus-value’ or ‘integral profit’ (pi, Π):
Πt 🢔 =mLαt – wLt (1.5)
Whereas K, the means of production that have been purchased, constrains
possible production, the power of labour (α) determines how much output is
actually produced. This is the big leap in a capitalist economy. The implication
is that labour – more specifically, the actual productive power of labour – is
the unique source of valorisation. Nevertheless this productive power is always
based on the actual technique of production. Technology and its application
in specific techniques is inevitably the result of social labour. (Choices of par-
ticular techniques are driven by competitive forces, amplified in Chapter 4.)
Further, the productive power of labour usually diverges between sectors of
45 This is analogous to what Marx calls ‘abstract labour’ (in the same reference as in the one
but last note).
46 If this is helpful for the reader: at this point ‘m’ can be considered as the realised price of
the net product of labour. I return to this in more detail in Chapter 3 (3§10).
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production as well as within sectors of production, along with differing tech-
niques of production.47
Finally on this point, using equations 1.1 and 1.5, we have for the rate of integ-
ral profit (1§13):
ωt = Πt / Kt′ = [(mLα)t – (wL)t] / Kt′ (1.6)
Thus given K, L and the technique, the rate of integral profit (ω) varies with the
wage rate (w) and the productive power of labour (α).
7 The production of capital
Neglecting for now any distribution of surplus-value (and hence consumption
out of surplus-value by capital owners – presented inChapter 3), it follows from
the exposition above that capitalist production, as dominated by valorisation,
results in essence in a growth of capital (amplified in 2D1):
Kt′ + Πt = 🢖 Kt or
Kt′ + ΔKt′ = 🢖 Kt
Because it is labour that produces the surplus-value (Π) and hence any growth
of capital, labour essentially produces capital – the owners of capital claiming
the entitlement to its appropriation (amplified in 6D1).
8 Measures of value-added
We had, for what I now explicitly call gross production:
Xt 🢔 = [(δ +μ)K + wL + Π]t (1.2)
and next:
Xt 🢔 = [(δ +μ)K + mLα]t (1.4)
For gross value-added, YG (macroeconomically, GDP) we have:48
YGt 🢔 = [δK + mLα]t (1.7)
For net value-added (macroeconomically, NDP):
Yt 🢔 = [mLα]t (1.8)
47 Because α in Lα is a technique-associated power (in its component of ά), α varies between
sectors of production (expanded in 2§2). In Chapter 4 (4§4) wewill see that α usually also
differs within sectors of production, though within smaller margins.
48 In a macroeconomic account, all microeconomic enterprises are by convention taken to
be integrated into one single enterprise. This implies (assuming a self-sufficient macroe-
conomic constellation) that the intermediate deliveries between enterprises cancel out.
(One reason for this convention is that the thus measured ‘output’ is independent of the
actual degree of enterprises’ merging.) In terms of the equations above, this especially
implies μ=0. (Note that for current economies μK often amounts to roughly the sum of
the GDP – thus the sum of the microeconomic production being very roughly twice the
sum of the macroeconomic production.)
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Note that the previous equations can be applied both macroeconomically
and microeconomically (for individual enterprises or for sectors of produc-
tion)– for the latter, as indicated, bothα andmmaydivergewithin andbetween
sectors of production.
1§14-a Explication. Market- and production-related concepts of labour
A strict distinction has been made between ‘labour-capacity’ and ‘labour’ (see
1§6, 1§6-c, 1§6-d and 1§14).Table 1.5 summarises this in comparison with ortho-
dox economics and marxian political economy (MPE).
table 1.5 Summary of the distinction between market- and production-








• market concept of labour labour (L) labour-power (L) labour-capacity (L)
• market value of labour(-…) wL wL wL












OS = VA – wL† SV = mL – wL ‡
(mL = value-added)
SV = mLα – wL‡
(mLα = value-added)
† OS = operating surplus. It is explained by the so-called ‘productivity of capital’ or by ‘waiting with
consumption’, sometimes in combinationwithmanagerial labour as a separate labour category. (See also
Naples and Aslanbeigui 1996).
‡ See also 1§14-c.
1§14-b Addendum. Smith, Marshall and Keynes on labour and profits
To conceive of only labour as potentially creative of value-added (1§14) has
nothing to do with the question of whether or not profits are necessary within
the capitalist system. For AdamSmith (1776), for example, profits are necessary.
At the same time he leaves no doubt that labour is the source of value-added
and hence of profit:
‘Thus, the labour of a manufacturer adds, generally, to the value of the
materials which he works upon, that of his own maintenance, and of his
master’s profit. … Though the manufacturer has his wages advanced to
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him by his master, he, in reality, costs him no expense, the value of those
wages being generally restored, together with a profit, in the improved
value of the subject upon which his labour is bestowed’.
Smith 177649
However, for Marshall – one of the founders of neoclassical economics – as
well as many neoclassical economists after him, capital is asserted to be pro-
ductive, though not on capital immanent grounds, but rather because without
its (presumed) productivity there would be no ‘justification’ (!) for profit:
‘It is not true that the spinning of yarn in a factory, after allowance has
been made for the wear-and-tear of the machinery, is the product of
the labour of the operatives. It is the product of their labour, together
with that of the employer and subordinate managers, and of the capital
employed; and that capital itself is the product of labour andwaiting: and
therefore the spinning is the product of labour of many kinds and of wait-
ing. If we admit that it is the product of labour alone, and not of labour
and waiting, we can no doubt be compelled by inexorable logic to admit
that there is no justification for Interest, the reward of waiting; for the
conclusion is implied in the premiss’.
Marshall 1972 [18901], p. 587; emphasis added
The point to be stressed is not so much the odd concept of waiting which is
somehowphysically productive, but that ‘justification’ should be the reason for
providing the argument.
Here follow two excerpts from what Keynes (1936) has to say on the issue:
‘It is much preferable to speak of capital as having a yield over the course
of its life in excess of its original cost, than as being productive. For the
only reason why an asset offers a prospect of yielding during its life ser-
vices having an aggregate value greater than its initial supply price is
because it is scarce; and it is kept scarce because of the competition of
the rate of interest on money. If capital becomes less scarce, the excess
yield will diminish, without its having become less productive – at least
in the physical sense.
I sympathise, therefore, with the pre-classical doctrine [i.e. prior to
Marshall c.s., i.e. what is now called classical political economy] that
everything is produced by labour, aided by what used to be called art and
is now called technique, by natural resources which are free or cost a
rent according to their scarcity or abundance, and by the results of past
labour, embodied in assets, which also command a price according to
49 Smith 1776, Book II, Ch. 3, section 1; see also e.g. Book I, Ch. 8, sections 7–8.
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their scarcity or abundance. It is preferable to regard labour, including,
of course, the personal services of the entrepreneur and his assistants, as
the sole factor of production, operating in a given environment of tech-
nique, natural resources, capital equipment and effective demand’.
Keynes 1936, pp. 213–14
‘Interest to-day rewards no genuine sacrifice … The owner of capital can
obtain interest because capital is scarce. But… there are no intrinsic reas-
ons for the scarcity of capital’.
Keynes 1936, p. 376
In Chapter 3 wewill seewhy there is no intrinsic reason for a scarcity of capital.
1§14-c Addendum. Comparison of the main text with conventional
marxian theory
I begin with a brief reference toMarx’s Capital I, Chapter 1. If we could abstract
from the duality of capitalist commodity production (in fact we cannot), Lα
could be viewed as a vector of ‘concrete labour’ in the process of producing
heterogeneous goods (useful entities). Given the actual duality,Marx’s concept
of what he calls ‘abstract labour’ is commodity-value producing labour (one
pole of the duality).50 My mLα is analogous to the latter, after Marx’s intro-
duction of money as the actual measure of value (Capital I, Chapter 3). I note
three issues. First, the dimension of mLα is monetary. Second, after Marx has
introduced the measure of money, his term ‘abstract labour’ disappears in
Capital. Third, in Capital I, Parts One to Three, Marx considers averages (the
average enterprise and average capital and labour); therefore here my α is not
prominent (Marx considers here ‘socially average’ – also called ‘socially neces-
sary’ – labour-time).51 See Reuten 2017 aboutMarx’s dynamic exposition in this
respect in Part Four and after.
I now compare the exposition in 1§14 with conventional marxian theory,
focusing on three main issues.
(1) Labour as the unique source of valorisation (1§14, heading 6). I argued why
labour is the unique source of valorisation. In conventional marxian theory,
labour has also been put forward as the unique element of the process of value
creation. However, this has most often been argued for on the basis of some
‘labour-embodied’ theory of value. The argument in 1§14 posits the uniqueness
of labour without any recourse to labour-embodied. (Indeed, the argument
that only labour potentially creates value-added should in no way be read to
50 Marx 1976 [18671, 18904], p. 128.
51 Ibid., p. 129.
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imply that value-added is in someway proportional to labour-time as a labour-
embodied theory of value would have it. The key point is that α is a variable
at both the microeconomic and the macroeconomic level; and that α usually
diverges between and within sectors of production.) The uniqueness of labour
as presented in 1§14 is no reason for calling that a ‘labour theory of value’.
Rather, I have presented a monetary theory of value (1D2). However, it is cor-
rect to characterise the exposition of 1§14 as a labour theory of surplus-value
(integral profit) – further amplified in the next chapters. Note that within the
framework of a ‘labour-embodied theory of value’ my term ‘value of labour’
belongs to the negative heuristic (in the sense of Lakatos 1970).
(2) The price of labour-capacity (1§14, heading 3). The thesis that the price
of the capacity to labour (i.e. the wage) has nothing to do with the ‘price of
production’ of labour-capacity, and that these terms are indeed incompatible,
appears very un-marxian.52 The determination of the wage is amplified in 2D2.
(3) The productive power of labour (Lα) and the ‘unit monetary value of labour’
(m), in the context of net value-added (1§14, heading 8). Recall the equation for
net value-added:
Yt 🢔 = [mLα]t (1.8)
This is a development and re-conceptualisation of an equation presented in a
path-breaking work by Aglietta (1979 [1976], pp. 43–4). He writes (in a different
notation for Y and L):
m = Y/L (1.8A)
calling m ‘the monetary expression of the working hour’. He next emphasises
that this equation is not a definition, but rather ‘themonetary constraint’ for the
realisation of value (i.e. the sale of commodities). I agree with his view about
m, and will return to this in Chapter 3 (3D5). However, after Aglietta, equation
1.8A became fashionable among a strand inmarxian political economy (e.g. via
the works of Lipietz 1985 and Foley 1986),53 and ‘m’ came to be called the ‘mon-
etary expression of labour-time’ (MELT), with the constraint aspect moving to
the background, though maintaining equation (1.8A) in varying notations.
Here I merely stress the fundamental difference between these equations in
the terms L versus Lα. This is not about a simple mathematical point of the dif-
ference between the two equations being that the second (i.e. MELT) has α=1.
Instead, all the MELT conceptualisations neglect the varying productive power
of labour between sectors of production (and often there is a homogeneous
52 Marx at least seems to have had in mind something like a price of production of labour-
capacity, as he conceives the wage related to the ‘reproduction of labour-power’ (‘labour-
power’, i.e. in our terminology, the capacity to labour).
53 See also Foley 2005.
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labour and a labour-embodiednotionbehind this – e.g.Moseley 2005, esp. p. 3).
Thus this concerns not a simplification (α=1), but rather a non-distinction.54
Even further, as far as I know, this distinction has never been made within
marxian political economy, or in mainstream economics.55
Anticipating Chapter 4 I mention that sector-wise relatively high K/L ratios
are usually associated with relatively high productive powers of labour (α > 1)
and vice versa (α < 1). In fact an expected rise in the productive power of labour
is a condition for the introduction of K/L rising techniques (addendum 4§4-d).
1§14-d Addendum. Capitalist production of babies and labour-capacity –
speculative remarks
Aldous Huxley’s story in Brave NewWorld is nowadays less of a fiction than it
was at the time of its writing (1932). It is technically possible to produce babies
in a capitalist production process and also to raise these to fit labour-capacity.
The question is whether and when this could be profitable (and legally per-
mitted). If this would be the case, then a self-contained circuit would be con-
structed in which it costs (aggregated) less than one hour of labour to produce
the capacity for one hour of labour. As a result, labour-capacity would become
an intermediate output and input, and the value of labour would reduce to
zero. Hence with such an annexation of the ‘creation’/‘production’ of labour-
capacity, the source of value-added would disappear. Along with it, capitalism
would disappear (cf. Reuten andWilliams 1989, p. 90).
Subdivision 5C. Grounding (sublation) of the dissociated outward bifurcation
1§15 The capitalist mode of production as solution to the dissociative
‘provision of thematerial elements for survival’ by enterprises
Given that a form of material ‘production’ (generally: transformative ac-
tivity) is indispensable for the survival of any society, the capitalist out-
ward bifurcation into households and privately owned enterprises
54 This has nothing to do with the MELT being applied either micro- or macroeconomically.
Reconsider the following equation, now interpreted as macroeconomic (but for what fol-
lows, the microeconomic case is no different):
Πt 🢔 =mLαt – wLt (1.5)
For the sake of argument, assume m, L and w to be constant, with α being normalised to
α=1 (which is implicitly the case for the MELT approach). In this case a rise in Π (integral
profit) could not be explained because an increasing intensity of labour (ϊ) or a technique-
associated rise in the productive power of labour (ά) escapes from view.
55 However, it is very interesting that Marx, in a neglected chapter of Capital I (in Part Four,
chapter 10 of the German edition, chapter 12 in the English edition), first makes the dis-
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appears as dissociative and hence utmost problematical (1D1). The en-
terprises’ dissociative production appears as resolved (sublated) in the
grounds (conditionsof existence) of themonetary-valuedimension, com-
modification and the dominance of the enterprises’ profit drive (1D2–
1D4).
However, the enterprises’ profit – more precisely surplus-value (1§12) – must
be produced. One main condition for the production of surplus-value is that
the ‘physical-technical labour process’ is grasped as a ‘valorisation process’ and
be dominated by the latter in face of the production of surplus-value (1§9–
1§11). Along with it, ‘capital’ is constituted as the monetary value-form of the
enterprises’ investment in the inwardly bifurcated inputs for production, and
as twinned with the grasping of time under production time. Posited relative
to standard time the ‘rate of integral profit on capital’ is the purified criterion
for the successful production of surplus-value (1§13). The so far final condition
(ground) for the production of surplus-value is the enterprises’ absorption of
the productive power of labour as taking on the form of valorisation – the pro-
duction of the value-added. Given the wages, labour so produces the surplus-
value and hence essentially produces capital (1§14).
Herewith the enterprises’ dissociative production appears as resolved (sub-
lated) in labour’s production of surplus-value, which, along with the enter-
prises appropriating the surplus-value, satisfies the enterprises’ driving force.
Although somemajor problems for the reproduction of the capitalist bifurc-
ated economynow seem resolved, wewill see in the following chapters that the
resolution reached so far requires further conditions to be met.
1§15-a Addendum. General comparison of Chapter 1 with Marx’s Capital
In terms of the systematic of Marx’s Capital, this chapter covers the fields of,
roughly, Parts One and Two of each of the three volumes of Capital (together
about 675 pages).56 Thus although we have in each case a movement from
the abstract-general to the concrete-specific, the order is nevertheless differ-
ent. Theoretically this chapter adopts a value-form approach emphasising the
‘monetary-value dimension’ taken on by entities within the capitalist system.
Next to a particular bifurcation dialectic, the chapter presents theoretical pro-
gress on six issues.
tinction, but later (in Part Five of the book) provides an averages account in which the
distinction is levelled out (discussed in Reuten 2017 and 2018).
56 Volume I, Chapters 1–6 (Chapters 1–4 in the German edition); Volume II, Chapters 1–17;
Volume III, Chapters 1–12.
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(1) A development of the ‘monetary value-form’ theoretic approach for all of
the fields mentioned (building on my earlier work when I used the brief
term ‘value-form’ with the same meaning – cf. 1§5-d).
(2) A refinement of the interconnection of value and money (1D2).
(3) The concept of ideal pre-commensuration and its effect on production
(1§10) – building on my earlier work.
(4) A re-conceptualisation of ‘capital’ as ideal monetary value, constituted
relative to standard time, from the first introduction of ‘capital’ onwards
(1§13). (This conceptualisation is only remotely connected to Marx’s and
marxian ideas of the circuit of a ‘singular process’ capital (1§13, point 2) –
which does not imply that the latter can be dispensed with in other con-
texts).
(5) A particular exposition of labour as the unique source of surplus-value,
in connection with the ‘productive power of labour’ (1§14).
(6) Points (1), (4) and (5) together imply that there is no general rate of profit
related ‘transformation problem’, because my point of departure is ‘full
capital’ rather thanMarx’s ‘singular process’ capital (which, inmy view, is
an embryonic conception of capital).57 In his expositionMarx postpones
the concept of the rate of profit until Capital III, Part One. In my view,
because the rate of integral profit (ωt) is essential at an abstract-general
level (one that abstractly captures the totality of the capitalist economy),
it must be presented early on.
These are alsomajor interventions inmuch currentmarxian theory. (In order to
keep this book within a reasonable length, I have refrained from extensive ref-
erences to the current literature. Whilst it is straightforward enough to insert
brief critical references when needed, it would take much more space to do
justice to the authors.)
Summary and conclusions
This chapter presents a first and abstract-general exposition of the capitalist
economy, focusing on its mode of production. The starting point is its appear-
ance in empirical reality of the outward bifurcation – the institutional separa-
tion – between, on the one hand, households that are the site of consumption
and of the pro-creation of labour-capacity and, on the other hand, privately
owned enterprises in which the production is carried out. This constellation is
57 Its problems are most transparent in Marx’s draft text for Capital, Volume II, Part Two, on
the ‘Turnover of Capital’.
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posited as dissociative even if we know that in reality the bifurcated poles are
in some way bridged. The object of the exposition is to comprehend the range
of this dissociation and the extent of its actual resolution. (Division 1.)
The poles of the outward bifurcation are apparently bridged via the trade
relation. However, the inherently multifaceted dimensions of goods and capa-
cities require commensuration in terms of a common denominator. The latter
derives from the everydaymarket ‘trans-abstraction’ that ascribes to goods and
capacities the super-sensuous dimension of ‘value’ as mediated by money –
money, which itself has no inherent content or value. Entities are made com-
mensurate in terms of this super-sensuous dimension that we ‘know’ only
through money as its quantifier, a quantifier whose guise is insignificant. The
market interaction so constitutes goods and capacities as commodities, that
is, as dual (or inwardly bifurcated) entities – duality along the multifaceted
dimensions of usability, on the one hand, and the mono-dimension of mon-
etary value, on the other.
The monetary-value dimension and the commodification of goods and la-
bour-capacity determine the market-interconnection of the poles, the enter-
prises being driven bymonetary profit. Themarket-interconnection engenders
‘merely’ the duality of things and capacities. (Divisions 2–4.)
This ‘mere’ duality becomes serious when the production in enterprises is
considered in face of the mono-drive of monetary profit. The latter then is
concretely dominant in respect of what is (not) produced and how it is (not)
produced. It affects what counts and what does not count. Astonishingly the
super-sensuousness of themonetary value of things and capacities affects their
sensuous being and coming into being. As such sensuous physical-technical
production becomes a mere instrument for valorisation – the production of
monetary value, or value-added. So much for the general form of the capitalist
production process. (Subdivision 5A.)
However, this general form lacks a criterion for determining what instru-
mental guise – namely what physical commodity and what physical tech-
nique – is most efficacious for profit.
This requires: first, a common measure for the amount of investments,
which is ‘capital’; secondly, the grasping of time of investment as ‘production
time’; and thirdly, a measure for the duration of capital investment in terms
of a standard time, which is the calendar year. The profit – more precisely
the surplus-value – gained during a year, over a year’s capital investment, that
is, the ‘rate of integral profit’, delivers the criterion. (Metaphorically: the end
‘omega’.)58
58 Apocalypse 21:6. https://www.tldm.org/bible/new testament/apoc.htm.
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Given the enterprises’ profit drive, the productionmust encompass the equi-
valent of the value-added component of profit. Even if the general form of the
capitalist production process is dominated bymonetary value and valorisation,
it necessarily also remains a physical-technical process, hence it remains a dual
process. Within this duality the main distinction between means of produc-
tion and labour-capacity (L) is that the former are inherently static elements,
whereas labour-capacity in operation, that is labour (Lα), is the active element.
Means of production can merely be operated or not be operated. Labour-
capacity operates means of production, and so exerts labour at the level of
some productive power (α), including a component of the intensity of labour.
At zero intensity (in effect a strike) there is no production, either physical or
through valorisation. Hence, along with its physical production, labour creates
the (yet ideal) value and so also the surplus-value (integral profit). Thus alpha
(α) is the ‘parameter’ of the productive transformation: the productive power
of labour in both these aspects. (Metaphorically: the beginning ‘alpha’.)59
Whereas capital constrains the possible production, the power of labour (α)
determines how much output is actually produced. The implication is that
labour–more specifically, the actual productivepowerof labour– is theunique
source of valorisation. Nevertheless this productive power is always based on
an actual technique of production. Technology and its application in specific
techniques is inevitably the result of social labour.
Labour being the creator of value-added, it is merely ‘compensated’ by the
wage, the enterprise appropriating the surplus-value, that is, the difference
between value-added and the wage. Surplus-value is generally the source of
the growth of capital. Because labour is the unique source of valorisation and
hence of surplus-value, labour essentially produces the equivalent of its own
wage as well as that of the growth of capital. Hence labour essentially produces
capital.60 (Subdivision 5B.)
Herewith, in sum, the enterprises’ dissociative production appears as re-
solved (sublated) in labour’s production of surplus-value, which thereby –with
the enterprises appropriating the surplus-value – satisfies the enterprises’ driv-
ing force. Although somemajor problems for the reproduction of the capitalist
bifurcated economy now seem resolved, we will see in the coming chapters
that the resolution reached so far requires further conditions to be met. (Sub-
division 5C.)
59 Apocalypse 21:6.
60 Thus the labour comprehending the process might claim to be the source of ‘Alpha and
Omega, the beginning and the end’ (Apocalypse 21:6).
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Introduction
Division 1 of this chapter sets out how the profit-driven production of enter-
prises – presented in Chapter 1 – necessarily gives rise to the accumulation of
capital, that is, the expansion of capital. Generally a macroeconomic growth
of the economy is produced alongside this. The next divisions of this chapter
present three main conditions of existence of the accumulation of capital.
The first condition is the expansion of labour-capacity (Division 2). This
expansion is embedded in a fairly complex constellation of determining fac-
tors. Each one of those factors has, by itself, received abundant attention in
the economic literature. The feature of their exposition in this chapter is their
interconnection. This centres, on the one hand, on the growth of the labour
population, the rate of unemployment and the wage rate, and, on the other, on
labour’s compliance during the production process, which together determine
surplus-value, the accumulation of capital and employment.
More specifically, the adjacent Division 3 presents the management of la-
bour’s compliance during production.
The second condition for the accumulation of capital is the expansion of
money (Division 4). Concretising the concept of money from Chapter 1 into
bank-issued money, it will be shown how the creation of money by commer-
cial banks accommodates the accumulation of capital.
The adjacent Division 5 indicates how the former condition is predicated on
an institutional separation between enterprises and banks.
The third condition, the corporate form of the enterprise, grounds the con-
tinuity and the possible scale of the accumulation of capital (Division 6).
The final Division 7 puts the corporate form of the enterprise in the per-
spective of the bifurcation starting point of Chapter 1, and elaborates on the
character of the private ownership of enterprises.
Scheme 2.1 outlines the systematic moments of this chapter.
At the expositional level posited thus far (Chapter 1), ‘capital in general’ was
considered.That is, individual capital in theperspective of thewhole (total cap-
ital), or, the enterprise in macroeconomic perspective. In the current chapter,
this perspectivewill be continued. Itmaybe repeated that, as before, the expos-
ition moves from general-abstract to gradually more specific-concrete con-
cepts. Thus, for example, whereas the concept of money as bank-issuedmoney
that will be presented in this chapter is fairly concrete, it still lacks concrete
connection with finance (Chapter 3). Note also that the exposition continues
to present institutions and processes that are necessary rather than contingent
to the capitalist system.
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scheme 2.1 Systematic of the Accumulation of Capital (Out-
line Chapter 2)
Legend
↡ grounded in (conditioned by)
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Division 1. Accumulation of capital
2§1 Profit augmentation
We have seen that capitalist production is driven by one-dimensional monet-
ary profit – rather than by themultifaceted usability of goods or the realisation
of human capabilities (1§11). The rationale of this mono-dimensional driving
force is more of the same: profit augmentation.
2§1-a Explication. Drive for ‘surplus-value’ and drive for ‘profit’
Recall from 1§12 the distinction between profit and surplus-value (or integral
profit), the latter being independent of the way enterprises are financed. Fin-
ance is only introduced in Chapter 3. Assuming for now a constant degree of
external finance, the terms ‘drive for profit’ and ‘drive for surplus-value’ can be
used interchangeably.
2§2 Management of the productive power of labour
It was shown that labour – more specifically the actual productive power
of labour – is theunique source of value-added, andhence also of surplus-
value and of profit. The productive power of labour covers two compon-
ents: the intensity of labour and the ‘technique-associated productive
power of labour’ (1§14).
Profit could in principle be augmented by an increasing intensity of labour, or
by a productive power of labour increasing technical change.
1 Management of the intensity of labour
Given a technique of production, a major part of the management of the pro-
duction process is that of managing the degree of intensity of labour.1 This is
predicated on the skills of the labour-capacity hired as inputs on the one hand,
and themanagement of the specific development of these skillswithin the pro-
duction process on the other. The management of the degree of intensity of
labour is connected to the organisational routines associated with a particular
technique. Even so, there are physical limits to the intensity of labour, whence
profit augmentation (2§1) seems limited.
1 Recall from 1§14, equation 1.3 the denotation of the productive power of labour by Lα, with
α = ά * ϊ. Here ά denotes a technique component and ϊ an intensity component. Note that L
refers to specifically skilled labour-capacity.
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2 Management of technological and technical change
Given these physical limits, another major part of the management of the pro-
duction process regards the choice of a technique and its specific adaptation
to the process at hand. The introduction of a new technique of productionmay
enhance the ‘technique-associatedproductive power of labour’. Alongwith this
enhanced productive power, a new process technique may both itself reduce
unit costs and create the possibility for new organisational routines to increase
the intensity of labour, and thence further decrease unit costs. With its intro-
duction the (potential) profits tend to increase for the initiating enterprises.2
Part of a given total amount of capital invested tends to be invested in the
‘research and development’ for profit-increasing new techniques of produc-
tion – that is, in valoro-technology (see 2§2-c for the latter term). Labour’s pro-
duction of knowledge leading to inventions then also takes on the monetary-
value form. This leads to the development of particular technology and the
search for particular techniques that are expected to increase profits.
2§2-a Explication. Management
The section above introduces management regarding the productive power of
labour. Management in general will be systematically introduced in 2D3.
2§2-b Explication. Limits to intensity of labour, and trade-off between
intensity and capacity utilisation
Regarding the increase in the intensity of labour, not only are there physiolo-
gical limits; there are psychological, social and moral limits, too. With a de-
crease in the length of the working day there are enhanced possibilities for an
increase in intensity of labour per hour. There is therefore a trade-off – depend-
ing on the technique of production – between the intensive use of labour and
the degree of utilisation of capacity of means of production.
2§2-c Explication. Valoro-technology and valoro-technique
The concepts of ‘technology’ and ‘technological change’ (knowledge) and ‘tech-
nique’ and ‘technical change’ (application) are broadly analogous to the
‘Schumpeterian’ concepts of ‘invention’ and ‘innovation’ respectively (cf. Free-
man 1974, p. 7). In order to emphasise that the capitalist form of technology
and the form of techniques of production are non-neutral, but rather valor-
isation driven (1§11), it would be preferable to use the terms valoro-technology
2 That this applies to the ‘initiating’ enterprises is amplified in 4§6 and 4§12 on stratification of
enterprises.
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and valoro-techniques. Having emphasised this, I henceforthmost often refrain
from explicitly adopting this terminology.
2§2-d Addendum. Marx on the productive power and intensity of labour
Marxwas the first political economist to undertake an extensive analysis of the
capitalist process of production. Almost half of the first volumeof Capital deals
with this analysis in terms of the production of absolute and relative surplus-
value (Parts 3–5).3 Particularly inChapter 12 (Chapter 10 of theGermanedition)
he presents the productive power of labour and in Chapter 15 (Chapter 13 of the
German edition) he presents the intensity of labour. Twentieth-century stand-
ard interpretations of Marx’s Capital have largely neglected how his exposition
inevitably distances itself from (Ricardian) labour-embodied concepts of value
(this is expanded upon in Reuten 2017).
2§3 Accumulation of capital
So far, profit augmentation (2§1) is limited by the given amount of capital and
the prevailing limits of the productive power of labour (2§2).
1 Augmentation of profit via investment of profit, hence capital
accumulation
Profit is further enlarged via its investment as capital, whence capital is accu-
mulated. The logic of the inward driving force of capital is the continuously
expanding valorisation of capital via its accumulation. This was briefly anticip-
ated at the end of 1§14 when it wasmentioned that labour essentially produces
capital, which means that surplus-value is accumulated.
Even if the mono-dimensional profit drive would seem to engender that all
surplus-value be invested (then ΔK =Π), this vies with the consumptive spend-
ing out of surplus-value. At the current expositional level I simply posit some,
largely contingent, ratio of accumulation out of surplus-value (å):
ΔK = åΠ [0 < å < 1] (2.1)
Thus labour produces capital (ΔK) plus the equivalent of the consumption out
of surplus-value: (1- å)Π.
3 Increasing ‘absolute surplus-value’ refers to lengthening of the working day at a given wage
per day; increasing ‘relative surplus-value’ refers to cheapening of the wage bundle at a given
real-wage. Thus these are, in effect, two mechanisms via which the real-wage per hour, i.e.
the wage rate, may decrease, thereby increasing the surplus-value per hour. In the relative
surplus-value case, real-wagesmight increase along with increasing surplus-value (cf. Reuten
2004a).
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2 Conditions for generalised accumulation of capital
Generalised accumulation of capital generates macroeconomic growth. How-
ever, because the latter is nomotive for enterprises, I start from the generalised
accumulation of capital and so get to macroeconomic effects.
There are two main conditions for generalised accumulation of capital.4
First, a continuous expansion of surplus-value and hence an expansion of
labour-capacity (Division 2). Second, a continuous expansion of the quantity-
flow of money (Division 4).5 These thus ground the accumulation of capital.
A third ground, the corporate form of the enterprise, contributes to the con-
tinuous accumulation of capital (Division 6).
2§3-a Explication: Investment and consumptive spending out of
profits – forward reference
At the current level of the exposition, a (largely contingent) ratio of accumula-
tion out of profits (å) is posited. Some determinants are presented in 3§10.
Division 2. Expansion of labour-capacity
This division presents the required expansion of labour-capacity via a series of
interconnections. The starting point in 2§4 of some rate of growth of capital
accumulation will be shown to be a result in 2§6.
2§4 Accumulation of capital – the required labour-capacity and the wage
rate
Given the technique component (ά) of the productive power of labour (α), the
micro- andmacroeconomic accumulation of capital (ΔK) necessarily requires:
• An expansion of labour-capacity (ΔL) – as created within households. This
requirement is modified by:
• An increase in the intensity component of the productive power of labour
(Δϊ) – as managed within enterprises (2§2).
This section expands on the first aspect; the second aspect is presented in 2§5.
4 That is, yet abstracting from the state (Part Two).
5 It might be considered that, analytically, we could have a generalised price deflation, which
would not require an expansion of the quantity-flow of money. However, it will be shown in
Chapter 4 that, apart from brief intervals, the capitalist system cannot survive with general-
ised price deflation.
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Henceforth the underlining of variables refers to their rate of growth.6
Henceforth also – → (or ← –) stands for ‘negatively related effect’ and +→ (or
←+) stands for positively related effect.
1 The required labour-capacity
The growth rate in labour-capacity required (L) is first determined by the
growth rate of capital accumulation (K) and by the valoro-technical capital to
labour ratio (K/L = τ) – see the left hand side of Figure 2.2. Thus:
L = (1/τ) K [requirement] (2.2)
[continued]
figure 2.2 Interconnection of the rate of capital accumulation
and the growth rate of labour-capacity input
6 Thus xt = (xt-1 – xt) / (xt-1). Note that in the main text, unless otherwise indicated, time sub-
scripts t are implicit (thus for x read xt).
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2§4 Continued
Whereas labour-capacity is an input for the enterprises, andwhereas it is traded
commodity-like on amarket (1D3) it is not produced as a commodity but rather
‘created’ in the sphere of households (cf. 1§14, point 3). Children, generally, are
not created and rearedwith a view to sale. (Nevertheless a particular education
may be instrumental to the ‘saleability’ of labour-capacity on the market).7
Generally the input of labour-capacity is fed from the reserve of labour-
capacity, i.e. the unemployed (U), with the latter being fed by the growth of the
labour population (see the bottom of Figure 2.2). Thus the rate of unemploy-
ment (u) increases with the growth of the labour population, and decreases
with the growth of employment:8
τL – → u ←+ labour population (2.3′)
Or, for the same, algebraic:
u = f1(τL) + f2(pop) [f1′ < 0; f2′ > 0] (2.3)
Population and labour population growth is determined by apparently contin-
gent socio-economic and socio-cultural factors. It is a problem for capitalist
enterprises that the reserve of labour is rather indeterminate and thus hard to
control.9
The interconnections presented in Figure 2.4 summarise how employers
(and many economists with them) like to see the matter: the growth of capital
positively affects employment, and so decreases unemployment (that is, when
τ is fixed).Thenany remainingunemployment results from(‘their’) labour pop-
ulation growth. This reasoning is correct. However, we will see in 2§6 that this
is only half of the story.
2 Labour-capacity and the wage rate
Whereas for straight commodities a demand-induced price increase evokes an
increase in their production, demand-induced wage increases do not evoke
an increasing ‘production’ of children. In this respect the ‘labour market’ –
inasmuch as the ‘money market’ – is very different from ordinary commodity
markets (Explication 2§4-a).
At the current level of the exposition, it suffices to establish that to the
extent that population growth results in a continuous or recurrent reserve of
labour, there is a continuous or recurrent downward pressure on wages, and
7 Public education is presented in Chapter 7.
8 The rate of unemployment (u) is defined as u = (N – L)/N, where N is the labour population,
i.e. the potential labour-capacity in contradistinction to the employed labour-capacity (L).
9 See Chapter 7, esp. 7D3.
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vice versa. Thus, more specifically (see equations 2.4), changes in the rate of
unemployment (Δu) are the major determinant of changes in the wage rate
(Δw). However, a secondary determinant of wage rate changes is a change in
the rate of growth of employment of labour-capacity (ΔL). (Amplification 2§4-
b.)
Δu – → Δw ←+ ΔL (2.4′)
Or, for the same, algebraic:
Δw = f1(Δu) + f2(ΔL) [f1′ < 0; f2′ > 0; f1 dominates] (2.4)
Because the rate of growth of employment of labour-capacity also affects
changes in the rate of unemployment, there is also a second order effect of the
former on the wage rate. (See Figure 2.3).
figure 2.3 General determinants of changes in the wage rate
2§4-a Explication. Peculiarities of the money and labour markets as
compared with straight commodity markets
Money and labour-capacity are similar in that it is merely their demand, not
their supply, which mimics commodity markets. As to their supply they are
similar in that they are not ‘produced’, but rather created (in the sense of
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1§1 – the processes of creation are dissimilar). For the money market this non-
production and creation is amplified in 2D4.
2§4-b Amplification. The effect of changes in (un)employment on the
wage rate (equation 2.4)
The insight of the effect of changes in employment on the wage rate can be
traced back to Smith (1776) and is also emphasised by Marx (1976 [1867],
pp. 763 and 772). (Cf. Reuten 2004b, p. 285). Briefly, the unemployment effect
stems from unemployed workers bidding down wages; the employment effect
stems from enterprises’ bidding up wages when employment accelerates and
when various types of labour become scarce. The combination of the twomay
account for wage increases even when there is unemployment.
2§4-c Addendum. Subsistence wages and population growth
Recall that the exposition is about full capitalism in general, which for quite
a few countries dates back to the nineteenth century. Generally, demand-
induced wage increases do not evoke an increasing ‘production’ of children.
Nevertheless, in the limit case of an around subsistence wage, wages do have
an indirect effect on population growth and the supply of labour-capacity.10 In
this limit case we have, in brief, the following long-run cyclical development.
A prevailing labour abundance drives wages down to below the subsistence
level. Population growth then decreases, not so much because of birth rates,
but rather because starvation (and especially child starvation) increases. This
decrease would generate a labour shortage in relation to the rate of accumu-
lation, whence wages increase again (above subsistence level), giving rise to
population growth (less starvation) and labour abundance. And so on.11 Along
this path, the rate of accumulation may accelerate up when wages decrease,
and down when wages increase.
10 Compare the ‘laws of population growth’ as theorised by classical political economy.
WhilstMalthus’s account is best known, there aremany forerunners (see Schumpeter 1972
[1954], pp. 250–8). Note that the reasoning in the remainder of this Addendum applies to
a constellation in the absence of any (perhaps state-instituted) welfare provisions. For its
manifestation the reader might think of nineteenth-century Europe or much of Africa at
the turn of the twenty-first century.
11 Thus themain ‘mechanism’ lies in rates of starvation rather than birth rates. For the reader
trained in neoclassical economics, who is perplexed by this ‘picture’, they may contem-
plate that in the traditional exposition of the labour market (think of the cross diagram)
there are no guarantees whatsoever that the equilibrium wage is one above the subsist-
ence level.
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2§5 The rate of surplus-value: wages and the productive power of labour
Recall from 1§14 the formulas for production (X), for the amount of surplus-
value (Π), and for the rate of integral profit (ω):
Xt 🢔 = [(δ +μ)K + mLα]t (1.4)
Πt =mLαt – wLt (1.5)
ωt = Πt / Kt′ = [(mLα)t – (wL)t] / Kt′ (1.6)
I now merely introduce a new definition: the ‘rate of surplus-value’ (e), which
is a measure for the capital-labour distribution of income, that is, the capital
share (Π) over the labour share (wL)12
et = Πt / wLt = (mLαt – wLt)/(wLt) [definition] (2.5)
A positive rate of surplus-value (e > 0) is a condition for a positive rate of integ-





A positive rate of surplus-value is conditioned by a range of combinations of
some wage rate (w) along with some exerted power of labour in production
(α).
w↑ – → e ← + α↑ (2.7′)
Or, for the same, algebraic:
et = f1(w)t + f2(α)t [f1′ <0; f2′ >0] (2.7)
The condition allows for the mutual variation of both factors. However, for
any given valoro-technique (2§3) the range of the variability of the product-
ive power of labour is limited, to the extent that the intensity of labour (Lϊ) is
limited (2§2). Thus:
(ϊ)t = (|ϊ|)t (2.8)
Because α = ά * ϊ (equation 1.3), we also have
(α)t = (|α|)t [implication] (2.9)
Whereas the valoro-technique conditions the productive power of labour, the
intensity component is co-determined by the labourer’s degree of compliance
with the conditions of the production process. Compliance is a complex factor
that is itself determined by both micro factors (such as the local manage-
ment of the production process and the rate of unemploymentwithin a sector)
and macro factors (such as the general rate of unemployment and the gen-
eral enterprise-labour relations) that are themselves intricate. A ‘high’ rate of
unemployment tends to go along with compliance (fear of being sacked: being
12 The rate of surplus-value is the core concept in Marx’s Capital, Volume I, Parts 3–6 (about
430 pages).
13 The systemic necessity is for positive rate of surplus-value (which does not exclude ‘max-
imum’ profits as in neoclassical theory – cf. Alchian 1950).
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substituted by another worker). Further there is a positive relation between
compliance and changes in the wage rate. Within limits wage increases then
positively affect the intensity component of the power of labour (and vice
versa).14 Thus as to the rate of surplus-value there is a trade-off between what
is reached in wage bargaining and in production (see Figure 2.4).
figure 2.4 Determinants of the rate of surplus-value
14 In ‘New Keynesian’ economics a similar thesis is proposed in the ‘efficiency wage theory’
(see e.g. Snowdon and Vane 2002a, pp. 200–1).
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2§6 Interconnection of capital accumulation, labour-capacity and the
rate of unemployment
Along with the amount of labour employed, the resulting rate of surplus-value
(e) determines profits (Π = ewL), which, together with any given ratio of accu-
mulation out of surplus-value (å, eqn. 2.1, 2§3), determines the degree of capital
accumulation (ΔK):
ΔK = åewL [implication] (2.10)
Then the growth in employment of labour-capacity (L) moves along with
the rate of capital accumulation (K = ΔK/K) and the technically determined
capital-labour ratio:
L = (1/τ)K (2.2)
And so forth – see Figure 2.5. Note that this outline is based on a prevailing state
of techniques and K/L ratio, and hence τ is not a constant (2§2).15
Thus ‘e’, the rate of surplus-value, determines the degree of the employment
of labour.16 Reasoned purely from the side of the enterprises’ employment of
labour, the following simple ‘equilibrating’ mechanism prevails:
• an increasing rate of accumulation of capital (ΔK) gives rise to an increasing
wage rate – equations 2.2 and 2.4 – (the latter is moderated or annihilated
by unemployment, in which case the accumulation may further accelerate;
however, at some point an increasing rate of accumulationwill lower unem-
ployment to a level where it no longer moderates or annihilates an increase
in the wage rate);
• if the increasing wage rate does not, or can no longer, go along with an
increasing power of labour in production (the physically and/or mentally
limited intensity component of α), the rate of surplus-value (e) is tempered
and so the rate of accumulation of capital (equations 2.5 and 2.6);
• a stagnating or decreasing rate of accumulation presses down wages and
pushes up the rate of surplus-value whence the rate of accumulation may
again take off.
Labour feeds the process of the expansion of capital inwardly (e) and at dis-
tance outwardly (population growth). However, the conditions are set by the
implications of the inward bifurcation of the capitalist production process.
[continued]
15 Amplified in 4§4 and 4D2–4D3.
16 From the perspective of labour as a whole, it is rather perverse that employment depends
on exploitation and that wage rate increases may effectuate stagnating or decreasing
employment.
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figure 2.5 Interconnection of the unemployment rate, product-
ive power of labour and rate of capital accumulation
(integration Figures 2.2–2.4)
2§6 continued
Although labour is the active generative power of the process, it is bound to pass-
ively follow the track set by the conditions (as long as the conditions are accep-
ted).
Ultimately this track is determined by the enterprises’ (rather than labour’s)
private property of the means of production (1§1). Reconsidering the employ-
ment and unemployment ‘benevolent’ Figure 2.2, and comparing it with Fig-
ure 2.5, further reflection reveals that, within capitalist relations, the rate of
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unemployment is in fact a key factor. At zero unemployment, wages rise and
(given the limited intensity of labour) the production of surplus-value damp-
ens. Thus, in brief, capitalist production and the accumulation of capital re-
quire unemployment.
2§6-a Amplification. The world behind the unemployment figures
We are accustomed to read the regularly published rates of unemployment
(4%, 11% or whatever) as an inevitable fact of life. Behind it is not only loss of
income and the humiliating redundancy of the former (or new) workers con-
cerned, but also the effects on their children (my mother/father is redundant)
that are carried with them well beyond the dreadful times.
Division 3. Managerial labour and the enterprise-labour relation
So far, the main part of the exposition explicitly presented two categories of
actors: labourers and enterprises. This brief division (one section) introduces
the category of managerial labour.
2§7 Managerial labour and the enterprise-labour relation
The production of surplus-value (1§14) is in many respects the ‘Achilles
heel’ of the system, one that must be overcome bymaking labour comply
during production with the monetary-value dimension and the require-
ments of profit-making (2D2).
1 Managerial labour or ‘management’
Only in very small enterprises is the owner of the enterprise able to be the
sole manager. Generally the ownership of the enterprise (owner or owners) is
dependent on managerial labour to carry out managerial work. Whatever the
particular institutional form of the enterprise (expanded on in 2D6), it must
be managed so as to make labour comply with the objectives of the enter-
prise. Ultimately the upshot of this management is the welcoming of labour
that does comply, and the sacking of labour that does not comply. However,
because there may be subtle modes of non-compliance, there must be subtle
methods of securing compliance, that is, ways of reaching what is called ‘good
labour relations’.
Thismanagement is itself labour, and so is carried out bymanagerial labour.
Its function entails that it must be elevated beyond, and considered to be super-
ior to, ‘ordinary labour’ (much like an ordinary person being raised to the peer-
age). The requirement for such elevation is that themanagerial labourer – now
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‘manager’ – has internalised the norms of the enterprise. In brief these con-
cern the optimal production of surplus-value, with a view to an optimal rate
of integral profit and accumulation of capital. (See 2§7-b on the terms of inter-
nalisation versus compliance).
Consequent on the elevation, this ‘labour’, rather than being ‘waged’, is nom-
inated to be ‘salaried’ (non-mundane) and is often held out the prospect of
sharing in the profit of the enterprise.17
2 Labour, managerial labour and wage differentials
‘Management’ in the previous subsection referred especially to the top exec-
utive management (and ultimately its ‘chiefs’) as the executive officer(s) of
capital.
However, this does not exclude that the middle and lower management, or
even the ordinary labour, may have internalised the norms of the enterprise
rather than merely complying with these.
Ultimately themost important function of the topmanagement is to secure
the compliance of labour by raising the degree of voluntary rather than invol-
untary conformism of its labour. There are several ways of ‘human resources
management’ contributing to this. However, it is consistent with themonetary-
value dimension to achieve this predominantly through the wage rate. Given
the perception that an overall increase in the wages sum generally impedes
profits, the compliance of the majority of labour is achieved via wage rate dif-
ferentials between labour, and theperspective (or dream)of the lower echelons
of upward movement on the wages ladder. Along with it go the status and
influence associatedwith an upwardmovement. All this requires the (self-)per-
ception that the lower rated work is important though inferior. Such a self-
perception is required for the lower echelons so that they can reconcile them-
selves to their position.
Thus for a given wages sum of each enterprise, the top management must
seek awages ladder (including their ownwages) that optimises theoverall com-
pliance (see also 2§7-c on ideology).
3 The enterprise-labour relation
In sum, the top-management manages what I henceforth will briefly call the
‘enterprise-labour relation’. This is the employment relation through which
17 ‘Labour’ in the first part of this sentence is in inverted comma’s because from the self-
perspective of these managers they ‘work’ without being sociologically a labourer or a
worker.
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labour, as determined by its ‘productive power’, produces the value-added and
hence also the surplus-value, the latter being appropriated by the enterprise
(1§14–1§15). In its quantitative aspect (the rate of surplus-value) this relation
is constrained by, first, the technique of production, second, the rate of unem-
ployment (2§6), and third (in face of that rate), the management of the com-
pliance of labour during production, as assisted by the managerial device of a
wages ladder that optimises this compliance.
2§7-a Explication. ‘Actors’
I use the term ‘actor’ or ‘social actor’ in a very general sense of ‘activity’. An actor
may be an individual (that is, an individual in a particular role, for example that
of labourer, entrepreneur, manager) or a (corporate) ‘person’ in the legal sense,
hence also an institution such as an enterprise, or the agent of a particular insti-
tution (e.g. enterprise).
2§7-b Explication. Compliance with and internalisation of norms
Whereas ordinary labour must be incited to comply with the norms of the
enterprise, the requirement for the management is that it has internalised the
norms of the enterprise. Christian Bay expounds the social-psychological con-
cepts of compliance and internalisation as follows:
‘Compliance refers to obedience or conformity without a conviction that
this behavior is desirable in itself. (…) Internalization … means a readi-
ness to conform to norms that have become integrated in the individual’s
self or in his cognitive outlook. (…) Internalization can insure conformity
throughout the lives of the individuals affected. Moreover, … internaliza-
tion, unlike coerced compliance, tend[s] to produce a “responsible” kind
of conformity. The voluntary conformist differs from the involuntary one
in that he is motivated and flexible enough to add elements of rationality
or efficiency in promoting the norms or purposes for which he has been
recruited.’
BAY 1979 [1958], pp. 252, 317–18
I merely record that the attitudes contributing to this internalisation are often
imparted in themainstreambusiness and economics schools that educate pro-
spective managers.18
18 The ‘principal-agent’ literature in economics in general lacks any notion of internalisa-
tion on the part of the agent. Hence its primary focus on ‘monitoring’ and on individual
financial rewards.
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2§7-c Amplification. The (self-)perception of the inferiority or
superiority of one type of labour versus the other
Heilbroner (1986 [1985], p. 107) conceives of ‘ideologies’ as ‘systems of thought
and belief by which dominant classes explain to themselves how their social
system operates and what principles it exemplifies. Ideological systems there-
fore exist not as fictions but as “truth” – and not only evidential truths but as
moral truths.’
For wage differences this would relate to the belief of the top manage-
ment that their own labour is superior to that of the middle management
and so forth for ‘ordinary’ labour, and hence that the executive management
deserves a superior wage, and so forth the inferior labour deserving inferior
wages. In the self-perception of groups of labour these differentials then work
in the opposite direction: because of the superior/inferior wage, the work
must be superior/inferior. This is how ideologies as systems of belief have real
effect.
Regarding changes in the distribution of labour income over time (for ex-
ample in terms of deciles), it would be hard to defend that a further skewing of
the distribution towards the top decile(s) would hence mean that the work of
the top has become more superior.
All this (2§7) implies that whereas ‘labour’ is a homogeneous economic cat-
egory, it is not sociologically homogeneous. Even further, the sociological het-
erogeneity is a requirement for the reproduction of the capitalist system.19
Division 4. Money expansion
The first condition of existence of the accumulation of capital (2D1) is the
expansion of labour-capacity and its productive power at a wage rate enabling
an average positive rate of profit (2D2). Its second condition – presented in the
current division – is the expansion in some way of the quantity-flow of money
accommodating the accumulation of capital. The division starts with a con-
cretisation of the Chapter 1 concept of money into bank-created money (2§8);
it then moves to inter-bank relations (2§9); and finally connects money cre-
ation to the accumulation of capital (2§10).
19 I am grateful to Susan Himmelweit for a thought-provoking discussion that convincedme
that this is a necessity rather than a contingency.
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2§8 Money concretised as bank-issuedmoney: money creation by banks
We have seen that ‘value’ is the abstract-general one-dimensionality that
absorbs and reduces the heterogeneous qualities of entities as their com-
mon denominator in the market (1§3). Money is the mundane mediator
and measure of value. It has no inherent content and it has no inherent
value. It is ‘merely’ the quantifier through which value appears (1§4).
When in this chapter (and the following chapters of Part One) I refer to ‘banks’,
these are commercial banks, without reference to a Central Bank or to the
state. Thus money creation (presented below) refers purely to the money cre-
ation by commercial banks (i.e. profit-seeking entities). Such a presentation
is adequate, because in actual practice – even when the state and a Central
Bank have been introduced in Chapter 7 – it is primarily the commercial banks
(henceforth ‘banks’) that carry out themoney creation. This section introduces
money creation from the perspective of one single independent bank. The next
section introduces the constellation of several banks.
Whereas all economic actors are, or can be, clients of a bank, in this divi-
sion – in view of the accumulation of capital – the focus is on the enterprises’
clientele.
1 Money creation
Consistent with the concepts of money (1§4), capital (1§13–1§14) and the accu-
mulation of capital (2§3) developed thus far, money concretely exists as bank-
issuedmoney. Thus bank-issued money is the concretemedium through which
value appears, and is perceived as reflected onto entities (1§4).
A bank issues money that it creates ‘ex nihilo’ (out of nothing). The basis for
that creation is a reciprocal credit relationship between the bank and a client.
On the basis of some collateral, the client borrows a sum of money from the
bank (booked as an entry on the asset side of the bank’s balance sheet; an oblig-
ation by the client to the bank). At the same time the bank creates this sum of
money ‘ex nihilo’ and credits the client’s account for it (booked as an equival-
ent entry on the liabilities side of the bank’s balance sheet; an obligation by
the bank to the client). See Figure 2.6. So initially at least, the bank immedi-
ately borrows back the sum of money that it lent out. Initially, that is, before
the client makes payments from its account to other accounts – when it pays
into other accounts, the latter account holders lend in that money to the bank.
(See Explication 2§8-a).
[continued]
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figure 2.6 ‘Ex nihilo’ money creation by commercial banks on the basis of a
reciprocal credit relationship
new loan to client by bank ex nihilomoney creation by bank
[= client’s issue of an obligation]† [= crediting of client’s account]‡
[= asset of bank] [= liability of bank]
† Collateral based, as specified by contract.
‡ Alternatively: banknotes newly issued by the bank at hand (alternatively: cheques instead
of banknotes)
2§8 continued
Alternatively, instead of paying the sum of money into the client’s account, the
bank may issue its banknotes to the client (equally an obligation by the bank
that appears on the liabilities side of its balance sheet).20
As indicated, the bank createsmoney on the basis of some collateral, i.e. the
pawning, mortgaging or cession of some security title: that in some property or
an expected future income stream. An interest – or a commission – is charged
as price for this service.21 For the bank the latter is the driving motive for the
money creation.
The bank (implicitly) promises that the money that it lends is a trustworthy
medium of value, accepted (at least) by the other clients of the bank.22 The
client promises that it will return the borrowed money in due time as stipu-
lated by contract, along with an agreed interest. Thus the client (implicitly)
promises that the activity for which the sum of money is going to be used
will be successful enough to repay the loan, thus that the activity is also trust-
worthy.
To the extent that the client must offer a security title, whereas the bank
provides no guarantees about its money being trustworthy – other than the
bank’s good name – the reciprocal credit relationship is uneven.
20 These would indeed be banknotes issued by this bank. If the bank is called ‘Emicon Bank’,
then the bank issues Emicon notes – somewhat similar to Emicon cheques. There is no
reason to havemore or less trust in the bank’s account than in the bank’s notes or cheques.
21 The concept of interest is systematically introduced in Chapter 3 (3§4–3§5). For the cur-
rent expositional level, the concept of ‘commission’ is sufficient. When in this chapter I
use the term ‘interest’ this may be substituted for the term ‘commission’.
22 Throughout this chapter I use the term ‘trustworthy’ instead of ‘fiduciary’ or ‘fiducial’ in
order to evade the perhaps different connotations of the latter terms in various monetary
and financial discourses.
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2 Bank account money
Regarding money creation there is no fundamental difference between ‘bank-
issued money notes’ and ‘bank account money’ (or ‘bookkeeping money’), the
latter being transferred by signature or electronically.23 There is a tendency for
bank-issued money notes to develop into bank account money. This tendency
is predicated on, first, cost efficiency. For each of the bank and the enterprises
(aswell as other agents), the holding of physicalmoney incurs ‘carrying costs’.24
Secondly, the created bank accountmoney stays with the bank so that, on aver-
age at least, its lending power increases. Its profit tends to increase at the same
time.
Because there is no fundamental difference between the two forms of
money, and because of the tendency referred to, I henceforth restrict myself
to presenting bank account money.25
The implication and condition of full ‘bank accountmoney’ is that all actors
hold bank accounts; in particular it implies that the wage bill is paid into the
bank accounts of labourers and that (most) household transactions are carried
out via bank accounts. Loans from banks to households are only dealt with in
Chapter 3 (these are important though contingent and are therefore dealt with
in its Appendix 3B).
It is important to the exposition (and the comprehension of money) that
the section above presents money as created by a commercial bank without it
being predicated on the existence of a Central Bank. (The latter is introduced
only in the next section; though prior to the introduction of the state in Part
Two, a Central Bank will be called a ‘Clearing Bank’).
2§8-a Explication. Money creation by a bank
Sheet 2.7a displays the simplified (end of year) balance sheet of a bank. The
amount ƒB on the assets side is the sum of the money created by this bank on
the basis of ‘securities backed loans’, the equivalent is the current accounts on
the liabilities side. The bank’s own capital ƒA is invested in property such as the
bank’s buildings and othermaterial assets. (Systematically the bank’s capital ƒA
is pre-posited. This pre-position is grounded in 3D4).
23 Although other authors may use the term ‘money of account’ in other senses, the term
‘bank account money’ is henceforth used in the sense of ‘current account’ money, that is,
‘book entries’ with banks.
24 The term ‘carrying costs’ stems from Keynes (1936), I presume. When he uses the term in
reference to money, he refers to money of account and its low or negligible carrying costs
(Keynes 1936, p. 227).
25 To be sure: the bank notes issued by the Emicon bank that someone holds represent a
credit to the Emicon bank. Notes issued by a Central Bank (introduced only in Chapter 7)
represent a credit to the Central Bank – moreover, a zero interest credit.
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sheet 2.7a Simplified balance sheet of a bank
Assets Liabilities
property ƒ A capital ƒ A
securities backed loans ƒ B current accounts ƒ B




Sheet 2.7b displays the balance alteration upon the creation of new money for
client X against a securities backed loan.
sheet 2.7b Additional money creation: alteration of bank’s balance sheet
securities backed loan to client X
(at 4%)
ƒ 100 current account client X
(= borrowed from X)
ƒ 100
Sheet 2.7b reveals a ‘lengthening’ of the bank’s balance, i.e. a growth of the
bank’s activity.When clients cancel loans we see the reverse. Sheet 2.7c displays
the alteration upon the payment of a sum of ƒ80 from client X to client Z.
sheet 2.7c Transfer of money between bank’s clients: alteration of bank’s bal-
ance sheet
securities backed loan to client X
(at 4%)
ƒ 100 current account client X
(= borrowed from X)
ƒ20
current account client Z
(= borrowed from Z)
ƒ80
2§8-b Amplification. Historical forms of bank issued money
The main text of 2§8 immediately presents the contemporary dominant form
of money (entries in bank accounts). Most economics textbooks from around
the year 2015 still present ‘modern’ money (1973 and after) by way of historical
narratives in terms of commodity money (e.g. gold) and next so-called ‘high
powered money’ as issued by Central Banks.
Several concrete forms of money (including commoditymoney or commod-
ity-based money) are compatible with the necessary requirements of money
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set out in the previous chapter (1§4). However, to the extent that the concept
of capital is associatedwithunrelenting accumulationof capital, some formsof
money will be more appropriate than others and the former will tend to drive
out the latter.
First. A pure gold-commodity-money configuration, for example, may be
compatible with capitalism only as long as the rate of accumulation of cap-
ital in the physical gold sector can keep pace with the general rate of accu-
mulation of capital; it would further require comparable rates of productivity
increase sincewith productivity in the gold sector lagging behind, the economy
would run into a constellation of general price deflation and potential depres-
sion.
Second. Regarding the potential for accumulation of capital, there is an
important difference between the cases of, first, the storing of commodities
as securities at the bank (as with pure commodity money), and second, the
mere pledging of the title to commodities. In the first case the commodit-
ies are retreated from circulation, thus throughout a twofold accumulation
is required, not only that in production capital but also that in, say, precious
metals or other commodity stocks. Obviously this hampers the potential speed
of the accumulation of capital since the precious metals securities (in this
case) are mere hoards. In the second case the securitised commodities (plant,
equipment, etc.) can function in production as it is merely their title that is
pledged.
2§8-c Addendum. A Monetary Circuit approach
The exposition of money in the current division is different from that of main-
stream economics, and especially that of themainstream textbook economics.
In its formal aspect (cf. the bank balance sheets in this and a number of Explic-
ations to come) the current exposition has roots in the Post-Keynesian and
especially theMonetaryCircuit approaches tomoney. (References areprovided
in Addendum 3§2-d).
Around 2015, and as against themainstream economics textbook approach-
es to ‘money’, thenotion thatmoney is endogenous and that it is predominantly
createdby commercial banks, is gainingmomentumamongst researchers asso-
ciated with central banks and the IMF. See especially Bindseil and König (2013)
and Jakab and Kumhof (2015) and the references they provide. These authors
work, respectively, at the EuropeanCentral Bank, theGerman Institute for Eco-
nomic Research, the IMF, and the Bank of England.
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2§9 Domain extension and inter-bank clearing: inter-bank trust and the
Clearing Bank
1 Interconnection between banks
To the extent that banks operate independently of each other, I refer to that
constellation as a ‘fragmented banking system’. (This is what was implicitly
presented in the previous section).26 Such a constellation limits the market
domain for enterprises (the ‘extent of the market’) to the domain over which
that money is an effective medium of value.
In order to extend the operation of themoney they issue, independently oper-
ating banksmust seek agreement between them to accept each other’s money,
at some exchange rate (conversion rate), for the settlement of their clients’
debts. This implies that there may be debt relations between banks – serviced
at some rate of interest agreed upon. Thus banks must trust each other – at
least temporarily. A transfer of money betweenbank clients, e.g. frombankA to
bank B, implies that the ‘receiving’ bank B must provide credit to the transfer-
ring bank A. Bank B might be in the position to clear with bank A,27 otherwise
the credit would have to be sustained against an interest. (Explication 2§9-c,
Sheets 2.8).
2 Interconnections between banks as mediated by a Clearing Bank
Alternatively banks may clear via a (dominant) bank in which they place ‘high
trust’. The latter bank then operates as aClearingBank (ClB), against an interest
or commission. Then this ClB may impose its own standard of money on the
banks for which it clears. To the extent that the other banks adopt this stand-
ard, their domain of operation is extended. Should one bank (e.g. A) remain
in debt with the ClB, and so via the ClB with other banks, then the ClB will
request interest as well as securities (collateral) from the bank in debt – part
of the interest that the ClB charges may be distributed to the creditor banks.28
(Explication 2§9-c, Sheets 2.9.)
This way the ClB will also set a standard for securities and impose liability
rules (see 2§9-b). In fact this is one of the main necessary conditions for the
26 Historically all regional banking systems started off from a high degree of fragmentation.
This is immaterial to the systematic exposition, even if on this matter the historical and
the systematic accounts run somewhat parallel.
27 That is, in case of an equivalent counter transfer fromB to A, the debt-credit relationships
cancel out.
28 Note that when particular banks place high trust in each other, they may evade the ClB’s
interest margin by borrowing and lending directly to each other.
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money domain extension. Once some ClB is dominant, a self-reinforcing pro-
cess compels banks to operate under the umbrella of this ClB, first because this
extends the domain for their clients, and second (and relatedly), because other
banks may refuse to deal with banks that adopt different standards.
Note that because the state and especially its monetary framework has not
yet been introduced, the ClB has no legal powers. It is merely a dominant com-
mercial bank.
3 Money creation
Whereas theClB can impose a standard for securities and impose liability rules,
it has, in comparisonwith the other banks, no specific powers regardingmoney
creation. It creates money for its own clients, inasmuch as the other banks do
for their clients. However, if it were to abstain from competition with the other
banks, it might abstain from relations with non-bank actors, and so abstain
from regular money creation.29 As such it would be a pure clearing bank (so
earning profits purely from the clearing).
2§9-a Explication. Systematic exposition – no historical narrative
I emphasise once more that all of the exposition – including that of money –
is not a historical narrative, but a purely systematic exposition. It is the latter’s
logic of grounding the moments that were presented earlier on that determ-
ines the next step. Nevertheless it may at times be the case that the systematic
exposition happens to parallel an apparent ‘logical’ history. Thus even if histor-
ically wemay have seen, for example, a development from fragmented banking
to a clustering of banks around a dominant bank that operates as a Clear-
ing Bank, this is accidental to the systematic exposition. In other words, I am
just gradually setting out the systematic logic of the current capitalist banking
structure (2D4 as continued in Chapter 3), albeit with the state and its Central
Bank abstracted from it (Chapter 7).
In fact the current division sets out (the limits of) the conditions of existence
of a banking constellation under the umbrella of a completely independent
‘Central Bank’ – at the current level of abstraction (all of Part One), this is what
is called a ‘Clearing Bank’.
29 It might then still engage in money creation via the purchase of financial paper on the
openmarket (usually with the purpose of selling it later, so undoing themoney creation).
Thus by ‘regular’ money creation I refer to the continuous process of money creation – at
the current stage of the exposition especially for enterprises.
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2§9-b Explication. Standard for securities and liability rules
TheClearing Bank (inChapter 7 theCentral Bank) sets rules for the banks oper-
ating under its umbrella. Standards for security pertain to the banks’ assets,
especially the composition of types of assets and their degree of risk. These
may also determine the degree of enforced loans of banks with the ClB. The
more general ‘liability rules’ relate to the liabilities side of the banks’ balance
sheet. These may include conditions on the banks’ degree of solvency, specific
(other) ratios of the composition of the liabilities, and on the assets-liabilities
maturity matches.
2§9-c Explication. Clearing via the Clearing Bank
The clearing between banks themselves, or clearing via a Clearing Bank (ClB),
is illustrated in the following sets of balance sheet alterations. It is assumed that
the banks clear, apart from one sum, which is a payment (of ƒ80) by a client X
of Bank A to a client Z of Bank B.
Sheets 2.8 are about clearing between banks (florin, ƒ, is the standard of
money)30
Sheet 2.8a records an initial creation of money: a reciprocal credit (2§8-b).
sheet 2.8a Alteration Balance Sheet Bank A: money creation
Assets Liabilities
securities backed loan to client X
(at 4%)
ƒ 100 current account client X
(= borrowed from X)
ƒ 100
sheet 2.8b Alteration Balance Sheet Bank A: transfer of ƒ80 from Xwith Bank
A, to Z with Bank B
sec. backed loan to X ƒ100 current account client X
borrowed from Bank B (at 3%)
ƒ20
ƒ80
30 To simplify the presentation it is assumed that banks A and B have already adopted the
standard of money of the Clearing Bank.
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sheet 2.8c Alteration Balance Sheet Bank B: transfer of ƒ80 from Xwith Bank
A to Z with Bank B
loan to Bank A (at 3%) ƒ80 current account client Z ƒ80
Sheets 2.8band2.8c:On the transfer of money frombankA tobankB, the receiv-
ing bank (B) must provide an equivalent loan to the money transferring bank
(A). Bank B will only be happy to receive this money, and hence to provide a
loan to A, if it has confidence in A. (In the absence of clearing via a clearing
bank, possible non-confidence is the root of a potential paralysing of the pay-
ment system).
Sheets 2.9 show the clearing via the Clearing Bank (ClB). Starting from Sheet
2.8a, banks A and B may, instead of a direct clearing between them, clear via a
ClB.
sheet 2.9a Alteration Balance Sheet ClB: clearing and inter-bank credit
Assets Liabilities
loan to bank A (at 3.5%)
(securities backed)†
ƒ80 borrowed from Bank B
(at 2.5%)
ƒ80
sheet 2.9b Alteration Balance Sheet Bank A: clearing and inter-bank credit
sec. backed loan to X (4%) ƒ 100 current account client X ƒ20
borrowed from ClB (3.5%) ƒ80
sheet 2.9c Alteration Balance Sheet Bank B: clearing and inter-bank credit
loan to ClB (at 2.5%) ƒ80 current account client Z ƒ80
† If bank A cannot provide securities we see the simple basis of a potential banking crisis
(expanded on in 2§10 and 2§10-b).
2§9-d Amplification. Enforced borrowing by banks from the ClB
Anticipating anynon-clearing (or for other policy reasons) the dominantClear-
ing Bank may compel the banks that operate under its umbrella to (continu-
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ously) borrow an amount of money from the ClB. Recall the simplified full bal-
ance sheet 2.7a from 2§8-b for a single bank (now called bank A).
sheet 2.7a Simplified balance sheet Bank A
Assets Liabilities
property ƒ A capital ƒ A
securities backed loans ƒ B current accounts ƒ B
(at some average interest rate of
b%)
Suppose the compelled borrowing, against a security title, amounts to a sum
ƒC. This sum appears on the liabilities side of Sheet 2.10a as a debt to the ClB
(the sum C2), and equally at the assets side of the ClB in Sheet 2.10b (the sum
C3). C1=C2=C3=C4.
sheet 2.10a Simplified Balance Sheet Bank A: enforced borrowing from ClB
Assets Liabilities
property
loan to ClB (at c%)
securities backed loans










Next the ClB lends out this sum to bank A: it credits the account of A for the
sum C4 (which appears at B’s assets side as C1).
sheet 2.10b Alteration Balance Sheet ClB: enforced borrowing from ClB
securities backed loan to bank A
(at c+%)
ƒ C3 account bank A (at c%)
(borrowed from A)
ƒ C4
For odd historical reasons (in the old days banksmight predominantly buy ClB
Notes from the ClB – in which case we have the entry ClB Notes), mainstream
economists often call the sum C1 ‘high-powered’ money and in my view erro-
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neously so. (It is notmoney, and even thesemainstream economists would not
call C1 ‘money in circulation’). Nevertheless we do have a reciprocal credit rela-
tionship.
2§9-e Explication. The Clearing Bank as foreshadowing the ‘Central
Bank’, and the predominant money creation by commercial banks
The Clearing Bank as introduced in 2§9 foreshadows the Central Bank. The
Clearing Bank, and its ‘standard of money’ and ‘liability rules’, has been presen-
ted in complete abstraction from ‘the state’. Therefore there has been no men-
tion of concepts such as ‘legally enforced currency’ and ‘legal tender’.
Even if in actuality the Central Bank has most often been granted by the
state the monopoly to issue ‘legal tender money notes’, it has (like the ClB)
no monopoly to create money. In fact commercial banks – as licensed to be
a bank – predominantly issue the money, i.e. current account money. (This
last notion is what B.J. Moore in 1988 called ‘horizontalism’, as opposed to ‘ver-
ticalism’, which is the idea that Central Banks generate or control the money
supply).
Bindseil and König (2013)31 argue that even if economics textbooks such as
those of Ball, Mankiw, or Mishkin32 still explain the money supply by means
of the multiplier process and proceed under the assumption that the cent-
ral bank controls the supply of money, ‘central bankers have by now largely
buried [this] “verticalism”, at least when it comes to monetary policy imple-
mentation – that is, the choice and technique to achieve the operational target
of monetary policy. And even though the textbook and academic mainstream
view on themoney supply still largelymaintains that the central bank can con-
trol it, the real-world developments inmonetary policy practice have paved the
way for an understanding of monetary policy as interest rate policies thatmust
necessarily sooner or later result in the horizontalist view of Moore’ (Bindseil
and König 2013, pp. 385–6).
31 The first author works at the European Central Bank, the second at the German Institute
for Economic Research.
32 They refer to L. Ball’s Money, Banking and Financial Markets (2010), G. Mankiw’s Mac-
roeconomics (2003), and F. Mishkin’s Economics of Money, Banking and Financial Markets
(2009).
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2§10 The private pre-validation of production by banks
This section connects money-creation for enterprises (2§8) explicitly to the
accumulation of capital.
1 Pre-validation of production by banks
Whereas bank-issued account money originates in a private reciprocal credit
relationship between bank and client (2§8), it subsequently acquires a social
character by ‘circulating’ in the bookkeeping of banks (2§9).33
Any money that circulates as transfers to enterprises – to accounts with the
same bank or any other – is money that has validated, or is in the process of
validating, previous production.34 On the other hand, money newly created in
a reciprocal relation between bank and enterprise is an anticipation of pro-
duction and realisation in the future. This way the current circuit of money is
‘opened’ and expanded. In other words, the bank that creates this new money
on the basis of a loan performs a private pre-validation of production, which
is socially validated when the anticipated production is sold – the loan can
then be cancelled. Such a pre-validation is a necessary condition for the ongo-
ing overall accumulation of capital. Along with the growth in the accumu-
lation of capital (and macroeconomic growth generally), the amount of the
pre-validating money creation grows.
2 The monetary condition of social validation: extended expansion
and re-creation of money
In pre-validating the future productionof an enterprise viamoney creation, the
bank anticipates the success of the borrowing enterprise, expecting that the
pre-validation will be followed by production and actual social validation (i.e.
sale) of commodities.Then themoneywould return to the enterprise’s account,
whereupon the loan, including the interest agreed upon, could be cancelled.
Thus the sum of money to be returned to the bank must be larger than
the pre-validating loan. The condition is that the pre-validation of one enter-
prise (anticipating its expansion), is socially confirmed at some stage by the
expansion of other enterprises – normally requiring money creation and pre-
validation for other enterprises.
33 I hesitantly adopt the term ‘circulation’ as it is rather anachronistic. Surely in the eight-
eenth, nineteenth andmuch of the twentieth century, ‘circulation of money’ used to refer
to the circulation of currency from hand to hand. Now it ‘circulates’ from account to
account.
34 Validation: the turning of outputs into money, i.e. sale of commodities (1§10).
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Thus, generally, expansion can only be validated by expansion. Only then is
the initially created new money a successful lever to the accumulation of cap-
ital. And so too for the validation of the expansion validating the initial expan-
sion.
In any case (and at a constant average velocity of circulation, that is, a con-
stant average rate of transfer of money from one account to the other), accu-
mulation of capital requires a concomitant expansion of the pre-validation by
banks, that is, a concomitant rate of re-creation of money.
3 Over-optimism, over-crediting and vulnerabilities of a multi-bank
constellation
Most of the time, a multi-bank constellation under the umbrella of a Clearing
Bank adequately accommodates the accumulation of capital – that is, in nor-
mal times and even in normal recessions. However, such a constellation is also
vulnerable to the failure of banks, which reduces or even paralyses the accu-
mulation of capital.
An enterprise’s getting into debt with a bank goes along with a degree of
the enterprise’s optimism about the future – sometimes over-optimism. The
same holds for the bank, although the bank hedges against possible failure of
the enterprise’s investment project by requiring securities. However, because
money creation is profitable for banks, these may also be over-optimistic and
require securities that are on the edge of covering possible losses. Competi-
tion between banks may further provoke this. Generally this is a matter of risk
taking and risk premiums as calculated in the interest rate charged – losses
against one client may be made good with profits from other clients. However,
as Keynes (1936, 1937) emphasised, next to statistically calculable risk, non-
calculable uncertainty is inherent to a capitalist economy.
Over-optimism and banks’ over-crediting comprise a multi-bank constella-
tion (2§9) vulnerable to failure of a bank, and even for failures on a large scale,
leading to a crisis of the banking system (Explication 2§10-b).
It was indicated in 2§9 that the ClB’s standard for securities and liability rules
(2§9-b) are one of the main necessary conditions for a multi-bank constella-
tion. It is a major problem for a capitalist economy that whereas tight rules are
necessary, these also put restrictions on the granting of the demand for money
by enterprises (and social actors generally) and hence on the rate of accumu-
lation of capital. (Expanded in 7D2 and 9D2).
2§10-a Explication. Expansion validated by expansion
Because banks – and banks only – create money, it is impossible for them to
receive back more money (interest) than they created. Therefore the valida-
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tion of the expansion of one enterprise necessarily requires the expansion of
other enterprises. Thus the pre-validation of the others provides the monet-
ary equivalent for the realisation of the surplus-value of the one, including the
interest to be paid to the bank (expanded in 3D1). This is the answer to the long-
standing dubious question of ‘where the money comes from’ so as to realise
surplus-value (cf.Marx inCapital II, pp. 641 and 676).35 The required expanding
expansion is also one of the main reasons why it is very difficult for a capitalist
economy to cope with decreasing growth, and especially with a negative rate
of growth (amplified in Chapter 5).
2§10-b Explication. Impossibility of bankruptcy of the banking system,
along with the vulnerability of individual banks to failure and the
paralysation of the banking system
• No exit from the banking system – impossibility of bankruptcy of the banking
system
Section 2§8 started off fromone single independent bank,without any relations
with other banks. Conceptually it is essential to see that such a bank cannot go
bankrupt, at least not as a result of its pure banking business.36 There cannot
be such a thing as withdrawing money from that bank. Clients can undertake
only two kinds of action. First, they can take loans (against interest) and cancel
loans. Second, they can transfer money to other clients of the bank (or receive
money from them). That is all.
A similar notion applies for the constellation of a multitude of interrelated
banks (2§9): that constellation as a whole cannot go bankrupt. Clients of one
bank can become a client of another bank (by transferringmoney to that other
bank). However, there can be no such thing as withdrawing money from the
banking system. (In actual practice this is no different for holders of US dol-
lars, euros or yuans – the only one additional action is that they might try to
exchange between these. Escaping from the whole of the banking system is
impossible).
• Failure of individual banks within a constellation of interrelated banks
For various reasons that do not matter for now, the security and liability rules
set by the ClB (2§9) may not be appropriately tight or appropriately enforced.
Alongside this, when individual banks behave too optimistically in their credit
provision (and thusmoney creation), their bad loansmay build up to the point
of insolvency. In this case the ClB (which via its rules or its non-enforcing of the
35 A question taken up by Rosa Luxemburg 1963 [1913], ch. 8, esp. p. 146ff.; see also Pastrello
2013.
36 Cf. Bellofiore and Realfonzo 2003, p. 200.
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rules is a party concerned in the insolvency!) has two options at its discretion.
(Recall from 2§9-c, Sheets 2.9, that clearing entails interbank loans).
First, the ClB can stop clearing for this bank, which soon implies the bank-
ruptcy of said bank. The other banks no longerwant to receivemoney from this
bank (that is, they no longer accept transfers from the clients of the bank in
trouble – recall 2§9-c, Sheets 2.8) meaning that the bad bank’s current account
holders are stuck – they cannot escape and ultimately lose their money up to
the level of the bank’s insolvency.
Second, it can keep on clearing against bad securities – hoping that the bank
in trouble will improve its degree of solvency (perhaps forcing it to take meas-
ures to reach that end). However, if and when it becomes known to the public
that the bank at hand is a ‘bad bank’, its account holderswill try to transfer their
money to accounts with other banks enmasse, which the latter will not accept.
This second case then reduces to the first one.
A crisis of the total banking system develops to the extent that more banks,
and big ones, run into an insolvent position. As long as this is not publicly
known, the ClB could in principle keep on clearing for the lot against bad
securities. However, when it becomes publicly known, account holders will try
to flee to ‘good’ banks, which (as indicated before) the latter will not accept.
Quite apart from the losses of the individual account holders, the capacity of
the remaining banking system to accommodate the accumulation of capital is
reduced with the reduction in the number of banks (at least for a considerable
period of time).
The ClB’s security and liability rules, and their upholding, are therefore
essential to the banking system.Would lack of either of those nevertheless res-
ult in the beginning of a banking crisis, then the latter can only be prevented
if the ClB (or at a later stage of the exposition, the Central Bank) would have
sufficientmeans, first, to pre-empt the flight of clients of the bad banks, by vast
loans to the bad banks, or to other banks that are willing to take over the bad
banks, and secondly, such that its trustworthiness remains intact. (The latter
relates to the amount of dubiously backed loans as assets, which in the end
might need to be written down, and along with it the ClB’s capital).37
The failure of one or perhaps a few small banks will usually have no signific-
ant impact on the economy. Graph 2.11 provides information on the frequency
of banking crises (more broadly financial crises) resulting in a recession. This
figure is based on data collected by Jorda, Schularick and Taylor (2012) from 14
37 Wewill see later (7D2) that for this reason it is hard for a Central Bank to be ‘independent’
of the state.
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OECD countries over the period 1870–2008.38 Of the total number of the reces-
sions/crises in this period, 22% were of financial origin. The figure shows the
average number of financially originated recessions per country per decade.
graph 2.11 Average number of recessions associated with financial crises,
per decade and per country 1870–2008, for a sample of 14 current
OECD countries39
Data source: calculated from Jorda, Schularick and Taylor (2012), Table 1
2§10-c Explication. Money at the current level of the exposition
With the current concretisation of money (2§8–2§10), the requirement of the
expansion of the quantity-flow of money in connectionwith the accumulation
of capital (2§3) has been grounded in the ‘fairly’ concrete actual existence of
money.
However, at this level of the exposition, abstraction is yet made from two
main subjects. First, the state and its Central Bank (Chapter 7) – as we will
see, this abstraction is only moderately important in normal times, though it
is important in times of severe financial crisis. Second, banks in their role as
financiers of enterprises (Chapter 3), which is vital. So far, banks have mainly
been presented in their role of creatingmoney, which is a general condition for
the accumulation of capital.
In fact the current division presented (the limits of) the conditions of exist-
ence of a banking constellation under the umbrella of a completely independ-
38 Australia, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Norway, Spain,
Sweden, Switzerland, UK and USA.
39 See the previous footnote.
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ent ‘Central Bank’ – at the current level of abstraction (all of Part One), I have
used the term ‘Clearing Bank’.
2§10-d Addendum. References
The terminology in 2§10 of ‘anticipation’, ‘private pre-validation’ and ‘social val-
idation’ originates from De Brunhoff (1978 [1976], p. 46); see also Aglietta (1979
[1976], pp. 332–5). Much of the exposition of money at a similar expositional
level in Reuten and Williams (1989) drew on these two authors as well as De
Vroey (1984). However, the exposition of the creation of money in the current
division deviates from these authors (that is, the current division posits money
creation as completely disconnected fromany remnants of commodity to com-
modity exchange, commodity money, and so-called ‘high-powered’ money).
This exposition is rather in line with the Monetary Circuit theory (amplified
in addendum 3§2-e).
Division 5. Separation-in-unity of enterprises and banks
2§11 Separation-in-unity of enterprises and banks
We have seen how the creation of money by banks is one of the two
major conditions of existence of the accumulation of capital (2D4). The
early starting point was the capitalist economy’s outward bifurcation into
households and privately owned enterprises (1D1). Banks entered the
exposition at the point required (2D4), though without amplification on
their identity.
The necessary condition of existence of banks is the separation between banks
and enterprises. (The latter can now more specifically be called ‘production
enterprises’, and when henceforth I use the term ‘enterprise’, the term can be
replaced by ‘production enterprise’). The separation is necessary to the extent
that bank-issued money must be generally accepted as money. Were this sep-
aration not the case, we would have the unresolved fragmentation of ‘trade’ at
the level of 1§2, i.e. prior to the exposition of money as the unity of measure
and medium of value. Further, the separation is enforced by the operation of
banks under the umbrella of a rules-setting Clearing Bank (2§9).
Nevertheless, banks, as much as enterprises, are driven by profit-making in
monetary terms and by expanded profit-making through the accumulation of
capital. In this respect there isnodifferencebetweenenterprises andbanks. Fur-
ther, each of the enterprises and banks have no existence independently from
each other. In these respects, they constitute a ‘unity’. There is a ‘mere’ func-
tional ‘difference in unity’. Commodities (as always this includes commodified
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services) are produced within enterprises, and money is created within banks.
However, for banks this activity is dealing in money as if it were a commod-
ity like any other, and in this sense we have, for banks, a commodification of
money.40
This complexity – of necessary difference and separation versus non-differ-
ence and identity – between enterprises and banks, is captured by positing it
as a separation-in-unity. This necessary separation-in-unity is a concrete insti-
tutional reflection of the abstract ‘inward bifurcation of the commodity’ (1§5).
Thus we have the seeming paradox that banks are driven by profit-making
in terms of money, the entity that, concretely, they themselves create. Rather,
they createmoney for others (other enterprises, generally other actors) but cal-
culate their own degree of success in the same monetary terms.
2§11-a Explication. The distinction between ‘separation-in-unity’ and
‘outward bifurcation’
Both ‘outward bifurcations’ and ‘separations-in-unity’ relate to major institu-
tional separation. In this book the only outward bifurcation is that between
households and privately owned enterprises (1§1). Outwardly bifurcated entit-
ies are generally each driven by different objectives. In contradistinction, the
different institutional entities of a ‘separation-in-unity’ (s-i-u) are (ultimately)
each driven by the same objective. Next to the current s-i-u (2D5) one more
follows in 2D7 of this chapter. Three further s-i-u’s are presented in Chapters
6–7.
2§11-b Explication. Similarity and difference between enterprises and
banks
The main text posits that banks, as much as enterprises, are driven by profit-
making in monetary terms and by expanded profit-making through the accu-
mulation of capital, concluding that – in this respect – there is no difference
between enterprises and banks. Nevertheless it is also the case that banks,
in their role of money creation and lending, do not produce surplus-value,
but rather share in the surplus-value produced in enterprises (amplified in
Chapter 3). Even so, the degree of banks’ success, as well as that of enter-
prises, is measured by the rate of profit on their capital (1§13 – amplified in
Chapter 3).
40 It is important to keep the terminology subtle here. This ‘commodification of money’ has
nothing to do with the historical phenomenon of ‘commodity money’.
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Division 6. Incorporation of enterprises
Labour-capacity expansion (2D2) andmoney expansion (2D4) are the proxim-
ate conditions of the accumulation of capital (2D1). The continuity and scale
of the latter is further grounded in the corporate enterprise, as presented in the
final two divisions of this chapter (see Scheme 2.1).
So far, themain part of the exposition explicitly presented four categories of
actors: labour; managerial labour; enterprises; and banks (the latter two so far
coinciding with their owners). This division introduces two further categories
of actors: shareholders and the administrative management of the enterprise.
2§12 The tendency for enterprises to take the corporate form
The expansion of labour-capacity and money (2D2 and 2D4) are necessary
conditions for the accumulation of capital. The incorporation of enterprises
grounds the continuity and the possible scale of the accumulation of capital.
Whereas small enterprises can come and go as non-incorporated firms, there
is a strong drive to incorporation and generally a necessary one for medium-
to large-sized enterprises, which is reinforced over time (diachronically). The
non-absolute character of the corporate form (especially for small enterprises)
is captured by the concept of ‘tendency’ (see Explication 2§12-a).
There is a tendency for enterprises to take the corporate form for five reas-
ons. First, regarding the continuity of a single enterprise, the corporate form
potentially overcomes problems of succession (the shares rather than the en-
terprise are passed on to the inheritors). Second, the corporate enterprise
allows for the limitation of risk and uncertainty (that is, to the value of the
share). Third, the corporate form allows for the spread of risk and uncertainty
over many corporations – many owners spreading their capital over many cor-
porations.41 Fourth, the corporate form overcomes limits associated with the
required scale of enterprises (either technically or competitively). A fifth main
drive to incorporationpertains to the expansionof the finance of the enterprise
(presented in 3§5.)
A similar tendency to incorporation applies to banks.
The corporate form of enterprises entails a particular separation of its own-
ership, the ownership being a layered one. Whereas the shareholders are the
owners of the enterprise, the enterprise as corporate body is the owner of the
41 In the latter respect there is a disparity between these capital owners and labour: labour-
ers cannot spread the risk and uncertainty for unemployment over many enterprises. (If
the employer does not insist on a full-time engagement, they can sometimes spread the
risk over some but not many enterprises).
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‘active capital’ (the assets).42 Themanagement of the latter ownership is deleg-
ated to administrators (see 2§13). Further, the shareholder is not responsible for
the practices of the enterprise (the enterprise is).43 The shareholder is merely
financially liable, and limited to the extent of the nominal value of the shares
brought in.44
The executive management of the corporate enterprise, as set out in 2§13,
also applies to banks.
2§12-a Explication. Tendencies
A tendency should be distinguished from an empirical ‘trend’. A tendency is a
process working in a certain direction, such that an entity takes a certain form
or quantitative expression. A tendency is always predicated on certain forces or
compulsions. Therefore an alternative formulation is: A tendency is the gener-
ation of a particular form of an entity or the particular quantitative expression
of an entity, this generation being predicated on certain forces or compulsions.
(In the current case of the tendency for enterprises to take the corporate form,
the tendency is predicated on the five forces indicated in 2§12).
In general, tendenciesmay be counteracted by other tendencies, or by other,
lower level complexities. A tendency is a determinant whose actualisation
might not always predominate in any individual case (for example, enterprises
that do not take the corporate form because of their financial structure or for
taxation reasons). However, to have the status of a tendency (in this book), it
must apply to a significant number of cases such that, when abstracting from
counteracting tendencies, it has a predominant character for the totality. (See
also the General Appendix, A§14).
The ‘tendency for enterprises to take the corporate form’ is predicated on the
forces associated with the growth of the average capital of enterprises.
2§12-b Explication. Enterprise: form of ‘firm’, form of ‘corporation’
With the introduction of the corporation it is now explicit that enterprises
operate either as ‘firms’ (non-incorporated enterprises) or as a ‘corporation’
(incorporated enterprises). In 6§10 these are posited as legal forms of the enter-
prise.
42 The specific powers of the shareholders are defined in the corporation’s charter.
43 Responsibility rests with the enterprise and its administrator(s). However, with the pos-
sible exception of criminal matters (cf. criminal law as introduced in Ch. 6), the adminis-
trator is not financially liable.
44 For non-corporate forms of the enterprise, the owner(s) is (or are) fully liable – extended
to their wealth in person.
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2§13 The executivemanagement of the corporate enterprise
The executive management is the administrator and representative of the
enterprise as corporate body. The main requirement for these officers is that
they have internalised the norms of the enterprise (2§7). Briefly, these relate
to the optimal production of surplus-value, with a view to an optimal rate of
integral profit and accumulation of capital.
Regarding especially the accumulation of capital, the effectiveness of the
management’s internalisation of the enterprise’s norms may contingently be
more encompassing than the shareholders’ normsof the enterprise, as revealed
in (contingent) conflicts over the degree of retaining profits (2§14-a).
Whereas the executivemanagement is formally employed by the enterprise,
these managers perceive themselves as employers. This reveals their internal-
isation of the norms of the enterprise as corporate body. Effectively this man-
agement is no longer ‘managerial labour’ (2§7), but rather the executive officer
of active capital, and hence of the enterprise-labour relation (2§7 for the lat-
ter).
Although the above pertains to the top executivemanagement (which tends
to be larger to the extent that the enterprise is larger), I reiterate what was
mentioned in 2§7 about the middle and lower management, which may, qua
aspiration, feel itself attached to the top management rather than to ordinary
labour. (From the perspective of the enterprise side of the enterprise-labour
relation, this is quite an achievement).
2§13-a Amplification. Conflicts between management and shareholders
over information and distribution of profits
In the relation between the corporate management and shareholders there is
ample scope for contingent conflicts of interest. In this amplification I men-
tion the two major themes of such conflict: information and distribution of
profits.
Information. For shareholders the selection of shareholding in one or an-
other enterprise is a matter of perception of diverging risk and uncertainty
and expected concomitant returns (systematically introduced in 2§15). Share-
holders therefore usually have an interest in obtaining optimal information
about the enterprises and accordingly in binding the management to rules for
transparent and consistent annual reports and accounts, as uniformly applic-
able between enterprises. The management, on the other hand, will usually
be reluctant to provide transparency for reasons of competitive strategy. There
seems to be no ready solution to this conflict.
Distributionof profits. Thedistributionof theprofits of the enterprise (profits
meaning surplus-value after payment of interest) centres on two aspects.
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Firstly, the decision as towhat share of profits is retained or distributed.Gen-
erally the logic of the enterprise is that profit is accumulated, and hence that
it – microeconomically – be retained and invested (2D1). The management’s
internalisation of the norms of the enterprise would then normally imply a
moderate distribution of profits, along with a substantial accumulation of cap-
ital. Given this logic it is not obvious why shareholders would want profits to
be distributed beyond some threshold. Retained profits would normally result
in an increase in both the equity and share prices – which an individual share-
holder might wish to sell.
Secondly, given agreement on the share of profits retained, there is a poten-
tial source of conflict over the question of if, and if so to what degree, the
management should be rewarded in terms of shares in the enterprise – be it via
donation out of a share buyback or out of new shares. (I present the matter in
this analytical order. In practice this may have been decided upon the appoint-
ment of themanagement).The reasoningon thepart of existing shareholders is
apparently straightforward: when themanagement has a stake in shareholding
it will look after itself, hence after ‘us’ (assuming guarantees that the man-
agement cannot sell in the short-run). However, the assumption behind this
shareholders’ view, rightly or wrongly, is that quite a lot of shareholders do not
have much confidence in the average manager’s internalisation of the norms
of the enterprise. The same applies for the case when themanagement’s salary
is linked to the enterprise’s results (bonuses).
2§14 Separation-in-unity of the shareholders and the executive
management of the incorporated enterprise
The corporate enterprise entails a layered separation of its ownership
(2§12). In addition, there is a separation between, on the one hand, the
ownership and management of the corporation’s ‘active capital’, and, on
the other, the ownership of the enterprise in the form of the shareholding
‘passive capital’ (2§12–2§13).
Even if and when the corporate enterprise’s layered ownership separationmay
contingently result in conflicts between the shareholders and the executive
management (2§13-a), the two constitute a separation-in-unity. The unity per-
tains to the aimsof the enterprise, that is, the objective of the ‘enterprise-labour
relation’ (2§7). That is, they unite (in brief) in the perceived requirement for the
extraction of surplus-value from labour, andultimately also in its accumulation
within the enterprise.
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Division 7. The twofold accumulation of capital
Owners of enterprises and owners of passive capital; the enterprise-labour
relation as reflected in the capital-labour relation
The previous division focused on the ownership-management relation of the
corporate enterprise. The current division (one section) focuses exclusively on
ownership relations, particularly in face of the starting point’s ‘privately owned
enterprises’ (1D1). It considers the formand character of ‘privately ownedenter-
prises’ in relation to the form of the ‘ownership of passive capital’.
2§15 Twofold accumulation of capital – enterprises and owners of passive
capital
The exposition’s starting point is the bifurcation between households
and privately owned enterprises (1§1). We have seen that enterprises are
driven by the production of surplus-value and the accumulation of cap-
ital, conceived as the ‘active capital’, that is, the capital assets of the enter-
prise (1§13).We have a parallel accumulation for the ‘passive capital’, that
is, the enterprise’s liabilities (recall the enterprise’s balance sheet of Fig-
ure 1.4 in 1§13-a).
1 The detached form of capital ownership together with the owner’s
mere instrumental ownership of enterprises
Regarding the ownership of ‘passive capital’, the exposition at this point is
restricted to passive capital as the enterprise’s ‘own-capital’ (in cases of non-
incorporated enterprises) or as ‘equity’ (in cases of incorporated enterprises –
equity being the sum of the nominal value of the shares and the reserves of the
enterprise).45
The private ownership of the non-incorporated enterprise (the firm), to-
getherwith the owner’s ‘own-capital’, can be characterised as an ‘involved own-
ership’. With the moment of the corporate enterprise (2D6) and especially the
shareholder’s objective to limit and to spread its risk and uncertainty (2§12), a
new formof passive capital has been introduced.Wenowhave a detached form
of passive capital ownership – detached from the management and the direct
production of capital. This implies that the ownership of the enterprise, or of
a particular enterprise, is not the capital owner’s object, but rather an instru-
ment for its capital ownership in general. Thus whereas for an enterprise, the
particular commodity produced is merely instrumental for the generation of
45 Other forms of ownership of passive capital are presented in 3§5.
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surplus-value (1§13), the particular corporate enterprise now appears as instru-
mental for the passive capital owner – switching the passive capital to another
enterprise if this seems advantageous. Hence the already abstract drive for
mono-dimensional surplus-value and accumulation of active capital (for any
enterprise) is, for the corporate enterprises, concretely paralleled by a detached
abstract drive for accumulation of mono-dimensional passive capital. Never-
theless, the corporate capital owner cannot simply escape fromanenterprise: it
has to find another capital owner willing to substitute, at some price, its share-
holding.
Table 2.12 summarises these distinctions. Thus in reference to the exposi-
tion’s starting point (private property of enterprises), the exposition has now
reached two forms of private property of enterprises (non-incorporated or
incorporated), each with a different character (involved or detached), and in
addition, two forms of passive capital ownership (own-capital or equity).
table 2.12 Forms of the ownership of enterprises and forms of ownership of
passive capital
Form of ownership enterprise Character Form of passive capital
ownership†
non-incorporated enterprises
(sole owner or partnership)‡






share of the equity of
enterprises
† Other forms of capital ownership are presented in Chapter 3.
‡ One or more partners can have a limited liability, though not all.
2 Twofold accumulation of capital
As indicated, the ownership of the incorporated enterprise is instrumental and
rather formal for the passive capital owner, whereas for a non-incorporated
enterprise (a firm) the ownership of the enterprise is an involved one.46 Sooner
or later there are nevertheless limits to this involvement, that is, when the
owner considers selling the enterprise (perhaps at the owner’s retirement
age) – so being ‘in process of detachment’. Evenwithout that possible prospect,
the owner is evidently conscious of the amount of ‘own-capital’.
46 This is different when a sole owner of a firm (or a partnership) opts for conversion into a
corporation, without aiming for a major spread of risk.
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Even if for any individual enterprise the active capital is simply equal to, as
well as inherently inseparable from, the passive capital (assets = liabilities), the
detached form of capital ownership makes the accumulation of passive capital
into a separate motive, whence accumulation of capital (2D1) now appears as
a disunited twofold accumulation of capital. Nevertheless, even if the passive
capital ownership is such a detached one, active capital and the growth of act-
ive capital is produced in enterprises and in enterprises only. Passive capital
is only its reflection. Thus some enterprise is the necessary instrument for the
detached capital ownership.47
3 The capital-labour relation
Alongside the twofold accumulation of capital, the concrete ‘enterprise-labour
relation’ (2§7) is reflected in an actually abstract ‘capital-labour’ relation. This
is the indirect exploitative relation between the passive capital ownership and
labour. As passive capital grows on the basis of the enterprise’s appropriation,
and next the distribution, of surplus-value, passive capital owners are involved
in the exploitative relation (including those that have never seen ‘their enter-
prise vehicle’ from the inside).
2§15-a Amplification. The categories of capital owners, managers and
labour, in terms of their relative size and income shares:
USA 1918–2012 (Mohun 2016)
At the current level of the exposition, ‘passive capital ownership’ is an as
yet incomplete category (of the components lacking, loan capital is the most
important one – this is presented in 3§5). Nevertheless, I already provide at this
point some quantitative empirical information about the categories of passive
capital owners, managers and labour. In an important and novel paper, Mohun
(2016) has estimated the development of these three main classes in the USA
from 1918–2012. He adopts the following definitions – as operationalised in his
paper, that is, given the available data. (1) ‘Subordinate workers’ are managed
without managing themselves. ‘Managers’ do manage other workers, though
they are themselves also managed by other managers – and ultimately by the
capital owners.48 (2) ‘Capitalists’ have sufficient non-labour income meaning
that they are not forced to engage in an employment contract (although typ-
ically they do engage in such employment); managers do not have enough
non-labour income to meet that threshold. (3) Labour income is composed of
47 This indeed relates to ‘capital’ ownership. Later on in the exposition, wewill see that there
are other forms of ‘monetary wealth’ to which this necessity may not apply.
48 Note that this managerial class is thus much wider than merely CEOs.
128 part one – the capitalist economy
wages, salaries and pensions. The latter, when employment-related, is in fact
a postponed wages component (cf. Chapter 3, Appendix 3A-2). Table 2.13 sum-
marises these definitions.
table 2.13 Economic characteristics of the three main classes
Non-labour income
(from asset ownership =







capitalists sufficient not required †
managers not sufficient yes manage and
being managed
subordinate workers not sufficient yes being managed
† When capitalists are engaged in an employment contract this will typically be in a manage-
ment function.
Mohunbases the threshold for capitalists’ ‘sufficient’ non-labour incomeon the
average of various measures, including the mean labour income and the max-
imum labour income, and also including weights for the number of persons
dependent onone income. In effect the threshold for the year 2012, for example,
is set at about $56,000 for a single person tax unit (Mohun 2016, pp. 345–8),
which was about two times the average working class labour income (ibid.,
p. 353).
Graph 2.14 shows some of Mohun’smain findings (he himself producesmore
detailed graphs). The first graph shows the development of the classes men-
tioned in terms of their numbers, and the second one in terms of income
shares. See Mohun (2016) for comments on the development of the class com-
position and the income shares throughout the period shown in these graphs.
He concludes that the ‘inequality of income in class terms is currently [i.e. in
2012] greater than at any other time since 1918’ (ibid., p. 359).
Summary and conclusions
The rationale of the enterprises’ driving force of mono-dimensional profit
(Chapter 1) ismore of the same: profit augmentation. Such augmentation could
in principle be reached by continuously increasing the productive power of
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labour, but such increase is nevertheless limited. Profit is further enlarged via
its investment as capital, whence capital is accumulated. (Division 1).
There are two major necessary conditions of existence for this accumula-
tion. First, an accommodating expansion of labour-capacity (Division 2), and
second, an accommodating expansion of money (Division 4). A third condi-
tion, namely the corporate form of the enterprise, contributes to continuous
accumulation of capital, without being a hard condition (Division 6).
The first condition. At a given technically determined capital-labour ratio, the
accumulation of capital generally requires a growth in labour population. The
latter, however, is beyond the control of enterprises. At a given growth in the
labour population, the rate of accumulation of capital is ultimately determined
by the rate of unemployment – thus accumulation of capital requires unem-
ployment. Unemployment presses the average wage rate down, and presses up
‘the degree of compliance of labour during production’, each positively affect-
ing the surplus-value produced and hence the growth of capital. (Division 2.)
Given the labour-capacity available, themanagement of the enterpriseman-
ages what I call the ‘enterprise-labour relation’. This is the employment rela-
tion at the point of production through which surplus-value is extracted from
labour, as constrained by: first, the technique of production; second, the rate
of unemployment; and third (in face of that rate), the management of the
compliance of labour during production, as assisted by the managerial device
of a wages ladder that optimises this compliance. This requires the workers’
(self-)perception that the lower ratedwork is important though inferior, so that
they can be reconciled to their position. (Division 3.)
The second condition. The accumulation of capital’s condition of an expan-
sion of money is – building on the earlier abstract concept of money of 1D2 –
grounded in bank-issued money. Banks concretely create quantities of money,
based on a reciprocal credit relation with their clients. More specifically, banks
‘pre-validate’ the future production of enterprises. Further, the expansion of
the domain of operation of enterprises requires cooperation between banks,
resulting in debt relations between them. The insecurities of the latter are mit-
igated when banks agree to operate under the umbrella of a dominant bank
that functions as a Clearing Bank and that imposes security and liability rules.
(Division 4.)
The subsequent necessary condition of existence of banks is the separation
between banks and enterprises. Nevertheless the two also constitute a ‘unity’,
because banks, just as much as enterprises, are driven by profit-making, and
because both enterprises and banks have no existence independent of each
other. Hence banks and enterprises constitute a separation-in-unity. (Division
5.)
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The third condition. Small enterprises can come and go as non-incorporated
firms. However, the continuity of the accumulation of capital by medium- and
large-scale enterprises generally requires their incorporation. Incorporation is
driven by the threats surrounding succession, by the limitation and spread of
risk and uncertainty, and by limits in respect of the scale of enterprises. The
corporate form of the enterprise entails a layered form of its ownership, with
the shareholders being the owners of the enterprise, and the enterprise as cor-
porate body being the owner of the ‘active capital’, which is administered by
the executive management of the corporation. Although this particular gov-
ernance separationmay contingently result in conflicts between the two layers,
these nevertheless constitute a separation-in-unity. (Division 6.)
The last divisionof the chapter puts the corporate enterprise in theperspect-
ive of the exposition’s starting point of privately owned enterprises (1D1). Along
with the shareholder’s objective to limit and spread its risk and uncertainty, we
have a detached form of passive capital ownership. The ownership of a partic-
ular enterprise is not the capital owner’s object, but rather an instrument for
its passive capital ownership in general – a detachment that, sooner or later,
also applies to the non-incorporated enterprise. Although for an individual
enterprise the ‘active capital’ (assets) and the ‘passive capital’ (liabilities) are
inherently inseparable, the detached form of passive capital ownership turns
the accumulation of passive capital into a separate motive, whereby the accu-
mulation of capital (2D1) now appears as a disunited twofold accumulation of
capital. Nevertheless, some enterprise must be the necessary instrument for
the detached capital ownership. In this way the concrete, directly exploitative
‘enterprise-labour relation’ is reflected in the actually abstract indirect exploit-
ative relation between the passive capital owner and labour, that is, the actually
abstract ‘capital-labour’ relation. (Division 7.)
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Introduction
This chapter grounds the production and accumulation of capital in the finan-
cing of enterprises by banks. It was shown that money creation by banks is a
necessary condition of existence for the accumulation of capital (2D4). In the
way this grounding moment of money creation was presented – that is, start-
ing from the concept of money – it has been implicit that banks in fact finance
enterprises. In making this explicit in the current chapter (Division 2) we will
see not only that the finance by banks is a continuous necessity for the accu-
mulation of capital, but also that it is unlike any other type of finance. In the
course of Division 3 it will be shown how other types of finance, once bank
finance has done its work, may substitute for the finance provided by banks.
At that stage of the exposition, a grounding of the starting point’s pre-
position (1§1) of ‘capital accumulated’ can be provided (Division 4).
It will be seen in this chapter that a systematic exposition of finance is inev-
itably connected to key macroeconomic questions and theorems. Next to the
concept of finance, the key concepts are investment and saving. Based on a
‘monetary circuit approach’ – as opposed to the traditional quantity of money
(or money fund) approach – it will be shown: (1) that saving is no precondition
for investment;1 (2) that – given the existence of saving – there is no macroe-
conomic investment ‘out of saving’; (3) that there may be merely an ‘ex post’
portfolio investment out of savings; (4) that the latter is always preceded by
banks’ financing of the enterprises’ investment; a finance on the basis of an ex
nihilo creation of money (Divisions 2 and 5).
Even if saving is no precondition for investment and the accumulation of
capital, saving is nevertheless ubiquitous. Its negative effect on the realisation
of surplus-value – and hence on the accumulation of capital – is presented
in Division 5 in terms of macroeconomic effective demand; here I build on
insights from Kalecki.
Beside the chapter’s main focus of the finance of enterprises, Appendix B
outlines lending by banks to labour and to capital owners. Appendix A out-
lines two contingencies of the finance-capital market regarding the scope of
pension funds and the secondary trade in financial paper. Appendix C briefly
expands on the treatment of rent in this book.
Scheme 3.1 outlines the systematic of the chapter.
1 When I use the term ‘investment’ I alwaysmean ‘direct’ or ‘real’ investment (mainly inmeans
of production) as opposed to ‘portfolio investment’.
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scheme 3.1 Systematic of the finance of enterprises (outline Chapter 3)
Legend
↡ grounded in (conditioned by)
⥥ bottommoment derives from top moment
* The moment 3D4 derives from 3D2. Along with it, it is a major ground of the starting point
(1D1).
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Division 1. Finance of enterprises and finance capital
3§1 Finance of enterprises, passive finance capital and the distribution of
surplus-value to financiers
1 Finance and the distribution of surplus-value
In the last division of Chapter 2 (2D7), I started distinguishing between ‘act-
ive capital’ (the capital assets of the enterprise) and ‘passive capital’. From now
on, the latterwillmore specifically be called ‘passive finance capital’ – themain
subject of the current chapter. Active capital is always financed by some form
of ‘passive finance capital’.
Within the latter category a distinction is made between the external form
of finance capital (provided by external financiers), and the remaining internal
form of finance capital, which is the ‘own capital’ (firm) or the ‘equity’ (corpor-
ation) of the enterprises’ owners.
Within the form of external finance capital, a distinction is made between
external finance by banks and other external finance (finance by capital own-
ers) – see Figure 3.2a. At the top of this figure (column four)we have banks –we
will see in 3D2 that any finance (including internal finance) necessarily starts
with bank finance.
Figure 3.2b shows where, and in what form, surplus-value (stemming from
the enterprises’ production, associatedwith active capital) is distributed. In the
form of interest it is distributed to banks and to capital owners (amplified in
3§4–3§5). The remaining part is internal profit (in common parlance, ‘profit’).2
One part of the latter is distributed to capital owners in the form of a ‘dividend’,
whilst the remaining part of ‘retained profit’ is added to the enterprise’s ‘own
capital’ (for firms) or ‘equity’ (corporations).
2 Banks and ‘banking entities’
In order to keep the exposition in this chapter as simple as possible, banks are
conceptualised purely as creators of money and as financiers. Any labour that
this might require is outsourced to a separate ‘production branch’ of the bank-
ing entity, which I subsume under the enterprises sector. This means that the
(pure) banks are not producers. Empirically ‘banking entities’ are engaged in
gigantic bookkeeping services (account management), credit evaluations and
[continued]
2 Marx and much of marxian political economy use the term ‘profit of enterprise’. This term
does not fit the conceptualisation in this book as ‘surplus-value’ is the ‘integral profit’ of the
enterprise. The concept of ‘internal profit’ will be expanded on in 5§1.
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figure 3.2a Active capital and forms of passive finance capital
figure 3.2b The distribution of surplus-value to passive finance
capital†
† Prior to introduction of the state.
* More precisely the result of production and its validation (explained in 3§10).
‡ Includes rent (see Appendix 3C).
3§1 Continued
various advisory services. These are equally allotted to the banking entity’s ‘pro-
duction branch’.
Banks receive (net) interest from enterprises. Part of this interest is added
to the bank’s own capital (own capital or equity). The remaining part of the
interest is distributed to the banking entity’s ‘production branch’, which may
itself also have commission income for its various activities.
As indicated, this chapter (its main text) deals with the finance of enter-
prises. Banks are also engaged in money creation and the finance of other
actors. This is briefly dealt with in Appendix 3B (and regarding the state in
Chapter 8).
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3§1-a Explication. The balance sheet of enterprises
Sheet 3.3 shows the equivalent of Figure 3.2a in the form of the balance sheet
of enterprises.
sheet 3.3 Balance sheet of enterprises†
Assets [active capital] Liabilities [passive finance capital]
• plant and equipment External finance capital a
• raw materials etc. • Loans from banks
• work in progress • Loans from non-bank financiers (bonds)
• commodities produced Internal finance capital b
• current account with banks
value equivalent of a + b K K=FC
† This sheet relates to enterprises that produce commodities, rather than enterprises engaged
in their distribution (mainly transport and retail) or various services, for which the assets
side would have a modified form. Commercial claims and commercial debts have been
omitted (and are neglected in this chapter).
Division 2. Pre-validating finance by banks
3§2 Themonetary circuit of pre-validating finance by banks (PVF): the
pure case of non-saving
In a capitalist economy, the creation of money coincides with the act of
lending by banks (2§8). Put more strongly, net lending by banks ismoney
creation. It was shown that the expanded creation of money by banks is
necessary for the accumulation of capital (2§10).
1 Accumulation of capital necessarily initiated by banks’
pre-validating finance
Expanded money creation is now further concretised as the banks’ finance
of enterprises (the current division). In a capitalist economy, any macroeco-
nomic accumulation of capital, and hence any economic growth, must be
not only accommodated but also necessarily initiated with money creation by
banks. More precisely, with the provision of money-creating loans to enter-
prises, banks provide a flow of pre-validating finance of production (cf. 2§10 on
pre-validation). Banks thus provide enterprises with passive finance capital.
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The pre-validating money creation by banks is required for the finance of
investment in means of production. On top of that, there is a systemic con-
tinuous necessity for the creation of money to finance the payment of wages.3
(Cf. the ‘monetary circuit approach’ – Addendum 3§2-e).
The required pre-validatingmoney creation by banks is the common theme
throughout this chapter. The current section presents this for the analytical
case – the ‘pure case’ – in which economic actors do not save. As we will see,
this pure case sheds an important light on the functioning of a capitalist eco-
nomy. We will see this especially in the next section (3§3) when we consider
the actually common situation in which many actors do save.
Banks are not usually interested in the enterprises’ intended destination
of a ‘pre-validating finance’ of production (PVF) as long as enterprises can
provide sufficient securities to the bank. However, for analytical reasons the
exposition in the current and the following division specifies the intended des-
tination of the bank credit (PVF), thus revealing analytical circuits of credit
flows.
The current section presents the pre-validation in three stages (subsections
2–4). Subsection 5 draws some conclusions.
2 PVF for wages payment and for purchase of means of production:
three macroeconomic categories (capital owners yet implicit)
For the credit flows presented in Circuit 3.4 three macroeconomic categories
are distinguished: banks; the integrated set of enterprises; and labour. In pre-
validating production (2§10), banks create account money for the set of enter-
prises.
Regarding thepre-validating finance (PVF) that enterprises destine forwages
payments, the money created is transferred to the accounts of the labourers
hired. Were all of this money transferred to labour or be spent with enter-
prises – that is, if there were no saving – then the money returns to the
enterprises’ accounts, so that the loan for the PVF with the bank can be fully
redeemed (see the left stream in Circuit 3.4). The influx of money (start stream
1) is so compensated by a full efflux.
[continued]
3 This is even so when wages are paid at the end of the production period. Wages cannot be
paid out of sales without a prior influx of money for those sales. They could only be paid out
of sales if there were a sufficient influx stemming from money creation for the payment of
means of production (cf. Explication 3§2-b).
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circuit 3.4 Macroeconomic pre-validating finance (PVF) by
banks for wages payment and for purchase of
means of production (MP) and their full redemp-
tion in case of full expenditure of the wage (cap-
ital owners being implicit)
Note: Circuit 3.4 is a picture of the money ‘circulation’ within bank accounts (the banks’ book-
keeping), that is, first, the money creation (1a) followed by the transfers (1b–1d), and second, the
money creation (2) followed by (internal) transfers (2b–2c) between enterprises.
3§2 Continued
Regarding the PVF that enterprises destine for the purchase of means of pro-
duction (the right stream in Circuit 3.4), purchases and sales occur as equival-
entswithin themacroeconomic set of enterprises, whencemacroeconomically
the PVF gets fully redeemed. (That is, provided the pre-validation of production
indeed gets validated, or, in other words, when the planned validation of pro-
duction would get realised – see Division 4).4
[continued]
4 See 2§10 under heading 3 for the case when enterprisesmake losses (expanded in Chapter 5).
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circuit 3.5 Pre-validating finance (PVF) by banks for the purchase of
means of production (MP), and its full redemption in case of full
expenditure of the wage; two macroeconomic enterprises’ sectors
(capital owners being implicit)
Note: For simplicity the PVF is reduced to one ‘shot’ (to Enterprises 2). Depending on the rate
of depreciation of MP, the initial PVF may be redeemed within one period (rate 1 – this is what
the picture shows) – or within several periods (rate <1); in the latter case the initial PVF may be
equivalent to redemptions by other enterprises within the period. (For example, Enterprises 1
may immediately redeem a previous loan, in which case a stream 3 would go up to the banks, so
postponing the streams 4–8).
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3§2 Continued
3 PVF for purchase of means of production along with wages payment:
four macroeconomic categories (capital owners yet implicit)
Circuit 3.5 presents the matter distinguishing two macroeconomic enterprises’
sectors (those producing means of production and those producing consumer
goods). Here the PVF combines purchases of means of production and wages
payments. (All these are analytically reduced to ‘one shot’ of PVF – in practice
there are numerous shots).
Note that both circuits 3.4. and 3.5 merely show how the production is fin-
anced by banks (and so far only by banks). These circuits do not show any
surplus-value result along the production processes (1D5, specifically 1§14).
(Explication 3§2-b shows the connection).
4 PVF for wages payment, purchase of means of production and
payment of dividends
Circuit 3.6 reintegrates themacroeconomic enterprises sector (as in Circuit 3.4).
Now, however, capital owners and their consumption are made explicit. Part
of the surplus-value is distributed to capital owners in the form of dividends.
Henceforth the term ‘dividends’ will include the ‘quasi dividends’ that flow
from non-incorporated enterprises to their owners. At this point of the exposi-
tion it is analytically assumed that capital owners collect dividends of nomore
than their consumption (as is actuallymost often the case for non-incorporated
enterprises).5 In the next section (3§3) this assumption will be dropped.
Enterprises tend to maximally accumulate surplus-value as active capital,
and to minimise on bank-credits, including for any transfers to capital own-
ers (at some agreed point in time). To the extent that capital owners spend
dividends for their consumption, this consumption validates production (amp-
lified in 3D5). The payment of dividends therefore tends to be financed via a
pre-validating bank finance, one that macroeconomically is redeemed to the
extent that capital owners spend (in this section fully).6 This is shown in the
outer right flow of Circuit 3.6. I repeat that the PVFs shown analytically pertain
to their destination, and that banks are not usually interested in the destination
so long as enterprises provide sufficient securities to the bank.
5 For incorporated enterprises retained profits are reflected in the value of shares.
6 It could perhaps be argued that these dividends or interest payments might be settled out of
monetary inflows to enterprises from sales. It might, but that would merely mean that the
redemption of PVFs for wages and/or means of production would be postponed. It is insight-
ful, and analytically pure, to separate these flows.
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Alternatively the payment of dividends might be settled out of monetary
inflows to enterprises from sales. That would merely mean that the redemp-
tion of PVFs for wages and/or means of production would be postponed. In
whatever way enterprises actually settle the payment of dividends, it is analyt-
ically insightful to separate these flows. (The same holds for interest payments
to capital owners, which will be systematically introduced only in 3§5).
circuit 3.6 Pre-validating finance for wages, means of pro-
duction and dividends; no saving by labour and by
capital owners
* The same applies for interest to capital owners (implicit until 3§5).
5 PVF: saving not a precondition for investment
So far this section has shown that savings are no condition for investment
because in the ‘pure case’ presented above none of the actors saves. This is eco-
nomically of utmost importance (expanded in 3§2-c).
In the three PVF circuits presented above, the influx of money is com-
pensated by a full efflux. Upon economic growth, this is followed by an increas-
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ing PVF and along with it an increased re-influx and re-efflux of money (thus
in non-recession periods, the macroeconomic PVF increases over time).
Savings are not necessary for the existence of the capitalist economy, but
rather contingent (introduced in 3§3). The interest that banks charge is presen-
ted in 3§4.
3§2-a Explication. Macroeconomic varieties
Generally a macroeconomic approach provides particular insights that cannot
be derived from a microeconomic approach, and vice versa. This explication
briefly expands on some main macroeconomic varieties. (1) A one-enterprise-
sector macroeconomic approach implies that all intermediate sales between
enterprises are treated as being cancelled out (Circuits 3.4 and 3.6). In effect it
implies a constellation ‘as if ’ all enterprises are integrated into one enterprise.
(2) Themonetary circuit theory that I build on in this chapter insists that banks
as creators of money should be treated as a separate macroeconomic category
(cf. Addendum 3§2-e). (3) A two-enterprise-sector macroeconomic approach
(Circuit 3.5) distinguishes between enterprises producing investment goods
and those producing consumer goods. In effect this implies a constellation ‘as
if ’ all enterprises were treated as being integrated into two such distinguished
enterprises.
These distinctions apply before and after the state and foreign relations are
taken into account.
3§2-b Explication. Pre-validating finance and realisation of surplus-
value – an illustration by way of a two-enterprises-sector
model
This Explication is for those readers who might wonder how the constellation
of pre-validating finance, as set out in 3§2, could accommodate the realisation
of surplus-value for enterprises. This can be illustrated by way of a simple two-
enterprises-sectormodel.7Wehave two sectors of production: Sector 1produces
means of production (MP); Sector 2 produces consumer goods (CG). Assume
that: (1) all surplus-value (integral profit) is accumulated as capital (in the form
of MP) – thus capital owners do not consume (or they also have a job as a
worker); (2) there are no savings out of wages; and (3) all means of production
are fully used up within the production period. The simple numerical example
below (Figure 3.7) is in e.g. billions of somemonetary standard ¤ and depicts an
equilibrium case: the output of Sector 2 (CG) of ¤200 just equals thewages sum
7 This type of model derives fromMarx’s Capital, Volume II, Part Three (see Reuten 1998 for an
appreciation).
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of the two sectors together (¤200); the output of Sector 1 (MP) just equals the
replacement of themeans of production of the two sectors together (¤160) plus
their surplus-value (¤40) as accumulated into additional means of production.
figure 3.7 Numerical example of a simple two-enterprises-
sector model (in monetary standard ¤)
(1) Sales: (80replacement-1 + 20investment-1) + (80replacement-2 + 20investment-2) = 200
(2) Sales: 100consumption-Labourers-1 + 100consumption-Labourers-2 = 200
Then the question is how this constellation is accommodated in terms of pre-
validating finance by banks. Normally this would go in several ‘shots’ of finance
to each of the sectors. In order to keep this illustration as simple as possible, I
assume just one PVF shot of ¤100 from the banks to the CG-producing enter-
prises.This caricatures the extent of themoney-creating PVF,which is normally
a fraction thereof.The earlierCircuit 3.5 cannowbe reinterpreted in these terms
(thus each stream in this circuit, 1, 2, etc., represents a value ¤100).
• Each sector started production (stylised) with a current flow stock in MP of
¤80.We are at the (stylised) end of the production period; the MP input has
been used up. Each sector has ended upwith an output of ¤200.Wages have
not been paid yet. No one has money means to buy.
• The bank pre-validates Sector 2’s ¤100 purchase of MP for the next period
(streams 1 and 2 in Circuit 3.5). Sector 2 has now ¤100 MP on stock for the
next period of production.
• With the ¤100 received, Sector 1 enterprises internally spend for ¤100 onMP
whence they equally have ¤100 MP on stock for the next period (stream 3).
This ¤100 is also a sales revenue for Sector 1, upon which they pay wages
(stream 4), etc.
• Finally (stream 8) Sector 2 cancels the PVF with the bank.8
8 In order to keep the example concise, I have neglected interest. The simplest way to include
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Generally, if workers spend all their wages, then: (1) the total surplus-value
(integral profits) of enterprises would be just equal to the total investment of
enterprises (investment → realisation of surplus-value);9 (2) enterprises would
merely require shots of credit from banks (in the example simply reduced to
one shot), credit that would be cancelled by the spending on investment and
consumption.
For completeness I must here briefly anticipate 3D5 (readers who find this
anticipation too difficult may return to it later). The surplus-value (SV in the
third column) is not a saving; rather this surplus-value only exists as such
when it has been expended in the form of additional means of production (i.e.
as investment expenditure). The banks provide the financial means for this
expenditure, and these samemeans and expenditure realise the surplus-value.
Thus there is (so to speak) no ‘intermediating act’ of saving by enterprises.
Rather, I repeat, there is merely an investment expenditure by enterprises as
accommodated by the banks. (To further complicate the matter, we will see
in 3D5 that orthodoxmainstream economics defines this investment expendit-
ure as a saving (!), which is analytically not very helpful – thus it defines an
expenditure as a saving).
3§2-c Explication. The redundancy of saving as a precondition for
investment
Section 3§2 has been called ‘the pure case’ of finance by banks. It is also a
transparent case and so one that we will regularly return to in this chapter.
In terms of the necessary requirements for the reproduction of the capitalist
economy, the stage of exposition that we now reach is pretty near to complete
for those requirements. It is just that we still lack the concept of saving (and
saving, as we will see in the sections to follow, introduces a vast set of complic-
ations). However, in principle, the capitalist economy could do without saving.
This is in effect what 3§2 shows. For some readers educated in neoclassical
economics, this must come as a surprise, because that strand strongly holds
that savings are a blessing and that these are a precondition for investment.10
interest to banks (a deduction from surplus-value) is via the introduction of a sub-sector
of sector 1: banks spend the interest on means of production.
9 This is Kalecki’s insight: ‘labour spendswhat it earns’ (¤200) and ‘capital earns (¤160+¤40)
what it spends’ (that is, given the production of surplus-value). See e.g. Kalecki 1942 (amp-
lified in 3§10-a).
10 This idea in fact stems from classical political economy, and it is widespread – also beyond
strict economics. In his influential The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism (1968
[19041]) MaxWeber argued that the Protestant (esp. Calvinistic) inclination to thrift con-
tributed to the rise of capitalism. On the other hand, within economics there has always
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The theoretical details of this canonly be set out in 3D3 (after savings havebeen
introduced in 3§3).
Keynes (1936) largely ignored production and rather challenged the ‘re-
ceived’ (classical and neoclassical) view as one in whichmoney plays no deter-
mining role (if there were any use of money at all, this would be a ‘veil’ over
the real economy, one that must be revealed). He showed that the erroneous
idea that saving enables investment is based on the false thesis that a capital-
ist economy can be modelled along the lines of a barter economy instead of a
monetary economy. Althoughmy line of argument in the sections to followwill
be somewhat different from that of Keynes, I most often agree with him on this
matter.
3§2-d Amplification. Point in time of wages payment and the implicit
credit provided by labour
The point of time at whichwages are paid (end of the day, week, month, etc.) is
contingent. The longer the time span, themore it is labour that provides (impli-
citly) a credit to the enterprises. This is in the enterprises’ interest because as
such they require less capital. However, given that benefit, enterprises are faced
with the question as to whether to finance wages payments out of a capital
fund or rather on the basis of a credit line with banks. The longer the time span
betweenwages payments, themore the opening credit lineswill scale down the
capital requirements. This implies that, next to any other requirement for pre-
validating finance by banks, the pre-validation for wages payments will tend to
be permanent. See Figure 3.8, which shows, schematically, the development of
credit lines for end of the month wage payments.
Just to get a feel for the numbers involved, consider that around 2010 the
average labour income share in the EU and the USA was just under 60% of
GDP. Hence, neglecting holidays and end of year allowances, about 5% of GDP
must be paid each month from the accounts of enterprises to those of labour.
In the ‘pure case’ of 3§2 the influx of money to pay wages is compensated by
a full efflux of money upon the full expenditure of the wages. More precisely
‘full expenditure’ is time dependent. Even if the wages are paid at the end of
the day, they are not fully spent at the end of the day but within some lapse of
time.
been a side stream of heretics in this respect from Bernard de Mandeville’s Fable of the
Bees (1714) onwards that is still vivid in current discussions about Keynes’s (1936) ‘paradox
of thrift’.
3. finance of enterprises [3§2] 149
figure 3.8 Bank-provided PVF for wages payment: full redemption
3§2-e Addendum. The Monetary Circuit Theory
Much of the current division has commonalities with the theory of the Mone-
tary Circuit that evolved from about 1980 in France and Italy, though it has im-
portant forerunners before 1950 (including Schumpeter – see Bellofiore 1992).
For overviews and further references see Graziani (1989, 2003) and the intro-
ductions and contributions in Deleplace and Nell (eds) (1996), Rochon and
Rossi (eds) (2003), Fontana and Realfonzo (eds) (2005), Arestis and Sayer (eds)
(2006), and Argitis, Evans, Michell and Toporowski (2014, sections 8 and 10).
Among the contributors to this literature that have sought to integrateMon-
etary Circuit theory into the marxian paradigm as a ‘monetary theory of pro-
duction’, I mention (non-exhaustively) Bellofiore (1989, 2004, 2005a, 2005b),
Bellofiore, Forges Davanzati and Realfonzo (2000), Bellofiore and Realfonzo
(1997, 2003), and Forges Davanzati (2011).
Both the post-Keynesian and the Monetary Circuit approaches agree that
money is essentially created ex nihilo and that normally it is endogenously cre-
ated by commercial banks (as opposed to the view that an ‘exogenous’ supply
of money by the central bank determines themoney in circulation, as neoclas-
sicals and also ‘new Keynesians’ would have it).11 They also agree that banks
should not be seen as financial intermediaries that channel savings to invest-
ment (again, contrary to the neoclassical and ‘newKeynesian’ views that do see
banks as intermediaries in this respect); instead, and as Keynes emphasised,
investment gives rise to saving. (See Rochon and Rossi 2003 for a comparison).
11 The Central Bank will be systematically introduced in 7D2.
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However, and in reference to Circuits 3.4–3.5 above, post-Keynesians tend to
start off with money-creating lending for investment (or also consumption);
Circuitists, on the other hand, insist that, for reasons of transparent theory, one
should start with money-creating lending for wage payments.12 For the latter
this would also fit a pure macroeconomic approach. I agree with these Circuit-
ist considerations. However, the two approaches are not inconsistent; rather
it is a question of whether one starts with a macroeconomic one-enterprises-
sector or with a macroeconomic two-enterprises-sector model. In each case
the key point is rather that the theorisation of the capitalist monetary eco-
nomy, and a macroeconomic account of it, inevitably requires the distinction
between enterprises and banks as creators of money (cf. Graziani 1989; cf. 2D5
on the separation-in-unity of enterprises and banks), and that the accumula-
tion of capital inevitably requires the money-creating pre-validation by banks
(2§10).
3§3 Saving by capital owners and labour: triadic debt-credit
relationships
Bank loans to enterprises pre-validate the latter’s production. With the
bank accountmoney created, enterprises settlemoney transfers between
them and transfer money to labour and capital owners. It was shown in
3§2 that if all of themoney transferred to labour and capital owners were
spent with enterprises – that is, in the event that there would be no sav-
ings – then the money returns to the enterprises’ accounts, so that the
PVF loan with the bank can be fully redeemed. Thus, in principle, capit-
alist production and its validation could proceed and grow without any
saving.
Saving is contingent. However, it is rather that ‘saving’ or ‘non-saving’ is con-
tingent: one of the twomust necessarily be the case. Thus the two being meth-
odologically on a par, saving and the degree of saving is nevertheless contin-
gent.13
When there are these savings, this has important necessary consequences.
The money transferred to labour and capital owners that is saved does not
return to enterprises’ accounts, and thus cannot be used to cancel their bank
credit, and so ends up as a saving of account money. This results in triadic
12 See Gnos 2003 for a comparison and for an atttempt to accommodate the post-Keynesian
concerns within a Circuitist framework; cf. Rossi 2003 and Seccareccia 2003.
13 Positing these as contingent by no means denies that for individual actors within a capit-
alist economy, it may make sense to save for precautionary reasons.
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debt-credit relationships: banks are in debt to these actors for this saving of
accountmoney, the latter sum being just equivalent to the remaining debt of
enterprises to banks. (See Circuit 3.9: in comparison with Circuit 3.6 only the
items in blue have been added).
[continued]
circuit 3.9 Pre-validating finance for wages, means of production and
dividends; saving by labour and by capital owners
* The same applies for interest to capital owners (implicit until 3§5).
Note 1. The ‘only’ difference between this circuit and Circuit 3.6 consists in the savings by labour
and capital owners (the dotted lines with ends 1B and 3B), and as a result the mere partial
redemptions of the PVF (ends 1A and 3A).
Note 2. The dotted lines are in fact not transfers: after the payment of wages and dividends, the
relevant savings remain on the accounts of labourers and capital owners. (Only in the historically
relevant case of banknote circulation might these be transfers: a deposit at the bank).
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3§3 Continued
From the perspective of enterprises then, savings are in fact a nuisance. The
upshot is that the banks are (continue to be) the enterprises’ financiers for the
amounts saved. Given these savings, enterprises as a whole are inevitably in
debt.
For enterprises the PVF from banks is an ex ante finance, the finance pre-
cedes (the expansion of) investment and production. This is a finance created
ex nihilo. For banks, however, the expansion of their own finance (their liabil-
ities) is an ex post finance through the savings.
3§3-a Explication. The non-necessity of saving for the investment by
enterprises
Itwas emphasised in 3§3 that saving is a nuisance for enterprises. Even if saving
is ubiquitous in a capitalist economy (and even if for individual actors it can be
rational for precautionary reasons), savings are not necessary for enterprises,
and enterprises would be better off without savings because their loans with
banks could be non-problematically redeemed.
For banks, however, savings are no nuisance at all, as lending is their main
business.
sheet 3.10a Integrated balance sheet of enterprises
Assets [active capital] Liabilities [passive finance capital]
• plant and equipment External finance capital
• raw materials etc. • loans from banks a
• work in progress • loans from non-bank financiers (bonds)†
• commodities produced Internal finance capital b
• current account with banks
value equivalent of a + b K K=FC
† Introduced in 3§6
3§3-b Explication. Ex ante finance of enterprises by banks, and enforced
ex post finance of banks by labour and capital owners – the
balance sheets of enterprises and banks
I expand on 3§1-a. Recall that the ‘assets side’ of the balance sheet of enter-
prises measures the active capital (K). The ‘liabilities side’ indicates how the
enterprise is financed through ‘finance capital’ (FC). See Sheet 3.10a.
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For the aggregate of enterprises, the expansion of the liabilities side is an
ex ante finance of the expansion of the assets side: the finance precedes new
investment in the assets. The expansion of the liabilities originates exclusively
fromaPVF– finance createdby the banks exnihilo. (Itwill be shown in 3§6 that
this also applies, or has applied, for the internal finance capital of the enter-
prise; all of the latter stem from PVFs).
sheet 3.10b Integrated balance sheet of banks
Assets [financial]* Liabilities [finance]*
Assets bank: non-financial (leased)** Own capital banks e
Assets bank: financial d Borrowed from non-bank financiers†
(bank bonds, time accounts)
Current accounts [CA]: borrowings g
• Loans to enterprises (d) • Current accounts: enterprises (borrowed)
• Loans to non-enterprises† • Current accounts: labour (borrowed)
• Current accounts: capital owners (borrowed)
• Current accounts: other (borrowed)†
• Loans to other banks‡ • Borrowed from other banks‡
Balance Sheet Total [a =] d = e + g Balance Sheet Total e + g = d
* Only in this balance sheet (with these items crossed out) do all of the banks’ activities serve as Finance
Capital for enterprises.
** Leased from the banking entities’ production branch (3§1, heading 2).
† Presented in Appendix 3B.
‡ Because the balance sheets of banks have been integrated, these items cancel out.
Regarding the banks’ balance sheet, however (see Sheet 3.10b), the expansion of
their own finance (liabilities) is an ex post finance through the savings, which
are generatedonlyafter the PVFhas beenprovided.Hencebanks donot finance
enterprises (or other actors) out of a pre-existing ‘loanable fund of savings’. The
neglect of this distinction between ex ante and ex post finance in the conven-
tional macroeconomics that neglects banks is a source of enormous confusion
(amplified in 3§6-d).
Savings, if any, are no precondition for any of the finances (enterprises,
banks). We sufficiently saw this for the ‘pure’ constellation of 3§2. Again – for
the case of saving – the finance of enterprises being an ex ante one, this finance
does not originate with savings: it originates with the bank’s PVF, which itself
is financed ex post.
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Moreover, in the aggregate the latter is an enforced finance. Capital owners
or labourers that save might switch from one bank to another, but they can-
not escape from financing the lot. The only freedom within this enforcement
is that of the degree of liquidity: current accounts, time accounts, etc. (In the
day of the fading away of the notes of the Clearing/Central Bank, people may
still take illusionary comfort in the possibility of hoarding heaps of CB-notes,
through which – in fact – they finance the CB).14
In this perspective, consider Sheet 3.11, which casts themoney streams of Cir-
cuit 3.9 regarding labour in terms of alterations of the banks’ balance sheet (a
similar sheet might be made for capital owners).
sheet 3.11 Alteration of banks’ balance sheet: case of saving by labour
1. money-creating loans to Enterprises for wages payment:
loans to Enterprises (PVF) $ x current accounts Enterprises $ x
2. payment of wages:
loans to Enterprises (PVF) $ x current accounts Enterprises 0
current accounts Labour $ x
3. spending of $(x-s) (hence a saving of $ s):
loans to Enterprises (PVF) $ x current accounts Enterprises $ (x-s)
current accounts Labour $ s
4. Enterprises cancel part of their loans:
loans to Enterprises (RPVF*) [x-(x-s)] $ s current accounts Enterprises 0
current accounts Labour $ s
* RPVF: Remaining PFV
14 The commercial bank books at the assets side ‘holding of CB-notes’ and at its liabilities
side ‘borrowed from the CB’. The CB books at the assets side ‘loans to banks’ and at its liab-
ilities side ‘banknotes issued’, which is how it finances the loan to the commercial bank.
When (or if) a worker or capital owner collects CB-notes from the commercial bank (for
which its current account is debited), they become the anonymous holder of CB debt
(‘banknotes issued’) and so become a financier of the CB.
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In the last row of Sheet 3.11 we have the equivalent of labour’s enforced ex
post finance of banks.
Becauseof the savingout of wages ($s), the initial loans to enterprises cannot
be fully cancelled, whence the bank keeps on financing them for the amount $s,
which is the equivalent of the bank’s debt to labour. Note that ex post it seems
as if enterprises are indirectly financed out of savings (as if we had bank inter-
mediation of ‘loanable funds’). However, this is a false appearance. From the
start the enterprises’ investment was financed by ex nihilo created money, and
the non-redeemed part is still being financed by ex nihilo created money. Sav-
ing does not give rise to investment; rather the investment – as accommodated
by ex nihilo createdmoney – gave rise to income out of which saving took place
(cf. Keynes 1936).
Considering the banks’ balance sheet, the enterprises at first financed the
bank(!) through their current account: see Sheet 3.11 entry 1 (liabilities side). In
the end (entry 4), labour substitutes for the enterprises. The enterprises’ fin-
ance of the banks (entry 1) had nothing to do with any saving.
3§4 The payment of interest by enterprises to banks
Recall the distinction between on the one hand ‘banks’ as purely creators of
money and as financiers, and on the other hand the banking entities’ ‘produc-
tion branch’ that is subsumed under the enterprises sector (3§1, heading 2).
In the form of the interest that enterprises have to pay to banks, the banks
receive a share in the surplus-value produced in enterprises. Because pure
banks only engage in money-creating finance, it does not matter how indi-
vidual enterprises settle the way of payment of the interest (as long as they pay
the interest on the date due). Theymight pay the interest out of theirmonetary
inflow from sales, or alternatively they might use their credit line with banks,
which means that they take an additional loan – as always this just requires
that they can offer the bank sufficient securities. When the latter is satisfied,
banks do not care about the destination of a loan, and on the other hand they
do not care from what fund the enterprise pays the interest.
Considering this macroeconomically, two points are at issue.
First, especially from Circuit 3.5 (and from that circuit in combination with
Figure 3.7) it can be seen that one or several ‘shots’ of pre-validating finance
can generate a numerically much larger income stream (in terms of e.g. net
production) – PVFs indeed flow through the economy. (This point is blurred
in macroeconomic circuits with only one enterprises sector: the other circuits
presented so far).
Second, because banks, and banks alone, create money, it is impossible for
them to receive back more money (PVF plus interest) than they created (PVF).
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This simple fact also contains the solution: macroeconomically, banks create
the money for their own interest receipts. This reveals the essence of banking.
Banks earn on loans, including on loans to pay interest. The only one require-
ment is that loans are security backed.
Further, banks earn their profit from net interest (gross interest after deduc-
tion of costs for the bank). If, for the sake of simplicity, we assume the cost to be
zero, all of the interest streams to the bank are profits of the bank. If all profits
are retained, this interest is added to the own capital of the bank. Banks’ finan-
cial assets are a formof financial paper. Their financial liabilities are also a form
of financial paper (electronic paper for accounts), and especially also the own
capital of the bank. All these are ultimately creations of the bank (in reciprocal
credit relationships – 2§8).
circuit 3.12 Banking entities as financier (‘banks’) and as
employer (‘active branch’) (note: this circuit
relates to Amplification 3§4-a)
* Spending: including material investment of the banking enterprise branch.
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3§4-a Amplification. ‘Banking entities’ and payment of interest from
enterprises to banks
So far ‘banks’ are conceptualised purely as creators of money and as financiers.
Any other activities of the ‘banking entities’ are allotted to their ‘production
branch’ that is subsumed under the category of enterprises (3§1, heading 2).
Henceforth I will continue to do this. However, for one time the ‘production
activity branch’ of ‘banking entities’ is made explicit. See Circuit 3.12. The banks
as financier internally transfer part of their interest receipts to their ‘production
branch’ (costs of leasing and outsourcing). From it, the latter spend with enter-
prises and also paywages (for simplicity all thesewages are spent). The streams
on the left hand side (‘start’) represent a loan from banks to enterprises (one
that enterprises intend to use for the payment of interest, but that for banks is
just a security backed loan like any other loan – see the main text of 3§4).
Division 3. Ex post substitution for the pre-validating finance by
banks
The grounding of the accumulation of capital in the expansion of bank-created
money (2D4) was further grounded and so concretised in the finance of enter-
prises by banks (3D2). The current division sets out how any limits to the
grounds of 3D2 are overcome or at least moderated (see 3§6). Preliminary con-
cepts for 3§6 are presented in 3§5.
3§5 Capital owners as financiers: dividend bearing and interest bearing
finance capital
Chapter 2 (2D6 and 2D7) introduced the category of ‘owners of passive capital’.
These are the ‘internal financiers’ of enterprises (3§1, Figure 3.2a), as further
explained below.
Until this stage of the exposition, banks are the sole external financiers of
enterprises. The degree of their accommodation of the accumulation of capital
via the PVF also operates as a constraint on the unlimited expansion of capital.
One consideration for the banks’ accommodation is the quantity and quality
of the securities that the enterprise can deliver for the PVF. Another consider-
ation, in terms of the liabilities of the enterprise, is the enterprise’s degree of
‘solvency’, that is, the ratio of internal over total finance capital (see balance
sheet 3.10a in 3§3-b). This implies that the expansion of capital is constrained
by the growth of the internal (own) finance capital of the enterprise and hence
by the retained profits (3§1, Figure 3.2b).15 Any non-retained profit is distrib-
15 At this point retained profits are solely the surplus-value that is not distributed to banks
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uted to the shareholders in the form of dividends. In principle the internal cap-
ital of enterprises can so be extended via the issuing of new shares, paid out of
dividends from any enterprise. As such we have ‘dividend bearing finance cap-
ital’.
Further, via the distribution of profits to shareholders in the form of divi-
dends, their wealth grows. In principle they can further limit and spread their
risk and uncertainty (cf. 2§12) by, instead of sharing, lending finance capital to
enterprises, perhaps in the form of bonds or direct placements.16|17 Like the
banks’ PVF, this is ‘interest bearing finance capital’.
3§5-a Amplification. The level of the rate of interest
Regarding the demand for loans by enterprises, interest is the price for being
able to command finance capital for the generation of surplus-value (cf. Robin-
son 1953, p. 87). As to the supply of loans other than loans provided by banks,
the level of the rate of interest is usually considered to be a matter either of
‘time preference’ (in which case interest might also be negative – as Robinson
1953 has argued),18 or of ‘the price for waiting with consumption’ (Marshall’s
1972 [1890] version of Senior’s ‘abstinence’ from consumption) – a rather ideo-
logical concept, which was one of the chief targets of Keynes’s (1936) critique
of the received view of his day.19 Instead, Keynes posited interest as ‘the reward
for parting with liquidity for a specific period’ (1936, p. 167).20 For the supply
side I consider the latter to be the best conceptualisation available. In 3§5 I
generalised this as the limiting and spreading of risk and uncertainty.
in the form of interest, and the part that is not distributed to the owners of the enterprise
in the form of (quasi) dividends.
16 The risk and uncertainty is further spread to the extent that the interest rate is fixed, and
the payment of interest is prioritised before the payment of dividend.
17 Systematically the category of ‘capital owners’ – as separate from the owners of enter-
prises – was introduced with the introduction of the corporate enterprise. Historically
the category of lending by capital owners emerged before the emergence of the corporate
enterprise.
18 For example, one might wish to command over sums of money at some retirement age,
even if the net interest over the period leading up to that time is negative.
19 The disputed idea is that savings are seen to be evoked by interest. Instead, actors save
because they want to save (for old age or some expense or precaution). This can be seen
especially in times of deep recession when, for (middle) layers that can afford it, savings
go up for reasons of precaution even when the interest goes down.
20 Relatedly, apart from any other actors, banks may offer such rewards for tempting actors
to keep their account money with their particular bank. (If savings are kept with another
bank, then the investment-loanprovidingbank is, for the amount saved, in debt to another
bank, not to the saver – cf. 2§12).
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3§6 Pre-validating finance by banks as ex post substituted for by
non-banking finance capital (the RPVF)
Banks necessarily provide credit to enterprises, which is a flow of pre-
validating finance (PVF). This flow returns to the banks on aggregate full
spending, thereby cancelling thepre-validating credit (3§2).However, any
non-spending of income interferes with this, and it implies that the bank
is (continues to be) the enterprises’ financier for this amount not spent
(3§3).
The non-redeemed part of the PVF, which equals the saving by labour and cap-
ital owners, is called the remaining pre-validating finance (RPVF). Hence banks
provide, in effect, next to amoney-creating flowof finance (PVF), a non-money-
creating stock of finance (RPVF) – the latter being based on previous money
creation, and now equally being based on the triadic debt-credit relationship
between the bank, the saver of money and the enterprise (cf. 3§3).21
At the same time, the non-spenders are potential ex post financiers. To the
extent that the latter explicitly enter into a (additional) finance relation with
the enterprises – thus substituting for the bank RPVF – they become actual ex
post financiers, or owners of (additional) finance capital.22 (See Circuit 3.13).
Even stronger, on average, non-bank financiers can be no more than ex post
financiers. They do not finance the process of the macro accumulation of cap-
ital and so macroeconomic growth – this is what the banks do. They can, on
average, merely finance already accumulated capital, that is, ex post, after the
deed of accumulation.23 Through the necessary creation of money, banks are
always the origin of finance capital. There is no ex ante finance beyond the
revolving pre-validating finance by banks (PVF). Because any new investment
is so accommodated, any existing investment has been so accommodated.24 (See
also 3§7, which expands on banks as the providers of the finance capital for the
founders of an enterprise).
A corollary is that actors do not become owners of finance capital by amere
saving of money. In the latter case the bank is the owner of finance capital,
whereas these savers are holders, claimants, of account money.
[continued]
21 In comparison with 3§3, I now have introduced the terms of ‘flow’ and ‘stock’. Although
these terms are correct, it should be kept inmind that the time-weighted-average of a flow
has a stock character.
22 The precise formof the ex post finance is not important in this context. These can be loans
(bonds or direct placements), or the enterprise may also issue additional shares.
23 The qualification ‘on average’ is expanded upon in explication 3§6-d.
24 That is, systematically at least: the mechanism for any remnants of banknote circulation
may be different, although the principle is the same.
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circuit 3.13 Ex post substitution by capital owners for ‘Remaining Pre-
validating Finance’
Note 1. To keep this circuit transparent, it is assumed that all savings of capital owners from Cir-
cuit 3.9 are used to purchase shares or bonds. The latter are newly issued shares and bonds (the
so-called primary market).
Note 2. Stream 3: a similar stream applies for the payment of interest to capital owners.
Note 3. In principle workersmight also purchase bonds or shares, in which case, for that part, the
categories of labour and capital owner would overlap.
3§6 Continued
However, there is a tendency to incite the capital owners engaged in saving, to
substitute, in part, for the bank-provided finance capital. Yet, I repeat, this can
only be a substitution ex post, that is, a substitution after the necessary initial
provision of finance capital (PVF) by the bank (amplified in 3§6-d).25 This tend-
ency is driven by:
25 These other actors are themoney savers themselves, or institutions channelling these sav-
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• first, the degree of actual indebtedness of banks along with the savings-
engendered indebtedness of enterprises (cf. Sheet 3.10b in 3§3-b);26
• second, the banks seeking to limit the saving- and RPVF-engendered risk and
uncertainty (so requiring fromenterprises a finance buffer, in the formof the
latter’s internal capital and non-bank external capital);
• third, the enterprises seeking finance at a price lower than that required by
banks.
In conclusion: A ‘loanable fund’ of current and past saving is no precondition
for investment (amplified in 3§6-d). Ex post substitution for the bank’s RPVF by
capital owners contributes to the banks’ ongoing accommodation of the accu-
mulation of capital via their PVF.
Finally, it should be remarked that there is no implication of the previous
exposition that there should be a macroeconomic equality of investment and
the PVF.27 Rather, investment must take off with ‘shots’ of pre-validating fin-
ance by banks. (The PVF circulates – see Circuit 3.5).
3§6-a Addendum. ‘Banks are not intermediaries of loanable funds’
When I wrote the first drafts of the current chapter, it was a heresy to con-
sider banks as the initiating financiers of the accumulation of capital (see
also Addendum 3§2-e on monetary circuit theory). However, in a 2015 paper,
entitled ‘Banks are not Intermediaries of Loanable Funds – andWhy This Mat-
ters’, Jakab and Kumhof, members of the research departments of the IMF and
theBank of England, distance themselves from the orthodox economics notion
of loanable finds (Jakab and Kumhof 2015). To get the main thrust of this 57-
page paper, the reader might turn to its summary (ibid., pp. i–iii).28 In the
context of 3§6 the latter’s key sentence is: ‘Saving does not finance investment,
financing does’ (ibid., p. ii).
ings (institutional portfolio investors, such as pension funds – cf. Appendix 3A, section 3A-
1). Recall that the term ‘actor’ or ‘social actor’ is used in a general sense (2§14-a).
26 Cf. 2§10 (heading 3) on crediting rules set by the ClB. At this point of the exposition, banks
lend to enterprises only (lending to other actors is introduced in Appendix 3B).
27 First, the PVF serves various purposes (including wage payments); second, the degree of
actual circulation of the PVF through the economy is dependent on the degree of savings
along that process.
28 Available at: http://z822j1x8tde3wuovlgo7ue15.wpengine.netdna‑cdn.com/wp‑content/
uploads/2015/02/wp529.pdf.
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3§6-b Explication. The connection between the PVF and the RPVF
New (additional) inputs of production are financed through money-creating
PVFs (keeping in mind the last sentence of 3§6). This relates to labour’s wages
(that are continuously an additional input) and the growth of means of pro-
duction (intermediate inputs and investment).
In the absence of any saving we ‘merely’ have a growing PVF flow along with
the rate of economic growth (this is serviced out of enterprises’ interest pay-
ments to banks).
With any saving, we have this growing PVF flow, as well as a RPVF stock. In
case there is no ex post substitution for the RPVF, we have a continuous growth
of the RPVF stock (saving period (t) = Δ RPFV period (t) – with the symbol Δ for
‘change’).29 ThisΔRPFV is a liability (to banks) on the enterprises’ balance sheet
(equivalent to a change of the banks’ financial assets at their balance sheet) and
for which enterprises pay interest to the banks.
The banks finance the ΔRPVF ex post by the current accounts of labour (sav-
ing from wages) and of capital owners (saving from dividends and interest).
This saving by labour and capital owners pertains tomoney createdby the bank
via the PVF.
Finally, especially capital owners and rich wage earners may in part substi-
tute for the ΔRPVF through the purchase of newly issued shares or bonds from
enterprises.30
3§6-c Amplification. Shorthand summary of the required type of finance
Figure 3.14 summarises the types of finance that are required at each conceptual
stage in 3§2–3§3 and 3§6. Recall that PVF is an abbreviation for pre-validating
finance by banks, and RPVF is an abbreviation for any remaining PVF (i.e. the
non-redeemed part of the PVF upon saving by labour and capital owners).
29 Thus whereas generally the macroeconomic PVF < investment (the last sentence of 3§6),
macroeconomic saving = Δ RPFV (prior to substitution for it).
30 Some of this substitution takes place via savings channelling institutions such as pension
funds (Appendix 3A, sections 3A-1 and 3A-2).
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figure 3.14 Forms of finance capital along with (non-)saving and (non-)sub-
stitution for bank RPVF
Flows of finance capital Stocks of finance capital
during period t [from (t′) to (t′′)] at the beginning of period t
1. Absence of saving (3§2; Circuits 3.4, 3.5 and 3.6)
PVF(t) [short-term bank loan] no other external FC
PVF(t′′) redeemed [Δ RPVF(t′′) = 0]
2. Saving, no substitution for RPVF (3§3; Circuit 3.9)
PVF(t) other bank-loans =
Σ RPVF(t-1) … RPVF(t-n)
γPVF(t′′) redeemed Δ RPVF(t′′) > 0
[redeemed fraction γ] [= (1-γ)PVF(t)]
3. Saving, with substitution for RPVF (3§6; Circuit 3.13)





γPVF(t′′) redeemed Δ RPVF(t′′) > 0 together equal to
[redeemed fraction γ] [= (1-γ)PVF(t)] Σ RPVF(t-1) … RPVF(t-n)
3§6-d Amplification. Ex post substitution for bank-provided finance
capital and deferred substitution (the illusion of loanable funds of
savings)
Throughout 3D2 and 3D3 I have distanced myself from a ‘loanable funds’
approach to finance, investment and accumulation of capital. (I repeat that
by ‘investment’ I always mean what is often called ‘direct investment’ – as
opposed to ‘portfolio investment’). Thus I distance myself from the classical
and neoclassical view, which holds that generally in a developed capitalist sys-
tem, the accumulation of capital and any new investment is financed out of a
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pre-existing money fund of savings, that is, of current and previous savings (a
loanable fund).31 This explication is about the qualification ‘generally’. We will
see that new investment may at times be financed out of a fund, but that this
cannot be on average the case. Consider rows 1 and 4 of Sheet 3.15.
sheet 3.15 Alteration of banks’ balance sheet (savings case) with various
forms of substitution (sheet continued in the text below)
money-creating loans to Enterprises for dividends payment:
1 loans to Enterprises (PVF) $ x current accounts Enterprises $ x
payment of dividends:
2 loans to Enterprises (PVF) $ x current accounts Enterprises 0
current accounts Capital Owners $ x
spending of $(x-s) (hence a saving of $ s):
3 loans to Enterprises (PVF) $ x current accounts Enterprises $ (x-s)
current accounts Capital Owners $ s
Enterprises cancel part of their loans
4 loans to Enterprises (RPVF*) [x-(x-s)] $ s current accounts Enterprises 0
current accounts Capital Owners
(RCB‡)
$ s
* RPVF: Remaining PFV
‡ RCB: Remaining credit balance flow
The initial loan was called the PVF (pre-validating finance). The current ac-
count balances (the right hand side of row 4) are called the RCBF (remaining
credit balance flow – remaining from the dividends transfer). I call the remain-
ing part of the PVF (the left hand side of row 4) the RPVF. These are analytical
names.
31 Note that I distance myself from any bank intermediated ‘loanable funds’ notion, includ-
ing those versions in which banks combine ex nihilo credit with loanable funds interme-
diation.
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Enterprises may sell bonds for $s to capital owners. If enterprises use the
money thus collected (the RCBF) to cancel the RPVF, i.e. the final part of their
dividends PVF loan with the bank, we have the analytically transparent case of
ex post substitution for the remaining bank-provided finance (RPVF).
5a loans to E [RPVF(t)] $ s CA E (due to sale bond) $ s
CA CO (due to purchase bond) $0
5b loans to E [RPVF(t)] (cancelled) $0 CA E (cancelling RPVF(t)) $0
* CA: Current accounts; E: Enterprises; CO: capital owners; (t) is a time indicator (some year)
All credits and debts with the bank for dividend payments have been cleared
(awaiting a new sequence). The finance substitution relates to investment (a
quantity larger than the dividend sum) that has taken place already: the assets
side (active capital) of the enterprises balance sheet grew, and equally so the
liabilities side (finance capital), initially through the banks’ finance that is now
in part substituted for (the saved dividends).
However, enterprises may not want to sell bonds now (perhaps because of
their long-term commitments), or theymay notmanage to sell bonds (because
of the liquidity preferenceof current account holders). Note that thebankmust
allow this situation to persist. Thus rows 5 are crossed out.
We now turn to the next period (t+1), row 6, which starts with the end result
of row 4. In this case we do seem to have a loanable fund (the RCB of row 4).
start of period (t+1), = row 4
6 loans to E [RPVF(t)] $ s CA E 0
CA CO [RCB(t)] $ s
In this period (t+1) (or later), the RCB of capital owners might be used for a
deferred substitution for the bank loan (the RPVF from period t). This would be
equivalent to row 5.
However, it might instead be used to finance a new investment. The latter
case is to be conceived as a substitution for a pre-validating finance [PVF(t+1)]
that would ‘normally’ have been taken on by the bank (see row 7a below).
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[ following on from row 6]
7a loans to E [RPVF(t)]
(not cancelled)
$ s CA E (sale bond for new investment
t+1)
$ s
CA CO (due to purchase bond) 0
7b (previous) loans to E [RPVF(t)] $ s CA E (due to sale bond t+1) $ s
(new) loans to E [PVF(t+1)] $ x′-s CA E (new PVF, analogous to row 1) $ x′-s
(x′= x plus the ‘normal’ rate of
growth)
7 7b in sum (analogous to row 1):
loans to Enterprises $ x′ CA Enterprises $ x′
In effect the sum of money $s from (t) – row 6 – remained ‘in circulation’. In
(t+1), therefore, the ‘normal’ influx of money can be reduced from $x′ to $x′-s
(row 7b), in sum resulting in a circulation of $x′ as in row 7 (where x′ = x plus
the ‘normal’ rate of growth).
In the situation exemplified in rows 6 and 7 the bank, in effect, ‘allows’ for
the (temporary) existence of a loanable fund ($s) by not forcing enterprises to
fully redeem the initial loan (PVF(t)).
Note that the enterprises’ expiration of previous non-bank loans (such as
bonds) provides no net loanable fund: if the loan is not renewed (reissue of
bonds), banks will have to provide a loan for the redemption.
I conclude that on average investment is not financed out of loanable funds of
savings and that the specific case of such finance is in effect a deferred sub-
stitution for the bank’s pre-validating finance as fully accommodated by ex
nihilo created bank accountmoney.Thus generally, and on average, investment
is (either directly or indirectly) necessarily accommodated by a pre-validating
finance by banks (PVF). Without it, savings and hence also the specific case of
a ‘loanable credit balance’ (RCB) could not have existed. The latter is just the
remnant of a prior PVF.
3§6-e Addendum. Minsky on the substitution of bank loans for other
loans
Enterprises may prefer other financiers to banks insofar as the latter’s charges
are higher. Conversely, the reason for (non-banking) ‘potential financiers’ to
become ‘actual financiers’ is that enterprises may provide them with a higher
yield (interest, dividend) than the interest that the bank might pay them. The
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drawback is a decrease in (the degree of) liquidity. Minsky (2004 [1954], p. 233)
apparently used the term substitution from the perspective of the financier
(portfolio investor), linking it toKeynes’s (1936) liquidity preference theory: ‘the
liquidity preference relation, which is shorthand for the substitution relation
between money and other assets [e.g. bonds that “other financiers” buy from
enterprises], becomes the appropriate tool to use in the analysis of the beha-
vior of the monetary system’ (quoted by Toporowski 2006, p. 13).
Division 4. The foundation of banks and enterprises
Grounding of the starting point’s capital accumulated
The systematic entry point to the exposition of the capitalist system (1§1) is
the outward bifurcation between households and privately owned means of
production. For a systematic-dialectical exposition, it is irrelevant how the cap-
italist system came into being historically (even if the latter is intriguing), as
the purpose is to exhibit the requirements and functioning of the existing sys-
tem.
Nevertheless it seems broadly within the remit of a systematic-dialectical
account of capitalism to set out how enterprises and banks come into being
within capitalism. Building on theprevious divisions of this chapter, the current
brief division (one section) sets out an elementary outline of this. The focus is
on the foundation of banks. However, because enterprises and banks mutu-
ally presuppose one another, and constitute a separation-in-unity (2§11), the
following section starts with a brief look at the foundation of enterprises.
3§7 The foundation of banks and enterprises
It was shown that banks provide enterprises with a pre-validating finance of
production and so with finance capital (3§1–3§2). This leaves unanswered the
question of where banks get their founding capital from.
1 The foundation of enterprises
The initial production and accumulation of capital of a new enterprise (‘within
capitalism’) is in effect generated by labour’s production of surplus-value (1D5),
with the pre-validating finance by banks as a condition (see heading 2).
The transparent constellation for the foundation of enterprises is one of an
absence of savings (3§2), as well as an absence of ‘hard’ collateral to be offered
to a bank. Hence the bank is merely confronted with a ‘business plan’ together
with the novice enterprise’s promise that it will pay back the loan with an
interest, and that, in the meantime, it offers the collateral of future purchases
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(means of production) and future profits.32 With merely a ‘business plan’ the
bank takes relatively more risk than in the case of ‘hard’ collateral – against it
the bank will require a relatively higher rate of interest.
2 The foundation of banks
New banksmay originate as offshoots from existing banks or enterprises. How-
ever, that position about foundation is regressive, so we need to abstract from
existing banks and enterprises. Abstracting from those, the foundation of a
bank originates with a loan from that new bank to the founders of that bank.33
This loan is a pre-validating finance (PVF), which is in principle no different
from the banking of currently existing banks. From that loan, the founders fin-
ance the own finance capital of the bank. The loan is redeemed from the bank’s
future distributed profits. The result is the particular type of liability that the
own finance capital of any existing bank is, namely a liability to itself. (Explic-
ation 3§7-a provides the details).
This initiating process of the foundation of a bank is in principle no different
from the extension of the own finance capital of an existing bank via the issue of
new shares. This proceeds by a transfer of current account money (of the new
shareholder) to the bank’s liabilities entry of ‘own capital’ (equity). However,
current account money is always the result of a money-creating loan by the
bank. Hence, the extra own capital comes (or has come) indirectly into being by
way of money creation by the bank at hand, or another one. (Explication 3§7-a).
This is all there is to it, so setting up a bank appears to be rather simple
(though further reflection on this reveals the very essence of what banking is).
Nevertheless, the problem – as with the establishing of a new enterprise – is
‘getting clients’. That is, clients on top of the founders of the bank. (Founders
acting as clients is not an illusionary matter, because in the actual history of
capitalism, some banks – especially cooperative ones – have functioned as
founders’ banks). This ‘clients problem’ is a matter of the domain of a single
bank (2§8).
32 Note that this also happens in current practice, even if exceptionally. Note also that a bank
that itself is new (heading 2) has no option but to choose between such business plans.
33 Quite apart from my concern to present the systematic foundation of banks, Lavoie cor-
rectly states the following in respect of the own capital of a bank in general: ‘The own
capital of the bank constitutes a liability to itself. It represents the funds which the firm
[the bank] owes to its owners. In general, the own funds play a role similar to deposits
[current accounts] that would be in the hands of the owners. … The own funds are an
accounting entry, but in contrast to deposits [current accounts] they cannot be drawn on
by the owners’ (2003, p. 512).
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Once there are extended domains, a ‘new’ bank will have to cope with the
rules set by a Clearing Bank (2§9). However, this is not the point of the current
section. Division 2D4 was entered by a mere reference to the actual existence
of banks. The brief outline above concerns the systematic coming into being of
that existence.
3§7-a Explication: The systematic foundation of banks in terms of their
balance sheets
We startwith the extensionof the own finance capital of an existing bank (Sheet
3.16). This sheet shows alterations of the bank’s balance sheet (a simplified full
balance sheet was presented in 3§3-b, Sheet 3.9b).
sheet 3.16 Extension of the own capital of a bank: alterations of the bank’s
balance sheet (Bank Z)
Assets Liabilities
1. Existing loans to enterprises (non-substituted part) of bank Z
loans to enterprises (RPVF) € x current accounts non-enterpr. (non-bank) € x
2a. Case of own capital extension of bank Z by clients of bank Z
loans to enterprises (RPVF) € x current accounts non-enterpr. (non-bank) € – x
own finance capital bank Z (shares) € x
2b. Case of own finance capital extension of bank Z by clients of other banks (the money
receiving bank always provides a loan to the money transferring bank – 2§9-b)
loans to other banks € x own finance capital bank Z € x
3a. Sum of 1 and 2a
loans to enterprises (RPVF) € x own finance capital bank Z € x
3b. Sum of 1 and 2b
loans to enterprises (RPVF) € x current accounts non-enterpr. (non-bank) € x
loans to other banks € x own finance capital bank Z € x
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Concerning either the extension or the foundation of the ‘own capital’ of
banks, that term should be taken in two senses: ownership and creation. Sheet
3.17 shows the bookkeeping act for the foundation of a bank (starting from
scratch).
sheet 3.17 Foundation of a bank in terms of its balance sheet
Assets Liabilities
1. money-creating loans to bank founders
loans to bank founders (PVF) € x current accounts bank founders € x
2. paying in of the own capital
loans to bank founders (PVF) € x current accounts bank founders 0
own capital (shares) € x
The collateral for the loansmight bebasedona variety of possessions.However,
in the ‘pure’ case it is merely based on the bank’s claim on the founders’ future
income stream from the bank capital, i.e. the distributed profits. Further, as the
founders are the owners of the bank, the future net value of the bank may be
offered as collateral.
Next, in the course of time, the loans to bank founders are redeemed out of
the bank profits distributed to the holders of the own capital (shareholders).
Thus the main difference between the extension (Sheet 3.16) and the found-
ation (Sheet 3.17) is the degree of collateral.
3§7-b Explication. Grounding of the starting point
With theprevious section (3§7) the startingpoint’s pre-positionof capital accu-
mulated (1§1) has been grounded (hence it is no longer a pre-position).With it,
all the previous ‘economic’ pre-positions have been grounded. However, the
state (Part Two) is still pre-posited.
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3§7-c Addendum. Marx on the historically initial accumulation of
capital
At the end of Capital, Volume I, Marx has a famous and interesting chapter on
what he calls the initial accumulation of capital.34 It describes the historical
transition from feudalism to capitalism. Hence it describes where the initial
capitalists got their ‘capital’ from. Even if such a history is important, it does
not quite square with a pure systematic-dialectical account of capitalism. Sys-
tematically such a history is a deus exmachina, the point being the problematic
phrase above: ‘where did the initial capitalists get their capital from’. This is
not so much a problem in terms of ‘physical’ entities; though it is a problem in
terms of the inward bifurcation of commodities (their physical and monetary
dimensions) and next the concept of capital itself. At some point, apparently,
non-capital turns into capital. Historically this must be true. Nevertheless, if
we were to rely on a historical procedure, this would question the appropriate-
ness of the systematic starting point (this applies for Marx’s Capital and for the
current book’s 1§1).
Division 5. Validation of macroeconomic surplus-value by
macroeconomic expenditure
Finance, investment, saving and surplus-value
Building on the connection between finance, expenditure and saving (3§3 of
3D2 and 3§6 of 3D2), the current division expands on the macroeconomic
interconnections regarding finance, investment, saving and surplus-value. Its
last section 3§10 (which bears the same title as the full division) is the key one.
It grounds the production of surplus-value (1D5) in macroeconomic expendit-
ure. The earlier sections (3§8 and 3§9) present some preliminaries to it.
3§8 Investment versus finance
• Primaryand secondary substitution: primaryand secondary financialmarkets
The ex post substitution for the pre-validating finance by banks (3D3, 3§6) per-
tains to the so-called ‘primarymarket’: the issuance of new shares or newbonds
or newdirect placements of loans. Again, the purchase of this primary financial
paper is necessarily based on a prior money creation by banks; the purchase
always involves the transfer of money from one bank account (the substitu-
34 Chapter 24 of the German edition, Part Eight of the English edition (English translation
of the title amended).
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ent’s) to another (the enterprise’s). Appendix 3A (section 3A-3) expands on
some contingencies of the secondary financial market: the trade in existing fin-
ancial paper, or the re-substitution for the banks’ PVF.
• Investment as against finance: enterprises as against financiers
The distinction between the purchasing investment in means of production by
enterprises and the purchase of financial paper by financiers (primary or sec-
ondary) is economically crucial.When before and henceforth I use(d) the term
‘investment’, this always means investment inmeans of production. For the pur-
chase of financial paper I will avoid using the term ‘portfolio investment’ and
‘portfolio investor’; instead I will use the terms ‘finance’ – be it primary or sec-
ondary finance – and ‘financier’.
Macroeconomically investment is independent of saving (3§2, 3§6, expanded
in 3§9). However, non-bank finance (the purchase of financial paper) is depend-
ent on saving: ‘a’ prior saving is a condition for it.35
3§8-a Amplification. ‘Real investment’ versus ‘portfolio investment’
In English we have ‘real investment’ versus ‘portfolio investment’.36 Econom-
ists and the business press often abbreviate these (one of these) in ‘investment’,
which gives rise to an enormous confusion (even in the mind of the author –
one can see this even in the work of a usually careful writer and thinker such
as Keynes). The term ‘finance’ is unambiguous.
3§9 Investment and saving: themacroeconomic inequality of investment
and saving (I≠S)
Orthodox economics posits the macroeconomic equality of investment and
saving, holding that saving is a precondition for investment. Keynes, Kalecki
and post-Keynesian economics hold that saving results from investment, pos-
iting nevertheless the ex post macroeconomic equality of investment (I) and
saving (S). As far as I know, all economic theory posits the macroeconomic
equality of investment and saving (I=S) in one of these variants. The exposi-
tion in this section explicitly departs from these views. In fact this was implicit
in the exposition from 3§2 onwards.
35 Appendix 3B (sections 3B-4 and 3B–4b) shows that in fact merely ‘some’ saving is a major
condition for it.
36 In many other languages, the terms have different roots. For example, German has invest-
ieren (verb), Investition or Investierung (noun) for ‘direct’ investment and anlegen (verb),
Anlage (noun) for the portfoliomeaning. Dutch has, respectively, investeren and beleggen.
French has investissement and placement.
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The previous divisions regularly used the terms expenditure, saving and
investment. As the state (Part Two) and international relations (Part Three) are
so far abstracted from (bracketed), there are only two forms of expenditure:
private consumption and private investment. Given the bifurcation between
households and enterprises (1D1), only households consume and only enter-
prises invest. These are addressed in turn.
1 Consumption expenditure by households
Only households consume.37 Alternatively they may in part abstain from ex-
penditure and hence save part of their income. For their savings there are
only two possibilities: keeping it in a bank account or purchasing financial
paper.38
2 Investment expenditure by enterprises
Only enterprises invest. This is the enterprises’ form of expenditure. As it is an
expenditure, it is not a saving. However, (remotely) similar to households that
may in part abstain from spending, enterprises might occasionally do some
saving: exceptionally for reasons of pure liquidity preference; or for strategic
reasons, whereby they purchase financial paper (perhaps in face of conglom-
eration).
3 The non-connection between investment and saving
It was shown in Chapter 1 (1D5) that labour, and labour alone, is the source of
surplus-value. Apart from the specific argumentation in that chapter, the gen-
eral thrust of this idea is no different from that of Adam Smith (1776). This is
about production.
However, Smith also argued that because ‘the masters’ (capitalists) do the
saving, and because in his view saving is a precondition for production (‘ad-
vances’), there must be profits for the ‘masters’.39 This is about the distribution
of production’s value-added.
37 This includes durable consumer goods, which again includes (e.g.) owner-occupied dwell-
ings. (See Appendix 3C-1, under point 6).
38 Recall from2§8 thepositing of uniquebank accountmoney. In the case of circulating rem-
nants of bank notes (as is still the case today), the third possibility is to substitute account
money in ClB-notes (which is in fact to purchase current zero-interest paper (‘currency’)
from the ClB via an ordinary bank).
39 Smith: ‘The value which the workmen add to the materials, therefore, resolves itself in this
case into two parts, of which the one pays their wages, the other the profits of their
employer upon thewhole stock of materials andwageswhich he advanced. He could have
no interest to employ them, unless he expected from the sale of their work something
174 part one – the capitalist economy
From Smith onwards, this idea about saving took root in allmainstream eco-
nomic theory: saving is a justification for private profits including interest (cf.
the Marshall citation in 1§14-b). (Marx would not agree with this, but he nev-
ertheless somewhat uncritically took on board Smith’s notion of ‘advances’ by
the capitalist – as do many marxian political economists today).
In fact themainstreammacroeconomicnotion of I=S (in both of its variants)
can only be defended byway of an utterly strange definition, which functions as
anassumption. This is todefine the (PVF accommodated) expenditure of invest-
ment as saving(!), thereby defining an expenditure as a non-expenditure. More
specifically, the investment expenditure equivalent of retained profits is defined
as a saving.40 This is categorially odd, though ideologically it does the job of
providing the alleged justification mentioned.
It was already explicit that the exposition in this chapter is not based on a
macroeconomic ex ante equality of investment and saving (this was explicit
from 3§2, and the critique of the notion of saved loanable funds – 3§3-b, 3§6,
3§6-a, 3§6-d). It is now also explicit that the exposition is neither based on a
macroeconomic ex post equality of saving and investment. Thus, in general,
macroeconomically I ≠ S, and more specifically I > S.
3§9-a Amplification. Keynes’s incomplete break from orthodox theory
Next to Kalecki, Keynes argued – against the orthodoxy of his day (which per-
sists to this day) – that instead of saving giving rise to investment, investment
gives rise to saving.41 The greatness of Keynes is that he integrated macro and
monetary theory. Neo-Keynesians (in contradistinction to post-Keynesians)
soon disintegrated the matter. Nevertheless, Keynes postulated the ex post
equality of the two (I→S, I=S ex post). Keynes’s break from prior economic the-
ory in this respect (I and S) is important. Nevertheless it is not a full break.
In hindsight Keynes allowed the ex ante equality to sneak back in via the
(erroneous) argument that in equilibrium the ex ante and ex post distinc-
more than what was sufficient to replace his stock to him; …’ (1776, Book I, Ch. 6, para. 5,
emphasis added). On saving specifically: ‘As the capital of an individual can be increased
only by what he saves fromhis annual revenue or his annual gains, so the capital of a society,
which is the same with that of all the individuals who compose it, can be increased only in
the samemanner. Parsimony, andnot industry, is the immediate cause of the increase of cap-
ital. Industry, indeed, provides the subject which parsimony accumulates. … Parsimony,
by increasing the fund which is destined for the maintenance of productive hands, tends
to increase the number of those handswhose labour adds to the value of the subject upon
which it is bestowed.’ (Book II, Ch. 3, paras 15–17, emphasis added).
40 In 3§10 this assumption will be criticised from a different perspective.
41 Bellofiore and Realfonzo (2003) argue howMarx is a precursor of this view.
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tion does not matter. Next the whole ideology of loanable funds and of parsi-
mony can be smuggled back in.
The strange definition/assumption of the (ex post) investment expenditure
equivalent of retained profits as a saving is not only dominant in economic the-
ory; it is also the national accounts practice.
Without, apparently, explicitly questioning the standard I=S notion, Jakab
and Kumhof (2015, p. 4, fn. 6) keenly remark: ‘in a closed economy, macroeco-
nomic (national accounts) saving is equal to investment by accounting defin-
ition rather than as a result of equilibrium, and the quantity of that saving is
unrelated to the overall quantity of financing’.
Simply as a definition (in effect that of ‘saving = non-consumption’) the ex
post equality of investment and saving does not domuch analytical harm– and
in what follows in this book nothing hinges on their equality or non-equality.
Themainstream notion is indeed ‘merely’ an ideological matter about the ‘jus-
tification by definition’ of profits and interest by parsimony, and often also a
‘justification by definition’ of a skewed distribution of income.
3§10 Validation of macroeconomic surplus-value bymacroeconomic
expenditure
In the exposition of the finance of enterprises, the focus inDivisions 2–3was on
thepre-validationof productionbybanks.This final section focuses on themac-
roeconomic validation (realisation) of production, and especially of surplus-
value. It explicitly connects the exposition of Chapter 1 to macroeconomic
implications of the exposition inChapters 2–3 so far. After an introductory sub-
section, the exposition focuses on the interconnection of the three sequential
processes of production (subsection 2), of themacroeconomic validationof pro-
duction and of surplus-value in particular (subsection 3), and of the distribution
of surplus-value (subsection 4).
1 The previous exposition
This subsection sums up the relevant stages of the exposition so far.
A. In Chapter 1 (1D5), production in general was presented, and hence the
production of surplus-value in general.42
B. In Chapter 2, enterprises and banks were distinguished. Even so the two
were presented as a separation-in-unity (2D5).
42 Themacroeconomic concept of surplus-value is in principle nodifferent from the concept
of ‘operating surplus’ as adopted in the current System of National Accounts. However, I
refrain from using the latter concept in order to evade the specific imputations that go
along with the SNA’s concept of the operating surplus – see 3§10-b.
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C. In 3§1 the production activities of banking entities (as against the bank’s
financing activities) were subsumed under the enterprises – thus ‘banks’ as
money-creating financiers do not produce, produce no value-added, and thus
no surplus-value. The same section outlined the interest flow from enterprises
to banks and other financiers as a share in the surplus-value of enterprises.
On this basis the remainder of this section presents a pure macroeconomic
account.
2 Macroeconomic production
In 1D5 it was pre-posited that capitalist production requires pre-validating fin-
ancebybanks (PVF) as treated in 3D2–3D3.The exposition in 1D5 (1§14, heading
6) set out how the production of capital is generated by labour’s production of
surplus-value.
Xt 🢔 = [(δ +μ)K + mLα]t [micro account] (1.4)
For a macro account the μK cancels out as intermediate deliveries; thus mac-
roeconomically μ=0. When considering net production (as in NDP) instead of
gross production (as in GDP) δK is abstracted from. Thus we have for net pro-
duction (Y):
Y 🢔 = mLαt [micro and macro account] (1.8)
Πt 🢔 =mLαt – wLt [idem] (1.5)
In 1§14 it was indicated that mLα is the actual monetary value of labour, with
‘m’ being the actual unit monetary value of labour, and that ‘m’ measures the
validation, the sale, of the product of labour. (Recall that ‘w’ is the wage rate
and that 🢔 indicates right hand side to left hand side determination.)
The wages sum (W) is defined as
Wt = wLt [idem] (3.1)
It is now made explicit that the constellation presented in 1D5 is such that the
validation of production as planned by enterprises on average squares with the
actually validated production. However, in the current section we allow for a
deviation between the production as planned by enterprises, and the actual
validation of production (the adaptation taking time).43 Therefore the equa-
tions for production (X), value-added (Y for net production) and surplus-value
(Π) presented in 1§14 are now rewritten in terms of planned production vari-
43 The previous sentence (about 1D5)means that sector deviations (or deviationswithin sec-
tors) roughly cancel out. The last sentence allows for divergences. These divergencesmust
be moderate in order to prevent that (from one period to the other) the economy spirals
into overheating, prompting the next recession. This implies that we are in something of
a steady-state phase of the business cycle (amplified in Chapter 5). Even so, the equations
presented in the remainder of this section do apply in each phase of the business cycle.
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ables (superscript p). Especially relevant is the possible deviation between the
planned unit monetary value of labour, ‘mP’, and the actual unit ‘m’.
We so have (time subscripts (t) are omitted):
XP 🢔 = (δ +μ)K + mPLα [macro account for μ=0] (3.2; cf. 1.4)
YP 🢔 = mPLα [micro and macro account] (3.3; cf. 1.8)
ΠP 🢔 =mPLα –W [idem] (3.4; cf. 1.5)
All variables (above and below) without the superscript p denote actually val-
idated variables.
Macroeconomically a deviation between the planned validation of produc-
tion and the actual validation is determined by macroeconomic expenditure
deviating from the planned one.44 Section 3§3 introduced the ‘savings’ aspect
of this expenditure on which I now expand.
3 Validation of macroeconomic production by expenditure
In this subsection the main focus will be on the macroeconomic categories
of investment (I) and consumption (C). As for production, the validation of
production by expenditure requires accommodation by the PVF provided by
banks. Most of this accommodation coincides with the PVF of production. The
PVF for investment results in investment expenditure, and the PVF for wages
results in consumption expenditure by wage earners. However, the PVF for the
payment of dividend and interest to capital owners occurs after production
(Circuit 3.9 in 3§3), and so does not coincide with the PVF of production. (See
heading 4 on the distribution of surplus-value Π).
Regarding the economic domain treated, it is noted that at the current stage
of the exposition (with the state bracketed), macroeconomic income (Y) con-
sists merely of the two categories of surplus-value realised (Π) and of wages
paid by enterprises (W):
Y = Π +W [macroeconomic domain] (3.5)
Π = Y –W (3.5′)
Similarly for the current domain, macroeconomic net expenditure (E) consists
merely of the net investment by enterprises (I) and consumption by house-
holds (C).
E = I + C [macroeconomic domain] (3.6)
Equations (3.5) and (3.6) do not represent a ‘determination’ but rather the
formal definition of the domain at this stage.
44 In what economists call ‘equilibrium’, the planned unit mP is equal to the actual unit m,
whence mPLα = mLα. Usually there is some degree of disequilibrium whereby we have
some degree of deviation between the two, the deviation being adapted for by changes in
investment and production in the next period of production.
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Given production (XP and YP), the validation of production results in income
as determined by expenditures (also called ‘effective demand’):
Y 🢔 = E (3.7)
Y 🢔 = I + C [implication] (3.7′)
The investment expenditure (I), i.e. the purchases of means of production, is
the investment concomitant of the current production XP (3.2). At this stage its
determinants are merely provisionally made explicit, without further amplify-
ing on these (expanded in Chapter 5).
It 🢔 = f(ωt-1; Xdt; PVFt) (3.8)
Thus current investment (and current investment expenditure) is determined
by the rate of integral profit realised in the previous year (ωt-1) and the desired
current production (Xdt), as conditioned by the current pre-validating finance
by banks (PVFt). Generally investment applies, on the one hand, to a possible
gap between the planned unit monetary value of labour, mP, and the actual
unit ‘m’ (as indicated above), and, on the other hand, to enterprises’ expect-
ations about the future (Keynes called such informed guesses ‘animal spir-
its’).
For consumption a distinction is made between consumption by capital
owners (Ck) and by wage earners (Cw):
C = Ck + Cw [definition] (3.9)
On average the consumption by capital owners (Ck) autonomously depends
on their standard of living. That is, it is independent of the ebb and flow of the
level of the surplus-value distributed (expanded in Chapter 5). However, the
consumption by wage earners is dependent on the wages (W), and the degree
of consumption out of wages is dependent on the level of wages and changes
thereof (expanded in Chapter 5). Given the payment of wages out of the PVF,
we have (substituting 3.9 and 3.7′ in 3.5′) for the surplus-value realised (Π):
Π 🢔 = I + Ck + (Cw –W) [implication] (3.10)
Thus the validation of surplus-value is determined by, on the one hand, the
investment expenditure of enterprises (I) and the consumption expenditure
of capital owners (Ck), and, on the other hand, the consumption expenditure
by labour (Cw)minus wages (W).45 Note that the validation of surplus-value is
thus determined by three distinct categories of actors: enterprises (I); capital
owners (Ck); and wage earners (Cw–W). It is emphasised that – as before – the
determination in (3.10) runs from the right hand side to the left hand side. None
of the right hand side current expenditure factors is determined by current
surplus-value (Π); it is indeed the other way around. Restricting to investment:
45 This insight is inspired by Kalecki – see 3§10-a.
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the act of investment expenditure by enterprises (via the banks’ PVF) determ-
ines the validation of surplus-value of other enterprises. Even so, the validation
of surplus-value in the current period (year)may affect theplans for production
and investment in the next period.
The saving out of wages (Sw) is by definition equal to wages (W)minus con-
sumption out of wages (Cw).
Sw =W – Cw [definition] (3.11)
Substituting 3.11 into 3.10 we have
Π 🢔 = I + Ck – Sw (3.12)
Thus the validation of surplus-value (Π) is positively determined by the expen-
ditures of enterprises (I) and capital owners (Ck) and negatively by labour’s
saving. In terms of validation of surplus-value, this affirms what was presen-
ted in 3D2 and 3D3 in terms of finance. That is, rather than being a macroe-
conomic benevolence, saving burdens enterprises. Saving hampers the valida-
tion of surplus-value (integral profit), the accumulation of capital and economic
growth. (Nevertheless, as indicated before, saving may make sense for indi-
vidual actors).
4 Distribution of surplus-value
The distinction between the three sequential processes of production, valida-
tion and distribution of surplus-value is essential to the exposition of the capit-
alist economy.These processes are distinct, though interconnected. Production
of output, and hence of surplus-value, inevitably precedes the validation of
output and surplus-value. Similarly, the validation of surplus-value inevitably
precedes the distribution of surplus-value. Therefore, there is no investment
out of surplus-value (integral profit), as much of orthodox economics would
have it. (Investments are not ‘advances’ by enterprises or capitalists or ‘mas-
ters’, as mainstream economics since Adam Smith has proposed; rather, banks
‘advance’ PVFs).
Only after the validation of the surplus-value produced can it be distributed,
namely in the three forms of:
• interest to banks (from which banks’ finance capital is fed);
• dividends and interest to capital owners;46
46 Immediately after equation 3.9 above it was stated: ‘The consumption by capital own-
ers (Ck) autonomously depends on their standard of living. That is, it is independent
of the ebb and flow of level of the surplus-value distributed’. Even so, with part of the
validated surplus-value being variously distributed throughout the year to capital own-
ers, some variable ex post saving from distributed surplus-value results (expanded in
Chapter 5).
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• retained profits, as already embodied in the capital assets during the pre-
validated process of production via investment purchases (on the enter-
prises’ balance sheet this appears as addition to its equity).47
Thus these are the three ex post shares in surplus-value.48 In hindsight Fig-
ure 3.2b, from which we started in 3§1, is to be interpreted in this way.
5 Concluding summary
We have three distinct, though interconnected, sequential processes: (1) pro-
duction of surplus-value; (2) validation of surplus-value; and (3) distribution
of surplus-value. The production of surplus-value (1D5) and the accumulation
of capital (Ch. 2) are grounded in the pre-validating finance by banks (3D2–
3D3). The redemption of this finance, as well as the validation of surplus-value,
is conditioned on the macroeconomic expenditure. There is no investment
out of surplus-value distributed (including the retained part). Rather, surplus-
value is a result of the first two processes. The first process establishes (for all
enterprises) any additional investment via the banks’ PVF. The second process
validates the production of investment goods via their sale (for producers of
investment goods), and it validates the production of consumer goods via their
sale (for producers of consumer goods).
3§10-a Addendum. Michał Kalecki
Recall equation (3.9): Π 🢔 = I + Ck + (Cw–W). Equations (3.9) and (3.12) are
inspired by Kalecki (1935; 1942) – who, working in the marxian discourse, was
a contemporary and precursor of Keynes. Kalecki’s view is aptly summarised
in Kaldor’s (1955/56, p. 85) well-known paraphrase of Kalecki: ‘capitalists earn
what they spend, and workers spend what they earn’ – that is, pending the
distinction between enterprises and capital owners, and pending saving by
workers.49 In the article from 1942 he remarks that capitalists ‘may decide to
consume and to invest more in a certain short period than in the preceding
period, but they cannot decide to earn more. It is therefore their investment
47 In thepenultimate sentence above, itwas stated that there is no investment out of surplus-
value. However, ex post we have an equivalent of investment in retained profits, that is,
for that part of the investment for which PVF loans have been redeemed.
48 These are the three shares in surplus-value with the state bracketed. In Chapter 8 we will
see that taxes constitute a fourth share in surplus-value.
49 In Capital II Marx wrote: ‘In relation to the capitalist class as a whole … the proposition
that it must itself cast into circulation the money needed to realize its surplus-value … is
not only far from paradoxical, it is in fact a necessary condition of the overall mechanism’
(Marx 18851, 18932; Fernbach translation p. 497).
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and consumption decisions which determine profits, and not the other way
round’ (Kalecki 1942, p. 259).
For an overview and appreciation of Kalecki’s work, see, for example, López
and Assous (2010), Toporowski (2013), and various essays in Bellofiore, Kar-
wowski andToporowski (eds) (2013, 2014) and inToporowski andMamica (eds)
(2015).
3§10-b Addendum. Surplus-value and the Operating Surplus (SNA) – a
preliminary note
The System of National Accounts 2008 (UN 2009) adopts the macroeconomic
surplus concept of ‘operating surplus’. Its starting point is output minus inter-
mediates (purchases and sales between enterprises) and minus wages. Tak-
ing this for all enterprises together (production and financial enterprises) that
starting point for the operating surplus (OS) would be equivalent to our con-
cept of surplus-value. However, the SNA also adopts a number of arbitrary
imputations, which mean that the two concepts deviate. I mention the two
most important ones. First, imputations regarding the interestmargin of banks
(via which value-added is imputed to banks), and second, the imputation
of rental income regarding owner-occupied dwellings. (I expand on this and
related matters in Appendix 3C, section 3C-1 under point 6, and in 8§6-d).
Summary and conclusions
The first section of this chapter provided guidance for the reader, distinguish-
ing between ‘active capital’ (enterprises’ assets) and ‘passive capital’ (the fin-
ance of the assets). Along with it surplus-value (the result of production) is
qua distribution decomposed into ‘internal profit’ (the sum of dividends and
retained profit) and ‘interest’ (as distributed to banks and other financiers)
(3D1).50
In the type of macroeconomics developed in this chapter – as inspired by
the Monetary Circuit theory – the distinction between enterprises and banks
is essential. Bank-provided pre-validating finance (PVF) for enterprises is not
only unconditionally necessary to the capitalist system; it is also fundament-
ally different from any other type of finance. One fundamental feature is that
this PVF is a pure ex nihilo accounting money operation, and another is that it
requires no saving, neither prior to nor after the investment that it accommod-
ates. Generally saving is not necessary to the capitalist system (3D2).
50 See the summary in Figures 3.2a and 3.2b.
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Nevertheless, savings are ubiquitous and their existence necessarily gives
rise to forms of finance other than the PVF. From a systematic point of view,
all other types of finance are derived from the bank-provided PVF. All these
other types are ‘ex post’ types of finance, that is, these serve to finance already
accumulated capital, or ready investments on the basis of the PVF. Therefore,
generally, saving does not precede investment; investment is not financed ‘out
of ’ saving. Only the bank-provided PVF finances the accumulation of capital.
Other types of finance may, ex post, substitute for a non-redeemed part of the
PVF, the non-redemption being caused by savings (3D3).
Whereasmacroeconomic investment is independent of saving, thepurchase
of financial paper (often misleadingly called portfolio ‘investment’ rather than
finance) is not independent of saving. Not only is there no macroeconomic ex
ante equality of saving and investment; there is also nomacroeconomic ex post
equality of saving and investment (the positing of such an equality in most of
economics is a categorial mistake, confusing expenditure and saving) (3D5).
The sequential character of the interconnected processes of pre-validation,
production, validation and distribution of output and surplus-value is essential
to a capitalist economy. Production and the pre-validating finance of produc-
tionprecede sales and so the validationof surplus-value.Thedegreeof redemp-
tion of this pre-validating finance, as well as the validation of surplus-value
(integral profit), is conditioned on macroeconomic effective demand. In line
with a Kalecki type of approach, it was posited that – at the stage of exposition
of Chapter 3 (with the state and international relations bracketed) – the mac-
roeconomic validation of the surplus-value produced is determined by invest-
ment (+), the consumption by capital owners (+), and the saving by labour
(–). The distribution of surplus-value (to banks, capital owners and as retained
profits) inevitably follows after the validation, whence there is no investment
out of a pre-existing surplus-value. In this way the investment-saving matter is
connected to the investment-surplus-value matter (3D5).
The brief 3D4 on the foundation of banks is simple and may not warrant
summarising. However, it deservesmention in terms of ‘conclusions’. That divi-
sion grounds the starting point’s capital accumulated (1§1). At that point of
the exposition (3D4), all prior pre-positions regarding the capitalist economy
appear to have been grounded within the exposition (3§7-b). However, regard-
ing the capitalist system as awhole, the capitalist state is still being pre-posited
(exhibited in Part Two).
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Appendix 3A. Two contingencies of the finance-capital market:
intertemporal trade and re-substitution trade
The main text of Chapter 3 presented the necessities of the finance of enter-
prises in face of the reproduction of the capitalist system. The contingencies of
this finance are ubiquitous and this book generally does not treat outright con-
tingent constellations. This current appendix nevertheless very briefly expands
on pension funds (that is, the intertemporal trade in savings – section 3A-2)
and the secondarymarkets of shares and bonds (that is, re-substitution trade –
section 3A-3). The introductory first section makes a systematic distinction
between the finance-capital market and the financial market at large.
3A-1 The finance-capital market
The main text of Chapter 3 dealt with, what I now call, the finance-capital
market, that is, the market for the finance of production enterprises. It was
indicated that there is a tendency for capital owners to substitute, in part, for
the bank-provided finance capital (3§6). It is contingent whether this substitu-
tion takes place via the direct intermediation of banks (the banks bringing the
parties together) or via other credit brokers or via a public or private issue of
‘finance capital titles’ (shares, bonds and other loans).
On the demand side of the finance-capitalmarket we have only enterprises.
On its supply side we have:
1. Banks. All of the following (2–4) may substitute ex post for the pre-
validating bank finance (see 3§6).
2. ‘Other financial institutions’, that is, other savings channelling institu-
tions: pension funds, insurance companies, other financiers’ companies
(i.e. portfolio ‘investment’ companies, including hedge funds). Next to
banks, especially the pension funds are a major vehicle for channelling
savings by labour (3§3).
3. ‘Private financiers’, i.e. individual capital owners operating on thismarket
(including rich wage earners).
4. Enterprises (especially large corporations) as financiers of other enter-
prises. This category is today especially important amongst the enter-
prises quoted at the topof the equitymarket (i.e. sharesmarket). (Because
of such finance, the adding up of the assets of all enterprises would
involve double counting).
I make a systematic distinction between the ‘finance-capital market’ (themain
text of Chapter 3 together with the current appendix) and the ‘financial mar-
ket’ at large. The latter includes the ‘finance-capital market’ together with the
contingent market for loans to labour and to capital owners (briefly treated in
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Appendix B). All of the institutions listed above may also operate on the fin-
ancial market at large.51 These distinctions are a matter of perspective. For the
financier, the several variants of the finance of enterprises, households (or gov-
ernments)may be just amatter of degree of security in face of expected (uncer-
tain) revenues. However, the starting point of our exposition in Chapter 3 is
not the individual financier (portfolio ‘investor’), but rather the investment
of enterprises in face of the accumulation of capital (cf. 3§1), which requires
finance. The distinction between the finance-capital market and the financial
market is relevant for this perspective.
3A-2 Pension funds: intertemporal trade – premiums, pension and degree
of recollected surplus-value for labour
The income distribution between capital and labour (surplus-value and
wages), as well as the distribution of surplus-value into interest, retained profit
and dividend, is called the primary distribution of income. From these wemay
haveaderived intertemporal redistributionof income. Pension funds areoneof
themain vehicles dealing in this derived redistribution. They collect premiums
today (such as out of wages), and with these they purchase financial paper or
other assets. From the revenues (or perhaps in part from their liquidation) they
redistribute pension benefits. Indirectly labourers so intertemporally recollect
some share of the surplus-value that they produced – basically the rate of rev-
enue (such as interest) on their premium. (Thus, merely as a very rough indic-
ation, if the premium is 2% of the wage and the average revenue (e.g. the real
rate of interest) is 3%, then the recollected surplus-value is 0.06%of thewage –
neglecting compound interest. At compounded interest – and depending on
the pension scheme – the recollection of SV is, averaged over the wage earning
premium years, most often under 1% of the yearly wage).
3A-3 Re-substitution trade in financial paper
Section 3§8 introduced the distinction between dealings on the ‘primary’
shares and bonds markets and dealings on the ‘secondary’ shares and bonds
markets. The current section expands on this distinction. I will mainly refer to
the shares market. The same applies most often to the bonds market: only the
differences will be indicated.
51 Anticipating Chapter 8, public finance is also part of the financial market.
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Substitution for the banks’ RPVF: the primary market’s flow of shares
The primary flow of shares is the net addition to the stock of shares. The primary
flow of shares concerns the issuance of new shares by enterprises. In the light
of 3§6 the purchase of newly issued shares is merely an ex post substitution
for the banks’ remaining pre-validating finance (RPVF) out of the capital own-
ers’ savings. (The enterprises’ buying back their own shares is in effect the
reverse).52
The purchase of new shares can stem from: savings by capital owners (out
of their dividends or interest); savings by labour (out of their wages); or, in
each case, non-bank financial institutions that collect these savings (see the
moredetailed list in 3A-1); incidentally, banksmay also substitute between their
RPVF, thereby substituting loans for shares or bonds.
Re-substitution for the banks’ RPVF: the secondary market’s trade in the stock of
shares
The trade in the stock of shares effectuates the spread of risk and uncertainty
for shareholders (referred to in 3§5). However, it also opens up the possibil-
ity for liquidation of the share’s value. That is, for an individual shareholder.
It is important to note that macroeconomically there can be no exit from the
stock of shares (the exceptions being the enterprises’ buy back of shares, or
the final liquidation of an enterprise). For most types of bonds this is differ-
ent as these are usually time-limited loans (e.g. 10 or 30 years). Microeconomic
(individual) liquidation is always a matter of re-substitution between an exist-
ing shareholder that exits value (acquiring a current account addition) and a
novice shareholder that enters value (current account deduction). That is, the
novice in this respect: the novice shareholder might own other shares already.
Note that even if this novice shareholder buys existing shares out of dividends
that the novice received, this is still a re-substitution (a deduction from the cur-
rent account of the novice from dividends, and a current account addition for
the liquidating seller of shares).
52 For the enterprise this action is either one of a reshuffling of their liabilities, or one of
(relative) disinvestment resulting in a positive current account balance with the bank,
the latter being transferred to shareholders.
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Appendix 3B. Contingent lending by banks to labour and to capital
owners
Next to the validation of production, the main text of Chapter 3 focuses on
the finance of enterprises and especially the key role of banks in this finance.
However, banks not only (pre-)finance enterprises. As a corollary to the main
text, this appendix briefly expands on banks’ lending to labour and to capital
owners. Although such lending is contingent (it is not necessary to the exist-
ence of the capitalist system), it nevertheless seems logically inherent to the
systemic necessities treated so far.
3B-1 The lending power of banks: money dealing and interest paid by
banks
Banks not only create money (2D4, 3D2); they also deal in their own creation.
In order to improve their lending power, banks are out to keep their existing
clients and to attract clients from competing banks. In other words, they are
out to collect money created by competitor banks, and to prevent their ‘own’
account money being collected, via account transfers, by competitor banks.
The main mechanism is that of offering clients an interest. This tends to be
accomplished via interest on time accounts, or ‘savings accounts’ (and perhaps
current accounts). Note that this may improve the lending power of an indi-
vidual bank, but not that of the banking system as a whole.53
The lending power of an individual bank may also increase via the sale of
bank-issued bonds or via the issuance of new shares.54 Whether in this case
the lending power of the banking system as a whole increases will depend
solely on whether these additional bonds (or shares) operate on the margin of
rules set by the Clearing Bank (ClB) regarding liabilities’ reserve ratios, perhaps
in face of the ClB’s standards regarding the composition of the assets (2§9–
2§10).
3B-1-a Amplification. Level of the rate of interest offered
In order to consolidate their liabilities, the offering of interest by banks to their
clients seems necessary (for common current accounts this may also take the
form of non-charging for bookkeeping services, i.e. transfers). However, the
53 This can easily be seen when the banks are analytically integrated.
54 Note that the issuance of bank bonds (or also additional share capital) in effect directly
decreases the amount of money in circulation (current account money is substituted for
the bank bond). For enterprise-issued bonds this is so indirectly, that is, in case the enter-
prise uses the bond proceeds to cancel a loan with the bank.
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level of the interest paid is highly dependent on the competitive or collusive
structure of the banking constellation.
3B-2 Generalisation of the form of money lending
The interest bearing ‘money-creating lending’ by banks for and to enterprises
is a systemic necessity. It is also a (potentially) profitable activity for banks.
Because this is profitable, banks tend to generalise the form of money lending
vis-à-vis any social actor. In particular theymay lendmoney to labourers and to
capital owners. They so createmoney in a reciprocal credit relationship similar
to the money creation for enterprises (2§8). Although the generalised form of
lending is contingent, the generalisation seems inherent to the form of lending
to enterprises.55
3B-3 Lending to labour
1 Loans for durable commodities and other consumer loans
For lending to labourers the collateral will be some asset that they own (such
as a house or another durable consumer good) or an expected future income
stream (wages). This lending facilitates the enterprises’ sale of relatively ex-
pensive and durable commodities.56 More important for enterprises is that
consumer loans affect the net profit of enterprises, as such loans are an ex ante
substitution for the pre-validating finance requirement for the enterprises’ pay-
ment of wages. This is so because in terms of credit, enterprises receive ‘for free’
revenues fromconsumption that they otherwisewould have had to pre-finance
upon wages payment. Hence enterprises pay less interest to the banks (instead
labourers pay interest). Circuit 3.18 illustrates this. Thus, whereas the saving by
labour is a ‘nuisance’ for enterprises (3§3), non-saving and consumer credit is
a pleasure.
This ex ante substitution is also a main distinction between loans to capital
owners and loans to labour.Whereas loans to labour do affect the finance cap-
ital requirement of enterprises (decrease), loans to capital owners have no such
effect.
55 Even so, the Clearing Bank (or at a later stage of the exposition the state or the Central
Bank) might put limits on such lending.
56 It may also facilitate the ‘saleability’ of labour-capacity in case (higher) formal education
is financed by loans.
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circuit 3.18 Enterprises’ saving on PVF for wages due to
consumer credit: case of zero saving out of
wages
Note: For simplicity and transparency it is assumed that the consumer credit (stream 1) is equi-
valently redeemed (stream 6). In fact stream 1 might (temporarily) be larger than stream 6. (For
the latter case see Chapter 5, Appendix A).
2 Interest as a share in surplus-value or as a share in wages
Macroeconomically, the interest paid by labour on loans may or may not out-
weigh the interest received by labour (3B-1). Any macro or micro net interest
from labour is paid out of wages income. This is analogous to the interest on
finance capital being paid out of the enterprises’ net income, that is, out of
surplus-value (3§4).
Although this is analogous, it is nevertheless conceptually different and so
systemically different. The interest that enterprises pay to banks is a share in
the surplus-value produced by labour. Should it be the case that labourers are
macroeconomic or microeconomic net recipients of interest paid by the bank,
then they indirectly reclaim a slice of the surplus-value.57 (Whether this is the
case is an empirical matter).
57 The following merely serves as an indication. Suppose that for labourers the macroeco-
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3B-4 Lending to capital owners: finance doubling
Individual capital owners, or institutions in which they participate (3A-1), may
want to increase their ex post financing potential (on primary or secondary
financial markets – 3§8) by borrowing from banks on the basis of, most often,
financial paper collateral. Especially for bank loans regarding secondary mar-
kets (existing financial paper), this means that, in sum, the lending power of
banks is allocated away from enterprises.
It was indicated that, because the lending of money to enterprises against an
interest is a (potentially) profitable activity, banksmayapply the formof money
lending vis-à-vis any social actor (3A-2). Remarkably this may also include the
lending by banks to capital owners. Banks may grant loans to these potential
ex post financiers on the basis of financial paper (shares, bonds) as collateral
security. (Explication 3B–4a shows the possible leverage mechanism of such
loans in cases of so-called ‘margin buying’).
By itself this leverage is a mere consequence of the constellation in which
banks do grant loans on the basis of financial paper. That by itself is not remark-
able: we may have analogous leverage mechanisms for loans to enterprises.
What is remarkable about it is that (to the extent that banks are contingently
allowed by the Clearing Bank to open up this constellation) we have a doubling
of the credit system. Consider Sheet 3.19.
sheet 3.19 Finance doubling
balance sheet enterprises balance sheet capital owners
assets liabilities assets liabilities
(material) ( financial)
assets → 1. bank loans (60%)
assets → 2. bonds (20%) – 2. bonds → 2. bank loans (the doubling)
assets → 3. shares (20%) – 3. shares → 3. bank loans (the doubling)
Recall that banks necessarily provide pre-validating finance to enterprises (the
left panel of Sheet 3.19). The collateral securities for these loans are the assets of
nomic interest bearing net loans to banks were 5% of wages at a real-interest rate of 2%,
then, neglecting compounded interest, they would reclaim 0.1% of the wage in surplus-
value.
190 part one – the capitalist economy
the enterprises (‘material’ means of production). Ultimately banks might per-
haps be willing to grant loans of up to, say, 60% of the total material assets (the
number does not matter).
However, there is a balance sheet liabilities side to the remaining value (say,
40%) of these assets (bonds and shares).58 The finance doubling occurs when
not only the enterprises call on the bank for credit, but also the non-bank hold-
ers of the enterprises’ bonds and shares. This is indeed credit on the basis of
financial paper (entries 2 and 3 at the right hand panel of Sheet 3.19). Because
of the lending on the basis of financial assets (and especially so with margin
buying) there may be a self-reinforcing inflationary boosting of especially the
shares market. (Suppose the bank is willing to grant loans to the enterprise up
to 60% of the assets of the enterprise, and at a rate of 80% to bond and share-
holders. Then, integrated, the bank – or different banks – in fact grant loans up
to 92% of the underlying material assets of the enterprise).
3B–4a Explication: The leverage of margin buying
‘Margin buying’ is the exemplary pattern for bank loans to dealers in finan-
cial paper (individual dealers andportfolio financiers companies). Suppose the
dealer owns, e.g. €10,000 in shares, which is offered as collateral security to the
bank for lending money.
• the bank lends, e.g., on a margin of 80%: €8,000
• for which the dealer buys additional shares, and then borrows
anew on a 80%margin:
€6,400
• and again: €5,120
• and again: €4,096
• et cetera: .............
• In total (on top of the initial €10,000) €40,000
(At a 70%margin the leverage is factor 2.3; at a 90%margin the leverage factor
is 9).
This boosts a booming stock market in a self-reinforcing way (rising prices,
rising credit, rising prices). This also works the other way around: with falling
prices there is enforced selling when the margin ceiling is reached. (The same
pattern may be applied to portfolio dealings in commodities and real estate).
This margin buying also applies for hedge funds. For the latter this is also
an instrument to exert (temporary) power over a corporation (given that for
quoted shares often only a smallminority of the shareholders appears in share-
58 If the bank is the first, agreed creditor in case of a failure, then the bank may not care
much about the composition of these liabilities.
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holders’ meetings). The fund may so impose its will on the corporation for
short-term purposes, and next jump on to another corporation.
3B–4b Amplification. The doubling of finance and the (in)dependency of
non-bank finance and saving
Recall from 3§9 that macroeconomically investment is independent of saving in
the sense that saving is no condition for investment. (Rather, saving dampens
investment, both in terms of expenditure and in terms of credit limits set by
the bank.) In 3§8 it was posited that non-bank finance (purchase of financial
paper) is not independent of saving, in the sense that ‘a’ prior saving is a condi-
tion for it. We can now see the reason for the qualification of ‘a’ prior saving.
Because of the doubling of finance, and so the granting of credit on the basis
of financial paper, even this financemay require merely ‘some’ prior saving (its
degree depending on the leverage that banks allow for).
Appendix 3C. Rent as a contingent share in the production
enterprises’ surplus-value
Lease as a particular way of finance
This appendix presents the concept of rent. For its treatment I introduce
the term ‘production enterprises’, that is, enterprises producing surplus-value
through the production of commodities (including commodified services).
Generally rent is the price for the use of something, for a period of time stip-
ulated by contract (instead of the price for the purchase of something). In the
history of economic theory, and especially Classical Political Economy, rent has
predominantly been associated with the ownership and lease of land.59|60 For
59 Adam Smith (1776) posits: ‘The whole of what is annually either collected or produced
by the labour of every society, or what comes to the same thing, the whole price of it, is
in this manner originally distributed among some of its different members.Wages, profit,
and rent, are the three original sources of all revenue aswell as of all exchangeable value. All
other revenue is ultimately derived from someone or other of these.’ (Book I, Ch. 6, para.
17, emphasis added).
Karl Marx (Capital III) posits: ‘The value freshly added in a year by freshly added
labour – and so also the part of the annual product in which this value is expressed … can
…be divided into three…parts… three different forms of revenue, … one part… accruing to
the owner of labour-power, one part to the owner of capital and a third part to the owner
of landed property.’ (Ch. 51, para. 1, emphasis added – next he expands on the relations of
production behind this distribution).
60 See, for example, Campbell (2002b) for an appreciation of Marx’s theory of rent.
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many, the rent of land is something of a sacrosanct category and I agree that
the private ownership of the earth is a core issue (1§1). Nevertheless, for pro-
duction enterprises, ‘land’ is merely a capital asset serving the production of
surplus-value, like any other capital asset. I will treat it as such in this appendix.
I consider the actual payment of rent.61 I will conclude that lease is a particular
way of finance and that rent is not a distinct final income category. Instead it
is taken account of as the profit of enterprises. More specifically: any net rent
that production enterprises pay originates from surplus-value.
3C-1 Rent as a contingent share in the production enterprises’
surplus-value
1 The ‘pure concepts’ presented so far
In the main text of Chapter 3, the concepts of ‘enterprises’ and ‘capital owners’
weremostly treated as pure categories. That is, enterprises (now called produc-
tion enterprises) only engage in production (whence K is production capital)
and capital owners only own financial paper (mainly shares andbonds). ‘Banks’
were presented purely as money-creating financiers, as against ‘banking entit-
ies’ thatmayproduce various services, the latter constitutingpart of production
enterprises (3§1). Appendix 3A introduced ‘financial enterprises’. Pure financial
enterprises own only financial paper (shares, bonds, direct placements), that
is, next to their premises. In the current appendix, banks have been included
in the financial enterprises. This is summarised in Figure 3.20, rows 1a–c. Recall
that, so far, internal profit is equal to surplus-value after the payment of interest
(3§1, Figure 3.2b).
2 Hybrid enterprises and hybrid capital owners
So far we considered the purchase and sale of commodities and of financial
paper. This appendix introduces the lease of commodities and, with it, the cat-
egory of rent. Along with it ‘hybrid entities’ are introduced (production enter-
prises, capital owners, financial enterprises) that combine various activities of
the pure entities, as well as the renting out of assets. Note, however, that all of
this hybridity is contingent.
61 I have no intention to impute rent where no rent is paid – see below on the SNA.
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3 The concept of rent as a way of finance (user) and profit opportunity
(owner)
I consider rent as the price for the lease of means of production, including
land and buildings (this pertains to enterprises) or for the lease of durable con-
sumer goods, including dwellings (this pertains to households, foremost labour
households). For the user (lessee) of means of production or durable consumer
goods, the decision to lease instead of purchase is a matter of finance (and
sometimes a matter of speculation, that I will neglect in this appendix). For
the owner (lessor), renting out is a matter of profit opportunity.
Thus, for example, for a low-paid worker it may not be possible to finance
the ownership of a dwelling, though out of wages it might finance its lease. A
starting enterprise may be able to get finance for the running production pro-
cess, though not for all the means of production, whereby it leases the latter. A
mature enterprise may see new investment opportunities, for which it is pre-
pared to give upownership in part of itsmeans of production– so leasing these.
4 The merging of rent income into the profit of enterprises
Surplus-value is produced within production enterprises, and production en-
terprises only. Hypothetically, all means of production could be leased by one
set of production enterprises (in which the surplus-value is produced) and
leased from a second set of enterprises that owns the means of production
without producing. The rent that the latter secure is a share in surplus-value
(like interest as a share in surplus-value).
Actually, regardingmeans of production it is immaterial whether or not pro-
duction enterprises lease means of production from other (hybrid or non-
producing) enterprises. If they do, the users (lessees) pay rent out of their
surplus-value; the owners (lessors) receive rent which for them (after the de-
duction of costs of maintenance) results in their profit. Thus the latter profit
derives from the surplus-valueproduced in the lessee’s (user’s) enterprise. (This
is summarised in Figure 3.20, rows 2a–2b).
Regarding durable consumer goods, the rent for their lease is paid out of
wages (or if capital owners lease, out of their capital income; in what follows I
will neglect this). The owners of the durable consumer goods (lessors) receive
rent, which for them (after the deduction of costs of maintenance) results in
their profit. (See Figure 3.20, row 2c).
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5 The income of hybrid enterprises – a more detailed presentation
Rows 3 of Figure 3.20 present a more detailed conceptualisation of the treat-
ment of rent for hybrid entities (mentioned in subsection 2 above). Below I
expand on each of the three hybrid categories.
A. Hybrid production enterprises. The category of hybrid production enter-
prises owns means of production for its own use and has its labour producing
surplus-value. However, groups of enterprises within this category also deal in
financial paper, and also rent outmeans of production to other enterprises. For
this part the latter share in the surplus-value produced elsewhere. (Figure 3.20,
row 3, top three sub-rows). Another group within this category leases out dur-
able consumer goods (DCG) to workers (mainly). (Figure 3.20, row 3, bottom
sub-row).
Overall, however, all surplus-value is producedwithin or among these hybrid
production enterprises.
B. Hybrid financial enterprises. Hybrid financial enterprises deal not only in
financial paper (as the pure financial enterprises do), but also in the lease of
means of production (MP) and of DCG. (See Figure 3.20, row 3b).
C. Hybrid capital owners functioning as enterprises. Enterprises own the
means of production (1§1). Capital owners thus far owned financial paper
(shares and bonds – 3§5), thereby in part financing ex post the enterprises’
ownership of the means of production (3§6). Now ‘hybrid capital owners’ are
introduced. These may also own means of production (MP) that they rent
out to production enterprises. They may also own and lease out DCG. Con-
sistency requires that such MP-owners are treated as (non-producing) enter-
prises – and often such ownership is actually converted into corporate form.
As a result these capital owners can be treated in the same way as the ‘hybrid
financial enterprises’. (See Figure 3.20, row 3b). However, any final distribu-
tion of income in the form of dividends ends up with capital owners (row 3b,
column 10).
In conclusion. Any rent that enterprises pay (and particularly also any rent
that hybrid production enterprises pay) is a share in their surplus-value. (See
Figure 3.20, row 3c).
6 Capital, investment and durable consumer goods – the SNA
treatment
Capital is a form of wealth. However, this does not mean that any wealth is
‘capital’. Capital is a form of wealth geared to production, with the purpose of
selling that production so as to make a profit (this makes the mainstream eco-
nomics denotation of labour capacity as ‘human capital’ a rather ideological
one). Investment is an addition to the capital stock (I = ΔK).
196 part one – the capitalist economy
Therefore, ‘durable consumer goods’ (DCG) are indeed what the term indic-
ates; these are consumer goods and the expenditure on these is ‘consumption’.
Having said this, it must be observed that the classification under DCG is rather
arbitrary. For example, many households use their cutlery for over 50 years.
Nevertheless, cutlery and similar items are in the statistics usually not con-
sidered as DCG.
On the other hand, in the SNA (the System of National Accounts – the official
international standard for national accounting and national account statist-
ics – UN 2009), the purchase of dwellings is not treated as the purchase of a
DCG at all. Instead it is treated as an investment! In order to accommodate for
a lurking inconsistency about their own (SNA) treatment of ‘investment’, the
owner-occupied dwellings of households are treated as an artificial branch of
enterprises! (Around the year 2015, this statistical ruse includes, depending on
the country, 50–70% of the labour households as part of capital-owning enter-
prises).
The SNA’s counterpart to this artificial treatment of households is that an
artificial rent income is imputed to these households. (The argument is that this
treatment makes the macroeconomic income indifferent to who owns dwell-
ings. This is true – if the imputation were reliable; however, these households
do not have this income, just as they do not derive an income from their cutlery
or from all kinds of DCGs that theymight lease but do not lease. Thus, even this
artificial treatment is not a consistent one).62|63
In the conceptualisation of Figure 3.20 I restrict the focus to actually paid
rent. Then, as a counterpart, the purchase of an owner-occupied dwelling
would be an act of consumption even if its usewere spread out overmany years
(like cutlery).
The SNA treatment has the effect that the actual macroeconomic income
is upgraded. That apart, macroeconomically the rent payments and receipts
between the total of enterprises (non-financial and financial) cancels out.
The remaining rent payments from wage earners to enterprises are indeed
expenditures out of wages.
62 To be sure, many heterodox economists have resisted, and do resist, this SNA treatment.
63 Piketty notes that: ‘durable goods (not included in official wealth accounts) generally
account for between 30% and 50% of national income, and that this level seems to be
relatively stable: during the period 1970–2010 as well as on the long the run, from the 18th
to the 21st century’ (2014 [2013], pp. 179–80 and technical appendix p. 30).
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Market interaction and stratified production
Competition, cartel formation andmonopolisation
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Introduction
Chapters 1–3 presented the necessary conditions of existence of the capitalist
economy (with the state yet bracketed). Chapters 4 and 5 (the last two chapters
of Part One) present no further conditions of existence, but rather concrete
manifestations of the earlier exposition (see also the pyramid figure at the
opening of the chapter).
Manifestations have three main characteristics. First, they are implications
of the necessary moments – implications that most often have a ‘tendency’
character. Second, manifestations are the culmination of the synthetic expos-
ition – building on that of the grounding moments. Third, whereas those
grounding moments reveal the reproductive strength of the capitalist system,
the implications of the simultaneous interaction of these grounding moments
are also expressed in concrete manifestations that thus reveal not only repro-
ductive strength but also reproductive vulnerability.
Chapter 4 introduces the market interaction between enterprises into the
exposition. Even though the exposition of Chapters 1–3 was prompted by
the commodification and the transactions that are necessary to overcome
the initial bifurcation between households and private units of production
(1D1), the term ‘market’ has hardly been mentioned up to this point. This
has been due to the method of exposition, which starts by seeking the con-
nection between phenomena in the elements that unite them into a total-
ity, that is, the totality of the capitalist system, and so far the capitalist eco-
nomy.
Until now the exposition treated the totality of the capitalist economy in a
way that combined a macroeconomic emphasis with the actions of the ‘aver-
age capitalist enterprise’. Broadly the focus was thus on, first, the interconnec-
tion between enterprises and labour, and second, the interconnection between
enterprises and banks. Now, in that light, the exposition in the current chapter
focuses on the interconnecting interaction between enterprises.
In this chapter the market interaction between enterprises is not presen-
ted from the perspective of an individual enterprise (the starting point of
much of orthodox economics), but rather from the perspective of the constel-
lation of enterprises in one sector (branch) of production. The central concept
throughout the chapter is the ‘stratification of enterprises’ in a sector (intro-
duced in Division 1). As we will see, this concept is related to the technique of
production adopted.
Analytically the formof market interactionbetweenenterprisesmaybe clas-
sified along a continuumof rivalrous competition on the one end, and– via car-
tel formation – monopolisation on the other. The position on that continuum
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would then seem to be contingent and each such positionmight be analytically
modelled (this is the main approach in orthodox economics).
In the exposition of this chapter, the forms of market interaction – competi-
tion, cartels, oligopoly andmonopolisation – are presented as being predicated
on the stratified structure of production in particular sectors. This structure is
again predicated on the accumulation of capital as conditioned by technical
change. (Divisions 2–5.)
In comparison with the competitive interaction (Divisions 2–3), relatively
little space is devoted to cartel formation, oligopolisation and monopolisation
(Divisions 4–5). This is not because the latter are of minor importance. On
the contrary. It is rather that their exposition is less complicated than that of
competition – noting here already that the latter is not presented from the per-
spective of equilibrium, nor of ‘perfect competition’.
The two divisions on competition are associated with price deflationary
(4D2) and, alternatively, price inflationary (4D3) constellations. It will be seen
in the latter division that ‘deflation’ or ‘inflation’ are not purely monetary phe-
nomena; rather these result from the ‘real’ interaction of enterprises, together
with their monetary accommodation by banks. (Again, monetary matters are
not a negligible ‘veil’, but of key importance).
The chapter starts with an exposition of ‘market interaction’ in general
(independent of its particular forms). Here we will see in particular how this
interaction is grounded in the structure of production (Division 1).
Scheme 4.1 outlines the systematic of the present chapter.
Division 1. The market and the stratified structure of production
Tendencies of enterprises’ market interaction
This division presents the previous exposition’s (Chapters 1–3) general mani-
festation in the ‘market interaction’ of enterprises – independent of its partic-
ular modes of manifestation presented in the rest of the chapter. As indicated
in the Introduction, like the following divisions it provides no conditions of
existence of the earlier exposition.
4§1 Market interaction
Enterprises are first of all interconnectedasunits that have the sameaim, that is,
the production of surplus-value asmeasured by the rate of integral profit (1§13–
1§14), along with production on an increasing scale (2D1). This is the primary
determinant of the enterprises’ similarity. However, enterprises may also be
similar insofar as they are engaged in the production of a similar physical
product and in similar transactions, through which they are part of ‘a market’.
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In going for the same aim enterprises may, in principle, engender compet-
ition, cartels or monopolisation. These are three forms of what will be called
the ‘market interaction’ of enterprises. In this first division, I present thismarket
interaction in general – applying to each of these three forms. Market interac-
tion (as competition, cartels or monopolisation) is the enterprises’ processes
of trade throughwhich they, directly or indirectly, force the determinants of the
capitalist system upon one another and upon themselves.1
Whereas enterprises have their capital necessarily invested in particular sec-
tors of production, and so operate in particular markets, they are nevertheless
merely units of one and the same thing – capital – that strive between, or with,
each other for one and the same thing: capital accumulation. In this respect
production enterprises are no different from banks or entities engaged in non-
banking financial or property businesses, or combinations of these.2 For the
market perspective of this chapter, therefore, these sectors and their enter-
prises are treated alike.3
For the purposes of this chapter, the current division’s exposition of market
interactionwill be restricted to its threemainmoments: first, inter-market rates
of integral profit (4§2); second, intra-market prices (4§3); and a thirdmoment,
‘stratified production’, which is a consequence of these first two moments
(4§4).
4§1-a Explication. Effective demand and supply
This chapter presents the enterprises’ market interaction. Macroeconomic
effective demand, and more specifically its effect on the validation of surplus-
value, was presented in 3D5. How this demand is allotted to specific microeco-
nomic sectors of production cannot be determined theoretically.We can say no
1 In terms of our exposition, these are the necessary determinants presented in Chapters 1–
3. The last sentence paraphrases Marx, regarding competition, in his Grundrisse (1973a {ms
1857–58}, p. 651): ‘Competition merely expresses as real, posits as an external necessity, that
which lies within the nature of capital; competition is nothing more than the way in which
the many capitals force the inherent determinants of capital upon one another and upon
themselves.’ Thus, what Marx writes about ‘competition’, I generalise to ‘interaction’ (includ-
ing competition).
2 This is so even if, as we have seen (3§1 and Figure 3.2b), ‘banks as pure financiers’ are non-
production enterprises that do not produce surplus-value and are, for the growth of their
finance capital, parasitically dependent on the production of surplus-value in production
enterprises.
3 For current purposes, the terms ‘market’ and ‘sector’ are used interchangeably. However, the
term sector is usually more appropriate in reference to production (as in ‘sector of produc-
tion’).
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more about it than that enterprises will try to attract demand via the design of
their products and via (broadly) advertisement, which below is treated as part
of the production costs. Given that, the effective demand for sector-products
is taken as given, at least for the horizon of the investments in fixed means of
production.
4§1-b Addendum. ‘Competition’ in economics dictionaries and
textbooks
Although this division is about market interaction in general, it seems useful
to say something about the term ‘competition’ now rather than later. Main-
stream economics does not seem to have a general name for what I call ‘market
interaction’ (or it should be ‘market behaviour’). It tends to take cartels and
monopolisation, including forms of collusion, as a ‘deviation’ from ‘competi-
tion’. Nevertheless, no textbook of economics that I have seen provides a suc-
cinct definition of ‘competition’.
However, in a paper specifically devoted to the matter, Saviotti and Krafft
(2004, p. 2) write:
‘we have come today to a rather consensual definition of competition …
Competition is taken tomean that range of actions aimed at ensuring the
realization of the choices of a given firm while restraining at the same
time the sphere of actions of its rivals. Competition is a process of rivalry
between firms which takes the form of contests within existing markets
(intra-industry competition), and the form of potential entry into new
areas (inter-industry competition). Competition includes rivalry in terms
of price, but also in terms of altered or improved techniques of produc-
tion or products …’
4§2 Inter-market interaction: the tendency to equalisation of average
inter-sector rates of integral profit
The dominance of monetary valorisation over the technical labour-
process (1D5, 1§11) entails that enterprises are indifferent to the particu-
lar output produced, an indifference that we have seen to be expressed in
the measure of the rate of integral profit, omega (1D5, 1§13).
Because integral profit is the internalised external driving force of enterprises,
capital valorised and validated in one sector tends to flow to another onewhen
its owner expects a higher rate of integral profit from that operation. This flow
will affect supply. Because a change in supply will have, ceteris paribus, an
inverse effect onprices andprofits – the inter-market interaction thereby estab-
lishes a tendency to equalisation of average inter-sector (i.e. inter-market) rates
of integral profit (TERP). (This is indeed a tendency. In 4D5 we will see how it
206 part one – the capitalist economy
is counteracted by tendencies to oligopolisation and monopolisation).We will
see in 4§4 why the qualification of ‘average’ inter-sector rates of profit is signi-
ficant.
4§2-a Explication. Status of tendencies
Much of the current division runs in terms of tendencies. See 2§12-a for the
status of tendencies. Recall that a tendency is the generation of a particular
form of an entity or the particular quantitative expression of an entity, this gen-
eration being predicated on certain forces or compulsions. In 4§2 this ‘entity’ is
a rate of profit. A tendencymaybe counteracted byother tendencies, or byother
lower level complexities. (A standard example from physics is the (tendency)
law of gravity. Because that tendency law is counteracted by other tenden-
cies we may, for example, feel fairly safe to sleep or work on the 7th floor of
a building). See the General Appendix A§14 for a more elaborative account of
tendencies.
4§2-b Amplification. Equalisation of rates of profit via ‘restructuring of
capital’
The process of effectuation of the tendency to equalisation of average inter-
sector rates of profit (TERP, 4§2) is a gradual one. It is concretised as a ‘restruc-
turing of capital’ (ROC), which encompasses two major phases. The first one
involves the liquidation of existing plants or divisions of an enterprise – either
by selling them and/or by the non-replacement of depreciated means of pro-
duction. The second phase is that of a gradual investment in a new sector of
production, or, farmore likely, that of taking over an enterprise (or a division of
it) in a new sector, whencewehave conglomerate take-overs, followed by invest-
ment in the new sector of production.4 The two phases may also be combined
in processes of conglomerate merging of enterprises, together with a shift in
investment from one to another part of the conglomerate. This type of restruc-
turing of capital, that is, inter-sector ‘TERP-associated ROC’, is one that takes
place rather continuously even if unevenly.
This ‘restructuring of capital’ is one of twomodes of ROC. In Chapter 5 (5§8–
5§9) a second mode will be presented, which is connected with the business
cycle.
4 The term ‘conglomerate’ refers to enterprises having vested interests inmore than one sector.
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4§3 Intra-market interaction: the tendency to uniform prices
For the concept of a market to make sense, we must analytically start from a
considerable degree of similarity between the commodities traded – so mak-
ing up a market (see Explanation 4§3-a). Given the similarity of the physical
outputs – including services – of a collection of enterprises (4§1), intra-market
interaction is generally determined as price setting in reaction to that interac-
tion. Starting off from any prevailing modal price in a market, there are analyt-
ically and practically two positions.
The first position is that of selling above the modal price. However, enter-
prises are compelled to continuously (rather than accidentally) realise the value
produced. Therefore, even if in some period an enterprise were to accidentally
be in a position to sell above the modal market price, such sales would tend
to be declined, as it would have the effect of repelling buyers in a subsequent
period.
The second position is that of selling below or at the (current) modal price.
decline Because selling below the modal price would affect profits negatively,
the individual enterprise has no interest in doing this, unless it is currently pro-
ducing at overcapacity. In the absence of overcapacity then, prices will tend to
stabilise at the existing level. In the case of overcapacity, and at a given effect-
ive demand, it does make sense to decrease the price.5 This implies that other
enterprises will be burdened with overcapacity. The price then tends to estab-
lish at the uniform level at which the overcapacity is (pro rata the enterprises’
capacity) evenly distributed.
Market interaction, therefore, establishes a tendency towards uniform prices
in a market (TUP). (See also the one but last footnote on product differenti-
ation.)
inter-market interaction intra-market interaction
tendency to equalisation of average
inter-sector rates of integral profit
tendency to uniform prices
[TERP; 4§2] [TUP; 4§3]
↓
structure of production:
stratification of enterprises [4§4]
5 When an enterprise produces at overcapacity, the profitability of a price decreasewill depend
on its effect on demand (the price ‘elasticity’).
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4§3-a Explication. Intra-market interaction and product differentiation
The main text stated that for the concept of a market to make sense, we
must analytically start from a considerable degree of similarity between the
commodities traded – thereby establishing a market. For both the actors and
the economist studying markets, a ‘market’ is ultimately a relative matter –
depending on the particular courses of action or the problem at hand. Some
product differentiation is often a factor in intra-market interaction. At some
grade of differentiation it is useful to consider a market as partitioned or split
off (and conversely, two markets as integrated). Theoretically and practically,
we then have the inter-market determinant of the TERP (4§2). However, to the
extent that product differentiation is increasingly the main focus, we either
lose the concept of a market, or each individual enterprise must be considered
as a monopolist. I think that in both analytical and practical terms, the latter
approach is not a fruitful one.
4§4 Stratification of enterprises and plants
1 Interaction as reinforcing technical change
The articulation of the two main tendencies of market interaction (TERP and
TUP, 4§2–4§3) means that the rate of integral profit of any enterprise comes
to depend on its production process for any output: the reduction of the costs
of production (given the input prices) and increase in the value-productivity
of labour. These are determined by the valoro-technique of production adop-
ted, together with the management of the power of labour as engendering
increase in the productivity of labour (2§3). (Having stressed the dual char-
acter of techniques, from now on I will simply use the term ‘technique’ instead
of valoro-technique.) The interaction of enterprises therefore reinforces and
reproduces more concretely the compulsion to the accumulation of capital in
new techniques of production (2§3–2§4).
In the remainder of this section, and in most of this chapter, I build on
the similarity of the products sold on a market (4§3; 4§3-a). Hence the focus
for techniques is on the process (as in ‘process competition’) rather than on
the product (as in ‘product competition’). This is the most transparent case
for the interconnection of production and the market; product innovation is
just amore complicated case, includingmarket strategic considerations, which
might in principle be incorporated in the framework below.
2 Stratification of plants
Stratification of enterprises refers to sectors of production being composed
of not technically uniform, but rather technically heterogeneous enterprises,
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as explained below. Because, concretely, the technique refers to a ‘plant’, and
because large enterprises tend to be composed of several divisions and ‘plants’
each with – at least internally – separated accounts, I will refer to this plant
level of the enterprise.6
The investment of capital in new plants incorporating new techniques of
production tends to be a discrete ‘lumpy’ process.7 In any case, the enterprise
that successfully initiates a new technique of production secures a rate of profit
above that for the existing enterprises (plants) in the sector. The consequent
threat of price competition by the initiating enterprise, and the necessity for
continuous valorisation, might seemingly compel the other enterprises to fol-
low suit.8 However, because each enterprise is burdened with the fixed costs of
its already accumulated capital, it will only scrap old plants when a new tech-
nique offers net profits (‘net’ that is, taking into account the costs of scrapping
old plants) greater than the profits on its existing plant.
In otherwords, the preservation of capital already accumulatedmayprevent
immediatemoves towards investment in new-technique andmaximum rate of
profit plants.9 Scrapping of plants is only enforcedwhen prices no longer cover
prime costs.10 Before that, the scrapping of plants in favour of investment in
new ones is determined by, first, the difference in rates of profit on the invest-
ment in an already existing plant, and on that in a new plant (inclusive of the
capital foregone because of scrapping); and second, by the availability of fin-
ance.11
6 Iwill restrictmyself to this one term ‘plant’. For financial or commercial enterprises, ‘plant’
refers to the establishments or branches of such enterprises, i.e. those with at least intern-
ally separated accounts.
7 Next to these lumpy investments there may be, additionally, more continuous invest-
ments. Note that in the small business sector and in parts of the services sector, the
(lumpy) ‘plant’ aspect of investment is onlymoderately dominant or sometimes even neg-
ligible. (To the extent that this is, contingently, inherent to a sector of production, this
applies to the configuration set out in 4D4.)
8 This is the mainstream neoclassical equilibrium idea.
9 I am drawn into this way of presentation by the conventional neoclassical static equi-
librium analysis of this matter, wherein the rate of profit is identified with the ‘physical’
plant-rate of profit. Note also that, in this chapter, interaction, and later on competition,
should not be conceived of as neoclassical ‘perfect’. Salter (1960) has shown that in the
case of neoclassical perfect competition, capital would always immediately move to the
new-technique plant.
10 ‘Prime costs’ are the costs exclusive of those of fixed means of production.
11 This implies that a maximum rate of profit can only be gained by fully amortised plants.
The conceptualisation here and in the remainder of this section differs from neoclassical
vintage models (discussed in 4§4-b).
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Since, therefore, plants embodying new technology will in general not be
immediately adopted by all enterprises, each sector of production tends to be
composed of a stratification of plants dated according to technique, cost of pro-
duction, value-productivity of labour and a resulting stratification of rates of
integral profit (see Figure 4.2).12 The difference in these aspects between the
top and the bottom of the stratification is called the range of the stratification.
Laterwewill see that the degree of this range depends on the speed of technical
change (4§13).
Recall my claim in the first sentence of this subsection. I do not claim that
enterprises in all markets are so technically heterogeneous for the concept of
stratification tomake sense. However, I do claim that it applies for the economy
on average. In the remainder of this chapter, I merely focus on the sectors that
are clearly stratified.
4§4-a Explication. Stratification and scrapping of plants
The concept of stratification implies that at each point in time, enterprises
within the same sector are physically non-identical (this may go without say-
ing for non-economists; however, economists educated within the standard
models of neoclassical economics are trained to see physical identity as the
starting point for analysis). The focuses for the non-identity are the character-
istics indicated at the endof 4§4: technique; costs; value-productivity of labour;
and rate of integral profit. The reason for this non-identity is that enterprises
will introduce new techniques of production only when these are expected to
result in a higher rate of profit in comparisonwith capital accumulated in exist-
ing plants. However, preservation of capital already accumulated may prevent
immediatemoves towards investment in new-technique andmaximum rate of
profit plants. Therefore capital tends to be stratified according to technique,
cost of production, value-productivity of labour and resulting rates of profit
(4§4), as visualised in Figure 4.2. The oldest plant within a sector is indicated
by the number 1, while the most recently invested plant is indicated by the
number n.
12 If rates of profit are calculated over the lifetime of an asset, and if there were such a thing
as perfect foresight, then calculated rates of profit might be equal. However, this does not
affect the argument (see also 4§6 on devalorisation). The exposition in this chapter high-
lights that the state of the economy conceptualised is generally not one of equilibrium,
nor is it one of ‘perfect competition’.
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figure 4.2 Stratification of plants
Recall from 1§14 the equations for the integral rate of profit (ω) and for produc-
tion (X), which are now applied to the microeconomic plant level (suffix i). All
variables in the four equations below refer to time (t) – time subscript omitted
to avoid cumbersome notation.
ωi = Πi / K′i = [miLάϊi – (wL)i] / Ki (4.1) cf. 1.3 and 1.6
Recall also that άdenotes the technique-associatedproductive power of labour,
and ϊ the intensity of labour.Whereas inChapter 2 the primary focuswas on the
latter, the primary focus in the current chapter will be on ά. Although the cur-
rent chapter does not exclude variations in intensity, it may be helpful for the
reader to assume ϊ to be constant throughout the chapter.
For each plant we have running material costs (μKi) and a depreciation of
fixed means of production (δKi). Thus we have for the plant output (Xi):
Xi = δKi + μKi + wLi + Πi (4.2) cf. 1.2
Then any scrapping of plants is only enforced when their returns (pqi) outrun
their ‘prime costs’ (μKi + wLi), i.e.:
pqi ≤ μKi + wLi (returns ≤ ‘prime costs’) (4.3)
Thus treating the costs of the fixedmeans of production as a complete loss, the
plant(s) at the bottom of the stratification may ultimately keep on producing
until this point.
However, rather than the complete loss case, we may suppose the scrap-
value of a plant, or its liquidation value, to be LVi. Suppose that there are no
obstacles of finance, technique, etc., so that any one plant at the bottom could
in principle be lifted to the top (‘n’, henceKn), then the simple decision criterion
would be:
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Πn /(Kn – LVi) > [pqi – (μKi + wLi)]/LVi (4.4)
To the extent that LVi is ‘small’, then – even if in 4.4 the LHS > RHS13 – it may be
profitable to keep the bottom plant going along with an investment at the top
by the same enterprise. Equation (4.4) presents the simple idea. A more soph-
isticated comparison would go in terms of the discounted profit flow of each
alternative.
(In most markets, there is some degree of product differentiation.We could
make this part of the stratification, whence theremay be price differences that
are reflected in the divergent rates of profit. However, for simplification this is
neglected here.)
Figure 4.2 is the general basis for the entirety of this chapter. The following
divisions set out specifications.
4§4-b Addendum. Stratification and vintage models
Conventional neoclassical general equilibrium theories assume ‘small’ homo-
geneous plants, or firms, engaged in atomistic competition. It is hard to under-
stand what would then keep competition going. Indeed, that conception of
competition is highly ambiguous. As each unit is a perfect copy of every other,
no more than comparative static states (differing from each other only to the
extent that exogenous variables differ) can be described (see Blaug 2001). Such
a conception may be traced back to the lack of differentiation between homo-
geneous capital as value and the heterogeneous embodiment of capital in a
technical sense (that is, in our terminology, the internally bifurcated form of
capitalist production).
However, neoclassical ‘vintage models’ are less simplified (see Solow 1970,
ch. 3; the seminal references are: Johansen 1959; Salter 1960; Kaldor and Mir-
rlees 1962; Solow, Tobin, von Weizäcker and Yeari 1966; and Cass and Stiglitz
1969). One main difference from the concept of stratification as presented in
4§4 is that in the neoclassical conception, the obsolescence of plants is determ-
ined by the real wage (wage costs exceeding the average labour-productivity on
a plant), rather than by the addition of plants to the stratification, introducing
new cost-reducing techniques of production, and the resulting price decrease
and/or overcapacity (see 4§6).
The notion of the extra profits gained by the enterprise (plant) at the top of
the stratification is closely related to Schumpeter’s notion of temporarymono-
poly profits accruing to the first enterprise to innovate, which are gradually
eroded as the innovation diffuses through the industry and even the economy
(see, e.g., Schumpeter 2003 [1943]).
13 LHS: left hand side; RHS: right hand side.
4. market interaction and stratified production [4§4] 213
4§4-c Addendum. Earlier work on stratification
I first set out the concept and a fairly simple model of stratification in Reu-
ten and Williams 1989 (Chapters 4–5) and in Reuten 1991. At that time I used
the concept and model particularly in the context of a theory of the business
cycle and a particular type of technical development (a type characterised by
an increasing capital-labour ratio), even if I alreadynoted then that the scopeof
themodel is wider than that context. A similar notion was adopted by Brenner
(1998, e.g., p. 24ff.). I have now explicitly generalised the model to characterise
market interaction in general (4§4) competition (4D2 and 4D3), cartels (4D4),
and oligopolistic and monopolising interaction (4D5).
4§4-d Addendum. Stratification, capital-labour ratios and the tendential
equalisation of average inter-sector rates of integral profit – a note
on marxian political economy
A concept of a stratified structure of production within sectors is implicit
in Marx’s notion of the development of the technique-associated ‘productive
power of labour’ as giving rise to intra-sector divergent ‘potencies of labour’
(my Lάi).14 Especially to the extent that new techniques would entail an
increasing capital-labour ratio (K/L), an increasing Lάi along with it is a pre-
condition for the introduction of such a technique. Regarding a comparison
between sectors, itmay be remarked that inter-sector capital-labour ratios usu-
ally diverge, which has largely to do with a limited diffusion of techniques
between sectors. This implies that, along with it, the average productive power
of labour (Lά) for each sector also diverges. All this implies that given some
average intensity of labour (Lϊ), we have the variables as set out in Table 4.3.
table 4.3 Stratification related intra- and inter-sector variables
Within sectors Between sectors
technology and technique diffusion limited diffusion
K/L ratios divergent* divergent
productive powers of labour (Lα) divergent* divergent
rates of exploitation (e = Π/wL) divergent* divergent
rates of integral profit (ωt = Πt /Kt′) divergent* tendential uniform
* Pending the diffusion.
14 Capital I, chapter 12 – chapter 10 of the German edition.
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Especially the diverging between-sector rates of exploitation have been a
much-contested issue within marxian political economy.15 All this is amplified
in Reuten 2017.
4§5 Instrumentality of the form of market interaction
For enterprises, the formof market interaction (competition, cartels,monopol-
isation) ismerely instrumental to their production andaccumulationof capital.
This does not mean that any individual enterprise has the choice of adopting
any instrument such as competition or cartel formation. As indicated (4§1),
in their market interaction, enterprises force the determinants of the capital-
ist system upon one another and upon themselves. Whilst any enterprise is a
constituent of this enforcement, one or another form of market interaction
may nevertheless be imposed on the enterprises. In internalising that form,
or in complying with it, they impose that particular interaction on themselves
and on the others.16 This means that we have distinct market constellations in
which one particular form (competition, cartels,monopolisation) is dominant.
Even so, this does not imply that the impetus that might give rise to another
form disappears altogether. Rather, in themutual counteraction of the respect-
ive forces that gives rise to each of the forms, one force comes to manifestly
dominate within a particular constellation. The other ones become subordin-
ate or latent.Wewill see later on that the pace of process innovation (technical
change) or of product innovation is oneof themain forces that determine these
constellations.
Divisions 2–3 present competitive constellations, Division 4 cartels, and
Division 5 oligopolisation and monopolisation.
Division 2. Deflationary price competition
This division presents the first general mode of manifestation of the enter-
prises’ market interaction. There are two main modes (or forms) of rivalrous
interaction of enterprises (that is, forms of competition), each one based on
the sector’s enterprises’ resignation to a rotating price-leader. The first general
mode of ‘deflationary price competition’ is presented in the current division.
The second general mode will be presented in the next division.
15 It is the main issue that is associated with the so-called ‘transformation problem’.
16 In this case, that form of interaction constitutes a configuration in connection with the
forces, ‘the determinants of the capitalist system’, developed earlier (Chapters 1–3). The
distinction between compliance and internalisation was set out in 2§7-b.
4. market interaction and stratified production [4§6] 215
4§6 Stratified price competition: devalorisation via a decreasing ‘unit
monetary value of labour’ (m)
1 Preliminary remarks
We have seen that sectors of production tend to be composed of a stratifica-
tion of plants (4§4). This is the basis for market interaction in general. I start
the exposition with ‘stratified price competition’ (though note that I do not
assume neoclassical equilibrium or so-called ‘perfect’ competition typified by
homogeneous small-sized firms).Wehave also seen that in the absence of over-
capacity,market prices will tend to stabilise at the existing level, whereas in the
case of overcapacity it doesmake sense to initiate price decrease (4§3). At near
to full capacity utilisation, price competition fades away.17Hence effectiveprice
competition is conditioned by overcapacity.18
Reading the exposition below might be facilitated if the reader briefly
reviews the terminology of 1§14 (especially that around equations 1.3–1.8) – see,
alternatively, the list of equations at the end of the book.
2 Stratified price competition
With competition, enterprises will try to eliminate competitors, or at least to
make them fall behind. In a constellation of general price competition, the ini-
tiator of competitive action tends to combine:
• a technical advance (such that it might reduce prices);
• the creationof potentialovercapacity in amarket by investing in anewplant;
• actual price decrease (so as to effectively put behind or eliminate competit-
ors).
It thus acts as price-leader – a function that might rotate between enter-
prises – setting the price at a level that maximises its profits. Given the tech-
nical advance and the production capacity of the price-leader, the other enter-
prises will tend to resign to the price-leadership. Explication 4§6-a sets this out
in detail in reference to the stratification framework initiated in 4§4. Here I
present the main thread.
So the initiator (i.e. the innovator) introduces a new technique. For its com-
petitors, nothing changes in their techniques and the associated production
power of labour (α, more precisely ά). Nevertheless, due to the market price
decrease, the latter are in effect confronted with a devalorisation (a decreased
17 It might be argued that the threat of entry from relatively low rate of profit sectors (4§2)
might induce price decrease. However, in the absence of any form of cartels (4D4), no
enterprise has an interest in pre-empting this.
18 Cf. Clarke 1994, pp. 281–3.
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valorisation – on valorisation see 1§10).19 Its benchmark is the valorisation of
the same capitals (enterprise, plant) in the previous period. This devalorisation
is due to the actual monetary value of labour (mLα) for any single capital lag-
ging behind that in the previous period. This applies not on the unchanged Lα,
but on a decrease in the ‘m’ (the unit monetary value of labour – 1§14, heading
6). For the initiator, on the other hand, the comparative rate of surplus-value
increases, because of the relatively greater value-productivity of the labour
employed in the plant added to the stratification (its α moves ahead of that
of competitors). Thus, denoting the initiator by (n+1) and the previous price-
leader by (n), mLα(n+1) >mLα(n), for any ‘m’. In fact (n+1)’s price decrease, means
that ‘m’ decreases for the whole sector, making this itself good via its higher α,
such that its integral rate of profit (ω) is higher than that of (n) – and all com-
petitors. The initiator’s strategic consideration is that it introduces this new
technique at the point when its price-decreasing action still secures a higher
rate of profit for itself. The effect is that for all the competitors, the rate of integ-
ral profit decreases in comparisonwith the previous period (see further 4§6-a).
Next to this devalorisation, and to the extent that plants from the bottom of
the stratification are eliminated prior to their full amortisation, there is also an
annihilation of previously accumulated capital.
I call this articulation of production and competition through time ‘strati-
fied price competition’.20
3 Summing up
So far, in sum,wehave a tendency to equalisationof average inter-sector rates of
profit (4§2), which, together with the tendency to uniform prices in a market
(4§3), gives rise to an intra-sector stratification of plants with corresponding
stratified rates of integral profit (4§4). Stratified price competition, the addi-
tion to the stratification of new technique embodying plants, gives rise to price
decrease and so devalorisation for the previous stratification and thus to a
decline in the rate of profit for that previous stratification.21
19 Devalorisation refers to the value-added, and should be distinguished from depreciation,
i.e. the (calculated) normal returns for the wear and tear of means of production (δK).
20 It might also be called ‘stratified dynamic price competition’ (cf. Schumpeter 2003 [1943],
pp. 103–4), who coined the term ‘dynamic competition’, in face of the taking into account
of sequences of production periods.
21 Note that a rigorous product innovation may have the same result: scrapping of ‘bottom’
plants and of devalorisation.
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4§6-a Explication. Stratified price competition
This explication sets out some analytical details onwhich 4§6 is based. It builds
on the framework introduced in 4§4-a. Most of the formulations of the second
half of 4§6 have been integrated in this explication.
Capital invested in a new plant (n+1) and added to the stratification oper-
ates with up-to-date techniques of production – those withminimal unit costs
of production andmaximal value-productivity of labour (4§4). If (n+1) were to
undertake no further action (hypothetically), this investment would increase
the total production capacity of the sector. The new investment is supposed
to be one that potentially fully results in overcapacity of the stratification;
this is the most transparent case – see Figure 4.4. (In a more complicated pic-
ture, we could account for degrees of extra capacity in relation to economic
growth and effective demand. Macroeconomic demand effects of investment
and scrappingwill be presented in Chapter 5. Another simplification is that the
overcapacity created by n+1 is assumed to be proportionally distributed over all
plants).
In case of the currently presented (4D2) form of competitive interaction of
enterprises, (n+1) anticipates the potential overcapacity (Figure 4.4) by price
reduction. As a result, the plants at the bottom of the stratification that no
longer cover prime costs will have to be scrapped (cf. 4§4 and 4§4-a). We may
suppose that the enterprise that added the new plant is the one to initiate the
price competition, i.e. an effective price decrease. Hence this enterprise acts
as price-leader – a leadership that might be rotating. Thus when plant (n+1) is
added to the stratification (1,…,n), andwhenhplants are scrapped, theprevious
stratification (1,…,n) becomes (1+h,…,n,n+1). (See Figure 4.5.)
(Note that the general employment effect depends on:
1. The scale of n+1, in comparison with the scales of the scrapped plants h;
2. The capital-labour ratios (K/L) of n+1 in comparison with h.
Chapter 5 presents the macroeconomic effect.)
Due to the price decrease, the revenue of the remaining part of the previous
stratification (1+h,…,n) decreases, whereas the revenue of the new stratifica-
tion (1+h,…,n,n+1) typically increases with the average rate of growth (to keep
the analysis concise, it is assumed that the share of the sector in the total eco-
nomy remains constant).22 I call the decrease in revenue of the capitals in the
previous stratificationdevalorisation (decreased valorisation). Its benchmark is
22 In case of (macroeconomic or sector) recession, the revenue may remain constant or
decrease (see Chapter 5). Generally, one sector may, of course, grow above average.
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the valorisation of the same capitals in the previous period. The devalorisation
is due to the actual monetary value of labour (mLα) for any one capital (enter-
prise, plant) lagging behind that in the previous period.23 Thus, because their
investments, costs and production processes are unaffected, whilst revenue
decreases (they have to share with n+1), the rate of integral profit of the capit-
als accumulated in the remaining part of the previous stratification (1+h,…,n)
decreases.24
figure 4.4 Stratification of plants after plant addition: hypothetical con-
stellation prior to market interaction
23 It might be argued that to the extent that devalorisation is foreseen at the point of invest-
ment, it is incorporated in calculating the ‘marginal efficiency of capital’. But even if there
were perfect foresight in this, the argument is unaffected. It cannot prevent devalorisa-
tion. Even with devalorisation, the net profits over the lifetime of the asset may still be
positive and ‘optimal’.
24 At the new price, the rate of profit of the capital invested in the new plant (n+1) will tend
to be above the average rate of profit of the capitals making up the previous stratification
(1,…,n) at the previous price; or also above the rate of profit of the plant (n) that was pre-
viously at the top of the stratification. In any case, since the new plant (n+1) operates at
lower costs and higher productivity than the previous plant (n), the rate of profit of the
new plant capital at the new price is above both that of the nth and the average rate of
profit.
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figure 4.5 Stratification of plants after plant addition: actual constella-
tion after price decrease, devalorisation and scrapping
* Identical to Figure 4.4
† Scrapping of two plants instead of one assumes that plants grow in size (in case of equally
sized plants (1)-(n+1), only plant (1) would be scrapped)
In other words, because of the relatively greater actual monetary-value-
productivity of the labour employed in the plant added to the stratification
(n+1), its comparative rate of surplus-value increases, whilst the actual monet-
ary value of the labour in the (1+h,…,n) plants decreases (typically by a decrease
in output prices). Therefore, not only is the ‘unit monetary value of labour’
(1§14, heading 6), mi, stratified increasingly from (1,…,i,…,n), but it also tends
to decrease (devalorisation) for all i when the stratification is extended.25
In sum, stratified price competition is a form of accumulation of capital
along with the driving out, from the bottom of the stratification, of plants
belonging to competitors. To the extent that these plants are driven out prior
to their full amortisation, there is an annihilation of previously accumulated
capital.
25 If there were some collaboration between the enterprises then we might have the
sequence price decrease, scrapping, price increase. However, in a pure competitive con-
stellation, there is no mechanism to bring this about. Moreover, price increase is predic-
ated on the definitive scrapping. Especially enterprises that operate several plants may
keep latently the non-used plant – at least for some time.
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(Quite apart from the stratification introduced here, this is analogous to
Schumpeter’s ‘creative destruction’ (2003 [1943], ch. 7). Incidentally,Marx (1981
[1894], p. 265) cast this in terms of his famous phrase of ‘neue Kombinationen’
(new combinations) that inspired Schumpeter (1934 [1911].))
4§7 Devalorisation accounted on devalued capital
(At this point this section seems a detail. Its relevance will become clear in the
next division.) The previous section (4§6) posited a decline in the rate of integ-
ral profit (ω) for the previous stratification (h, … n). This is based on the con-
vention of historical (dated) accounting. Alternatively, enterprises (when they,
through competition, have become aware of the stratification change) may
immediately apply the alternative convention of current cost accounting (or
present value or replacement value accounting).26 They then apply a devalu-
ation of capital proportional to the difference between the historical value of
their assets as comparedwith the assets purchase price of the innovator’s tech-
nique. Hence via this pure balance sheet operation, their decreased profits
due to devalorisation are accounted on the now devalued capital. This second
convention is most often the practice today. Its dubbed ‘advantage’ is that the
implied losses are not revealed in a permanent decline of the rate of profit, but
rather in an immediate capital loss.27
Thus, depending on the accounting practice, devalorisation may be mani-
fested either directly in a declined rate of profit or in an annihilation of capital
accumulated. The net effect (the cash flow effect, i.e. the sum of depreciation
allowances and profits) is the same.
4§8 Derived price decrease and derived devaluation of capital
Generalised price competition gives rise to generalised price decrease. This
implies that even if for specific sectors no new profit-increasing techniques are
available, these are still affected by the technical change and price competition
of other sectors.
This is so for the following reason. Consider an enterprise – currently pro-
ducing at the bottom of the stratification of a sector A – which moves without
26 As Polak (1940, pp. 15–16) indicates, this accounting method was originally set out by
Kovero in 1912 and by Schmidt in 1921.
27 We have for the integral rate of profit of any plant i:
ωt = Πt / Kt′ = [(mLα)t – (wL)t] / Kt′ (1.6) plant version
When because of devalorisation ‘m’ decreases, the rate of profit decreases. The balance
sheet operation referred to results in a devaluation of K, such that ω remains about con-
stant.
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innovating to the top (n′) by merely duplicating the technique of the top plant
(n). It buys the new plant and equipment inputs from a (composite) sector B
in which there was technical change and price decrease along with it. There-
fore the fixed capital outlay of the new plant (n′) in sector A which it buys
from B is nevertheless lower than that of A’s (n) – because (n′) can buy the
identical plant at lower prices than (n) did – whence (n′) is in a position to
decrease the sector A output price. Thus the competitive process and price
decrease in sector A is predicated on technical change and competition else-
where (B).
Again we have a devalorisation for the previous stratification (of A), in this
case one that I call derived devalorisation. Again, depending on the accounting
convention, the implied rate of profit decrease may alternatively be expressed
as a derived devaluation of capital.
In sum, (primary) devalorisation/devaluation stems from changes in the
labour process, induced by new technical change within the sector under con-
sideration. Derived devalorisation/devaluation comes about by a mere price
decrease due to process changes and price decreases in other sectors. However,
this derivedpricedecrease equally tends tomultiply through the economy, thus
developing into (further) general price deflation.
4§8-a Explication. Physical reproduction and reproduction of capital
From a one-sided physical (use-value) approach, it might seem that the
derived devaluation of capital does not affect the reproduction. Indeed, phys-
ical reproduction (that is, the number of units of output of a plant) need
not be affected by the input price decrease because new means of produc-
tion can be bought at the lower price. But this does not take away the fact
that the accumulation of capital (or the valorisation potential) has decreased.
This becomes obvious when a plant is wholly financed by loans: then the
amortisation reserves may be sufficient to buy a new plant, but not to cancel
the loans.
4§8-b Explication. Quality (or product) competition
So far the exposition of competition has beenmainly phrased in terms of price
competition. Along with it we have product (or quality) innovation and com-
petition. For the (primary) devalorisation (and devaluation of capital), the dis-
tinction is not relevant because product competition has the same effect. This
also applies for the derived devalorisation (or devaluation) with respect to pro-
ducer goods since their quality increase has a cost of production decreasing
effect.
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4§8-c Explication. Small business sector and services sector
Even if stratified competition is on average less prominent in sectors that are
product-inherently supplied by small businesses and in much of the services
sector, the latter are nevertheless affected by generalised deflation and partic-
ularly derived devalorisation/devaluation of capital.
4§9 Generalised price competition and the pace of technical change:
price deflation and the tendency to stagnation
It was indicated in Chapter 2 that profit augmentation is limited by the pos-
sible increase in the intensity of labour, and that this limit is overcome by the
investment of capital in technology and the application of technical change
(2§2). Even if this is a high level determinant of the capitalist system, the pace
of technical change is contingent. However, when this change is triggered such
that its combinationwith price competition generally precludes the full amort-
isation of (modal) capital investments – as revealed in continuous devaluation
of capital – and when this multiplies through the economy in the form of
price deflation, then it develops into a system-destructive or at least paralys-
ing force.
Insufficient amortisation implies that the general accumulation of capital
is in some degree annihilated. Then the uncertainty about this annihilation
(or the expectation of annihilation) tends to dampen investment. This is first
revealed in adampening of thepre-validating finance (PVF) requestedby enter-
prises and provided by banks (3§2). Thus the production of surplus-value
dampens and so the part of surplus-value in the form of interest that accrues
to banks dampens.
Further, and more specifically, for the PVF that is being provided, general
price deflation implies that the redemption of the PVF is impeded.28 Note
that an actual non-redemption in this case – we may call this the ‘deflation-
ary PVF gap’ – is quite different from a non-redemption of the PVF due to
savings (named RPVF in 3§6). In the latter case, savers may substitute for the
non-redemption. In case of a deflationary PVF gap, there are no potential sub-
stituents, i.e. no potential non-bank financiers (for this gap). For those gaps
there is a permanent increase in borrowing from banks. Ultimately this may
outrun the securities that the enterprises can provide to the banks.
28 Although this is generally so, it ismost obvious for the case inwhich the PVF is used for the
purchase of fixed means of production. The depreciation (δK) returns in many tranches,
with each subsequent tranche being smaller than the earlier one because of the devalu-
ation of capital.
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Thus the result is not only a decrease in the quantity of bank finance (PVF),
but also an increase in its risk and uncertainty. Any likely risk premium that
banks will put on the going interest rate will further dampen the invest-
ment.
As to the (other) remaining part of the PVF (i.e. the RPVF apart from the
gap), that is, the part for which there are potential financiers in the form of
bonds, general price deflation puts these potential financiers in a position of
relative power. The point is that they can wait with substituting for the RPVF
provided by banks – so improving their bargaining position – because with
generalised price deflation the purchasing power of their credits with banks
increases anyway. In other words, general price deflation empowers potential
ex post financiers with the means of ‘striking’. This tends (ceteris paribus) to
put an upward pressure on the ‘real’ rate of interest. (An actual strike increases
the banks’ risk, whence banks will increase the rate of interest.)29
General price deflation brings on two subsidiary problems for enterprises.
One is that normally wages tend to be sticky downwards (this may be dif-
ferent in crises and recessions; however, we are considering a structural con-
stellation). A second, though temporary, problem is that the prospect of price
decrease may have the effect of postponement of purchases of consumer dur-
ables as well as purchases of means of production in the branches with a relat-
ively slower rate of technical change (e.g. services).
In conclusion, the combination of generalised speedy technical change (or a
fast increasing pace of technical change) and generalised price deflation tends
to generate stagnation. However, next to the deflationary constellation presen-
ted in the current division, an inflationary constellation (4D3) is also an implicit
system possibility. Yet – recalling that Part One yet abstracts from (or brackets)
the state and its economic policy – there are no economy-inherent forces that
turn a deflationary constellation into an inflationary one. Further, there are no
economy-inherent forces to get out of stagnation.30
4§9-a Amplification. The paradox of ‘beneficial technical change’ and
‘beneficial competition’ in combination
Both technical change and competition are often conceived of as beneficial
features of the capitalist system (not least of all in ideological discourses; dis-
courses in which, moreover, technical change is indiscriminately called ‘tech-
29 Further, an increasing rate of interest means that shares (as compared with bonds)
become inferior to financiers; this aggravates an inferiority of shares due to devaluation
of capital.
30 In the systematic of this book, wars are contingent.
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nical progress’). However, it appears that prolonged fast technical change in
combination with price competition does not fit the system.
4§9-b Addendum. The tendency of the rate of profit to fall in marxian
political economy
Within one main strand of marxian political economy, an important theorem
regards the ‘tendency of the rate of profit to fall’.31|32 Recalling that the expos-
ition still has the state bracketed, a corollary of the main text of Division 2 is
that the positing of such a tendency makes sense for a deflationary constel-
lation with a generalised high pace of technical change. However, as we will
see in the next division, that constellation cannot be generalised as a unique
or dominant one for capitalism. That again does not imply that there could be
no declining profit rate in the constellation that I present in Division 3. Gener-
ally, from my own perspective, the development of the profit rate is especially
relevant as an indicator for the accumulation of capital.
Basu and Manolakos (2010; 2012), using data from Duménil and Lévy, show
the long run secular movement of the rate of profit for the USA as reproduced
in Graph 4.6.33
Note that Graph 4.6 inevitably shows the result of both structural and cyc-
licalmovements (the latter are presented inChapter 5) aswell as contingencies.
In reference to the dotted line that Basu and Manolakos plot (a Lowess
trend), it is relevant that according to data for the USA from Piketty (2014, tech-
nical appendix), the period 1870–1913 is on average deflationary (-0.7%) and the
period thereafter inflationary (for that period he provides for intervals of 20 to
37 years, average inflation rates of 2.2% to 5.6% – ending with 2.2% for the
period 1990–2012). However, from Piketty’s source (Piketty and Zucman 2013)
it can be seen that the period 1921–33 is on average highly deflationary (-3.5%).
31 Roberts (2012) is a concise 13 pages paper with empirical findings (1963–2008 for the G7)
and references to other empirical findings. It shows a sharply decliningprofit rate for 1963–
1975, half of which recovers between 1975–1988, with next, until 2008, again a gradually
bending down to the early 1970s level. https://thenextrecession.files.wordpress.com/2012/
09/a‑world‑rate‑of‑profit.pdf.
32 Regarding Marx’s work I think that there is hardly a basis for this theorem in Marx’s
Capital if we neglect Engels’ additions to that text – this is shown in Reuten 2004c.
Nevertheless, there is a basis for it in Marx’s manuscripts of before 1864 – as shown
in Reuten and Thomas 2011. However, such a (non-)basis in Marx’s work is irrelevant
for the (in-)appropriateness of the research findings of current marxian political eco-
nomy.
33 I am grateful to the authors for putting the graph at my disposal.
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Those two periods have been shaded in the graph. This shadingmerely puts the
focus on one determinant – one that is focused on in Divisions 2 and 3 – among
many others (see Chapter 5).
graph 4.6 Long waves in the rate of profit: USA 1870–2007
Source: Basu and Manolakos (2010, p. 45), on the basis of data from Duménil
and Lévy (shading added).
Division 3. Inflationary ‘structural overcapacity competition’
This division presents the second general mode of manifestation of the enter-
prises market interaction. It is a competitive mode alternative to the one
presented inDivision 2. The current division does not set out how the economy
goes from a deflationary to an inflationary constellation, because there are no
economy-immanent forces to reach such a transition.34
Deflationary price competition is not difficult to understand – in main-
streameconomics, it is theprototypeof competition.Understanding themech-
anisms of inflationary competition is far more difficult.
4§10 Overcapacity competition: introduction
‘Inflationary structural overcapacity competition’ is a form of competition in
which competitors are not eliminated by way of price decreases, but rather
by burdening them with overcapacity. Overcapacity generally implies that,
given the fixed cost (including especially those of fixed means of production
34 The state’s efforts to prevent generalised price deflation are presented in 9§5 (and briefly
anticipating that in 7§8).
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and overheads), unit cost increases in comparison with full capacity produc-
tion. Production at overcapacity thereby results in decreasing revenue, whence
marginal producers at the bottom of the stratification are forced out. Further
details are presented in 4§12.
Alternative names are ‘structural excess capacity’ or ‘structural under-
utilisation of capacity’.35 It is to be emphasised that structural overcapacity
is not the effect of market demand, but rather an overcapacity at any given
demand. It is an overcapacity for market strategic reasons, at least so for the
price-leader in a sector.
The constellation of prolonged fast technical change together with price
competition, as presented in Division 2, is almost incompatible with the capit-
alist system. (By ‘almost incompatible’ I mean that the constellation engenders
a tendency to stagnation.) The main reason is the primary and the derived
devaluation of capital, set out in 4D2 (4§6, 4§8).We have seen that this implies
a degree of annihilation of the general accumulation of capital, and that this
tends to dampen investment.We saw also that this affects not only production
enterprises but also banks. For the latter it not only affects the quantity of their
credit provision (PVF), but also their risk and uncertainty.
For these reasons, banks andproduction enterprises have a common interest
in evading general price deflation. Although there is this common interest,
there are no economy-immanent forces to bring it about (coordinated action
would either presuppose the state, or a grand cartel via ‘joint meetings’ and
decision making of captains of industry and banks, to which all others would
have to comply).
The presentation below presupposes the existence of an inflationary con-
stellation, in whatever way it is reached. There are two major conditions of
existence for this constellation.The first one is presented in 4§11 and the second
in 4§12.
35 The OECD glossary of statistical terms states: ‘Excess capacity refers to a situation where a
firm is producing at a lower scale of output than it has been designed for’. It adds: ‘Excess
capacity is a characteristic of natural monopoly or monopolistic competition’. Note that
the current division broadens this considerably. It also adds: ‘Firms may also choose to
maintain excess capacity as a part of a deliberate strategy to deter or prevent entry of new
firms’. This somewhat approaches the issue as presented in the current division, even if
the focus will not be primarily on entrants but rather on squeezing out current producers.
https://stats.oecd.org/glossary/detail.asp?ID=3209.
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4§11 Themonetary condition of an inflationary constellation: banks’ PVF
and the ‘unit monetary value of labour’ (m)
Onemajor condition for a constellation of generalised price inflation is thewill-
ingness of banks to accommodate that constellation via their credits to enter-
prises (PVF) as affecting themoney in circulation.More specifically this has the
effect of an increasing ‘unit monetary value of labour’ (m).
This accommodation has three further general effects. (Below any compar-
isons with a deflationary constellation are indented.)
In comparison with a deflationary constellation, banks now in effect
accommodate a ‘socialisation of private losses’. That is, they in effect
socialise private losses that would be due to the devaluation of capital
induced by technical change in the absence of price inflation.36 Relat-
ive to a deflationary constellation, price inflation results in an increased
profit of enterprises and banks.37
First, its counterpart is a loss of purchasing power for social actors with non-
equity financial assets (including ‘small savers’) and of actors with fixed
incomes or with incomes that are (in part) adapted to inflation with a time-
lag.
Note that even a constellation of zero inflation makes quite a difference
in comparison with some deflation, because it takes away the derived
devaluation of capital (4§8).38
Second, inflation generates an actual derived revaluation of capital – the coun-
terpart of the derived devaluation of capital presented in 4§8. This revaluation
is expressed in the balance sheets of enterprises as capital ‘reserves’ (part of the
equity).
Third, inflation puts employers (enterprises, including banking entities) in
an advantageous bargaining position.
At a given, bargained, nominal wage, price decreases implied by labour
productivity increase would automatically compensate labourers for the
productivity increase.
36 The concept of socialisation of losses is set out in De Brunhoff (1978 [1976]) and derives
initially (to my knowledge) from De Brunhoff and Cartelier (1974), though for each not
in the context of devaluation of capital and competition. However, Aglietta (1979 [1976],
pp. 313–15 and 365–70) theorises inflation in terms of ‘anticipated obsolescence’, which
the current chapter connects to the structure of production (stratification).
37 For banks this is a matter of quantity and quality of the finance provided (as indicated
above). Note that credits can be made ‘inflation proof’ for banks by flexible interest rates
or by interest rate indexation.
38 In case of zero inflation theremay still havebeenanaccommodated socialisationof losses.
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In case of inflation, workers will have to re-bargain for the productivity com-
pensation or even for a mere maintenance of the purchasing power of the
initial wage. (In the case of partial or full compensation, these compensations
tend to come about with a time-lag.)
4§12 Stratified structural overcapacity competition
Recall from the beginning of 4§10 that overcapacity competition involves the
burdening of competitors with overcapacity, whence their unit costs increase
in comparison with full capacity production. The second main condition of
inflationary overcapacity competition (next to the one presented in 4§11) is
generalised ‘structural overcapacity’. It prevents a, continuously lurking, shift
into a deflationary constellation. I present this constellation in three steps,
starting with ‘simple overcapacity’.
1 Simple overcapacity: merely transitional overcapacity
Similar to the constellation of price competition (4D2), stratified overcapacity
competition is initiated by a (rotating) price-leader that has added a new plant
to the stratification, which embodies a technical advance over its competitors.
Again, this plant addition increases the (potential) total production capacity of
the stratification.Now, however, the price-leader aims to squeeze out competit-
ors from the bottom of the stratification not by price decrease as affecting their
revenue, but rather by burdening themwith overcapacity as affecting their rev-
enue (their unit costs increase in comparison with full capacity production,
because they continue to be burdened with the fixed cost, including especially
those of fixed means of production and overheads). Thus the price-leader cre-
ates actual overcapacity in the sector (equivalent to the size of its own plant).
Along with it, the aim is to increase the price, or to keep it at least constant. In
order to keep the exposition concise, I present the analytical case of marginal
inflation, that is, constant prices. Thus the price-leader sets a price equal to that
of the previous period.
See 4§6-a, Figure 4.4 (plant addition). Now, however, read in that figure for
‘potential overcapacity’, ‘actual overcapacity’. Figure 4.7 shows that situation
with the bottomplants next having been scrapped (note that these plants were
already operatingmarginally or near to it). This scrappingmaynot occur imme-
diately, as at a constant output price these plants might be kept going for some
time at merely a coverage of their prime costs (4§4, penultimate paragraph).39
[continued]
39 Their aim is tomove to the top of the stratification (or near to it bymerely copying the (n)
or (n+1) technique), as this increases their rate of integral profit. This is actualised in case
there is no financial bottleneck.
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figure 4.7 Stratification of plants with simple overcapacity (non-stable
in case of marginal inflation)
* Analogous to Figure 4.5 (deflationary price competition).
⁑ Disappears after scrapping of bottom plants
† The equality applies for the analytical case of a constant price; in fact we havemi (t+1) ≥ mi (t)
4§12 Continued
2 Structural overcapacity
The following is relevant for marginal or low rates of price inflation and not so
much for ‘moderately high’ rates (see Amplification 4§12-b).40
So far an inflationary overcapacity-competition seems feasible on the basis
of a constellationof amere transitional ‘simple overcapacity’ as outlined above.
However, considering Figure 4.7 it appears that such a constellation may not
be stable (especially not on the edge of inflation –marginal inflation – that we
are discussing; it might be more stable at higher levels of inflation). The point
is that rotating price-leaders require an instrument to effectively respond to
competitors that might contest their price-leadership via price decrease. This
40 Theoretically, it cannot be pinpointed what the relevant borderline is between ‘low’ and
‘moderately high’ rates. Perhaps the borderline is at around a rate of 4% price inflation.
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instrument is a structural overcapacity. That is, overcapacity beyond the trans-
itional overcapacity.When the price-leader (n+1) has a structural overcapacity,
it is in the position to immediately respond to contesters (such competitors
know that a, further, price decrease by the price-leader will immediately take
away a large part of their market share). Because the price-leader must have
a structural overcapacity, it will keep on having this overcapacity when in the
course of time it moves down the stratification (its top position having been
taken over by a new price-leader). Therefore, once an inflationary constella-
tion is vested, all plants will tend to operate at a structural overcapacity. (See
Figure 4.8.)41
3 Stratified overcapacity competition via ‘transitional extra
overcapacity’ beyond ‘structural overcapacity’
With competition, enterprises will try to eliminate competitors, or at least to
make them fall behind. In a constellation of structural-overcapacity competi-
tion, the initiator of competitive action tends to combine:
• production at structural overcapacity (like all the competitors – see heading
2 above);
• a technical advance (such that it might effectively reduce the price in case a
contestation of its price-leadership wouldmake price reduction necessary –
see heading 2 above);
• the creation of transitory extra overcapacity, such that it might take over the
market share of competitors down the stratification (this extra overcapacity
is equal to the potential production of the plant that was added, net of its
structural overcapacity); after the bottom plant(s) is (are) scrapped, all of
the extra overcapacity disappears. (See Figure 4.9, which is further expan-
ded on below.)
It so acts as price-leader – a function that might rotate between enterprises –
setting the price at a level that maximises its profits. Given the technical
advance and the structural overcapacity of the price-leader, the other enter-
prises will tend to resign to the price-leadership.
With generalised price inflation ‘m’ (interpreted as the price or price index
of NDP) changes roughly in the same direction and the same pace as the prices
of means of production. As indicated above, to keep the presentation trans-
parent and concise, I present the case of marginal inflation, that is, constant
41 Depending on the particular sector and its technique of production, the size of a plant
may be somewhat flexible. In that case plants down the stratification, which speculate
that there will be no longer price competition, might downsize their plant. This does not
apply to the upper plants.
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prices and a constant ‘unit monetary value of labour’ (m). (This is empir-
ically relevant – see Explication 4§12-b.) Thus the price-leader sets a price
equal to that of the previous period. I denote the initiator/price-leader and its
plant added to the stratification by (n+1). We may assume that the expected
effect of this investment, especially on its integral profit and rate of integ-
ral profit (ω), has been taken into account prior to the investment in the top
plant.
As a result of the transitory extra capacity (n+1), and given the demand for
this sector’s output, the revenues for all plants in the previous stratification
initially decrease (devalorisation), tantamount to this overcapacity. (See Fig-
ure 4.9.) As a result the plants (1…h) at the bottom of the stratification produce
at marginal or zero profit, and will be scrapped.42 The result is that the extra
capacity (not the structural overcapacity) is undone.
The total result (that is, pending the exposition of Chapter 5) is that for the
remaining plants of the previous stratification (1+h … n), the conditions are
similar to that of the previous production period. This includes equal (rates of)
integral profit. In comparison with the constellation of price competition this
is due to the inflationary ‘socialisation of private losses’ (4§11). Note that from
the perspective of enterprises, the structural overcapacity is in fact a ‘desired
overcapacity’ (a term that will frequently be used in Chapter 5).
I end this section with two remarks. First, as with the deflationary constella-
tion, the pace of technical change is important. Speeded up technical change
and investment in newplantsmaymean insufficient amortisation of the plants
at the bottom of the stratification, whereby for these the accumulation of cap-
ital is in some degree annihilated (with effect on the environment, including
the climate and natural resources – cf. 4§12-a). Independently of these effects
on the bottom of the stratification, the question as to whether there is also a
macroeconomic annihilation of capital accumulated depends on the combin-
ation of the speed of technical change and the inflationary ‘derived revaluation
of capital’ referred to in 4§11.
Secondly, as with the deflationary constellation, the general employment
effect of the inflationary constellation depends on: the scale of n+1, in compar-
ison with the scales of the scrapped plants h; together with the capital-labour
ratios (K/L) of n+1 in comparison with h. (Chapter 5 presents the macroeco-
nomic effect.)
42 I neglect that, for strategic reasons, these bottomplantsmight be kept going for some time,
producing at prime costs. In that case the end result would be reached in a subsequent
production period.
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figure 4.8 Stratification of plants with structural overcapacity
* Analogous to Figure 4.5 (deflationary price competition), though now with structural over-
capacity
4§12-a Amplification. Continuous overcapacity and ‘efficiency’
The term ‘efficiency’ is never a neutral one, and should always be specified as
to the efficiency criterion. From the point of view of the climate, environment
and natural resources, continuous overcapacity is not efficient. From the point
of view of the generation of surplus-value for and the accumulation of capital
of enterprises, it is efficient.
4§12-b Amplification. Merely transitory versus transitory-cum-structural
overcapacity: the degree of inflation and the measurement of
overcapacity
The measurement of overcapacity in a sector is not an easy matter, as such
measurement is dependent on questionnaires among enterprises that for
market-strategic reasonsmay not be keen to disclose the relevant information.
Recall that the main section made a distinction between transitional ‘simple
overcapacity’ and ‘structural overcapacity’. It was indicated that the former
tends to be unstable in the case of marginal or low rates of price inflation,
and that it tends to be more stable at higher rates of inflation. This means
that we can expect structural overcapacity to occur at especially ‘low’ rates of
price inflation (perhaps a range of rates from 0 to 4%?) and a merely trans-
itional overcapacity at higher rates (below called the upper range). In the latter
case, enterprises might not mention this, even if they are upfront in question-
naires.
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figure 4.9 Stratification with structural overcapacity: marginal inflation
Δm= 0
* Analogous to Figure 4.5 (deflationary price competition), though now with structural over-
capacity.
⁑ Disappears after scrapping of bottom plants.
† The equality applies to the analytical case of a constant price; in fact we havemi (t+1) ≥ mi (t).
‡ This full row indicates the main difference between the inflationary and the deflationary
constellation (cf. Figure 4.5 for the latter).
The point about the upper range is that within it there could be recurrently
some degree of price competition within some sectors (contesting the price-
leadership) without falling into generalised deflation. Should it tend to more
structured price wars, then the price-leader will build up structural overcapa-
city (like in the lower inflation range).
4§12-c Addendum. Kalecki and kaleckians on overcapacity
Kalecki suggested that there is on average a structural overcapacity: ‘Even on
the average the degree of utilization [of equipment] throughout the business
cycle will be substantially below themaximum reached during the boom’ (1971
[19431], p. 137, see also his 2003 [1954], pp. 129–31). Ever since, there has been a
controversy about this matter among heterodox economists. (See Lavoie 2014,
ch. 6, who provides a thorough review of this controversy.) Its context ismainly
the business cycle, and in this context that is an important matter (see also
Chapter 5).
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However, the current 4D3 does not (directly) intervene in that debate. My
concern has been to understand the constellation of inflationary competition.
It is rather in that context that structural overcapacity seems plausible, espe-
cially at marginal or moderate rates of price inflation.
Division 4. The tendency to cartel formation
This division presents a third, and particular, mode of manifestation of the
enterprises’ market interaction. Please refer to the outline of Scheme 4.1 about
the systematic of the current chapter.Theprevious twodivisions presented two
alternative (andperhaps alternate) general constellations of competition.Divi-
sions 4 and 5 present two particular modes of manifestation that coexist with
each of the earlier general modes of manifestation (those of Divisions 2 and 3).
Within each of these modes of manifestation, enterprises seek – in some way
and to some degree – to overcome the rivalry associated with the competitive
constellations. For Divisions 4 and 5 in particular, the reader is reminded once
again that the state, and regulation by the state, has not yet entered into the
exposition.
4§13 The tendency to cartel formation: stagnant innovation
Cartel formation may contingently occur in various circumstances. I emphas-
ise that in this section I restrict myself to its impetus as related to the stratified
structure of production and to innovation.
1 Range of the stratification of production
The frequency of the innovation in a sector of production (be it process or
product innovation) determines the ‘range’ of the stratification – the range
being the difference in the value-productivity of labour between the top and
the bottom of the stratification (that is, the number of layers; several enter-
prises/plants may operate at the same layer – see Figure 4.10). In sectors where
innovation is stagnant, the range of the stratification narrows down. This
implies that it will bemore difficult, and in the end impossible, for the top plant
to induce the scrapping of bottom plants.
2 Stagnant innovation and the tendency to cartel formation
The more or the longer innovation slackens, the more time the bottom and
medium plants will have to more or less copy the technique or the product of
the top plant. Competition then approaches stagnant competition (somewhat
similar to neoclassical static competition). Stagnant innovation and stagnant
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competition clear the ground for cartel formation.43 The object of a cartel is
most often the fixing of prices.44
3 Cartel types as related to the number of enterprises
In stagnant sectors cartels, as based on firm agreements between enterprises,
tend to be restricted to such sectors with a moderate number of enterprises
supplying the commodity at hand. The reason is that agreements are difficult
to maintain when a large number of enterprises operates in a sector.45
When the number of enterprises in a stagnant sector is relatively abundant,
cartels tend to be implicit ones, taking the form of a tacit price-leadership.
Although cartels maintain profits higher than in the absence of the cartel,
‘too’ high profits might evoke entry into the sector. However, entry into a tech-
nically stagnant sector is hardly attractive for entrants.
4§13-a Explication. The range and density of the stratification of
production
It has been implicit so far that a stratification of production is not only char-
acterised by some range (the number of layers), but also some density (the
number of plants at the same level) – see Figure 4.10. However, plant addition
to the top of the stratification (n+1) tends to be accomplished by a single innov-
ator. Later on other enterprisesmaymove to the top bymore or less copying the
technique of the innovator.
43 As indicated, this division is restricted to cartel formation related to the stratified struc-
ture of production and to innovation. Cartels also have advantages to enterprises with
dynamic innovation.
44 ‘The most common practices employed by cartels in maintaining and enforcing their
industry’s monopoly position include the fixing of prices, the allocation of sales quotas
or exclusive sales territories and productive activities among members, the guarantee of
minimum profit to each member, and agreements on the conditions of sale, rebates, dis-
counts, and terms.’ (Editors Encyclopaedia Brtittanica, ‘Cartels’.) https://www.britannica
.com/topic/cartel – accessed 17 September 2016.
45 See also Ivaldi, Jullien, Rey, Seabright and Tirole (2003, p. 32) and Europe Economics
(2001). The latter research institute mentions few firms, stable market conditions, and
‘mature market with low innovation and low uncertainty’ as conditions for collusion
(p. 120; cf. pp. 27, 71–2 and 79).
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figure 4.10 Stratification of production: range and
density at each point in time
n1 n2 … nj … nm
n-11 n-12 … n-1j … n-1m
: : : :
i1 i2 … ij … im range
: : : :
21 22 … 2j … 2m
11 12 … 1j … 1m
density
4§13-b Amplification. Agreements regarding tenders and market sharing
Independently of the make-up of the stratification of production, there is also
a tendency to collaboration in case of recurrent tenders for big projects (ran-
ging from construction to ICT). In this case the enterprises provide each other
with information about their offer (all but onemake a fake offer), so as to reach
market sharing. This market sharing is generally more likely when a market is
oligopolistic.
4§13-c Addendum. Adam Smith on cartel formation: conspiracy
The phenomenon of cartels of enterprise is as old as the early emergence of
capitalism. In 1776, Adam Smith wrote: ‘People of the same trade seldommeet
together, even formerriment and diversion, but the conversation ends in a con-
spiracy against the public, or in some contrivance to raise prices’ (Book I, Ch. 10,
section 82).46
Division 5. The tendency to oligopolisation andmonopolisation
This division presents a fourth, and particular, mode of manifestation of the
enterprises’ market interaction. Like Division 4 it is particular in that it coex-
46 He continues: ‘It is impossible indeed to prevent such meetings, by any law which either
could be executed, or would be consistent with liberty and justice. But though the law
cannot hinder people of the same trade from sometimes assembling together, it ought to
do nothing to facilitate such assemblies; much less to render them necessary’ (cf. Book I,
Ch. 8, sections 12–13 on ‘combinations’ not to raise wages).
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ists with either a deflationary or an inflationary constellation. Although this is
a brief division (one section), the content is far-reaching in its effects. The tend-
ency outlined in this division is presented purely from the perspective of the
capitalist economy. (See Chapter 9 about the involvement of the state.)
4§14 The tendency to centralisation of capital
1 Centralisation of capital
The particular market interaction is a mere instrument for the profit-making
of enterprises (4§5). This equally applies to the two competition extinguishing
forms of market interaction, one of which is the merging of fellow enterprises
within a sector, that is, the vesting of some degree of centralisation of capital.
The other is the take-over form of centralisation. The ultimate form of cent-
ralisation of capital is that of vesting oligopolies and next a monopoly in a
market.47
2 Oligopolistic sectors: capital-labour ratio and scale
Although mergers and take-overs are a general phenomenon, there is a tend-
ency to centralisation of capital particularly in sectors with, first, a relatively
high capital-labour ratio (K/L), and secondly, when extra surplus-value can be
gained from a large scale (K).48 This applies to a large variety of sectors, ran-
ging fromtheproductionof energy, agricultural seeds,meansof transport (cars,
trains, aeroplanes), industrial intermediates (steel, aluminium),means of com-
munication, pharmaceuticals, to banking and insurance. The larger the scale
grows, themore the entrance to the sector is precluded (and if there is entrance,
this tends to be from the part of conglomerating oligopolies).49
3 Stratification of oligopolistic sectors
As with the general constellations of competition (4D2 and 4D3), one enter-
prise tends to act as price-leader (tacit or agreed). In this case, however, the
effective range of the stratification tends to be such that each oligopolistic
enterprise operates at all levels of the stratification, which, in comparison with
(full) competitive sectors, may be a relatively small ranged one. To the extent
47 Moreprecisely, this is the penultimate formof centralisation of capital. Theultimate shape
of centralisation is the centralisation of all capital in one inter-sector monopoly.
48 This is a particular case of increasing returns to scale.
49 For example, an oligopolistic pharmaceutical enterprise may, by way of a merging con-
glomeration, enter the oligopolistic agricultural seeds sector (the case of Bayer initiated
in 2016).
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that oligopolistic enterprises have an about even production andmarket power
(spread over their plants), they tend to evade price competition and to restrict
to capacity competition.50
4 Monopolisation
To the extent that, within an oligopolistic sector, a further centralisation via
mergers or take-overs creates a new unevenness in power within that sector,
this may temporarily reinforce the rivalry for the vesting of a price-leadership
and next reinforce mergers of competing oligopolies. In this way the central-
isation of capital tends to develop into a self-reinforcing process: centralising
actions within a sector tend to evoke centralising actions by other enterprises
so as to counteract the shift in the balance of power.When the result of such a
series of mergers is a duopoly with uneven production andmarket power, then
their merging into a monopoly tends to be the final outcome.51
5 Profit criterion
From the perspective of the enterprise, the ‘centralisation of capital’, and hence
the limitation or exclusion of competition, is in line with the (from their per-
spective) ‘rational’ optimal profit-seeking. All along the criterion for these (and
other) enterprises is the rate of integral profit (1§13). The form of oligopoly and
monopoly seems frightening for many. However, more threatening to the cap-
italist system is that it openly puts the ‘why’ of the criterion on the agenda.
6 Counteraction of the tendency to average inter-sector equalisation of
profit rates
For all these constellations it holds that – as long as sectors of production are
unevenly populated by oligopolies (andmonopolies) – the joint market power
within a sector results in prices above competitive prices (4D2, 4D3), which
affects the costs for other sectors, and ultimately the prices of consumer goods.
This unevenness, togetherwith the entrance impediments referred to, counter-
acts the tendency to average inter-sector equalisation of rates of profit (4§2).
50 It is often argued that oligopolies ‘compete’ in terms of product differentiation. This argu-
ment is fine as far as it goes. Either such differentiation is negligible in terms of the oli-
gopolies constituting a market; or it is effective whence we in fact have a constellation of
monopolies in single markets. (Cf. 4§3-a on intra-market interaction and product differ-
entiation.)
51 Recall again that the state is still bracketed at this stage. To the extent that the state
prevents monopolisation, a powerful oligopolistic enterprise may allow a weaker one to
continue operating.
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4§14-a Amplification. Centralisation of capital and the monetary value of
labour
Recall from 1§14 that the valorising exertion of labour is measured as value-
added: mLα, with the surplus-value being measured as mLα – wL. This applies
both macro- and microeconomically.
To the extent that centralisation of capital is technique related – that is,
alongwith relatively high capital to labour ratios (K/L) and large scale (K) – the
productive power of labour (Lα) increases concomitantly. However, when on
top of the technique related centralisation, centralised enterprises (oligopolies
or monopolies) also gain extra profits from market power, these profits do not
stem from labours’ productive power (Lα), but rather from the unit monetary
value of labour (m).52 Empirically the two (Lα and m) are not distinguishable
(we can measure just value-added, mLα, and regarding surplus-value the lat-
terminuswages).More precisely, they are directly indistinguishable. Indirectly,
the two can be distinguished via average inter-sector equalisation of rates of
integral profit. That is, when in a sector the average rate of integral profit is
structurally above the total economy’s rate of integral profit, we can infer that
this stems from between-sectors differing market power positions as reflected
in a between-sectors diverging unit monetary value of labour (m).
That we can measure this only indirectly is a shortcoming, even if similar
ones also apply to many accepted theories in the social and natural sciences.
A similar indirect measurement relates to cartels (4§13). However, without
additional information about the structure of sectors, this would mean that
cartel formation and centralisation power are difficult to separate.
Summary and conclusions
Rather than presenting conditions of existence of the earlier exposition
(Chapters 1–3), this chapter has set out the concretemanifestationof the earlier
exposition in the market interaction between enterprises.
Division 1 set out how the interaction of enterprises gives rise to the inter-
market tendency to equalisation of average inter-market rates of integral profit,
and the intra-market tendency to uniform prices (4§2–4§3). The articulation
of these tendencies implies that the rate of integral profit of any one enter-
prise comes to depend on its production. To the extent that the structure of
52 I stick to the term ‘unit monetary value of labour’ because without labour’s production,
there would be no production at all (1§14) and hence also no gains frommarket power.
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production is dynamic, asmeasured by the degree of technical change or other
innovation, enterprises in amarket – particularly their plants – tend to be strat-
ified as to the production power of labour and concomitant rates of integral
profit (4§4).
On the basis of this framework of the stratification of enterprises, Divisions
2–5 presented four main forms of the market interaction between enterprises.
Division 2 set out, what was called, ‘deflationary price competition’. Depend-
ing on the degree of process and product innovation, price competition tends
to result in a combined accumulation and devaluation of capital (4§6–4§7).
Generalised price competition gives rise to deflationary generalised price
decrease. Price decreases then affect not only the sector at hand, but also the
input prices of other sectors and again their stratification, whence we have a
derived devaluation of capital (4§8). It was indicated how the combination of
generalised fast technical change (or a fast increasing technical change) and
generalised price deflation tends to generate stagnation. There are no economy-
inherent forces to get out of such stagnation (4§9).
Division 3 presented the alternative competitive constellation of ‘inflation-
ary structural overcapacity competition’. In terms of effects, the main distinc-
tion with the deflationary constellation is that it leaves undone not only price
decreases in the sector at hand, but also its multiplication throughout the eco-
nomy via input prices (i.e. the derived devaluation of capital). It was indicated
that within this constellation (pending the exposition of Chapter 5), enter-
prisesmay over timemaintain their integral rate of profit. However, depending
on the pace of technical change, this may go along with insufficient amortisa-
tion (hence a degree of annihilation of previously accumulated capital) for
enterprises successively operating at the bottom of the stratification – with
effect on the environment including natural resources (4§12).
It was also indicated in this division that the just mentioned maintenance
of the rate of integral profit is (in comparison with deflationary price com-
petition) the effect of ‘inflationary socialisation of losses’ due to the banks’
accommodation of inflation. The counterpart of the comparative profits deriv-
ing from it are in a loss of purchasing power for social actors with non-equity
financial assets (including ‘small savers’), for actors with fixed incomes or with
incomes that are (in part) adapted to inflationwith a time-lag, the latter includ-
ing workers who will have to re-bargain for the productivity compensation or
even for ameremaintenance of the purchasing power of the initial wage (4§11).
Divisions 4 and 5 presented two particular constellations that coexist with
each of the earlier general constellations. Within each of these constellations,
enterprises seek to, in some way and to some extent, overcome the rivalry that
is associated with the competitive constellations.
4. market interaction and stratified production 241
Whereas Divisions 2–3 presented the enterprises’ interaction in dynamic
sectors and their markets – that is, the sectors in which innovation is flourish-
ing – Division 4 turned to sectors and their markets that are stagnant in terms
of innovation. In such sectors, competition fades away and clears the ground
for cartel formation of enterprises.
Division 5 presented a final form of market interaction: the centralisation
of capital via mergers and take-overs giving rise to oligopolisation and mono-
polisation. Such centralisation is particularly prevalent in sectors producing
at relatively high capital-labour ratios together with a large scale of capital.
Centralising actions within a sector tend to evoke centralising actions by other
enterprises, whence centralisation is a self-reinforcing process. The final form
of centralisation is the vesting of a monopoly in a market. Centralisation (as
long as it is unevenly distributed over sectors) counteracts the tendency to
equalisation of inter-market rates of integral profit (4§2). The joint market
power within a sector concomitant with this centralisation results in prices
above competitive prices (4D2, 4D3), which affects the costs for other sectors,
and ultimately the prices of consumer goods.
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Introduction
This chapter reaches the most concrete level of the exposition of the capit-
alist economy in this book. Chapters 1–3 presented the necessary conditions
of existence of the capitalist economy – with the state yet being bracketed.
Chapter 4 presented the concretemanifestation of the earlier exposition in the
market interaction between enterprises as predicated on the stratified struc-
ture of production. Like that chapter the current one presents no conditions of
existence of the capitalist economy. Rather it presents the concrete manifesta-
tion of all of the previous exposition (Chapters 1–4) in the diachronic cyclical
movement of capital.
The alternation of economic expansion and contraction – commonly
referred to as ‘the business cycle’ – is an empirical phenomenon that main-
stream economists have sought to explain by an alternation of merely contin-
gent ‘exogenous shocks’. This chapter shows that the production and accumu-
lation of capital in the form of its cyclicalmovement derives from the capitalist
system’s immanent forces.
In brief it will be set out how cyclically recurrent barriers to a continuous
accumulation of capital develop in the second half of the economic upswing.
These are next violently resolved in the recession. Whereas system-immanent
forces engender the accumulation of capital, the same forces generate over-
accumulation of capital in the form of excessive overcapacity. This is a con-
stellation that cannot be simply corrected and that leads to reactions that are
perverse to the accumulation of capital. In presenting this constellation I build
on the financial determinants of accumulation (PVF and RPVF) and the mac-
roeconomic determinants of the realisation of surplus-value (including the
obstacle of savings). Their concretisation will be assembled by the stratified
structure of production, which is now lifted to a macroeconomic level. (Divi-
sion 2.)
The exposition in this chapter synthesises many of the threads of the earlier
exposition at this concrete level. However, as economic reality is inevitable
always actual in some phase of this movement (one phase of the business
cycle), its exposition is also a concrete synthesis of the earlier exposition.
In preparation for the main exposition in this chapter, Division 1 presents
a number of concretising concepts. The cyclical movement of capital itself is
presented in Division 2 (see Scheme 5.1).
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scheme 5.1 The cyclical over-accumulation and destruction of capital
(outline Chapter 5)
Legend
.ɱę. concretising mode of existence
.Ṃ. concrete manifestation
Division 1. The internal profit of enterprises: surplus-value net of its
distribution to external financiers
Preparatory concretising concepts for 5D2
This division is a conceptually preparatory one for the outline of the cyclical
movement of capital in Division 2. The investment of enterprises will be seen
to be a main determinant of the cyclical movement of capital (Division 2).
Onemain factor that determines investment decisions is the ‘internal profit’ of
enterprises – that is, the surplus-value after a share of it has been distributed to
external financiers. The current division expands on this internal profit in the
perspective of the earlier exposition – especially that of finance. Along with it
(and building on 3D5) this division expands on the determinants of macroeco-
nomic expenditure that result in the internal profit of enterprises.
This division starts by considering the rateof profit (5§1),moving to themass
of profit in the later sections.
Unless otherwise indicated, all equations in this division refer to the period
(t).
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5§1 The rate of integral profit and the rate of internal profit
This section presents the interconnection between the finance of production
enterprises (Chapter 3) and their rate of profit. This is relevant for the enter-
prises’ investment decisions as presented in 5§5.
1 The rate of integral profit (the rate of surplus-value on capital)
The production of capital being predicated on the monetary-value dimension
and the commodification of labour-capacity (1D2 and 1D3), 1§13–1§14 presen-







Much of its dynamic determinants were concretised in 2D2 and its synthesis
in 2§6 (see also Figure 2.5). Prior to the exposition of money expansion (2D4)
and of the finance of enterprises (Chapter 3), the latter determinants were only
implicit in the rate of integral profit on capital (ω). This rate indeed applies to
the totality: it is independent of how production capital is financed and inde-
pendent of what part of surplus-value accrues to financiers including banks
(Chapter 3).
2 The rate of internal profit of production enterprises
I now make explicit this earlier concretisation (Chapters 2–3) regarding the
profit rate that will be called the ‘rate of internal profit’ of enterprises, which
is their profit rate after the distribution of surplus-value to external financi-
ers (banks, bondholders and holders of other loans). External finance and the
calculation of profit over the internal (own) capital of enterprises affects the
numerator and the denominator of (1.6).
• Let the share of ‘external’ finance (banks plus other financiers) in capital be
ε (epsilon). Hence the internal finance capital is (1- ε)K.
• Let i be the average rate of interest (the weighted average of the rates paid
to banks and to other external financiers). Then the interest paid by pro-
duction enterprises is iεK. This is the part of surplus-value that production
enterprises share with external financiers.
Thus we have for the ‘internal profit’, R (first introduced in 3§1; cf. Figure 3.2b):
R = Π – iεK (5.1)
That is, surplus-value minus its share distributed to external financiers.1
The rate of internal profit on the internal capital is called ρ (rho):
1 Recall that ‘banking entities’ generate surplus-value for their service of bookkeeping, and
that these, for their part, are considered as production enterprises. However, their branch
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ρ =
R
K – εK =
mLα – wL – iεK
K – εK (5.2; cf. 1.6)
Dividing (5.2) by K we have:
ρ =
[mLα – wL]/K – [iε]
1 – ε =
ω – iε
1 – ε [implication] (5.3)
• As long as i < ρ (or iε < ω), external finance acts as an amplifier on ρ. Con-
versely i > ρ pulls down ρ.
Thus ε is a finance factor and ρ takes account of this finance.2
We can interpret each of the equations presented above both microeco-
nomically (then the subscript ‘i’ is used) and macroeconomically (properly: a
semi-macroeconomic two sector account – one sector for production enter-
prises and the other for external financiers as including banks).
A corollary of this subsection is that ‘the tendency to equalisation of aver-
age inter-sector rates of integral profit’ (4§2) takes the form of ‘the tendency to
equalisation of average inter-sector rates of internal profit’.
In sum, the internal capital measure ρ is the ‘concentration’ of the determ-
inants that were developed so far. Nevertheless, the rate of integral profit ω
remains relevant for the total economy’s production capital, and for the pro-
duction capital of any one enterprise. The share of iεK is ‘merely’ an important
distributional component.
5§2 The realisation of surplus-value (Π), and the internal profit (R) as a
distributional result
1 Validation of surplus-value produced
3D5 (3§10) presented the macroeconomic validation (realisation) of surplus-
value.
Πt 🢔 = [I + Ck + (Cw–W)]t (3.10)
and
Πt 🢔 = [I + Ck – Sw]t (3.12)
of ‘banks’ regards purely their finance, for which these share in surplus-value (their part of
iεK) – 3§1.
2 Mainstream business accounting uses the term ‘net profit after taxes’. Let us call this Rat (‘at’
for after taxes). Then it has for what is called the ‘return on equity’ (ROE): ROE = Rat / (K–εK).
This is a consistent measure (ρat). It also adopts what is called the ‘return on assets’ (ROA):
ROA = Rat / K. This of course measures what it does. Note though that the numerator (Rat) is
dependent on how the enterprise is financed, whereas the denominator (K) is independent
of the way of finance. Our ω =Π/K has each of the numerator and denominator independent
of the finance. More significant is that in the conventional measures it is rather implicit that
each of the internal profit (R) and interest (εK) descend from surplus-value.
(See http://thismatter.com/money/stocks/valuation/profitability‑ratios.htm for a brief
outline of the ROE and ROA definitions.)
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(Ck denotes the consumption expenditure by capital owners, both the exter-
nal and the internal financiers – the latter being the (quasi) shareholders. Sw
denotes the saving out of wages.)3 Recall the essential sequence of ‘produc-
tion of surplus-value’ as predicated on the pre-validating finance by banks, of
‘validation of surplus-value produced’ and of the ‘distribution of surplus-value’
(3§10).
2 The internal profit as a result of production, validation and
distribution
Substituting (3.10) in (5.1) we have, ex post, that is, after the distribution of iεK,
the result of the internal profit:
Rt = [I + Ck – Sw]t – iεKt [validation–distribution mix] (5.4)
Hence, in contradistinction to (3.10) and (3.12), (5.4) is not a pure validation
equation. Substituting (5.4) into (5.2) we have, after the validation of surplus-
value, for the rate of internal profit:
ρ =
R
K – εK =
I + Ck – Sw – iεK
K – εK [validation–distribution mix] (5.5)
The following sections of the current division expand on the determination of
equation (5.4): consumption and saving (5§3), external finance and the rate of
interest (5§4) and investment (5§5).
5§3 Determinants of saving by labour and consumption by capital
owners
This section briefly expands on the determination of Ck and Sw in equation
(5.4). (The same applies for equation 3.12). Consumption and saving by labour
and capital owners were introduced in 3§10. Here I briefly expand on these in
connection with the phases of the business cycle broadly considered (the par-
ticularities of these phases are presented in 5D2).
1 Saving by labour
Wehave by definition that Sw ≡ sw(wL). However, the savings ratio sw out of the
wages income wL is not constant. When wages rise, the savings ratio tends to
increase (and vice versa). The unemployedwill dis-save as long as they can, and
further survive on the savings of relatives and friends or perhaps saved funds of
labour unions. Thus in all these cases the (cyclical) variation of unemployment
tends to go along with a variation in savings.
3 In 3§2 it was indicated that the term ‘dividends’ is considered to include the ‘quasi dividends’
that flow from non-incorporated enterprises to their owners.
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2 Consumption and saving by capital owners
The income of capital owners varies over the phases of the business cycle.
Regarding (quasi) shareholders: when profits (R) rise, more dividends tend to
be distributed (and vice versa). Regarding external financiers: when banks and
other financiers perceive an increase in risk anduncertainty, the rate of interest
tends to increase (and vice versa). Therefore the income of capital owners var-
ies over the business cycle. Nevertheless they tend to hold on to an autonom-
ous constant standard of living and so expenditure (Ck). When their income
exceeds their expenditure, they save, and when it falls short, they dis-save.4
Therefore their expenditure functions as an automatic stabiliser.
Thus, generally, in a recession the savings ratios tend to decline and in an
upturn they tend to rise. (In 5D2 this is set out more specifically for the various
phases of the cycle.)
5§4 External finance: the PVF, the RPVF and the rate of interest
This section amplifies on the determination of iεK in equation (5.4).
1 Variations of the PVF and RPVF
Recall from Chapter 3 the concept of the ‘pre-validating finance’ by banks
(PVF). An increase in economic growth requires an increasing PVF (and vice
versa). To the extent that there are savings by labour and by capital owners, and
a fortiori when these increase, production enterprises are unable to redeem the
PVF whence we have a ‘remaining PVF’, abbreviated as RPVF (see the summary
in Figure 3.14 of 3§6-c). The ΔRPVF varies with the PVF alongside the savings
that are themselves dependent on the phase of the business cycle (5§3 and
amplified in 5D2).
2 The RPVF and the rate of interest
This subsection introduces some simplifications that serve to reduce the com-
plication of the exposition of the business cycle in the next division.
Figure 3.14 also summarises the point that non-bank financiers may ex post
substitute for the RPVF. In 5D2 I will hardly emphasise this, and merely take
4 Behind this is in fact a Kalecki consumption function (Kalecki 1971 [1933], p. 1), which is sim-
ilar to a Keynes one applied to capital owners separately. Kalecki has: Ck=B0+λP (where B0 is
an autonomous component and P stands for profits). He remarks ‘where λ is a small constant’.
In what follows I neglect this ‘small’ profit-dependent component. Thus, as already indicated
in 3§10, even if the capital owners’ level of consumption is autonomous, some ex post level of
savings (Sk) from the dividends and interest distributed (PD) results: PD ≡ Ck + Sk.
In case capital owners borrow from banks, this is (macroeconomically) not for consump-
tion, but rather for their primary or secondary finance activities (Appendix 3A, §3A-2).
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changes in the RPVF as an approximation for the external finance cost of enter-
prises (analogous to a change in iεK – 5§1). Hence in 5D2 the issuance of new
shares is neglected (thismeans in effect that this issuance is taken as constant).
Thenwe have as an approximation: ΔRPVF ≈ ΔεK. To the extent that an increase
in the external finance ratio ε implies a risk for external financiers, they will
require a risk premium on the rate of interest (and vice versa). Then a Δimoves
along with a ΔRPVF (hence we have for a ΔiεK, a quantity effect ΔεK combined
with a price effect Δi in the same direction).
5§5 Determinants of investment
This section outlines the determinants of investment (I), the remaining com-
ponent of profits equation (5.4).
1 Investment: preliminary conceptualisation
K being the total capital accumulated, investment is the addition to it:
ΔKt = It [neglecting devaluation by scrapping beyond obsolescence] (5.6)
ΔK*t = It – scrapt [including scrapping beyond obsolescence]5 (5.6a)
Relative to consumption the determinants of investment are rather complex,
and in outcome investment is far more volatile than consumption. Investment
is mainly determined by two factors (each of which being the concentration of
many determinants): the rate of internal profit (ρ) in the previous period; and
the rate of undesired overcapacity (ø) in the previous period.
It = f(ρt-1; øt-1)
[I being positively related with ρ and negatively with ø] (5.7)6
2 Investment and the rate of internal profit (ρ)
Next to the rate of integral profit (ω) the rate of internal profit (ρ) is the ‘con-
centration’ of the determinants that were developed so far in this book. This
concentration is also transmitted into the determination of investment. I espe-
cially refer to all the factors determining the process of production of capital
(1D5), including its management (2§2), and its conditions in the expansion of
labour capacity (2D3),money expansion (2D4), finance (3D2, 3D3), the produc-
tion validating macroeconomic expenditure (3D4), as well as the constellation
5 Equilibrium models do with (5.6). Equation (5.6a) makes explicit why accumulation of cap-
ital cannot be reduced to investment.
6 This equation deviates somewhat from equation (3.8) in 3§10. First, the PVF condition is now
implicit in ρ via iεK. Second, the factor of desired production (Xd) in (3.8) (posited prior to
the introduction of stratification in Ch. 4) is now specified via the overcapacity factor ø, as
amplified below.
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of the stratification of enterprises (4D1, 4D3). Thus the rate of internal profit is
the capitalist system’s key immanentmeasure for themovement of capital and
so investment.7
I reemphasise that in this book’s exposition – on this issue inspired by
Kalecki – profits do not determine investment in the sense of financing invest-
ment – contrary tomainstream economics – but that investment is, via the val-
idation of surplus-value produced (3§10), a main determinant of profit (‘main’,
that is, next to iεK). Nevertheless this profit as a result determines the rate of
profit (ρ) as a result, which as a success indicator co-determines the investment
in the next period. Thus the combination of equations 3.10 and 5.7, or 5.4 and
5.7 (including their time indices) is essential.
Note that, given the determination of ρ (equation 5.2), the finance of invest-
ment is taken account of via the rate of interest (i). The assertion behind it is that
enterprises can always get credit frombanks even if perhaps at a rate of interest
that they consider exorbitant, as a result of which they might decline.
3 Investment and the rate of undesired overcapacity (ø)
The rate of technical (over)capacity measures the current production in ref-
erence to the qua cost optimal production at the current capital assets (K).8 I
make a distinction between desired overcapacity (o) and undesired overcapa-
city (ø). Individual enterprises may want to hold on to some degree of overca-
pacity (o), first, because they expect an increase in effective demand in the near
future, and second, for market strategic reasons (regarding themarket share or
competitive price reactions).9 The rate of undesired overcapacity (ø)measures
the overcapacity beyond its desired rate.10 From now on ‘desired overcapacity’
7 The followingpoint isnot relevant for thebusiness cyclebut rather for the structuralmove-
ment of the capitalist system. Even if the rate of internal profit is a key determinant of
investment, ‘the’ rate of internal profit provides no absolute benchmark, as the appropri-
ateness of the going average or modal rate of internal profit is customary and related to
the broad stage of structural development. Relevant for the business cycle is the rate of
internal profit in the going epoch, which stretches over a multiple of cycles.
8 This (over)capacity applies for plant and equipment as well as for the part of the labour
capacity that cannot (or not easily) be varied. Any overproduction is considered to be a
temporary factor to which enterprises can adapt fairly quickly in most sectors.
9 We saw in 4D3 that enterprises may produce at overcapacity either of their own free will
for strategic reasons (theprice-leader), or because themarket circumstances enforce them
to do so (those that are enforced to comply with the price-leader).
10 Any overcapacity has a negative effect on the current rate of profit via,mainly, the denom-
inator K. For the desired overcapacity this negative effect is expected to be compensated
in the future.
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will be indicated as such. For brevity ‘overcapacity’ always stands for ‘undesired
overcapacity’ (ø).
We will see in 5D2 that this overcapacity (ø) is a crucial determinant for
the course of the cyclical movement of the production and accumulation of
capital. More precisely it bounds the investment as determined by the rate
of internal profit. Even if at some juncture enterprises would consider the
rate of internal profit (ρ) ‘high’ or high enough to undertake profitable addi-
tional investment, it makes no sense to further increase the capacity when
there is overcapacity, that is, beyond its desired rate. Note that the desired
overcapacity also indicates the degree of the enterprises’ ‘optimism’ about the
future.11
5§5-a Addendum: Steindl on investment
Capacity and undesired overcapacity as a determinant of investment can also
be found in Steindl (1976 [1952]). Steindl also has what he calls ‘a factor of
indebtedness’ as affecting profits (cf. equation 5.5 above, and my approxima-
tion of ΔRPVF ≈ ΔεK in 5§4). On Steindl see also Hein (2015), esp. sections 3–4,
and the references he provides.
5§6 A condensedmacroeconomic sequence
This section takes some of the previous threads together in terms of an utterly
condensed economic sequence. It is difficult to present a macro process
sequentially, because we in fact have microeconomic and macroeconomic cir-
cuits in which everything is a simultaneousmovement. Nevertheless (a change
in the level of) economic activity starts inevitably with production.
(0) A state of the economy results in a rate of internal profit (ρ) at some rate
of overcapacity (ø) – the latter might be zero. This result determines the next
state and the sequences thereof. (See Figure 5.2, column 1.)
(1) The result determines the intended level of the new production – mLα
being its core. The level of change is determined by PVF mediated investment
for which the realised ρ and ø are decisive. (Figure 5.2, column 2.)
(2a) Labour generates production (α) whereas its wages are output real-
ising (sales of producers of consumer goods). Investment is capacity generating
(production) aswell as output realising (sales of the producers of means of pro-
duction).
11 The distinction between the desired and the undesired overcapacity thus includes the
factor that Keynes (1936) called ‘animal spirits’ (instincts of the enterprises’ management
about the future).
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(2b) The expenditures by enterprises and capital owners (their investment
and consumption) minus the savings by labour realise profits (via the realisa-
tion of surplus-value). (Figure 5.2, column 3.)
(3) This results in a rate of internal profit (ρ) at some rate of overcapacity (ø),
which determines the next state and the sequences thereof (analogous to (0)
above). (Figure 5.2, column 4.)
figure 5.2 Condensed macroeconomic sequence of production and profit
determination
5§6-a Addendum: Theories of the business cycle
Until the 1960s the business cyclewas hardly theorised bymainstreamneoclas-
sical economists, presumably because itwashard to fitwithin their equilibrium
framework. By that time Friedman and his collaborators took up the matter,
followed by Lucas towards the end of the 1970s. Prior to it, business cycles had
been mainly studied and theorised by the non-mainstream heterodox strands
in economics/political economy, Marx being the first business cycle theorist
(see Appendix 5B). As indicated in the General Introduction, it is generally
beyond the scope of this book to review the literature (references are mainly
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restricted to tributes and acknowledgements). For a series of brief overviews
regarding strands of business cycle theories, I refer to articles in An Encyclope-
dia of Macroeconomics (editors Snowdon andVane 2002) and the literature dis-
cussed in those. Mainstream strands: Monetarist approach (Hammond 2002);
New Classical approach (Snowdon and Vane 2002b); Political Business Cycle
approach (Frey and Benz 2002); Real Business Cycle approach (Ryan 2002).
Heterodox strands: Austrian approach (Garrison 2002); Keynesian approach
(Trigg 2002); Marxian approach (Reuten 2002b).
5§6-b Amplification. Empirical business cycle indicator USA 1950–2015
As preliminary to the next division, Graph 5.3 shows the change of GDP and
the recession periods in the USA from the second half of the twentieth century
onwards.
graph 5.3 Change of GDP and recessions in the USA 1950–2015
Line: Real GDP, % change from preceding period, semi-annual, seasonally adjusted annual rate.
Vertical bars: NBER based recession indicators from the period following the peak through the
trough, semi-annual.
Data source: FRED economic data (Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis)12
12 https://fred.stlouisfed.org/. GDPupdated 21December 2017; NBER indexupdated 3 January
2018 (each accessed 11 January 2018).
256 part one – the capitalist economy
Division 2. The cyclical over-accumulation and destruction of
capital
Business cycles
With this division we reach the most concrete level of the exposition of the
capitalist economy in this book. Although the movement of capital is neces-
sarily cyclical in some way, this should be understood as a necessary up and
down movement, a movement of accelerating expansion and next a stagna-
tion and contraction. In that sense the cycles of movement are regular. This
regularity does not apply to the length of cycles (the time between the top of
one cycle and the top of the next) or the amplitude of cycles (the difference
between the accumulation level at the top of a cycle and its trough). In the last
sense this Division 2 definitely reaches contingency. In the first sense, however,
the cyclical movement of capital is a concrete synthesis of all the necessary
moments that were presented so far. The fact that the particular exposition in
this division will not explicitly touch on each one of the moments presented
in Chapters 1–4 is a matter of self-imposed restriction in terms of space (i.e.
text). Division 1 prepared the floor for the moments on which this synthesis
will explicitly touch.
Those readers who are accustomed to accounts of the business cycle just in
terms of models should be warned that the current division – as a ‘moment’ –
rather presents the framework for a model.
5§7 The phase-wise stratified cyclical movement of capital: preliminaries
The determinants of the capitalist economy that were presented so far seem
to sustain the continuous accumulation of capital via expanding production
(Chapters 1–4). In fact, as we will see in 5§8, these determinants sustain this
accumulation so much that they recurrently generate an over-accumulation
of capital that leads – for a considerable time at least – to apparently system
perverse dis-sustaining reactions. We will see that the ‘logic’ of accumulation
so turns in its opposite of destruction of capital along with the expulsion of
labour, that is, of the generator of surplus-value. The euphemism for it is eco-
nomic ‘contraction’. Then, for the reproduction of the capitalist system, there
should be system-immanent forces that lead from this contraction to renewed
expansion (presented in 5§9). Together these are called the cyclical movement
of capital.
Section 5§6 presented a condensed macroeconomic sequence of the pro-
duction, finance and accumulation of capital. In the following sections, the
cyclical movement of capital is presented as one where such sequences move
phase-wise in the same direction: expansionary or contracting. Figure 5.4 shows
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a stylised curvature of this cyclical movement, ordered in six phases that I will
clarify in the next two sections.
figure 5.4 Stylised shape of one business cycle (growth of
production in 6 phases)
Note: Although the duration of each phase has been put to unity, the duration of the phases var-
ies considerably in practice. Amplitudes (the value difference between trough and top) also vary
considerably between cycles.
One major systematising framework for the exposition of the cyclical move-
ment will be the stratification of capital (Chapter 4). On the one hand, the
stratification will now be considered in macroeconomic perspective. On the
other hand, it will be disentangled as the phase-wise form of the movement of
capital. In adopting this framework the focus is on the competitive dynamic
sectors of the economy within a constellation of marginal inflation (cf. 4D3).
However, because the current exposition integrates all stratifications into one
macroeconomic stratification, the stagnant sectors (cf. 4D4) are part of it.
Following on from Chapter 4, Figure 5.5 below could be interpreted as the
movement through time of one random microeconomic sector (with plant
addition at the top and scrapping at the bottom). However, in the remainder
of the current division it is interpreted as a macroeconomic constellation. In
what follows the regular scrapping (below the fat line at the bottom) will be
neglected.
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figure 5.5 Phase-wise macroeconomic stratification of
capital
5§8 Cyclical movement (1): from expansion to stagnation
(In reading the text below the reader may want to consult the summaries in
Figures 5.6 and 5.7 (on pp. 262–63). Expanding on the latter figure, all cyclical
phases are outlined in some more detail in Explication 5§9-b, to which the
readermay turn selectively as required.Note that especially Figure 5.7 is to serve
those readers that require an overview of the details.)
A The early and the steady expansion (phases 1 and 2)
In the first two phases of the expansion (the early upturn and the steady expan-
sion) we have a negligible overcapacity and along with it an internal profit rate
determined, increasing investment (5§5).13 The result is rising profits (R) and
a rise in the rate of internal profit (ρ). After the hesitating early upturn phase
(phase 1), actors perceive the second phase as one of ‘back to normality’, which
generates a climate of optimism. Indeed, considering all thephases of the cycle,
this secondphaseof steady expansion is oneof modal (‘normal’) circumstances
(see the list in the second column of Figure 5.7).
13 In 5§9 we will see how the early expansion starts from an increased rate of profit as an
outcome of the recession (i.e. the previous phase).
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B Expansionary over-accumulation (phase 3)
The main conditions for the crisis and downturn are laid in the third phase of
the expansion. Actors generally perceive this phase as one of prosperity, which
regarding incomes and employment it indeed is. Recall from 5§2 that
ρ =
R
K – εK =
[I + Ck – Sw] – iεK
K – εK (5.5)
1. The rising profits (R) and profit rate (ρ) and the slim overcapacity in the pre-
vious phase engender a generalised euphoric investment. Enterprises are keen
not to miss the opportunities. Overall the sector stratifications get extended
boosts. By itself this generates another investment-determined boost in profits
(R). However, the (inherently uncoordinated) broad increase in investment –
and hence capital accumulated (K) – also generates vast overcapacity (ø). Tak-
ing these two issues in isolation, we have, regarding the rate of internal profit
(ρ), the profits increase effect from investment expenditure, dominating over
the capital increase effect, whence ρ increases.
2. However, the profits (R) are mitigated by increased savings (hence pres-
sure on effective demand). Because the expansion goes along with increased
employment as well as increased wages, the savings from the part of labour
rise (Sw – recall that this is mediated by an increasing savings ratio sw). Recall
that the consumption expenditure by capital owners is roughly constant (nev-
ertheless their savings, Sk, which increase due to an increased distribution of
profits, affect the RPVF – point 3 below).
3. The profits (R) are furthermitigated due to finance. Because of the expan-
sion, not only is the pre-validating finance by banks (PVF) boosted, but, more
important, the increased savings mean that a larger part of it cannot be
redeemed (ΔRPVF). Thus we have an increasing ΔRPVF ≈ ΔεK. Because of the
increasing risk, the rate of interest increases (i). This means (cf. 5§4) that the
leverage effect of external finance is pressed down (and perhaps already starts
becoming negative).
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The net effect (1–3) on profits and the rate of internal profit (ρ) is an empir-
ical matter. Say that, in comparison with the previous phase, ρ is roughly con-
stant. Perhaps it declines or increases. For the further course of the cyclical
movement this is not particular important, as we will see below.
Generally this third phase turns the steady accumulation of phase 2 into
over-accumulation of capital (nevertheless this fits the ‘logic’ of accumula-
tion – 2D1).14
C The top of expansion and turning point (phase 4)
Most important for the next phase – the top phase of the expansion – is
the overcapacity that has been built up.15 Given the determinants of invest-
ment (the rate of internal profit and undesired overcapacity) the enterprises
weigh these factors. Faced with undesired overcapacity they perceive that
extra investment makes no sense (5§5).16 Hence enterprises will generally cut
back on investment (some investment may still go on, first, because of invest-
ment plans in the pipeline, and second, because of a number of enterprises
remaining optimistic). This decrease in investment implies that the invest-
ment expenditure effect on profits now dominates negatively, whence the rate
of internal profit definitively declines, and sharply so. Note that whereas the
growth of the PVF and RPVF decline because of the declined investment, the
risk for banks is still increasing whence the interest rate further dampens the
profits (R).
Because the growth of production goes on (though at a slackened rate)
employment increases and hence there is a further upward pressure on the
wage rate, with the same effects as indicated above (B-2) for savings – now fur-
ther reinforced.
On the basis of the composition of forces it is not evident what action enter-
prises should take. For small and medium-sized enterprises there is no easy
way out. For large to very large enterprises, however, this tends to be differ-
14 The over-accumulation of capital is measured, ex post, by the rate of undesired overcapa-
city (ø); see further Explication 5§9-b.
15 Overcapacity is openly observable in cases such as real estate (‘for rent’). The previous
constructionof buildings boosted employment andprofits. Similar phenomenaoccur, less
openly observable, behind the gates of production enterprises – less openly, that is, until
plants are closed down.
16 This is so exceptwhen an individual enterprise couldmake a great innovative leap (4D3) –
great, that is, on topof the advances already implemented in thepreviousphaseonabroad
scale.
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ent.17 Their size and the fact that these are often composed of several plants
put them in a position to undertake a cost-cutting restructuring (reorganisa-
tion) of their enterprise. Along with it they will, selectively, slow-down their
replacement investment as well as their hiring of labour-capacity (hence for
those enterprises/plants we have a slow to negative rate of growth for each).
Although from their perspective this makes sense, the macroeconomic effect
of these actions takes off the remaining growth and puts an end to the general
expansion.
A note on the duration of phases
I end this section with a note on the calendar time of the various phases. The
duration of each of the phases is an empirical matter. The duration of a phase
might, for example, be half a year, but also three years or longer. Empirically
it appears that the length of a complete cycle takes between 6 and (rarely)
12 years. This matter is relevant for the characterisations of each phase (see
also Figure 5.7). For example, should the phase of over-accumulation (the
third phase) be an extended one with perhaps a gradually developing over-
accumulation and overcapacity, then the rate of profit (ρ) will tend to move
to declining during that phase, perhaps halfway or towards the end.
5§8-a Explication. Summary of the phases of the cyclical movement of
capital
Figure 5.6 outlines a simple summary of the phases of themovement of capital
(taking together the four expansion phases and the two contraction phases).
Figure 5.7 is a more detailed summary. At this point only the expansion is rel-
evant (the reader can turn to the contraction part after reading the next sec-
tion).
17 The relative importance of ‘large’ enterprises is contingent on a particular economy. Just
as an example, for theNetherlands in 2010 ‘large enterprises’ (above 100workers)made up
almost 1% of the total number of enterprises with just over 60% of the total employment.
(Amongst these the ‘very large enterprises’ (> 500 workers) made up 0.2% of the number
of enterprises with 44% of the total employment.) (Source: Netherlands Central Bureau
of Statistics, ‘Statline’, accessed 12 March 2012.)
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figure 5.6 Simple summary of the cyclical movement: expansion and contraction
expansion (ph. 1–4) contraction (ph. 5–6)
Production and Investment
Investment (ΔK) from ↑ via ↑↑ to ↓ ↓
Production and employment ↑ ↓
Wage rate ↑ ↓
Unemployment rate (u)* ↓ ↑
Finance
PVF from banks ↑ ↓
savings effect on RPVF Sw↑; Sk↑ (each increasingly) Sw↓; Sk↓
resulting RPVF and εK ↑ ↓
resulting iεK ↑ ↓
Expenditure
Expenditure (I + Ck – Sw) I↑; Ck const.; Sw↑ I↓; Ck const.; Sw↓
Total expenditure ↑ ↓
Capital and capacity
Overcapacity (ø) from negligible to ↑↑ capital destruction (to ø=0)
Capital (K) ↑ ↓
Results
Profit (R = [I + Ck – Sw] – iεK) ↑ (expenditure dominates)† ↓ (expenditure dominates)
rate of profit (ρ = R / K – εK) from ↑ to ↓ from ↓ to ↑ (K effects dominate)
* Ceteris paribus the labour population growth.
† Profit declines at top of expansion.
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figure 5.7 Stylised summary of the cyclical movement of capital: core mac-
roeconomic variables (amplified in 5§9-b)
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5§9 Cyclical movement (2): from stagnation to contraction and renewed
expansion
The interconnection of all the determinants of the capitalist systemmeans that
it can cope very well with economic growth – and hitherto most of the time
indeed generates growth. However, the system can hardly cope with declining
growth, and even less with shrinking activity (negative growth or decline). For
these cases the system-immanent reactions are rather perverse, over-reactive
and problem-aggravating.
A Economic crisis, or early recession (phase 5)
A-1 Spiralling down
We saw in 5§8 that at the top of the upturn, the reaction to a declining rate
of profit by, initially, large enterprises, is a restructuring and alongside this
a selective slowing down of investment increase and cuts in their hiring of
labour-capacity. This gives rise to a general, effective demand generated, neg-
ative spiral in employment, investment and profits. Once this negative spiral
is underway it is hard to stop. Once the economy moves into a (early) reces-
sion, lack of investment is not the sole problem; there is also a lack of effective
demand in general. Further, although the PVF declines, the required interest
on the RPVF built up earlier turns into a deleverage and so further squeezes
internal profits.
In this phase the large enterprises continue their restructuring course of
action from phase 4, and also close down plants. Small and medium-sized
enterprises that already operated at a loss go bankrupt. The others do their
utmost to cut on costs. Because of the physical destruction and/or devaluation
of capital along with it (K↓), the rate of profit may not further decline on top of
the earlier sharp downfall.
How long this phase lasts, and how deep it cuts, much depends on the
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suddenness and length of the preceding top of expansion phase. A brief and
sudden top phase tends to bring forth a steep crisis (or early recession).
A-2 Crisis and failure of banks
The early recession phasemay but need not be associatedwith a banking crisis,
including failure of banks. When accompanied by a banking crisis, then this
phase cuts deep and tends to be of extended duration. The term ‘crisis’ is most
appropriate for the combination of an ‘early recession’ and a banking crisis.18
We know from Chapters 2 and 3 that banks are essential to the capitalist sys-
tem. Therefore the term crisis for the combination is appropriate, as a banking
crisis is not only a crisis for banks, but indeed a crisis of the system.
B Recession (phase 6)
In the recession phase the spiralling down (A-1 above) goes on. At the same
time, however, this phase prepares the conditions for a new take-off. The
remainder of this sectionprimarily focuses on these conditions (B-1 to B-6) that
result, as we will see, in a restoration of the rate of profit (ρ).
B-1 Restructuring of capital: annihilation of capital accumulated
Themain characteristic of the recession is ‘restructuring of capital’ much rein-
forced from its moderate start in the previous phase. In brief this involves rein-
forced internal reorganisations, bankruptcies, take-overs andmergers – for the
latter twowe so have a cyclical centralisation of capital (in contradistinction to
a structural centralisation – 4D5). With it, and on top of the bankruptcies, the
least efficient plants are closed down. Together these undomost of the overca-
pacity built up in the expansion phase.19 In sum we so have a violent cyclical
destruction and so cyclical devaluation of capital. Hence part of the capital
produced and accumulated in the previous phases of the cycle is annihilated
(K′<0). Thus the apparently insurmountable problems that came to expres-
sion at the end of the expansion (5§8) are ‘resolved’ by in part annihilating the
expansion.
However, with it, the applied natural resources are destroyed – those that are
accounted for in the MVD as well as those that are not (1§14, heading 2). This so
affects the, at least eventual, system requirement for a symbiotic metabolism
of human beings with nature (1§9). More directly grinding, the destruction of
18 Before 1940, about one third of the cyclical tops ended with some form of banking crisis.
Themore scarce banking crises afterwards are related to state regulation (see Chapter 10).
19 ‘Most’ of the overcapacity is done away with. Large corporations with sufficient reserves
can often survive with overcapacity, perhaps assisted by banks.
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productive activity and productive capacity destroys employment of labour.
The resultant misery is concentrated in those expelled into unemployment.
Predominantly these, and their children, are sacrificed for the process of ‘cre-
ation and destruction’. (Even if along this Sisyphean process the average real
income per head may increase, the heads are not equal and especially the
unemployed are ‘hors catégorie’ in this respect.)
The following factors are the ‘by-products’ of this restructuring assisting a
new expansion.
B-2 Survival on savings and a declining RPVF
Due to the restructuring of capital, workers are laid off. Thus whereas many
enterprises and financiers lose part of their capital (even if the corporate form
of the enterprisemitigates risks – 2§12 and 3§5),manyworkers lose theirmeans
of subsistence. Oftenworkers can, for some time at least, survive by drawing on
previous savings (their own, that of relatives and friends, or of means collected
by labour unions, for example). These dis-savings press down the RPVF. This
also applies for capital owners who, with decreased or zero profits distributed,
maintain their standard of living from their previous savings. From the part of
the employedworkers, savings are further pressed down due towage decreases
that result from the generalised unemployment.
B-3 Losses of banks along with rebuilding the structure of finance capital
Due to restructuring of capital, and especially bankruptcies, banks too have to
take finance capital losses.20On the other hand, these also rebuild the structure
of their balance sheet as presumably dubious assets disappear from the assets
side.
Further, starting from the top of the upturn and continuing throughout the
recession, banks take a breath from a too spurious increase of the PVF, and
especially of the RPVF, in the phase of over-accumulation.21 This breath also
rebuilds the structure of their balance sheet.
20 Even if banks may have reserves from risk premiums built up in the expansion, this still
shortens their balance sheet.
21 Jakab and Kumhof observe that ‘especially during the boom periods of financial cycles
when all banks simultaneously decide to lend more, [this] is [the result of] their own
assessment of the implications of new lending for their profitability and solvency.’
However, ‘an individual bank that considers whether to deviate significantly from the
behaviour of its competitors’ is faced with the dilemma of ‘increased credit risk when
lending too fast to marginal borrowers’ and of a diminution of its clients when ‘too many
of them are lost to competitors’ (2015, p. 5).
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B-4 Compliance of labour: disciplining by the recession
Alongwith the restructuringof capital, the rate of internal profit for the remain-
ing enterprises is further pushed up because the unemployment affects the
compliance, and so the power of labour in production – that is, of those that
remain employed. Recall from 2D2 and 3D6 that the compliance of labour is
in fact a major open end (under-determined). The restructuring of capital is a
chief disciplining factor.
The result of the restructuring of capital (B-1 to B-4) is that the rate of
internal profit for the remaining enterprises increases. By itself this is no suffi-
cient impetus for extra investment, as long as there is no extra effective demand
forthcoming, or at least an expectation of it.
B-5 Cyclical ‘hoarding’ and implementation of techniques
Because, through the restructuring of capital, the least efficient plants are
scrapped, we have a reduction in the range of the stratification.22 With it, we
saw, the structural overcapacity that was built up during the expansion is cut
away.
Generally any successful newplant investment requires either extra demand
(which is not the case in the recession) or a degree of productivity difference
between the top and the bottom of the stratification. This difference should
be such that the general overcapacity that emerges through that investment
enforces the scrapping of plants down the stratification – so relieving the gen-
eral overcapacity. Conversely the general range reduction through the restruc-
turing has reduced this opportunity of productivity difference.
However, along the recession, when new plant investment does not come
forth, research and development goes on but new technology is not imple-
mented in new techniques.23We so have a ‘hoarding’ of new techniques.When
such a hoarding has been built up it pays at some point to invest in new tech-
niques, with the intention that bottom plants are scrapped (this is the inten-
tion; however, in case a generalised renewed investment generates sufficient
macroeconomic growth, this scrappingmight not be forthcoming – see phase 1,
and its fragility alluded to in 5§9-b). Hence, overall, we have a cyclical (de)con-
centration in the implementation of new technology.
22 See Figure 4.9 on the range of the stratification.
23 Even in severe recessions, enterprises tend to keep at least the core of their R&D workers
because the rebuilding of a R&D department takes enormous effort and time. (The main
text puts primary emphasis on process innovation; however, the same applies for product
innovation.)
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Note that, as for all of the above, this is amacroeconomic account. In a reces-
sion, some sectors may keep on investing even if at a lower scale, whence for
these the hoarding also is a mitigated one.
B-6 Renewed bank credit
Because of the factors B-1 to B-4, banks are inclined to accommodate the invest-
ment projects B-5.
C Early expansion (phase 1)
To the extent that the ‘dishoarding’ of techniques macroeconomically syn-
chronises (and alongwith the factors B-1 to B-4) there arises amoderate though
general boost of investment (without, initially at least, required scrapping).
This provides the take-off to a new expansion (the early upturn phase, as
presented in the previous section).24
5§9-a Addendum. Marx and Schumpeter on cyclical movement and
‘neue Kombinationen’
Marx presents his exposition of the cyclical movement of capital in Capital I,
Part Seven, and in Capital III, Part Three (Marx 1976 [1867], and 1981 [1894]).
Schumpeter credits him not only for being the first business cycle theoretician,
but also for detecting the phenomenon: ‘We find practically all the elements
that ever entered into any serious analysis of business cycles, and on the whole
very little error. Moreover, it must not be forgotten that the mere perception of
the existence of cyclicalmovementswas a great achievement at the time’ (2003
[1943], pp. 40–1).
Theexpositionof 5§9builds onMarx’smajor insight that in the recession the
rate of profit is restored via destruction and devaluation of capital. However,
Marx also posits that the competitive struggle in the recession impels the intro-
duction of new methods of production. He cast this in terms of his famous
phrase of ‘neueKombinationen’ (newcombinations) that inspired Schumpeter
(1934 [1911]).25 In Marx’s text it is not very clear as to whether these ‘neue
Kombinationen’ start being applied in the recession or (mainly) in the upturn.
Anyway, for Schumpeter this happens in the early upturn – to which I agree.
24 Compare Schumpeter who, in contradistinction to the current theory, provides no mech-
anism for the impetus to the upswing (see 5§9-a).
25 Marx 1972 [1894], p. 265: ‘… Anwendung neuer Maschinen, neuer verbesserter Arbeits-
methoden, neuer Kombinationen’. The English edition (Fernbach translation) uses the
phrase ‘new forms of combination’ (1981 [1894], p. 363).
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However, neither Marx nor Schumpeter offer any account of why inventions
are produced during the slump and implemented in the upturn. The argument
above about ‘hoarding’ and ‘dishoarding’ of techniques is that innovations are
produced all along, but that – on average – their implementation in the slump
would not pay because the restructuring and centralisation of capital produces
a decrease in the range of stratification, whence the dynamic competition
between enterprises remains only latent (hoarding of innovations) until suf-
ficient productivity difference between the (potential) top and the bottom of
the stratification has been built up.
5§9-b Explication: Phases of the business cycle – a macroeconomic
account
This explanation sets out the course of the business cycle in mainly macroe-
conomic terms. Figure 5.7 serves as a synopsis for it. Although this explication
adds details to the outline of the main sections 5§8 and 5§9, the purpose is
far from being exhaustive. It is meant to be in line with all of this book’s pur-
pose of setting out the main interconnections of the capitalist system. Now,
however (as was already the case in Chapter 4), contingency creeps in increas-
ingly.
I classified the cycle into six phases. This number is somewhat arbitrary
(other accounts may adopt more or fewer phases).
Below I adopt the term CG sector (the sum of the consumer goods produ-
cing industries) andMP sector (the sum of themeans of production producing
industries, including the intermediate production), first introduced in 3§2-a.26
Unless otherwise indicated the terms change/increase/decrease refer to com-
parison with the previous phase.
For all of the phases described below, it may be useful, as before, to keep in
mind the equations for internal profit and the rate of internal profit.
ρ =
R
K – εK =
I + Ck – Sw – iεK
K – εK (5.5)
26 The MP producing industries encompass far more than is measured by ‘investment’, as
these include all of the ‘intermediate’ production. Very roughly today the intermediate
production (of MP) is equivalent to the total of GDP, thus total gross production being
twice GDP. (This varies depending on the structure of an economy; the number can be
read off from the statistical input-output tables of a particular economy.)
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1 Early upturn (or recovery)
This first phase is inherently the most fragile one. (In so-called ‘double dips’,
the fragility of the early upturn is such that we have a fall back into recession.)
• In the early upturn we have a moderate: I↑ and L↑, and hence Y↑. The
lead for the increase in production is taken by the MP sector that initially
increases the production of replacement investment, which next has a mul-
tiplier effect in net investment. The investment, as well as the production for
it, embodies new techniques.
• The demand for additional replacement investment, and next the I, L and
Y increasing production of it, is triggered by a combination of three factors,
which is the result of the recession, whence their explanationmust be post-
poned (see phase 6 and 5§9). Here I just mention these: (a) a restoration
of the rate of profit due to a devaluating ‘restructuring’ of capital (through
which inefficient plants/enterprises have been scrapped or eliminated) and
through which the remaining plants can produce at near to full capacity;
(b) for survived enterprises a further restoration of the rate of profit due to
declined wages together with increased compliance; (c) ‘hoarding’ of tech-
niques (dishoarded in the current early upturn). All these factors result in a
rise in labour productivity.
• The restoration of the rate of profit provides confidence for banks to accom-
modate investment via additional PVF. The recession factors justmentioned
are (further) effectuated in the early upturn.We also have a rise in productiv-
ity for plants that ‘hoarded’ labour-capacity.27
27 ‘Labour hoarding’ (in fact labour-capacity hoarding) refers to the reluctance of enterprises
to lay off in the recession the specialist echelon of their workers that may be difficult to
replace by other workers in an expected upturn. Thus during the recession these are in
part idle at a perhaps full wage.
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• Although the PVF rises, the RPFV tends to be constant in comparison with
its strong decline in the previous phase: the slim savings by capital owners
(due to thin distribution of profits) and by the employed (due to decreased
wages) more or less outweigh the dissaving by, or for, the unemployed.
• The previous strong decline in RPVF, togetherwith the decreased risk in face
of the previous restructuring of capital, mean that the rate of interest is at a
low ebb, whence the RPVF leverage effect (for the existing iεK) is positive.
• The merely moderate increase in investment means that there is hardly any
overcapacity.
• In sum, profit (R) rises – mainly due to the investment effect – and its rate
of increase is larger than the rate of increase of capital accumulated (R′>K′)
whence the rate of internal profit (ρ) rises.
Early upturn









Sk and Sw ≈ const. ø ≈ const. R′>K′ R↑; ρ↑
hesitating
x′ = rate of growth of x
2 Steady expansion
Based on the increased rate of profit and the cuts of overcapacity we have
in this phase a steady growth of macroeconomic investment, employment
and income. Generally there is a restored confidence and optimism about the
future. For the management of enterprises, the previous crisis and recession
gradually moves to the back of their minds. On the other hand, much of labour
is still distressed with unemployment even if its rate decreases.
Through investment there is a net addition of plants along with a moderate
increase in capacity, which takes it near to the desired capacity. Whereas the
PVF increases along with the employment and investment, there is also amod-
est increase in the RPVF because of a gradual modest increase in savings on
the part of capital owners. The interest rate is still near to its low ebb, whence
the RPVF leverage effect is positive. The sum of profits (R) rises steadily due to
the investment effect. Its rate of increase is larger than the rate of increase of
capital accumulated (R′>K′) whence the rate of internal profit (ρ) rises.
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Steady expansion
















This is the phase of a generally violently increasing accumulation and growth.
Investment fiercely accelerates based on the previous phase’s increased rate of
profit and the narrow overcapacity. Enterprises hate to miss the opportunities.
The CG sector (consumer goods) swings and reinforces theMP sector’s growth.
Considering the investment effect on profits taken in isolation, the growth in
profits accelerates (R = I + Ck – Sw – iεK). Investment considered in isolation
would also positively affect the rate of internal profit (ρ), because the rate of
growth of investment (and hence profits) is larger than the rate of growth of
accumulation (I′> K′). However, each of these effects is mitigated by the sav-
ings effect by itself (Sw) via expenditure, and by saving effects (Sk and Sw) on
the RPVF and hence on iεK.
First, the acceleration in investment goes along with both an increase in
employment and an increase in the wage rate (together wL). The extra saving
from it (Sw) directlymitigates the profits (R). Second, the growth in both invest-
ment and wages is conditioned on an increasing PVF from banks. This will go
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alongwith adisproportionate rise in theRPVFbecauseof extra savingby capital
owners (Sk) from increased distributed profits, and because the extra savings
out of wages, as mentioned (Sw). This rise in RPVF affects the external finance
(iεK) in volume (εK) as well as in price (i) because of the extra risk premiums
required by banks and other financiers. The RPVF lever on the rate of profit
moves down, or is perhaps becoming negative (this depends on the concrete
situation and may be different for specific cycles).
As indicated in the main text, the net effect of these factors on the rate of
internal profit is an empirical matter. Decisive for the next phase is that the
(inherently uncoordinated) broad increase in investment also generates vast
overcapacity.
Expansionary over-accumulation













The macroeconomic rate of overcapacity (ø) is a measure for the macroe-
conomic over-accumulation. The current phase was characterised as ‘expan-
sionary over-accumulation’. In fact, actors (as well as the economist-spectator)
usually perceive the over-accumulation only towards the end of this phase or
perhaps halfway. However, even if enterprisesmight perhaps have some earlier
inkling that their investment could be excessive, they will most often be reluct-
ant to leave the floor to competitors. All the enterprises that withdraw miss
out against those that do not, especially if the latter are few. Cyclical over-
accumulation of capital is at the edge of being the necessary form of accumu-
lation. Grand cartels, sector monopolies forming inter-sector cartels or in the
end one grand monopoly might perhaps prevent it.
4 The top of expansion and turning point
Even if at the end of the previous phase the rate of internal profit would have
been increasing instead of damping or stagnant, investment falls back because
of overcapacity. Even at a comparatively high rate of profit, it makes no sense
to invest when this increases the overcapacity still further (5§5, heading 2).
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Macroeconomically there may still be a moderate investment because of run-
ning investment plans and investment orders, and also because some enter-
prises remainoptimistic about sales and the rate of profit. Given that individual
investments are most often complementary to others, once the plans are def-
inite and investment purchase orders have been placed, investments are rather
fixed for (t) and (t+1) or even longer.28
The fall back in investment is the decisive characteristic of this phase, and
the one that makes the business cycle turn downward. Because investment
expenditure decreases sharply, profits (R) go down sharply in comparison with
the previous phase. At the same time, because L keeps increasing (though
mitigated), wages keep increasing (non-mitigated). Hence saving out of wages
(Sw) increases,which also negatively affects the validation of surplus-value and
hence profit.
Whereas the PVF decreases in comparison with the previous phase (it
increases due to the increased wage sum, but decreases more due to the
decreased investment), the RPVF nevertheless increases modestly due to the
Sw increase, which is counteracted by a decrease of Sk because of a decrease
in profits distributed. This volume effect of external finance, along with the
increased risk of it, makes the interest rate rise so that the leverage effect of
external finance goes further down.
As a result, profits and the rate of internal profit decline sharply (cf. equation
5.5). Once the seriousness of the constellation is apprehended (perhaps in the
second half of this phase), it is not evident what actions the smaller echelons
of enterprises should take in reaction to this. Large to very large enterprises,
by contrast, are in a position to start undertaking cost-cutting reorganisations.
As indicated in 5§8 they will tend to, selectively, slow-down their replacement
investment as well as their hiring of labour-capacity (hence we have for those
enterprises/plants a slow to negative rate of growth for each). The macroeco-
nomic multiplier effect of these actions takes off the remaining growth and
puts an end to the general expansion.
28 In this context Kalecki (1971 [1933], pp. 2–4) distinguishes between ‘investment orders’,
‘production of investment goods’ and ‘deliveries of finished equipment’ (see also the dis-
cussion by López and Assous 2010, pp. 29–30).
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Top of expansion and turning point






I↓; K↑; L↑; Y↑
(slow-down of growth)
I′ < K′
Sk↓; Sw↑ ø↑ R′< K′ R↓; ρ↓
5 Crisis (early recession)
I will not repeat here the main outline of this phase, which was, for the cur-
rent purposes, sufficiently described in the main text of 5§9 (introduction and
under subsection A). Here I briefly expand on the spiralling down process of
this and the next phase, as well as on some details for the current phase regard-
ing the macroeconomic profit (R) and profit rate (ρ).
The downfall in investment of the previous phase first hits the sales of the
MP producing sector, and so the rise in unemployment starts here. The effect
is a decline in consumption, which affects the sales of the CG producing sector
whence it cuts back production, and lays off labour.This re-affects its own sales.
In response this sectorwill cut back on replacement investment, so re-affecting
themeans of production producing sector. And so forth. This is the spiral down
process that was alluded to in the introduction of 5§8, and the reason for the
statement that the capitalist system is not suited to cope with declining and
shrinking economic activity. (As indicated this applies for the crisis phase and
especially also for the recession discussed in the next subsection under phase
6.)
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In the current early recession we have the first bankruptcies of small enter-
prises. Next to it the reorganisations started by themiddle and large enterprises
in the previous phase nowmature into the scrapping of plants down the strat-
ification. This implies that we have a decrease in the capital accumulated (K)
and hence also a decrease in overcapacity. Because K declines, and although
the macroeconomic profit (R) decreases, the rate of internal profit tends to be
roughly constant – that is, in comparisonwith the sharp decline in the previous
phase 4. The net decline in profit stems from, first, the investment expenditure
effect (negative), second, a modest positive effect from decreased saving out of
wages, and third, an increase in the interest on the RPVF. Although the RPVF
volume modestly decreases, the sharp decline in ρ from the previous phase,
which now endures at that low ebb, means that debt extensions require a risk-
motivated higher interest rate.
Crisis (early recession)











ø ↓ R′≈ K′< 0 R↓;
ρ ≈ const.
6 Recession
In effect, as we will see below, the recession prepares the conditions for a
renewed accumulation of capital (in the early upturn of phase 1). In the reces-
sion phase we have a continuation of the restructuring of capital (ROC), initi-
ated by large enterprises at the end of the upturn. Now we have a generalised
and enforced ROC as well as centralisation of capital. The enforcement is due
to a growing number of enterprises being at the edge of bankruptcy and that
for others the rate of internal profit is at a low ebb or negative (phases 4–5).
ROC: intra-enterprise reorganisation and inter-enterprise centralisation of
capital. Generally the duration and the intensity of the ROC (and hence the
duration and intensity of this phase) depend on the intensity of the over-
accumulation of phase 3. There aremany possible forms of ROC. These include
the reshuffling of the departments of an enterprise but also the closing downof
plants or perhaps particular departments of plants. However, this ROCmay also
be combined with inter-enterprise reorganisations. In that case it is combined
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with the selling and buying of plants between enterprises or with take-overs
or with mergers (followed each time by, then, intra-enterprise reorganisation).
This inter-enterprise reorganisation is called ‘centralisationof capital’. This term
(stemming from Marx) is appropriate as the governance of enterprises moves
from local in degree to central in degree.29
Actual bankruptcies, as well as the closing down of plants, means that we
have in part a destruction of what was built up in the previous upturn of the
cycle. Much of the previous labour employment growth is extinguished into
unemployment. From the point of view of enterprises we have, along with
the physical counterpart, a destruction of capital, an annihilation of previous
accumulation (hence K↓).30 In terms of the stratification of capital we have an
enforced shortening of the range of stratification as the least efficient plants get
scrapped (cf. Figure 4.9 on the range of the stratification).
Further effects of ROC. Along with these pure capital effects, the concomit-
antly increasing unemployment gives rise to wage rate decreases. This implies
not only a vast decline in saving from the employed, but also dissaving from
the part of those unemployed who had built up savings previously (or, in case
these are lacking, from relatives, for example). Along with it the RPVF declines,
which pushes the profits for the remaining enterprises. This profit push some-
what compensates for the primary negative effect on profit, which stems from
investment approaching nil (a continuation from the previous phase).
At the same time unemployment, or the threat of it, also enforces a ‘discip-
lining’ and compliance of labour during production (2§5, Figure 2.4), which in
effect increases the productivity of labour.
These effects on capital and labour together constitute the ‘curing’ effect of
the recession. In sum, so far, the vast destruction/devaluation of capital from
the ROC means that even if profits are at a very low level, the rate of internal
profit increases for the remaining enterprises.
This increase is reinforced by the following finance factors. First, because of
the decreased saving (from the part of labour, and from the part of capital own-
ers as a continuation from phase 4 onwards), the running PVF – for wages – is
near to fully redeemed by enterprises. Second, the restructuring bankruptcies
imply that banks, and other external financiers, have to write off their loans,
whence the RPVF decreases. Third, the balance sheets of the production enter-
29 In mainstream economics this is called ‘concentration’. (Marx also uses the term concen-
tration, but rather for the growthof enterprises –big enterprise, i.e. local growth. SeeMarx,
Capital I, Ch. 25; German edition Ch. 23).
30 Regarding ROC, and up to this point of the text, I take inspiration from the work of Fine
and Harris (esp. 1979, pp. 83–7) andWeeks (1981, pp. 208–13).
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prises have been cleaned up, whence for the existing RPVF the risk of banks
is moderated. These factors, together with their favourable effect on the rate
of profit, mean that banks are increasingly prepared to charge a lower rate of
interest on debt extensions (just the opposite of the previous two phases). This
means that the leverage effect now starts becoming positive.
Recession










I′= 0; K′< 0
Sk ≈ const.;
Sw↓
ø ↓ R′>K′< 0 R ≈ const.;
ρ↑
The curing in the recession provides a precondition for recovery and renewed
accumulation of capital. However, it is not evident at all what might take off
renewed investment at an overall declining production and income (Y↓). Its
key lies in range of the stratification of capital and the (dis)hoarding of new
techniques as explained in 5§9, heading D.
5§9-a Addendum. An immanent appreciation
Generally this book presents an immanent critique of the capitalist system,
that is, from its own norms. It so leaves any further appreciation to the reader.
From its own norms (in brief, the monetary-value dimension and the rate
of profit as criterion for economic activity, which engenders the motive for
accumulation of capital for the sake of accumulation of capital), the cyclical
movement of the accumulation of capital is at least paradoxical. The accu-
mulation of capital recurrently results in a great deal of annihilation of that
accumulation. This is so continuously (the continuous scrapping as presented
in Chapter 4) but especially cyclically. Individual enterprises and capital own-
ers always hope to escape the dance. However, only few corporations survive a
long series of cycles. In jointly over-accumulating capital (phase 3), enterprises
do no more than applying the ‘logic’ of the system that they so reinforce.
On an individual level, capital owners take a risk of their own free will (the
big ones can spread that risk) and may win or lose. Workers, however, do not
take a risk of their own free will: lacking command over means of production
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and access to sufficient bank loans, they are forced to sell their labour-capacity
and get ‘employed’ (used) under penalty of starvation. That is immanent to
the system. Being used along with wage increases and again wage decreases is
one thing. However, it is also immanent to the system that the uppermost dark
side of its cyclical movement gets concentrated within one particular echelon:
those that are laid off to be unemployed.
Further, it is questionable – to say the least – as to how long the cyclical over-
accumulation and destruction of capital is physically sustainable in terms of
the climate and natural resources. Themonetary-value dimension and the rate
of profit merely measure what they do measure and thus what is subsumed
under these measures.
Summary and conclusions
This chapter has set out the concrete manifestation of the earlier exposition in
the cyclical movement of capital. We have seen how the production and accu-
mulation of capital concretely takes the form of this cyclical movement. Its
exposition synthesised many of the treads of the earlier exposition (Chapters
1–4) at this concrete level. However, as economic reality is inevitable always
actual in some phase of this movement (one phase of the business cycle), its
exposition is also a concrete synthesis of the earlier exposition.
Division 5D1presented concretising connections from the earlier chapters to
the current one, especially that of themacroeconomic ‘internal profit’ of enter-
prises and the ‘rate of internal profit’, each of which accounts for the external
finance of enterprises and its (de)leverage effect. Investment being the main
locomotive for the cyclical movement, the rate of internal profit as bounded by
the rate of overcapacity were presented as the core macroeconomic determ-
inants of investment decisions. The final section of this division presented a
condensed macroeconomic sequence of production predicated on bank fin-
ance, of validation by expenditure, of distribution of surplus-value to external
financiers and of the resulting rate of internal profit.
Division 5D2 set out how phase-wise series of these sequences cyclically
develop from phases of expansion (5§8) into phases of crisis and contraction
(5§9). In this cyclical movement, the capitalist systems’ immanent expansive
forces generate over-accumulationof capital (5§8).31 In the crisis and recession,
31 This is an almost necessary process. ‘Almost’: in 5§9-b, at the end of the account for phase
3, it was indicated that grand cartels andmonopolies (in fact a privately planned capitalist
economy) might possibly outstrip this necessity.
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this is violently cured by destruction of capital that prepares the conditions for
a renewed expansion and again contraction (5§9). That is, inwardly bifurcated
productive activity is cyclically destroyed.With it the applied natural resources
are destroyed – those that are accounted for in the monetary-value dimension
(MVD) as well as those that are not. Along with the destruction of product-
ive activity and productive capacity, employment of labour is destroyed. The
misery is condensed in those who are expelled into unemployment. Predom-
inantly these, and their children, are sacrificed for the process of ‘creation and
destruction’. Even if during this Sisyphean process the average real income per
head may increase, the heads are not equal and the unemployed in particular
are ‘hors catégorie’ in this respect.
Chapter 5 in the perspective of Chapters 1–4
TheMVDdeterminedbifurcatedproduction (Chapter 1) enforces accumulation
of capital (Chapter 2) as conditioned by bank finance and next the (in part) ex
post substitution for it (Chapter 3). Because the competitive dynamic interac-
tion between enterprises is ultimately battled out in production, and because
enterprises are out to optimally preserve their capital accumulated, the struc-
ture of production tends to be stratified according to the value-productivity of
labour and rates of profit (4D1). This structure, therefore, is a main focus for
the exposition of the cyclical movement of capital. As indicated, the rate of
internal profit is the core determinant of investment decisions and the cyclical
movement (as bounded by the rate of overcapacity). Like its twin of the ‘rate of
integral profit’ (with surplus-value at its base, first posited in 1§13, cf. 5§1) – it is
the concentration of the determinants that were developed so far (Part One),
as it is in the everyday practice of enterprises. It is the reflection of the concrete
internally bifurcated process of production of capital; that is, labour’s produc-
tion of capital through the production of surplus-value (Π =mLα – wL) for the
owners of capital – the productive power of labour (α) being the prime mover
(1§14). The point is indeed that practically abstract entities (i.e. abstractions in
practice, 1§4, 1§4-b) – that is, monetary value and the rate of profit – determine
the capitalist world as it concretely appears in our experience as including the
economic high and low tides.
Whereas labour is the prime mover of the production of value and capital,
capital itself is the primemover of its cyclical course of accumulation and again
the partial annihilation of this accumulation – labour is passively confronted
with the ups and downs of employment and unemployment.
Banks are a top-level institutional determinant of the capitalist system
(money as presented in 1§4 was concretised as bank-issued money in 2D4).
Banks are the only originator of the external finance of enterprises (aswell as of
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their internal finance). The bank-provided PVF is a continuous capitalist neces-
sity (2D4, 3D2). To the extent that there are savings – the big financial nuisance
for enterprises – there is a non-redeemed part of the PVF (the ΔRPVF equal to
theΔεK),whichneeds to be substituted for, in part, by other external financiers.
The degree of saving so affects the required degree of external finance. This is
reflected in the rate of interest. Its variation over the cycle determines whether
external finance acts as a (de)leverage on the rate of internal profit.
On average, saving out of wages negatively affects the validation of surplus-
value (3§10), and so the resulting profit (5§1). Because the savings ratio out
of wages varies over the phases of the cycle, this affects the resulting profit
phase-wise (negatively in the second half of the expansion and positively in
the recession). Savings out of wages are – directly or indirectly – a last resort
for the unemployed. From the point of viewof labour, the cyclicalmovement of
capital develops behind their backs. Producing capital for the owners of capital
is immanent to the capitalist economy (1D5, 5§8).We have now seen that along
with the recessive annihilationof their product, labourers arehit by the scourge
of unemployment – all potentially, many actually. This is equally immanent to
the capitalist economy (5§9). From the sweat of one’s brow to redundancy and
pauperism.
Appendix 5A. On the particular structural background of the 2008
crisis32
Introduction and synopsis
No cycle, including its crisis, is identical to the previous one. Chapter 5 indic-
ated their general pattern. However, the 2008 crisis and its aftermath is no cyc-
lical phenomenon. The 2008 financial-economic crisis in especially the EU and
the USA results from a structural change that developed from the early 1980s
onwards (see below). The extended recession period following it combines,
first, the aftermath of this structural change, and second, the restructuring of
capital that is characteristic of a ‘normal’ recession.
This structural change combines two main issues. First, a considerable shift
in themacroeconomic distribution of incomebetween capital-labour in favour
of capital income (which ‘normally’ would have a negative effect on consump-
tion expenditure). Second, a shift in the structure as well as the size of bank
32 This appendix is based on an article that appeared in Science and Society (Reuten 2011).
The current version is more refined and also corrects some mistakes (for which I apolo-
gise).
282 part one – the capitalist economy
credits, the latter involving vastly increased credits to consumers/wage earners.
The latter so maintained or even increased their consumption (counteracting
the wage effect).
Within this period of structural change (i.e. from the early 1980s to 2008),
we had the ‘normal’ cyclical alternation, though with modifications regarding
the destination of the PVF, and of the sources of savings and the RPVF.
Below this structural change is phrased in terms of a ‘postponement of stag-
nation’. While the policies of banks played the core role in postponing the
stagnation, the roots of the crisis are located at a deeper level. The implica-
tion is that the economic problems are much more difficult to overcome than
the usual analyses suggest.
I hesitated over whether I should include this Appendix at this point or
rather at the end of Chapter 10. The point is that the empirical figures below
are – evidently – predicated on the existence of the state (even if rather impli-
citly) as well as on policies concerning, for example, unemployment payments
(presented in Part Two). I finally decided to include it here, first, because the
subject intimately relates to the finance of capital (Chapter 3) and especially
the course of the cyclicalmovementof capital (Chapter 5), and second, because
the structural changes referred to mainly developed independently of state
policy – or rather because the state (in fact many states) mainly refrained
from legislation on this matter (i.e. the structural causes including the role of
banks).
5A-1 The general constellation
This appendix considers the era of so-called ‘neoliberalism’ (from about 1980)
until the year 2010 and in comparison with the two decades prior to it (1960–
80). Graph 5.8 shows graphs for various variables as a share in the GDP of the
USA and the EU-15 countries.33
Investment. Of the variables shown, investment is the best measure for the
cyclicalmovement.However, because the graphs show its share inGDP, the cyc-
lical volatility of investment is flattened out (as for all these variables).34 From
1980 onwards the average investment share was roughly constant in the |EU-15
and declined in the USA.
33 The EU-15 are the 15 countries that made up the European Union until 2004 (statistically
this is a useful group because much of the relevant data for these countries often go back
to 1960).
34 GDP shares show changes of one variable relative to the change of another. One advantage
of measurement in GDP-shares is that we need not correct for price inflation.
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Wages. From about 1980 the wages share decreases considerably in the USA
and vastly in the EU-15 countries. This structural change relates to develop-
ments in the labour market and the production aspects of income determina-
tion.35 In brief, the enduring vast unemployment following on from the severe
1981–82 recession shifted the balance of power between enterprises and labour,
such thatwage increases could continuously be held below labour productivity
increases.
Consumption. Remarkably thewages sharedecrease is not reflected in a con-
sumption share decrease. The latter slightly increased in the EU-15, and vastly
in the USA. For the reasons set out in 5§2 I take it that theCk-share (fromcapital
income) is roughly constant. The next section expands on the consumption by
wage earners (Cw).
Surplus-value. The share of the operating surplus shown in the graphs is
merely a very rough indicator for the share of surplus-value in GDP (this is
due to the way in which the National Accounts are constructed – see 3§10-b;
Chapter 3, App. 3C, §3C-1 under point 6, and in 8§6-e).
Recall (from 3§10 or 5§2) the following equations for the realisation of
surplus-value.
Π 🢔 = I + Ck + (Cw–W) (3.10)
Π 🢔 = I + Ck – Sw (3.12)
• For the EU-15we had a vast decrease in theW-share (from 1980 in total about
10 percent), with the Cw-share roughly constant, which accounts for a great
deal of the rise in the Π-share.
• For the USA we had a more moderated W-share decrease together with a
vastly increasing Cw-share (a gap moving to 10% in 2008). Together these
equally account for a great deal of the rise in the Π-share.
• This is the broad picture – I abstract from the effects of changes in state
expenditure and from those of the foreign sector.
5A-2 From declining savings out of wages to ‘colonisation of the future’
Refer to Chapter 3 for Circuits 3.9 and 3.18 that are here reproduced, with in the
last circuit an extra column added at its outer right (‘or colonising postpone-
ment’). RegardingCircuit 3.9 recall that saving out of wages (aswell as those out
of capital incomedistributed) account for an increase in the debt of enterprises
(the ΔRPVF).36 To the extent that saving out of wages decreases (spending
35 There are four determinants for the distribution of income: (1) the labourmarket; (2) pro-
duction; (3) price setting; (4) expenditure. (This fourfold determination has been force-
fully stressed by Bellofiore – e.g. 1999, pp. 64–5.)
36 Recall also that ex post the initial finance by banks (the PVF), capital owners or wage
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circuit 3.9 (reduced). Pre-
validating finance
(PVF) by banks for
wages: case of sav-
ings out of wages
circuit 3.18 Enterprises’ saving on PVF
for wages due to consumer
credit: case of zero saving
out of wages (outer right
column added)
consequently increases), this source of the debt of enterprises decreases. De-
clining saving out of wages therefore affects the distribution of surplus-value
earnersmight substitute for the enterprises’ stock of debtwith banks, for example, by buy-
ing bonds from enterprises (either directly or indirectly, for instance, via pension funds).
Pending such a substitution, the triadic credit-debt relationship between banks, enter-
prises and labour is normally favourable for banks in terms of interest margins.
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between banks and production enterprises, in favour of the latter.37 This is a
partial effect (see the end of this section).
The further step is the movement of consumption beyond wages (see Cir-
cuit 3.18). This divergence was financed by direct consumption credit and by
indirect consumption credit via mortgages – the latter in face of (expected)
increasing collateral value. For the first time in history we saw consumption
being financed on a massive scale by banks and next, in securitised form, sub-
stituted for by wealthy financiers, mostly via hedge funds. In this way, workers
‘compensated’ what they had lost on the wage front. All along, this prevented
aggregate demand stagnation, even if this was not the motive.
However, loans require interest and must, at some point, be redeemed.
Hence the banks – as well as other financiers via the banks – made claims on
future wages of labourers. Lysandrou (2009) aptly called this the ‘colonisation
of the future’. Because this implies less future spending, the effect was a post-
ponement of stagnation.
Note that Circuit 3.18 shows the simple case of an immediate redemption
of consumer credit out of wages. This is the case of the pure substitution of
consumer credit for PVF. In actual fact this redemption was – and remains –
postponed, resulting in a stock of debt owed to banks by workers: the colonisa-
tion of the future.
I indicated that declining saving out of wages affects the distribution of
surplus-valuebetweenbanks andproduction enterprises, in favour of the latter.
This is a partial effect because the surplus-value distributed to capital owners
vastly increased (compare the shares in GDP of investment and the operat-
ing surplus). Given the capital owners’ stable consumption, this accounts for a
structural savings increase, and hence an increased RPVF from their part (com-
pare 3§6 and Circuit 3.13). The effect on the RPFV of the two saving categories
might well balance out.
5A-3 Conjunction of interests
Due to a conjunction of interests, all the elements for this postponement of
stagnation seemed to fit, that is, until about 2007.38
37 Where other financiers partially substituted for the stock of debt (i.e. an ex post substitu-
tion for the non-redeemed part of the PVF), it is of course these financiers that receive a
smaller share of surplus-value.
38 I am not arguing that the grand process of financing the divergence between wages and
consumption was a concerted action. I merely indicate that there was a temporary, con-
tingent fit so that no interest group had a motive for behaving differently.
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First, the direct beneficiaries were enterprises. After the initial and continu-
ing wagesmoderation – that of wages growth lagging behind labour productiv-
ity increases – enterprises saw a decrease in the proportion of saving out of
wages and hence, through higher spending, a decrease in the stock of debt owed
to banks (Circuit 3.9). Presumably, though, this was roughly balanced out by
increased saving from the part of capital owners. On top of this, once banks
provided workers-consumers with consumer credit that was spent with enter-
prises, there was – for an amount equal to the amount of consumer credit –
an ex ante substitution for PVF. Thus consumers took on a part of the credit
that banks ‘normally’ would have provided to enterprises (Circuit 3.18).39 On
the other hand, due to the increased distribution of surplus-value to non-bank
financiers, the PVF for thosemust increase. In sum, enterprises pay lowerwages,
without being punished in terms of lower consumption expenditures.
Second, supposing that the PVF effect aswell as RPVF effects cancel out (first,
above) banks won in interest from labour (their share in wages). Further, for
those mortgages that banks resold via securitisation, they received commis-
sions.40
Third, the banks’ securitisation of the mortgages provided an outlet for
wealthy financiers that cried out for portfolio-investment opportunities. Thus
in the relatively short period from2000 to 2007, the securities issuanceof banks
in the USA and Europe quadrupled from US$400 to nearly US$1600 billion.41
The behaviour of banks resulted in the postponement of stagnation and a
vastly increased share of surplus-value (operating surplus) in GDP. However,
alongwith themortgage-drivenhousingmarket bubble that the postponement
evoked, it also laid theminefield of risky assets. Once this process of postpone-
ment of stagnation was well under way, there were no sensible institutions to
prevent its continuation: neither central banks nor other supervising authorit-
ies, nor governments. States had declared the ‘independence’ of central banks,
while central banks – as intertwinedwith commercial banks via personal ties –
declared ‘self-regulation’ for commercial banks. Commercial bankers may not
have sat at the Basel assemblies, but they were important consultants for its
39 Note that if consumer credit is provided by the enterprises themselves – or specialised
branches thereof – the enterprises would require a PVF for that credit. Hence this case
ultimately reduces to a sub-case of that of Sheet 3.10.
40 In a report from the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision it is calculated that over
the 15 years preceding the crisis (1993–2007), banks secured an (after tax) average rate
of profit of 14.8% on their own capital. See ‘An assessment of the long-term economic
impact of stronger capital and liquidity requirements’, BIS, August 2010, p. 48. http://www
.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/r_100818a.pdf.
41 This is amplified upon by Lysandrou 2009.
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weak ‘framework’ and weaker performance. (In this respect all this is not alien
to the constellation of private ‘Clearing Banks’ as presented in Chapter 2 and
onwards in Part One.)
5A-4 Course of the 2008 crisis and its crisis-ridden aftermath
The course of the crisis itself is not particularly difficult to follow, and it has
been detailed at great length in the literature. Because most banks were weak
on the assets side of their balance sheet, they had reason to distrust other
banks in that respect. Once one or several main banks got into actual trouble –
i.e. insurmountable debts to other banks – the distrust domino-ed around the
world, affecting the USA and the EU most directly. Ultimately even the bank-
ing system as a system of money transfer (payments) nearly collapsed: banks
did not want to receive payments from other distrusted banks as this puts the
one bank in risky debt with the other. States ultimately had to step in, national-
ising or semi-nationalisingmajor banks, so as to at least preserve the payments
system.
In sum, enterprises and banks had no choice but to accept reduced profits.
The portfolio investors who had bought the securitised loans were the least
affected group because banks had generally provided off-balance sheet guar-
antees. The biggest misery was imposed on the increasing numbers of the
unemployed, with still-employed workers in a close second spot, facing wage
cuts andultimately lower living standards through cuts of state-provided trans-
fers.
5A-5 Problem of stagnation not resolved
(Conclusions below apply to the state of affairs when I completed this book.)
The financial and economic crisis is the expression of the reaction to the sub-
stantial shifts in the distribution of income beginning around the early 1980s.
However, the 2008 crisis and its aftermath have not resolved the problem of
potential stagnation. On the contrary:
• If banks do not face more effective regulation than what has so far been pro-
posed (when I completed this book), the banking system risks renewed
collapse. A new round of massive state assistance, apart from being politic-
ally less likely, would once again encroach on the financial means of states.
On the other hand, if banks are going to be effectively regulated, then the
postponement of stagnation will come to an end: relative consumption will
substantially decline as consumer credit stagnates and plays a lesser role in
financing consumption.
• Besides this, we have the colonisation of the future labour incomes: income
claims that will also result in a relative decline of consumption.
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• With a relative decline in consumption, the investment of enterprises will
also slacken.42
In sum, the economies of the USA and the EU are likely to enter a period of
stagnation.
5A-6 Modification of the ‘normal’ course of the business cycle
As remarked in the introduction to this appendix, along with the period of
structural change (i.e. from the early 1980s to 2008) we had the ‘normal’ cyc-
lical alternation, though with modifications. These regard the destination of
the PVF (shifting fromenterprises towards labour), the sources of savings (shift-
ing from wages towards capital owners) and the diverse effect of these on the
ΔRPVF (even if the sum of the ΔRPVF may not have been much affected).
Regarding the outline of the cycle presented in Chapter 5, it should first of
all be recalled that the outline refers to a constellationwith the state bracketed.
As we will see in Chapter 10 (10D1), this has a main effect on the cycle’s amp-
litude to the extent that the state impacts as an (automatic) stabiliser. In face of
unemployment benefits it also affects the degree of savings decrease by labour
in the crisis and recession.
That said, refer to the stylised summary of Figure 5.7. Generally, the struc-
tural change referred to flattens the cyclical changes in Sw. On the other hand,
because of the structurally increased distributed capital income, the Sk effects
are reinforced. These savings differences also affect their impact on the RPVF.
These do not seem to have major effects on the directions of the change in the
core determinants of investment, that is, the rate of internal profit (ρ) and the
rate of overcapacity (ø).
Given that the income of capital owners is rather functionless (whilst their
consumption acts as an automatic stabiliser, their savings are not only non-
necessary but also make the RPVF increasing), a restoring re-shift in the distri-
bution of income could prevent stagnation.43 However, in case of an effect-
42 An additional and vast ‘deepening investment’ might in principle keep up investments
but there seems to be no market incentive for these to come about at just the right
time, in large enough amounts. An obvious field for such investments might be that of
non-conventional energy. A ‘market’ incentive for that might be a heavy taxation on con-
ventional energy. The problem with such a solution is that this would further depress
consumption in the following two decades – and hence non-deepening investment. Such
a programme would have to be combined with an intensification of the measures dis-
cussed in the next section.
43 The first part of this sentence is reminiscent of one of Keynes’s judgements: ‘I see there-
fore, the rentier aspect of capitalism as a transitional phase which will disappear when it
has done its work. … [T]he euthanasia of the rentier, the functionless investor [presum-
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ive stagnation via consumption decrease, much depends on its pace. A fast
decrease would tend to take the economy into depression. At a slow decrease,
such that at least an on average poor rate of macroeconomic growth is main-
tained, cyclical movements would tend to be imposed on that poor rate of
growth.
Appendix 5B. Stratified production andMarx’s unfinished theory of
the cycle
As indicated in Addendum 5§9-a, Marx presents his exposition of the cyclical
movement of capital in Capital I, Part Seven and in Capital III, Part Three.44
Although I have taken much inspiration from Marx’s treatment of the matter,
his exposition is quite different from the one presented in Chapter 5, mainly
because he systematically introduces finance only after the cyclical move-
ment – as specified below.
Marx’s first treatment (Capital I) – as he is verymuch aware – is based purely
on the production and accumulation of capital, without having systematically
presented at that point: the (any) rate of profit; the expenditure side of the eco-
nomy; banking and finance.
When Marx reaches his second treatment (Capital III) he has developed
the rate of integral profit (surplus-value based), though he has still bracketed
expenditure, banking and finance.45 Thus in Marx’s systematic he would have
to return to the business cycle after his treatment of banking and finance (the
second half of the current Capital III). Alas, however, he did not reach this in
his lifetime. Therefore Marx’s theory of the cyclical movement of capital is an
incomplete one.
Even so, insight is to be gained from an abstract treatment such as Marx’s
thatwehave. I briefly expandonMarx’s second treatment. (In comparisonwith
Chapter 5 all effects of external finance (the RPVF and iεK) and of saving in rela-
tion to expenditures are thus bracketed.) Marx focuses on surplus-value, the
rate of integral profit, accumulation and technical development.
ably he means financier or portfolio investor], will be nothing sudden, merely a gradual
but prolonged continuance … and will need no revolution’ (Keynes 1936, p. 376).
44 Marx 1976 [1867] and 1981 [1894].
45 This is so in his last manuscript on the matter. Presumably he planned to include the
expenditures side that he had developed largely after that manuscript in his manuscript
for the last part of Volume II of Capital.
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Marx’s view on technical development is that this of a K/wL rising type.
Then, assuming that the rate of surplus-value (Π/wL) is more or less constant






(roughly constant in upturn)
(rising in upturn)
As a result the rate of integral profit (ω) declines in the upturn. Then, what I
called ‘restructuring of capital’ in the downturn (destruction and devaluation
of capital) restores the rate of profit, whence – as Marx expresses it – ‘we go
round the whole circle once again’, a vicious circle (‘Zirkel vicieux’).46 This rate
of profit curing effect of the recession reveals Marx’s tremendously impress-
ive insight of the matter (one that also impressed Schumpeter, as indicated in
5§9-a).47
Some critics of Marx have questioned this presentation on the grounds that
micro foundations are lacking for it. In their view, capitalists would not gen-
erally introduce rate of profit decreasing techniques of production.48 I have
indicated (Reuten 1991) that from the perspective of a stratified structure of
production, it is quite feasible that new techniques have a rate of profit decreas-
ing effect for a sector or the economy at large.49 I should now add that this
is especially the case in a constellation of price competition. (Compare 4D2
where the price-leader introduces a new technique – perhaps a K/wL rising
one – whence for the totality of the stratification the rate of profit declines.)
From this perspective the critic alluded to can be refuted.
However, further scrutiny of Marx’s theory indicates that it is quite compat-
ible with amore general theory of over-accumulation of capital, one of either a
K/wL increasing or a K/wL decreasing type of technical change (as I remarked
in my 1991 paper). This more general theory has been presented in Chapter 5,
including the main complexities of finance and expenditures (via savings),
which affect the distinct movement of the various phases of the cycle.
46 Marx 1993 [ms. 1864–65], p. 329; cf. the somewhat deviating formulations for ‘Zirkel vicieux’
inMarx 1964 [1894 ed. Engels], p. 265 and 1981 [1894 ed. Engels, English translation], p. 364.
47 In studying the cycle Marx gradually developed this view. Along with it he put increasing
emphasis on the rate of profit restoring character of the recession. SeeReuten andThomas
2011, andThomas and Reuten 2013. Note also that in Engels’s edition of Marx’smanuscript
for Capital III, there are significant changes (by Engels) that deemphasise the restorative
role of the recession (Reuten 2004c; this article also provides a commented general outline
of the three chapters constituting Marx’s theory of the cycle in Capital III).
48 See the references in Reuten 1991.
49 Cf. Reuten andWilliams 1989, Chapter 4.
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Introduction to part two: the capitalist state
Note: ‘c.o.e.’ abbreviates conditions of existence and ‘manif.’ concrete manifestations.
Part Two of this book presents the state and economic policy (Chapters 6–10)
vis-à-vis the capitalist economy (Chapters 1–5). Part One sought to ground the
capitalist economy ‘within itself ’. In Part Two, we will see why and how these
grounds are insufficient. Early on inChapter 6 it is shown that the capitalist eco-
nomy’s existence necessarily requires the capitalist state (6D2 will clarify why
the term ‘capitalist’ state is used at all). The exposition will then be confron-
ted with a twofold task. It must show how the state’s doing and not doing can
provide sufficient grounds for the economy’s existence. However, along with
it, the conditions for the existence of the state itself must be presented. Recall
from the General Introduction the following schematic outline.
The starting point of Chapter 6 is similar to that of Chapter 1: the dissociated
bifurcation between households and privately owned enterprises. Inasmuch
as Chapters 1–3 next sought its economy-immanent conditions of existence,
Chapters 6–8 will seek sufficient conditions of existence for the economy as
well as for the state itself. A similar analogy applies to the last two chapters of
this Part: Chapters 9–10 will present the concrete manifestations of the state
vis-à-vis the economy.
The order of the book is evidently as it is: from Chapters 1–11. This is in line
with one object of the book – as indicated in the General Introduction –which
is that Part One endeavours to show to what extent the capitalist economy
might be thought to conceivably stand on itself. In linewith this, the systematic
exposition runs from Chapters 1–5 and again Chapters 6–10.
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However, the book also sets out a complementary systematic, which runs
zigzag from Chapter 1 to the juxtaposed 6, and from Chapter 2 to the juxta-
posed 7, and so forth. In principle the book might be read in that order. This
last systematic mainly determines the dividing lines between the chapters of
Part Two.
As before, the exposition is a systematic one, not a historical one. Therefore
the abstract existence of the capitalist state is presumed. Systematically this
presumption refers indeed to an abstract existence, that is, as long as its condi-
tions of existence have not yet been presented.
Finally, when I use the term ‘state’ this includes, when relevant, the central
state of a federation or of a union of states.
© Geert Reuten, 2019 | doi:10.1163/9789004392809_009
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Introduction
The exposition started in Chapter 1 with the concept of ‘dissociated bifurca-
tion of households and privately owned units of productions’. The rest of that
chapter – andChapters 2–3 –presented the capitalistway of ‘sublating’ the out-
ward bifurcation (that is, stages of partially resolving the bifurcation without
the bifurcation itself being undone – 1§1, heading 4). The outcome – Chapters
1 through 5 – is a constellation that often appears problematical (presumably
also from thepoint of viewof enterprises andowners of financial titles), though
one that apparently may have seemed a systematic reproducible whole.
However, it will be shown inDivision 2 in general terms (see its introduction
below) – andmore concretely throughout the chapters to come – that the cap-
italist economy cannot exist without the capitalist state. Thus the grounding
of the starting point so far is an insufficient one, whence the exposition must
be extended – throughout Part One extension in case of such insufficiency has
always been the dialectical procedure.
As the starting point of the total exposition (Parts One and Two) is the cap-
italist economy and its dissociated bifurcation, the systematic exposition of the
capitalist state starts in Division 1 again with the capitalist economy’s bifurc-
ation. This is all the more opportune, because in hindsight, as we will see,
key ‘insufficiencies’ that cannot be resolved within the capitalist economy are
already prevalent at the very early stages of the capitalist way of sublating the
bifurcation.
For these systematic reasons the starting points of 1D1 and 6D1 coincide,
although the presentation in Division 1 of the current chapter will be an abbre-
viated one.
Division 2 introduces the state into the exposition. In Part One it was all
along implicit that the actors (enterprises and households) have the freedom to
act as outlined. Implicitly they claimed to be entitled to act as outlined and that
these claims (for example, claims to entitlement of property) are respected by
the other actors. Division 2 sets out that the institutions of the capitalist eco-
nomyby themselves cannot guarantee the actualisationof such claims,whence
an extraordinary institution, the state, is required to grant these claims in the
form of rights.
Division 3 presents a first set of major abstract-general conditions of exist-
ence of the state, especially regarding the form of the state’s operation. The
first one of these is that the state must gain legitimation for its (non-)actions.
Further conditions ground this first one.
Division 4 presents a categorisation of the required capitalist economic
rights: legal rights to property and to the employment of labour. At the level
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scheme 6.1 Systematic of state-granted capitalist economic rights –
the capitalist state in general (outline Chapter 6)
Legend
↡ grounded in (conditioned by) downward moment
↠ grounded in juxtaposed moment
of the state these constitute the primary condition of existence for the exposi-
tion in Chapter 1.
As economic rights are futile without legal rights to existence, Division 5
presents a categorisation of the latter.
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Granted legal rights (6D3) are emptywithout their upholding. The final Divi-
sion6presents theupholdingof these rights in ‘public security’,which includes,
among others, the police and public prosecution.
It should be kept in mind that – in line with the systematic-dialectical
method as outlined in the General Introduction – this chapter is about actual
right and law only to the extent that rights are necessary (an absolute condi-
tion) for the continued existence of a capitalist economy – now the capitalist
system (including the state). On top of these, there are many rights that are
morally or culturally important, but that are nevertheless contingent from the
point of view of the reproduction of the capitalist economy. Throughout this
book, as indicated, such contingencies are ignored.
Scheme 6.1 outlines the systematic of the moments presented in this chap-
ter.
Division 1. Dissociation – outward bifurcation into households and
privately owned enterprises
As the startingpoint of the total exposition (capitalist economyand state) is the
capitalist economy, the systematic exposition of the capitalist state starts with
the capitalist economy’s dissociated outward bifurcation (here briefly summar-
ised). Thus this division is systematically analogous to 1D1. See also the Chapter
Introduction.
6§1 Dissociated outward bifurcation into households and privately
owned enterprises
The capitalist economy (and the capitalist systemgenerally) is characterised by
the dissociated outward bifurcation between households and privately owned
enterprises, the latter being private owners of appropriated earth and of means
of production. Generally, enterprises are not owned by the labourers that carry
out the production (see 1§1-e, or the Glossary, for the term ‘general’). Hence
capitalist society is characterised by an extended outward bifurcation into, on
the one hand, the owners of private enterprises, and, on the other, the – gener-
ally non-overlapping – labourers carrying out the production. Along with these
private property relations, the enterprise appropriates the product produced
by labour – in whatever way, and for what, and to what extent, labour receives
a ‘compensation’ for its production.
Apparently this constellation is dissociative, even if we know that in reality
the bifurcated poles are bridged. The object of the exposition is to comprehend
the range of this apparent dissociation, to comprehend the extent of its actual
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resolution, and to set out the necessary conditions of existence (or grounds) of
the starting point above.
6§1-a Explication. The twofold grounding of the starting point
Because the startingpoint of the total exposition (capitalist economyand state)
is the capitalist economy, the grounding of the starting point (1D1) is systemat-
ically a twofold one – alluded to in the Introduction. Scheme 6.2 visualises this
twofoldness.
scheme 6.2 The twofold grounding of the starting point
Legend
= similar
↡ grounding in downward moments
↠ grounding in juxtaposed moments
Division 2. Capitalist economic entitlement claims as granted by
the state in the form of rights: the capitalist state
In this book’s systematic- rather thanhistorical-dialectical exposition, the exist-
ence of the state is presumed (General Introduction, C§3). Pending the expos-
ition, this is methodologically yet an abstract existence. This division sets out
why and when the state in a capitalist system is to be characterised as a ‘capit-
alist state’.
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6§2 Capitalist economic entitlement claims
In the exposition of the capitalist economy, it was implicit that dissociation and
its grounding requires the private enterprises and the households to have the
freedom to act as set out in Chapter 1 and later chapters. Freedom, however, is
utterly abstract. These freedoms are therefore posited as specific claimsof being
entitled to act as set out. The core of these are:
• first, claims of entitlement to private property in the earth;
• second, claims of entitlement to private property in means of production
other than for production by the claimant;
• third, claims of entitlement to employ labour as combined with the appro-
priation of the surplus-value produced by that labour.
Together I call these in brief the ‘capitalist core economic entitlement claims’
(concretised in 6D4).
6§2-a Explication. Freedom and compulsion
The private enterprises and the households require the freedom to act as set
out in Part One. However, the freedoms that are necessary for capitalism also
result in a structure of compulsion.We have seen that the capitalist economy is
structurally determinedby themonetary-value dimension and the forces deriv-
ing from it.
Predicated on the dissociative bifurcation (1D1), economic actors are en-
forced to trade in order to survive (consumer goods, inputs, outputs).
To the extent that workers own no means of production, they are forced
to sell their labour-capacity to any enterprise (1§6). Hence their freedom is
restricted to selling it to company i or j – they are materially not free to sell
at all, because they have no alternative. To the extent that workers command
restricted monetary reserves, they are, moreover, forced to sell their labour-
capacity immediately (affecting their bargaining position). Further, depend-
ing on the growth patterns (2D2) or the cyclical state of the economy (5D2),
the freedom to sell labour-capacity may even be void altogether (unemploy-
ment).
Finally, a large number of restrictions and forces operate on any enter-
prise. For example, their position in the stratification of enterprises (4§4) may
enforce them to acquire extra finance capital; or, the cyclical restructuring of
capital may mean that enterprises lose property and/or are enforced to merge
or be taken over (5§9).
It follows that whereas the existence of the capitalist economy requires eco-
nomic actors to have economic freedoms, the same capitalist economy negates
freedom in force, compulsion and restriction. There is no general freedom, but
rather an asymmetric freedom, or, conversely, asymmetric compulsion.
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It may be argued that any association into which persons enter at least con-
strains freedom (for somemarriagemight be an example). Nevertheless, if one
engages freely and consciously in association, its constraints are not compuls-
ive.However, the institutionsof the capitalist economyarenotbasedona freely
willed social contract – even when perhaps a majority would consent to these
institutions.
6§2-b Amplification. Interconnection of the three claims to entitlement
Of the three core claims set out in 6§2, claim 3 is the key one. The ownership of
means of production (claim 2) is a precondition for any production; however,
claim 3 (appropriation of the surplus-value produced by the labour employed)
requires not merely some ownership in means of production, but rather such
ownership corresponding to the amount of labour employed.1 (Self-employed
workers or worker cooperatives would not require this extra claim, because
they have no employees, and hence require no such means of production.)
Of the first two claims, the first is the most far-reaching one. Much of
the earth functions as means of production (hence this is, more specifically,
includedunder claim2). Given that the earth cannot be expanded (like produc-
tion can be expanded) it is in fact a monopoly claim for the category of owners
of land and other natural resources. (This would not be so if, for example,
land were rented from the collective world population in some institutional-
ised form.)2
6§3 The claim of entitlement to existence
Economic entitlement claims (6§2) are futile without a claim of entitlement
to existence. Thus the former are necessarily grounded in the latter. (When
actors are not free from violence regarding their person, the exercise of their
economic claims is barren.)
1 Adam Smith writes: ‘The value which the workmen add to the materials, therefore, resolves
itself in this case into two parts, of which the one pays their wages, the other the profits of
their employer (…). In this state of things, thewhole produceof labour does not always belong
to the labourer. He must in most cases share it with the owner of the stock which employs
him’ (Smith 1776, Book I, Ch. 6, paragraph 5).
2 During feudal times inmuchof Europe, aswell as inmanyother cultures, therewas at least the
idea that land is a God-derived collective property (governed by stewards). See, for example,
Locke 1689, Second Treatise, Chapter V.
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6§4 The capitalist state: capitalist economic entitlement claims in the
form of granted rights
The claims to the capitalist core economic entitlements and to existence enti-
tlement are necessary to the capitalist economy (6§2, 6§3). However, within
the economy there is no institution guaranteeing these claimed entitlements.
Within the economy, dominated by themonetary-value dimension, commodi-
fication and the criterion of the rate of integral profit (1§13), these claims can be
no more than moral strivings – perhaps conflicting ones – in face of the struc-
ture and forces of that economy (Part One). Sowe have a fundamental continu-
ity impediment: the actualisation of these claimed entitlements is necessary
and impossible within the economy.3 Hence the capitalist economy cannot
stand on its own.
The state is an institutional constellation granting (constructing) these
claims in the form of rights. It demarcates these granted rights and it upholds
them. In doing so, the state grounds the actual mode of existence of the capital-
ist economy.
To the extent that the state actualises particularly the capitalist economic
entitlement claims (listed in 6§2) as granted rights, the state is identified as the
capitalist state.
6§4-a Explication. The state, agents of the state and moral norms of the
latter
Throughout Part Two, I use the term state, or capitalist state, denoting the state
as institution. As much as possible I avoid notions of ‘agents of the state’, or
‘state actors’. This implies that the reference is mainly to the state in its effect
as laid down in legislation and other regulation, rather than to processes lead-
ing to that effect, including the motives of agents of the state. Therefore I also
avoid using the term ‘government’, which often has a connotation of a group of
people staffing the state. Emphasising the state as institution in reference to its
effects also implies that I am not concerned with themoral or ethical norms of
agents of the state. I am not denying that state officials might be intrinsically
motivated by these norms. I am also not denying that they might not.4
3 See Addendum 1§1-j on the term ‘continuity impediment’ versus ‘contradiction’.
4 The same applies for perhaps self-centred economic drives. Thus the exposition is the reverse
of much of the ‘public choice’ approaches of the state.
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6§4-b Explication. State and nation: the systematic order of the
exposition
‘The state’ is usually associated with a national context. Nationality and geo-
graphywill be introducedonly inPartThree (Chapter 11). In termsof nationality
and geography, the current level of the exposition is to be associated with one
capitalist country operating in isolation, or alternatively with world universal-
ity without national borders.
6§4-c Explication. Rights presented in this chapter
The rights presented in this chapter are restricted to rights that are neces-
sary for the existence of the capitalist economy. Many rights that have been
enacted, for example, those of free speech or assembly, are contingent to the
existence of the capitalist economy (which does not qualify these as ‘unimport-
ant’).
6§4-d Addendum. ‘Society’ vis-à-vis the capitalist economy
In this book the term ‘society’ is used only in 1D0 (sociation), in 1D1 (dissoci-
ation) and in the current division.Quite apart from the introductionof the state
in the current chapter and its further concretisation in the following chapters,
I thus far presented a reduced account of capitalist society – that is, the cap-
italist economy (Chapters 1–5). The point is that I do not intend to present
concrete society in its entirety. The aim is to present the necessary conditions
of existence of the capitalist economy; indeed the state is a major condition for
it.
Gender, racial and sexual diversity, the arts, religion, sports and so on, all
comprise key elements of social life hitherto.However, in termsof the existence
of the capitalist economy, these social elements are contingent. However, this
again does not imply that these are not affected by the monetary-value dimen-
sion. We know all too well that they are.
On the other hand, such social elementsmaywell assist or support the repro-
duction of the capitalist system. (Marx, for example, once called religion the
opium of the people. Later, Max Weber argued that Protestantism, especially
Calvinism, propelled the capitalist ethos.) Many cultural and political constel-
lations are compatible with capitalism – e.g. liberalism, conservatism, religious
fundamentalism, corporatism or fascism. All this is not the object of the cur-
rent investigation.
6§4-e Addendum. The state: systematic exposition and history
As always, considerations of systematic order are different from considerations
of historical order.
6. state-granted capitalist economic rights [6§4] 307
Regarding history Hirsch (2005) argues that ‘the state’ emerges with the
emergence of capitalism, and that it is wrong to ‘naturalise’ the state by extend-
ing its history. Historically feudal domains were the unity of a governing entity
and an entity including exploitative social-economic power (only in hindsight
might these perhaps be discerned as an entity that includes an ‘economy’). His-
torically the capitalist economy bifurcated away from the feudal domain (in
my terminology), and became a power in itself – initially in opposition to the
feudal domain. The feudality as a governing entity then collaborated with the
capitalists because it had to. Historically the feudal entity, including (in hind-
sight) a governing branch, was gradually transformed into a capitalist state – as
mediated by the mercantile state (see the qualifications by Hirsch 2005).
By implication it is hard to imagine how a capitalist economy could ever
have emerged without a feudal polity de facto sustaining that emerging eco-
nomy. The ‘thought experiments’ about the ‘state of nature’ by British classical
political philosophy from Hobbes (1651) to Smith (1776) concluded that ‘civil
society’ has no existence without the state – that is, unless we allow for a ‘war
of all against all’, as Hobbes phrased it. Smith (1776) writes: ‘Where there is no
property … civil government is not so necessary.’ And: ‘Civil government, so
far as it is instituted for the security of property, is in reality instituted for the
defenceof the rich against thepoor, or of thosewhohave someproperty against
those who have none at all.’5
The current systematic exposition bypasses the collaboration, etc. and
presents a, so to speak, ‘fresh’ state (devoid of feudal remnants and so on). The
existing state is exposed insofar as it is necessary for the capitalist economy.
Division 3. Granted rights in the form of law and the legitimation of
the state
In this division the state is grounded in five conditions of existence regarding
the form of the state’s operation. These are listed in Scheme 6.3. The reader
should be warned that at this point (this division) this is a grounding in fairly
abstract-general terms. The key concept of ‘legitimation’ of the state, will only
gradually gain content in the current and in the next chapter.
5 Wealth of Nations, Book V, Ch. I, paras 45 and 55.
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scheme 6.3 The initial conditions of existence of the
state: the form of its operation
6§5 Legitimation in compliance
The capitalist state as an institutional constellation positing particular entitle-
ment claims in the formof granted rights (6§4). The first condition of existence
of the state is that it is legitimated in the compliance of a vast majority of the
actors. The statemust continuously seek this legitimation – outlined in general
terms in the remainder of this division.
6§5-a Explication. Seeking legitimation: general theoretical position
regarding the capitalist state
In very broad terms the exposition in this chapter, and that of legitimation in
particular, is not a normative one (a main strand being ‘social contract theory’)
but rather a descriptive one (on the distinction see Peter 2016, section 1).
This amplification briefly outlines the general theoretical position that
underlies the exposition in this chapter in contrast with ‘social contract the-
ory’ from which I distance myself. Much of political philosophy and political
theory is in someway based on a ‘social contract theory’. The early formulation
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goes back to Hobbes, Locke and Rousseau, in works published between 1651
and 1762.6 In brief: Given opposing interests and continuous conflicts among
the people, the institution of the state (in feudal times a ‘sovereign’) is con-
ceived of as the result of a ‘social contract’ between ‘the’ people. In the social
contract view they ‘will’ and submit to the authority of the state (or a sovereign)
in order to mitigate or overcome conflict.
The position in this chapter (and ones that follow) is, first of all, that there
cannot be a ‘pre-state’ capitalist constellation from which such a contract and
‘general willed’ state could be seen to emerge. The feudal economy and the
feudal governing entity gradually transformed into a capitalist economy and
state (see 6§4-e). However, amid this process, and continually within full-
fledged capitalism (that is, including capitalist production), it is the state that
has to seek its legitimation (and hence the legitimation of the capitalist sys-
tem). Thus this position is rather the reverse of a social contract theory. The
state’s seeking legitimation will bemade explicit, albeit still in abstract-general
terms, in the following sections. It will be further expanded in Chapter 7.
6§5-b Amplification. Legitimation and authoritarian regimes
The upshot of 6§5 is that compliance, at least, is necessary. At this level,
however, compliance is abstract-general, thus any particularisation is prema-
ture – that is, there may be various ways to gain compliance. The abstract-
general level of the exposition demands refraining from linking legitimation
and compliance to a contemporary constellation of the reader’s preference –
perhaps some form of political democracy. As history has shown, the capitalist
system is compatiblewith democracy (including abuses in the shape of fraudu-
lent elections and/or presidents elected by only aminority of the actual voters)
as much as with corporatism and fascism. In all cases the point is merely that,
for example, the majority or minority presidency or the fascist leader has to
gain the compliance of the majority of the people. Even a non-elected dictator
has to seek (and obtain) the compliance of the majority of actors. That is, ulti-
mately: in periods of transition, compliance may be weak.
6§6 The state and the putative general interest
The state’s legitimation in the compliance of the actors (6§5) is ultimately
grounded in the gaining of that compliance by positing its actions in terms of
the putative general interest.7 At this point of exposition these actions regard
the positing of certain claims in the form of granted rights (6§4). ‘In the name
6 For an overview, see Friend (n.d.) [accessed 2016].
7 The adjective ‘putative’ in the phrase ‘putative general interest’ is to be taken to mean that
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of’ the general interest, the state seeks legitimation to uphold (its definition
of) these granted rights. Conversely it posits the rights as being in the general
interest. (That is, of what it conceives as the general interest.) This framing of
these rights being in the general interest is particularly precarious when gran-
ted rights conflict, so that the state must prioritise the one right over the other.
Conflicts of interest are again resolved in terms of the putative general interest.
Whereas ‘general interest’ is inherently abstract, it is in actual practice, and
recurrently so, offered by the state as the legitimising basis for its (non-)actions.
Nevertheless, by any new (non-)action the state further concretises its implicit
concept of the general interest, which is again defended in reference to the gen-
eral interest, and so on.
Even if and when the state’s reference to the general interest is abstract, this
general interest is ultimately the de facto continual existence of the capitalist
system (ultimately the granting andupholding of the three core economic enti-
tlement claims in the form of granted rights – 6§2 and 6§4). This ‘de facto’ is
falsifiable, and it would be falsified if the state no longer granted these claims
as rights.
6§6-a Explication. Legitimation and implicit actions of the state
So far, the actions of the statemerely regard the positing of certain claims (6§2–
§6§3) in the form of granted rights. Other actions of the state are still implicit.
In the remainder of this chapter and in the next, these actions will be further
extended. Legitimation in terms of the putative general interest also applies to
these extended actions, albeit implicitly.
6§6-b Explication. The undefined general interest
In the context of legislation (properly introduced in 6§8), the state’s reference
to the general interest is circumventing and circular. This is what it is. No defin-
ition of it is provided by the state (even if we can infer that implicitly it is
ultimately defined by the continual existence of the capitalist system). The
statemay posit such a reference in general preambles. However, when it comes
to the defence of laws or law proposals in actual practice, such reference is also
the last straw when there are insufficient arguments for particular legislation.8
the state proposes its actions to be in what the state itself considers to be the general interest.
In this way the state in fact defines its actions to be in the general interest. Other actors may
have different views about what the general interest would be.
8 This has also been my own experience when I was a member of the senate in the parliament
of the Netherlands (2007–15). I can point to numerous legislative debates where ‘the general
interest’ was indeed presented as a last straw.
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6§7 The state’s self-imposition as impartial institution; versus the state as
constituting vis-à-vis the capitalist economy a ‘separation-in-unity’
within the capitalist system
The state’s recurrent reference to the ‘general interest’ for its seeking of legit-
imation (6§6) requires that it (putatively) positions itself above and outside
the opposing particular economic interests. Thus a condition of existence of
the legitimation in terms of the general interest is that the state imposes itself
(putatively) as an impartial extraordinary social institution, unlike all other
social institutions.9
In this sense the state is an institution separate from the economy. However,
given that the state de facto grants the core economic claims in the form of
rights (6§6), it constitutes vis-à-vis the capitalist economy a separation-in-
unitywithin the capitalist system.
Possible and potential conflicts between entitlement claims, as well as
between rights granted by the state, are not overcome by this separation-in-
unity; rather, such conflicts are settled by the state as extraordinary social insti-
tution, in some mode of (perhaps still conflicting) existence.10
6§7-a Explication. The state’s ‘separation-in-unity’ within the capitalist
system: the de facto objective of the state
The term ‘separation-in-unity’ (s-i-u) was first introduced in 2§11 in the context
of the separation between enterprises and banks, which was posited as an s-i-
u. The term was expanded on in 2§11-a (see alternatively the Glossary). Like an
outward bifurcation, an s-i-u is a main institutional separation. The key differ-
ence is that, in contradistinction to an outward bifurcation, the institutions, or
bodies, or component parts, of an s-i-u are ‘(ultimately) each driven by the same
objective, which articulates their unity’.
In the context of the main text of 6§7 the previous sentence requires spe-
cification. The state is considered vis-à-vis the capitalist economy, the latter
being institutionally bifurcated (recall that this is the meaning of ‘outward’
bifurcation). The poles of that bifurcation are driven by different objectives.
Together these constitute the capitalist economy as entity, which is not a unity
9 ‘Impartial’ is always a tricky concept as it is inevitably based on impartiality premises. If
the continual existence of the capitalist system is the premise, then the state may indeed
posit itself as impartial.
10 Note that the exposition is still at the level of abstract-generality. At more concrete levels
of the exposition, the state’s positioning of itself above the opposing interestsmay require
that it bounces back to the economyhyper-conflicting issues, either directly or in the form
of a relegation to bodies such as a Central Bank or a Competition Authority (cf. Chapters
7 and 9).
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but rather a dissociated bifurcated entity. The main text (6§7) posited: ‘given
that the state de facto grants the core economic claims in the form of rights
(6§6) it constitutes vis-à-vis the capitalist economya separation-in-unitywithin
the capitalist system’. Ultimately, given the state-granted rights, the de facto
objective of the state is the reproduction of the capitalist system – whence
it (pro temps the granting of those rights) is identified as the capitalist state
(6§4). In that sense it constitutes a separation-in-unity within the capitalist
system.
A recurrent theme in this chapter and ones to follow is that the state has to
seek legitimation for this position. In seeking this legitimation – as we will see
in especially Chapter 7 – the state is required to take account of several conflict-
ing interests, including those that are articulated by the different objectives of
the bifurcated poles referred to above.
In reference to explication 6§4-a (on state agents, or state actors and their
motivations) it should be emphasised that the state as entity has no ‘subjective’
objectives. Objectives of the state are identified by the effects of the operation
of the state as laid down in legislation and other regulation, and by the state’s
upholding of that legislation.
6§8 The positing of granted rights in the form of law – taking position:
legal rights as political rights
The positing of the state’s actions in terms of the general interest (6§6) and its
separation-in-unity (6§7) is grounded in the positing of granted rights in the
form of law. Thus the state posits rights granted in the form of legal rights. The
form of law explicitly posits that these rights apply equally to all. Herewith the
state (putatively) establishes its extraordinary impartial status.
The positing of the state’s actions (so far regarding these granted rights)
in the form of law requires a precise and often complicated demarcation and
specification of these, also in face of the practicable upholding of these. This
implies that the statemust take a stance on the specific content of rights. Espe-
cially when rights are actually or potentially in conflict (6§7), this stance of the
state articulates its position as a political position – even if framed in terms of
the general interest. In this way legal rights appear as political rights.
6§8-a Explication. Stages of the exposition and the ‘construction’ of
rights
Note the three stages of the exposition: from (1) entitlements claimed (6§2–
6§3); via (2) these claims as posited in the formgranted rights (6§4); to (3) these
granted rights in the form of law (6§8). As posited in the last form these are fur-
ther concretised in 6D4–6D6.
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Granted rights in the formof lawmayalsobe called ‘legal rules that construct
the entitlement’. Morris (1993, p. 823) remarks: ‘Entitlementsmust be construc-
ted so that they domore than simply “give legal force” to certain interests. They
must also specify the extent and type of legal force that a given interest has in
any particular context and in relation to any other particular entitlement.’
6§8-b Explication. Codified and non-codified law
The state may define right by way of codified law or other law-creating acts,
such as judgments or verdicts. In what follows my implicit reference will be
the ‘code law systems’. However, the exposition equally applies to ‘common law
systems’ even though this might often require some reformulation.
6§8-c Amplification. ‘Natural rights’ versus state-granted rights
In political philosophy and political theory, there is a longstanding tradition
of conceiving rights as ‘natural rights’ or at least as rights that exist independ-
ently of the state (e.g. Gavison 2003). I take distance from this tradition because
there is no criterion to demarcate one ‘pre-state right’ from another.11 In 6§2–
6§3, therefore, I used the term entitlement claims. With respect to ‘property’
the former position (rights existing independently of the state) has been called
‘full liberal ownership’, and the latter position (rights are granted by the state)
‘bundle theory’ (see the overview by Breakey n.d.; see also Azevedo 2010). In
the latter tradition, authors often use the term ‘rule’ instead of right. (See, for
example, Morris 1993; the same applies for Calabresi and Melamed on whose
work she builds.)
6§9 Arbitration and sanctioning
The state posits granted rights in the form of law (6§8). However, in order for
legal rights not to be empty, in the sense that actors could neglect the law,
the state must maintain these legal rights. Thus the grounding of legal right
requires the state to be the arbiter and sanctioner of deviation from the law.
(At this point of the exposition, the public prosecution of such deviation is
implicit – it is amplified in 6§18. At this point of the exposition, arbitration is
part of the state’s administrative body. In 7D6 the judiciary is presented as a
separate body of the state.)
11 In Reuten andWilliams 1989, we took, in my current view, insufficient distance from this
tradition, by merely distinguishing between right and legal right.
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Division 4. The capitalist economic rights framework
In this division, and all following ones in the book, ‘framework’ is a short-
hand for ‘legislative framework’. This division presents a brief categorisation
of necessary legal rights to property and to the employment of labour. At the
level of the state, these constitute the primary condition of existence for the
exposition in Chapter 1. Together these are called the economic rights frame-
work. ‘Framework’, here and in the next divisions,merely denotes that I present
a very general categorisation insteadof detailed specifications (in the end those
that one finds, depending on the framework, in the hundreds or thousands of
pages of the legislative codes).
6§10 Necessary categories of the legal right to property
This section merely lists the categories that necessarily make up the legal
property rights framework. More detail is not required for this chapter’s pur-
poses. The legal right to property is concretised in civil law and in criminal law.
Althoughall the rights listedbelowarenecessary, none is necessarily a full right.
Regarding property, the focus of the exposition in 6§2 and 6§4, and by
implication in 6D3, was on ‘claims of entitlement’/‘granted rights’/‘legal rights’
to (1) private property in the earth and (2) private property inmeans of produc-
tionother than forproductionby the claimant. For capitalism these are the core
granted property rights, comprising part of thewider category of granted prop-
erty rights in general. However, to the extent that the state draws no distinction
between these two and property right in general, the following connects to
property right in general, on the understanding that the earlier two property
rights are the essential ones, and that other property rights are subordinate,
even if the latter can be necessary corollaries of the former.12
• The legal right to property (both for natural persons and corporations)
The legal right to property is ruled by the convention that possession is a suffi-
cient title for ownership (whereas the actor challenging that ownership has to
prove its own title).13 Several forms of expropriation, such as theft, are classified
as criminal and hence so prosecuted and penalised as concretised in criminal
law. However, some forms of expropriation can be legal (cf. 7§2).
12 Herewith I make explicit that a systematic exposition need not stick to the categories and
the specific generalisations of the object of the exposition. ‘Re-categorisation’ is often at
the heart of scientific investigation and exposition.
13 Amoredetailed account of thismatterwouldhave to treat thequestionof whatmay count
as property and what may not (e.g. intellectual rights).
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• The legal right to free usage of property
Ownership is ruled by the legal right to the free usage of property as long as
this does not hinder the property of others. This legal right to free usage may
conflict with legal rights to existence whence this property right is a restricted
one (6§14 below).
• The legal right to the fruits from property
Free usage of property might seem to include the legal right to the fruits from
property. We will see in 7§1 and 7§18 that these rights are not analogous and
that the latter is not a full legal right. Quite apart from the caveat in the last
sentence, it is essential to capitalist legal right that surplus-value (see also 6§11
below) is defined as a fruit from the property in the earth and other means of
production, rather than as the fruit from labour (for the latter view see again
the quotations from Smith (1776) and Keynes (1936) in 1§14-b).
• The legal right to transfer property by agreement
The permanent transfer of property or the temporary transfer of property (hir-
ing, lending, renting, leasing) is ruled by the right to free contract or agreement
(including that of marriage). In face of the shaky basis of possession for owner-
ship (see the legal right to property), substantial property (especially real estate
and dwellings) is ruled by law about its registry, its transfer agreements and its
conveyance.
• The legal right to incorporate
A special form of the right to transfer property is the right to incorporate
(cf. 2D6).
Even this brief listing, together with some main restrictions to the full exer-
cise of these rights, may make it clear that the legal formulation of property
rights is a complicated matter. Nowadays their legal codes and sub-ordinary
regulations take up thousands of pages.
6§10-a Explication. Contingent property right: legal succession of
property
The succession of property is a particular form of transfer of property right as
concretised in civil succession law.14 The reason for not incorporating this in
the main text of 6§10 is that it is contingent. Schumpeter (2003 [1943]) makes
a big point about succession as a cornerstone for the survival of capitalism –
whence, in our terminology, it would seem to be necessary for the capitalist
system. He might have had a point for a mainly non-corporate organisation of
the business structure where enterprises in case of single ownership would die
(or perhaps go into public ownership) with the death of the owner. However,
14 Succession to family members seems a feudal remnant.
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because there is no escape from ownership of the corporation (unless it goes
bankrupt), the corporation does not die with the death of one or more of its
current shareholders.
Note also that between capitalist countries today, succession tax rates are
highly divergent.
6§10-b Amplification. Limited liability of owners of corporations
The restriction on the free usage or property of ‘not hindering the property
(and person) of others’ implies that property owners are liable in this respect
vis-à-vis other property owners. In case of corporate property, the corporation
is liable whereas the liability of the owners of the corporation (i.e. the share-
holders) is limited to their finance capital contribution. This limited liability
is a remarkable aspect of corporate law and hence of capitalist property right
(cf. 2D6 that expands onmerely the ‘economic’ aspect of this). In the absence of
corporate limited liability, enterprises might still engage in joint ventures with
unlimited liability.
6§11 The legal right to employ labour as combined with the employer’s
legal right to appropriate the surplus-value produced by that labour
Labour law makes no distinction between trade in labour-capacity and labour
(1§6). In this section, therefore, the distinction is bracketed. The enterprise’s
legal right to trade and employ labour as combinedwith its legal right to appro-
priate the product and particularly the surplus-value produced by that labour
is essential to the capitalist system.
• Trade and appropriation: property in persons
Market trade of commodities is based on the premise that the actor selling
a commodity is its legal owner, the ownership being transferred by the trade
contract. With commodity trade in the form of lease (also called renting), the
owner (lessor) transfers the use of a commodity to a contracting party (the
lessee), for a time and other conditions a stipulated by contract.
The legal right to the market trade of labour derives from the notion that
human beings (in this caseworkers) are tradable in some form,which is indeed
the case in a capitalist economy (aswell as,more broadly, in systems of slavery).
Market trade of labour is based on the remarkable premise that a person (the
worker) is the owner of its own person. (This notion seems to have originated
withRichardOverton, 1646, andwas,more influentially, phrasedby JohnLocke,
1689, who wrote: ‘every man has a property in his own person’.)15 Only on the
15 Overton writes in An Arrow against all Tyrants: ‘To every individual in nature is given an
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basis of this premise can some entity (land, horses, persons) be traded in either
the form of ownership transfer, or the form of use transfer.
Only on the basis of this premise could – in the case of a labour lease con-
tract – the enterprise command the fruits of the use of the commodity, that
is, appropriate the product, including the surplus-value produced by labour –
labour’s ‘compensation’ being the wage (a form of rent).
If a person (the worker) would indeed have the property in its own person,
then, on the basis of property and contract law, the ownership could in prin-
ciple be transferred. However, labour law does not allow for this (or sometimes
is not explicit about it).16 This seems to imply either that labour has a very lim-
ited property in its person, or that the premise of ownership in persons does
not hold – whence the lease of labour and the appropriation consequences are
shaky.
However, the fundamental point is the capitalist commodification of human
beings (1§6), in the case of labour – a commodification that the state grants as
a legal right. It could be argued that this is still better than systems of slavery or
of feudal appropriations (such as the enforced labour on the land of the lord).
Nevertheless ‘it could be worse’ is not a firm legal basis.
• Free trade and enforced trade
A second premise of labour contract law is that the labour contract is a free,
non-enforced, one. This was, in a somewhat different context, already alluded
to (1§6 and6§2-a).Workers are free to choosewhichemployer is going to appro-
priate the surplus-value that they produce. In this sense the appropriation is
based on a free contract. However, to the extent that workers lack property
in the earth and other means of production, they are forced to engage in an
employment contract with some enterprise. In this sense the appropriation is
not based on a free contract but on an enforced one. In each sense, neverthe-
less, the appropriation is a legalised appropriation.
individual property by nature not to be invaded or usurped by any. For everyone, as he is
himself, so he has a self propertiety, else he could not be himself; …’ (quoted by Ishay 2008,
p. 92). Locke (1689) writes the phrase quoted in the main text, in the context of a discus-
sion of the God-given commons. That Locke himself (in the last sentence below) derives
an apparently radical conclusion from this thesis – for labour, not for the commons – is
another matter. He writes: ‘Though the earth, and all inferior creatures, be common to all
men, yet every man has a property in his own person: this no body has any right to but
himself. The labour of his body, and the work of his hands, we may say, are properly his.’
(Two Treatises of Government, Book II, Chapter 5, §27).
16 In the latter case, the assumption is presumably that people do not engage in the stupidity
of selling, knowing that the worker’s ownership of the selling price will be transferred to
the purchaser along with the purchase of the person.
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Finally, we will see in 6§15 that the unlimited exercise of the legal right to
employ labour may conflict with the right to existence (initiated in 6§3). Thus
although this right is essential and necessary to the capitalist system, we will
see that is must be a restricted right.
6§11-a Explication. Employment of labour versus exploitation of labour
I have hesitated over whether, instead of the term employment of labour, I
should use the term exploitation of labour (asMarx andmostmarxian political
economist do). Exploitation of labour is an analytical term, which has noth-
ing to do with heavy or not so heavy exploitation (that is measured by the
rate of surplus-value). Because in the common language of the past decades
‘exploitation’ has come to mean ‘undue employment’ (which would be ‘heavy
exploitation’) I have decided against the term exploitation because that is not
the general issue. The general issue is that enterprises appropriate the surplus-
value produced by labour (‘heavily’ or less ‘heavily’).
I will nevertheless sometimes use the term ‘exploitation’ if there is no risk
of the confusion just mentioned, or when the context requires it. For example,
the phrase ‘the legal right to employment’ tout court might be interpreted as a
workers’ right instead of a right of enterprises. (In Chapters 6–7 employment
of labour by the state is implicit – it will be made explicit in Chapter 8.)
6§12 The general interest and ‘objective class’ interests
Economic legislation, and especially the state’s giving legal force to entitlement
claims, is inherently about opposing and conflicting interests.17 Throughout
this book, the objective is to set out the moments that condition the reproduc-
tion of the capitalist system. When the state casts its arguments for particular
legislation ‘ultimately’ in terms of the ‘general interest’ (6§6), this regards ulti-
mately the reproduction of the capitalist system. However, for the assessment
of the position of the state, it is opportune to see what are the particular ‘cap-
ital’ or ‘labour’ interests served by the state’s legislation and other regulation.
For this purpose I will henceforth use a shorthand indication that is based on
a very broad distinction into two ‘categories’ – or ‘objective classes’: the ‘capit-
alist and managerial class’ (CMC) and the subordinated working class (SWC).
Together these share the general drawbacks of capitalism (in short, the one-
dimensionality of monetary value, 1§4). Particularly these twocategories derive
different (dis)advantages from the capitalist system in terms of their decision-
makingpower and of their shares of incomeandwealth. In linewith 2§15-a these
classes are defined as follows:
17 Cf. Morris 1993, p. 823.
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• SWC. Subordinated workers are defined as workers who have no decision-
making power (in the USA between 1930 and 2010 this category included
between 73% and 90% of the relevant population). Their average income
is considerably lower than the average CMC income. (2§15-a, Graph 2.14.)
• CMC. Capitalists have direct or indirect decision-making power. The size
of their non-labour income is such that they are not forced to engage in
an employment contract – that is, to be employed themselves (although
typically they do engage in such employment contracts). Managers have
decision-making power and benefit from ‘super-wages’.18
These are called ‘objective classes’ in terms of these two measures of decision-
making power and of income only, and in contradistinction to any notion of
‘subjective class’, that is, of class-consciousness.
Division 5. The rights to existence framework
After briefly introducing rights in relation to the direct safety of the body of per-
sons, this division focuses on various protections of the person that in some
way restrict full property rights. These are consumer and environmental pro-
tections, as well as labour protection during the production process.
6§13 Legal rights to existence
Legal economic rights (6D3) must necessarily be grounded in state-granted
rights to existence (6§3 and 6§4), and next be posited in the form of legal rights
(the current division). Hence the state must demarcate, define and so concret-
ise these rights. This concerns, first of all, the respect of the body of the person
and hence the forbearance of direct violence regarding the person. More con-
crete existence rights, and especially those existence rights in demarcation of
economic rights, are presented in the following sections of this division.
6§14 Protection of the consumer and the environment: restrictions on
commodity production
Respect for the existence of the person regards not only direct bodily viol-
ence but also violation of the person’s safety and health regarding food and the
environment (including the climate). Granting these as rights in general seems
18 As indicated in 2§15-a: In the USA between 1930 and 2010 the average income of the total
managerial class was between 3–4 times higher than the SWC total average. The average
income of the capitalist class was between 9–29 times higher than the SWC average. (Cf.
Mohun 2016.)
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persuasive and simple qua principle. However, when it comes to formulating
these rights in the form of law, potential conflict centres on their degree and
hence content. What is more, much of the regulation in this field is difficult to
enact precisely and hence tends to be extensive and complicated.
• Consumer protection
The monetary-value dimension of production determines that the physical
quality of output is no intrinsic motif for production, but rather its by-product
(1§11). This indifference towards the physical output is a potential threat to the
consumers’ safety and health conditions (1§11-a).
• Environmental protection
Even more than with consumer protection, the scope for protection of the
environment is elastic. And evenmore so than the former, environmental pro-
tection can be postponed (even if notwithout damage). Another key difference
is that whereas the transaction of a consumer good passes the market (1§4),
free nature inherently does not: it has no monetary value (1§14, heading 2).
The other main difference is that neglecting consumer protection may affect
a human generation, whereas neglecting environmental protection may affect
many, or all, future generations.
• Conflicts of right: restrictions on commodity production
Next to the inherent conflict regarding the demarcation of the degree and con-
tent of these rights to protection, these protections put restrictions on the
production of commodities, and so conflict with, and must restrict, rights to
property (6§10).
For both consumer and environmental protection it applies that whereas
this protection is necessary as a ‘moment’ (that is, there must be this protec-
tion), the degree and specific content of such protection is contingent and a
source of potential conflict. Facing this (potential) conflict, much of the spe-
cific content of these protections tends to be delegated to semi-independent
regulative authorities and the prosecution to semi-independent inspectorates
(see further 6§16).
6§15 Labour protection regarding labour time and occupational safety
and health: restrictions on the production process
Next to consumer andenvironmental protections (6§14), the legal right to exist-
ence (6§13) is concretised in labour protection.
This protection concerns the regulation of labour time (especially the max-
imum labour time per day and per week) as well as the regulation of occupa-
tional safety andhealth. Labourprotection in general is rather persuasive as it is
directly about existence issues. However, the potential conflict about such reg-
ulation centres again not somuch on their principle but rather on their degree
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and hence content.Whereas the regulation of labour time is fairly easy to enact
precisely, the regulation of occupational safety is not, and tends to be complic-
ated.
Labour protection puts restrictions on the design of the production pro-
cess, which conflicts with the legal right to free usage of property (6§10) and
the legal right to employ labour (6§11). As with consumer and environmental
protections, labour protection is necessary as a moment (there must be pro-
tection) whereas the actual content is contingent and a source of continuous
potential conflict. Again the specific content of the regulation tends tobedeleg-
ated to semi-independent regulative authorities and the prosecution to semi-
independent inspectorates (see 6§16).
6§15-a Explication. Labour time and the minimumwage
For the regulation of labour time it is pre-posited that the permittedmaximum
labour time is sufficient to gain a ‘living wage’ or at least a subsistence wage.
So far there are no guarantees for this, other than via the compliance of labour
(2§7). The (a) minimumwage is presented in 7§10.
6§16 Delegation of the specific regulation and of the supervision of its
execution: purification from conflict
The upholding of the rights to existence insofar as these require restrictions
on commodity production and the production process (protection of the con-
sumer, of the environment and of labour), conflict with capitalist economic
rights (6§14–6§15). This clash of rights threatens the legitimation of the state.
In attempting to moderate problems, the state tends to enact these protec-
tions/restrictions in general terms, and to delegate specific regulation to partic-
ular putatively (semi-)independent regulation authorities, and the prosecution
to particular putatively (semi-)independent inspectorates.
In this way the state ‘purifies’ its core administrative body from conflict (to
some extent). Nevertheless, the state is ultimately responsible for the actions
that it delegates.However, in the caseof disasters orheavy conflict, the state can
dismiss and replace the board of the authority or of the inspectorate, thereby
evading or mitigating any heavy effects on its own legitimation.
6§16-a Amplification. Purification from conflict through delegation
The delegation referred to in the main text is the first occasion of an institu-
tional ‘purification’ of the state, that is, purification from potential conflict in
order to protect its legitimation.ThroughoutChapters 7 and 9, similar aswell as
other forms of purification will recurrently be introduced into the exposition.
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Division 6. The public security framework
This division presents the framework of ‘public security’ (6§18). The first sec-
tion (6§17) is introductory and applies to (most) public security as well as to
rights in general.
6§17 ‘Rights’ (allowance rights) and ‘positive rights’
Generally a right held by one person imposes on other persons the duty to
respect that right.19 (In accordance with judicial discourses, when I use the
term ‘person’ this term includes reference to non-natural persons such as busi-
ness companies and corporations.) Concerning rights a distinction is made
between ‘allowance rights’ and ‘positive rights’. So far, when I used the term
‘right’ I implicitly meant what I will now term ‘allowance right’.
An allowance right held by a person – e.g. the allowance right to property of
means of production– entails thedutyonall other persons to respect that right.
That is, the duty of non-interference, non-obstruction or non-action. Thus a full
allowance right to property entails that once a person possesses property, the
possession ought not be obstructed and, more specifically, the possessor ought
not be expropriated. Similarly, a full allowance right to existence imposes the
duty on other persons to not interfere with or obstruct this right, e.g. by viol-
ence. (In much of the literature, allowance rights are called ‘negative rights’, in
reference to the duty side of the this type of right – see Addendum 6§17-a.)
A positive right entails duties that go much further: requiring ‘positive
action’. (Positive rights require a specification as to whether the duty of posit-
ive action falls on all other persons, or on a specific category, or perhaps on the
state or some other institution.) A positive right to property, for example, to the
earth, might more specifically entail that everybody is granted the right to pos-
sess some portion or perhaps an equal proportion of the earth; it might impose
the duty on others to transfer their disproportionate share in the earth to the
other right holders. Similarly apositive right to existence, for example, specified
as the positive right to decent work, or the positive right to a decent living (all
to be specified further), imposes the duty on others of sharing the available
decent work or to share other means of decent living. Again, the required duty
might fall on the state or some other institution.
Returning to allowance rights: a restriction of rights to allowance rights
implies the negation of symmetric positive distributions (of property, work,
existence, etc.). In other words, the restriction implies formal equality for
19 See, e.g., Morris 1993, p. 828.
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economic actors regarding duties of the non-obstruction of rights (property,
existence), whilst there may be material inequality regarding the distribution
of property or means to existence.
In capitalism, legal property rights are generally restricted to being legal
property allowance rights. For existence rights there are several varieties (see
further 7D5). Note that the drawing line between allowance and positive rights
is not anexact one.Take the caseof consumerprotection. Fromoneperspective
this imposes the ‘abstinence’ duty on enterprises to not obstruct the secur-
ity of consumers (allowance right). From another perspective it imposes the
‘positive’ duty (regarding positive right) of producing secure food and other
commodities.
Having made this distinction, the term ‘right’ will henceforth denote allow-
ance right. Other rights will be specified as ‘positive right’. The distinction will
become especially relevant in Chapter 7.
6§17-a Addendum. Rights (allowance rights or negative rights) and
positive rights
Allowance rights (negative rights) are a common, or perhaps the most com-
mon, category of rights in a capitalist system. I have refrained from using the
term ‘negative right’ because when I did so in earlier drafts of the book, which
were shared with mainly economics students, the latter felt uneasy about the
term, questioning especially what is particularly ‘negative’ about the mainten-
ance of such a right. Because this book provides an immanent critique of the
capitalist system, I would notwantmy terminology to resemble an external cri-
ticism, with which the term ‘negative right’ might be associated. (Alternative
terms for ‘allowance right’ would be ‘tolerance right’, ‘permit right’ or ‘non-
obstruction right’.)
The distinction between negative rights (allowance rights) and positive
rights derives from Isaiah Berlin (1958) who made a distinction between neg-
ative and positive freedom (see Andre and Velasquez 1990, for an introduction
in two pages).
6§18 The public security framework: upholding of the legal economic and
existence rights and of the institution of the state
• Public security components
The state’s upholding of both the legal right to property (6D4) and the legal
right to existence (6D5) requires a public police and public prosecution, the
public police being entitled to use violence.
The upholding of each of the legal rights to property and existence also
requires the protection against fire, open water and other elements.
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These together – public police and prosecution and the protection against
‘elements’ – are called ‘public security’. They have in common that – for various
reasons – their provision cannot, or cannot adequately, be sold on the market.
Hence they must be collectively provided by or via the state – even if some of
the execution might be outsourced, perhaps via procurement and licences.
Public security, or specific components thereof, can be granted in the form
of a provision (weak claim) or in the form of a ‘positive right’ (strong claim) –
see 6§18-a.
• The state’s legalised violence and its limits
As institutionalised in the public police, the state grants to itself the mono-
polistic right to the use of violence and next institutionalises this right in
legal form.20 This legalised violence is the state’s extreme though limited legal
resource for the protection of the rights that it grants and legalises. It is also
the extreme though limited legal resource for the protection of the institution
of the state itself (6§4).
The state can use this violence against a limited number of actors that devi-
ate from the law. This amount of deviating actors is limited because the state’s
violent powers are inherently materially restricted – in the end because the
means for violence must be materially produced and because there must be a
sufficient number of reliable police forces to operate thesemeans.21 Ultimately,
and predominantly, therefore the state must seek legitimation for its actions
and non-actions not just in a majority compliance, but in the compliance of a
vast majority of social actors (6§5).22
6§18-a Explication. Positive right to public security
Note thus that themaintenance of legal rights to property and existence (rights
to non-interference)must be translated into positive rights to protection (rights
to interference) by the police, fire brigades, and so forth. If, for example, the
20 The state,Weber noted, ‘claims themonopoly of the legitimate use of physical forcewithin a
given territory.…The state is considered the sole source of the “right” to use violence’ (1999
[1919], p. 1). However, there are (degrees of) exceptions to this monopoly, for example, in
the USA on the basis of its citizens’ right to bear arms.
21 I realise verywell that the restrictions towhich I refer, and the state’s searching the limits of
these restrictions, have historically and contemporarily resulted in an enormous amount
of blood.
22 It cannot be pinpointed what, in this context, constitutes a ‘vast majority’. It is likely more
than 75% rather than less. Approaching this from the other side, that is, violent action by
state subjects, even such rebellion by 10% of the people seems insurmountable. And even
that is a very high number within a ‘normal’ police force, as measured by OECD averages,
and even when the active military is included.
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protection of property or person by the police were a positive right (instead of
a provision), it is the specific definition of the protection that determines the
meaning of the right. Generally the state tends to prefer to formulate its legisla-
tion for various elements of public security in terms of ‘provisions’ rather than
rights, because this reduces the effectivity of possible liability claims in case of
damage.
Summary and conclusions
This chapter returned to the expositional level of Chapter 1. It started with
the capitalist economy’s dissociated outward bifurcation between households
and privately owned enterprises – now predicated on not only the presumed
abstract existence of the capitalist economy, but also presumed abstract exist-
ence of the state. (Division 1.)
In the exposition of the capitalist economy it was implicit that actors have
the freedom (concretised as entitlement claims) to act as set out in Part One.
The core of these are: first, claims of entitlement to private property in the
earth; second, claims of entitlement to private property of means of produc-
tion other than for production by the claimant; third, claims of entitlement to
employ labour as combined with the appropriation of the surplus-value pro-
duced by that labour; fourth, claims of entitlement to existence.
However, within the economy there are no institutions guaranteeing these
claimed entitlements, whence the capitalist economy cannot stand on its own.
When the state grants particularly these claims in the form of rights, the state
is identified as a capitalist state. The state demarcates these granted rights and
it upholds them. (Division 2.)
The existence of the state is grounded in five conditions of existence regard-
ing the formof its operation: (1) its legitimation in the compliance of the actors;
(2) in gaining that compliance by positing its actions in terms of the putative
general interest; (3) the latter requires that it putatively positions itself above
and outside the opposing particular economic interests, hence as extraordin-
ary social institution – as a separation-in-unity; (4) this again requires that it
posits right in the form of law, equally applying to all, which, however, implies
that it must take a stance on the content of right; (5) the form of law requires
that the state maintains law by arbitration and sanctioning. (Division 3.)
The ‘economic rights framework’ is the first moment of the state’s positing
right as legal right. It comprises various necessary ‘property rights’, and the legal
right to employ labour as combined with the employer’s legal right to appro-
priate the surplus-value produced by that labour. (Division 4.)
326 part two – the capitalist state
Economic rights are futile without the right to existence. Hence the former
rights are grounded in the latter – the second moment of the state’s positing
right as legal right. Much of the demarcation of the rights to existence in the
form of law (consumer and environmental protections and labour protection)
conflicts with economic rights. Hence potential conflicts at the level of the
economy are transferred to the level of the state. The state attempts to mit-
igate their effect on its legitimation by delegating the regulation of the specific
content of these protections to be delegated to (putatively) semi-independent
regulative authorities and the prosecution to (putatively) semi-independent
inspectorates. (Division 5.)
The state’s upholding of the legal right to property and the legal right to
existence is grounded in the state’s provision of public security – police, public
prosecution and protection against fire and water (Division 6).
This completes the exposition of the capitalist state at the expositional level
analogous to that of Chapter 1.
The first main conclusion is that the existence of the capitalist economy can
only insufficiently be grounded within the capitalist economy itself. In light
of that insufficiency, ‘economic freedom’ cannot be grounded within the eco-
nomy.
The second main conclusion is that the state, by granting the ‘economic
rights’ that it does grant, is indeed identified as a ‘capitalist state’. Therewith
these rights are indeed political rights. However, that adjective is in a way
empty, as all actual rights are political rights. We will see in Chapter 7 that the
legitimation of the state requires more than ‘merely’ the granting and uphold-
ing of these economic rights (as we have already seen for elementary existence
rights).
∵
Note: The reader who would generally skip the Appendices in this book, but
who is going to take cognisance of the empirical Amplifications (in the next
chapters), is advised to read at least the first section (6A-1) of the following
Appendix.
Appendix 6A. Empirical data in chapters 7–10: the OECD-21 average
In the systematic exposition of this book, the starting point of ‘dissociated out-
ward bifurcation’ in 1§1 and 6§1 set out an abstract-general characterisation
of the capitalist system. The concrete meaning of full-fledged ‘capitalism’ is
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determined by the starting point’s increasingly concrete conditions of exist-
ence and their manifestations as exhibited in Chapters 1–10. Throughout the
rest of Part Two (Chapters 7–10) I will, especially for various categories of state
expenditure and taxation, refer to historical data of the average of 21 OECD
countries during the period 1870–2015 as explained below.
6A-1 Empirical reference to ‘capitalism’ as exemplified by the OECD-21
‘strongest version’
Empirically, the 34 countries that made up the OECD (Organisation for Eco-
nomic Development and Co-operation) in 2015 are main examples of full-
fledged capitalist countries. However, not all of those countries can be char-
acterised as capitalist throughout the period 1870–2015. This applies especially
for most of the countries that became OECD members after 1990. For histor-
ical data I therefore restrict myself to the countries that were OECD members
in 1990, though omitting Iceland, Luxembourg and Turkey, because for these
countries pre-1960 data are always missing and many data afterwards. This
leaves 21 countries. I henceforth use the term ‘OECD-21’ for: Australia, Austria,
Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Greece, Germany, Ireland, Italy,
Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzer-
land, United Kingdom (of Great Brittan and Northern Ireland), United States
of America.23|24
The countries of the OECD-21 are indeedmerely examples of capitalist coun-
tries, though a specific selectionof those, in that on aworld scale these are char-
acterised by a relatively high GDP per capita, and many of these built that on
a colonial and imperialist history. On the other hand, I consider that a critical
exposition of ‘the’ capitalist system should focus on its hitherto economically
strongest version, in whatever way that was historically reached. (Personally
I have moral views about that history and thus on the appreciation of that
‘strength’. These views, however, are irrelevant to the exposition of the repro-
duction of the capitalist system in its strongest version.)
We will see in Chapter 7 that for the average of the OECD-21, state expendit-
ure increased from about 11% of GDP in 1870 to about 45% in 2015, with the
main expenditure component of social security transfers increasing in the
23 In 2015, the share of these 21 countries of the world population was 13%, whereas their
share of world GDP was 56% (source: World Bank, databaseWorld Development Indicat-
ors – update 17 Nov. 2016).
24 In 2015, the 13 other OECD countries were: Iceland, Luxembourg, Turkey – as mentioned
(from the year 1961); Czech Republic, Hungary, South Korea, Mexico, Poland (from the
years 1994–96); Chile, Estonia, Israel, Slovak Republic, Slovenia (from the year 2010).
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same period from about 0% of GDP to 25%. In face of the legitimation in the
compliance of the vastmajority of the actors (that is necessary for the capitalist
system), I will submit that there is a tendency for a similar future development
of state expenditure for the more recent and the currently weaker capitalist
countries (Chapter 11).
I emphasise that all quantitative references to the OECD-21 form no part of
the systematic exposition, and these are therefore relegated to Amplifications of
the systematic sections. The systematic sections refer to all capitalist countries
characterised by the starting point’s ‘dissociated outward bifurcation’, however
old or young these are in this respect, andwhatever their stage of development
in terms of, for example, state expenditure and GDP per capita. To be sure, all
of Part One applied to all of these countries.
6A-2 Empirical references to the arithmetic average of the OECD-21
As with Part One, Part Two is concerned with full-fledged capitalism in gen-
eral, not individual countries. When in Amplifications I refer to the average of
merely the OECD-21, this is for the pragmatic reason of lack of the relevant and
reasonably standardised data of the average of all capitalist countries in a long-
run perspective (1870–2015).
I refer to the OECD-21 averages except for a number of cases when averages
are not available or when averagesmake no sense (in that case Imay refer to an
individual country).More specifically, the reference is always to theunweighted
average or arithmetic average (which is the same as the ‘arithmetic mean’). The
reason for this is that I am not concerned with the possible economic impact
of one country on another. My concern is the average OECD country’s political
economic constellation. Then it does not matter if a country is big or small. In
each case it has to uphold a full legislative framework and in each case its state
has to gain legitimation for that framework. Therefore, as amatter of principle I
have to measure in terms of arithmetic averages (without weighing for the size
of an economy).25
6A-3 Data sources for the OECD-21
When it has the data available I always use the OECD database. Mostly this is
the case for data fromafter 1990 and sometimes for data fromafter 1960 or 1970.
Incidentally I use specialised databases, such as from UNESCO.
25 Note that this is rather common in this field. See, e.g., Tanzi and Schuknecht 2000, Castles
2006 and Tanzi 2011. The OECD database often also calculates unweighted averages for its
‘OECD Total’.
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For the years forwhich the OECDhas no data available, Imainly rely on three
sources: Tanzi and Schuknecht (2000); Castles (2006); and Tanzi (2011). For the
years prior to 1960, decomposed state expenditure data on a common base are
scarce, and the further we go back, the number of countries for which there are
data on a common base is also restricted. For all years (1870–2015) I have used
themaximumamount of information thatmy sources provide for the OECD-21.
Finally, the common statistics in the field of ‘state expenditure’ most often
adopt the term ‘total government’ or ‘general government’ for the sum of ‘fed-
eral government’ (when relevant), state government and local governments.
For graphs and tables I adopt the latter convention of ‘general government’.
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Introduction
The exposition in Chapter 6 showed that the capitalist economy cannot exist
by itself and that its reproduction necessarily requires the state to grant core
economic entitlement claims in the form of legal rights. This chapter starts by
setting out that the material grounding of the state and its actions requires it
to collect means from the economy in the form of taxation. Hence taxation
overrides property right. Thus we have the paradox that the state’s upholding
of property right must intrude property right.
The ‘action radius of the state’ is that which it can do given the constraint
of feasible taxation. The latter is determined by the prevailing condition of the
accumulation of capital. The capitalist state’s necessary action in face of feas-
ible taxation determines (the degree of) its furthering the conditions for the
accumulation of capital. The main body of this chapter consists of the expos-
ition of these conditions. First, monetary conditions (Division 2). Secondly,
conditions regarding the quantity and quality of the supply of labour-capacity
(Division 3). Thirdly, conditions regarding the economy’s infrastructure (Divi-
sion4). Especially the concretisationof the secondand third conditions require
extra state expenditure and hence taxation. However, the feasibility of taxation
concernsnot somuch its absolute amount, but rather the feasibility of tax rates.
A (potentially) quantitatively important category of state expenditure con-
cerns social security provisions. These, and their requirement in face of the
legitimation of the state, are presented in Division 5.
Whereas action of the state on all these terrains is necessary, we will see
throughout this chapter that the degree is the crucial point. This opens up con-
tinuous sources of conflict, which may threaten the legitimation of the state.
The last two divisions show how potential conflicts in respect of this legitima-
tion require twomajor separations within the body of the state. As a result the
state exists institutionally within three bodies. The core one is the Administrat-
ive, with next to it the bodies of the Judiciary (Division 6) and the Deliberative
(Division 7). The latter’s seeking of compliance, and ultimately its actual gen-
eration of compliance, is an indispensable condition for the existence of the
state, and hence for the capitalist system.
Throughout this chapter I never use the term ‘state intervention’. I consider
that term to be highly ideological to the extent that it is based on the pre-
sumption that the capitalist economy could possibly stand on itself. Instead,
the capitalist economy and state constitute a necessary unity, be it institution-
ally distinct as a ‘separation-in-unity’.
The current chapter presents the first conditions of existence of the expos-
ition in Chapter 6. At the same time it is the sequel to the exposition in
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scheme 7.1 The conditions furthering the accumulation of capital
(outline Chapter 7)
Legend
↡ grounded in (conditioned by)
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Chapter 2, setting out the latter’s conditions of existence, especially regarding
the accumulation of capital and its moments of the expansion of money and
of labour-capacity (Divisions 2 and 3 of the current chapter).
Themainmoments presented in this chapter are summarised in Scheme 7.1.
Division 1. The state’s action radius as predicated on its furthering
of the conditions for the accumulation of capital
General terminological note: I use the term regulation for the entirety of laws
and of the ‘delegated regulation’. When I explicitly refer to the latter I always
use the adjective ‘delegated’. When I refer to ‘regulation’, this refers, as said, to
the entirety. (See further 10§2.)
7§1 Thematerial existence of the state: taxation and the state’s action
radius
The state’s actionof the legislation andupholding of right (6D4–6D6)necessar-
ily requires its material reproduction. For that material reproduction the state
is dependent upon the economy. The formof separation (6§6) requires, at least
in principle, that the state itself does not engage in profit-generating processes
of production out of which it might finance its action. Therefore the state is
compelled to appropriate means from the economy by taxation. Thus taxation
grounds the action radius of the state.
7§1-a Explication. The state and profit-generating processes
The main text refers to an abstaining ‘in principle’. In fact, for the average of
the OECD-21 countries in the early twenty-first century, about 2% of the total
labour force is employed in state enterprises. To be sure: the proceeds from it
far from cover the total state expenditure (around the same time on average
about 45% of GDP).
7§2 The fundamental conflict of taxation; the tax base and the tax rate
The state’s material reproduction via taxation (7§1) implies that its mainten-
ance of right requires the overriding of property right through taxation. Hence
taxation is fundamentally conflicting. This fundamental conflict cannot be
overcome, even if it can be moderated. (I systematically bracket this funda-
mental conflict until the last division of this chapter – 7D7.)
Quite apart from the fundamental character of this conflict, the degree of
conflict is determined by the tax base or the tax bases (that on which taxes are
levied) and the rate of taxation. The tax base is the value amount of the income
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or property that can in principle be taxed. Thus if the state requires an amount
of x in taxes, themacroeconomic tax base (for example, the amount of surplus-
value) determines the tax rate (t%) that generates x.
7§2-a Explication. Taxation in general
The previous sections – and all of this chapter – posit taxation in general.
Chapter 8 presents the various forms of taxation (such as particularly on prop-
erty, income or expenditures) as well as their effect on profits in face of the
accumulation of capital.
7§3 The potential action radius of the state, the tax base and the state’s
furthering of the conditions for the accumulation of capital
The ‘action radius of the state’ is that which it can do given the constraint
of feasible taxation. So far, this action radius is demarcated merely by what
was presented in Chapter 6. Thus the state’s action radius is grounded in feas-
ible taxation (7§1), which is determined by the ‘tax base’ and a concomitant
‘tax rate’ (7§2). The tax base (e.g. that of surplus-value) is again grounded in
a constellation of the accumulation of capital (Chapter 2). Thus a prevailing
constellation of accumulation would constrain the action radius of the state –
one that may not be sufficient for its necessary action. Given the constraint of
feasible taxation, the capitalist state’s necessary action requires it to further the
conditions for the accumulation of capital. Hence the latter is inherent to the
constellation of the capitalist state (methodologically this characteristic again
grounds the state’s existence – summarised in Scheme 7.2).
Whereas this furthering is qualitatively an important determination of the
state, the continuously crucial point is its quantitative degree in face of feasible
tax rates.
Thus the state must seek to further the conditions for the accumulation of
capital and along with it the conditions for economic growth.1 Hence these
conditions are instrumental for taxation, the maintenance of the legal rights
that the state grants, and the legitimation of the state. Nevertheless economic
growth, togetherwith accumulation of capital, tends to be defended in terms of
1 Recall from 2§3 that ‘accumulation of capital’ or ‘economic growth’ is a matter of perspect-
ive. The state can alternate between these perspectives. The perspective of the accumulation
of capital will be popular in discourses between the state and enterprises; the perspective
of economic growth can be more appropriate for the formulation of policy in terms of ‘the
general interest’, not excluding though that accumulation of capital is appropriately phrased
in terms of ‘the general interest’. (This is also a matter of the contingent ideological cli-
mate.)
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the ‘general interest’.2 This way the state at least presents this as an independent
objective even if the tax base might be its primary concern. It does not really
matter in what order the state itself presents this in actual practice. Whatever
the order, the statemust seek legitimation in the compliance of actors not only
for its granting and upholding of legal rights (6§5–6§6), but also, concurrently,
for its furthering the conditions for economic growth.
As a consequence the monetary-value dimension (1D2) is a constitutive ele-
ment of the considerations of the state. This applies inherently for taxation and
economic growth. Regarding legal rights we have as effect that their specific
concretisation in legislation is formulated not only within a qualitative legal
discourse, but also – especially in the ‘explanatory memorandums’ of legisla-
tion – in terms of costs and benefits, that is, in terms of the discourse of the
quantitative monetary-value dimension.
The next divisions present the three main levers for the state’s mainten-
ance and improvement of the conditions for economic growth, that is, those
regardingmoney and banking (7D2), labour-capacity (7D3), and the economic
infrastructure (7D4).
scheme 7.2 The grounding of the state’s action radius in its
furthering of the conditions for the accumulation
of capital (systematic of 7D1)
Legend
↡ grounded in
|| implicit in the previous moment
2 Recall from 6§6 that ‘the general interest’ is inevitably ‘the putative general interest’: the state
338 part two – the capitalist state
7§3-a Explication. Simplification by assuming surplus-value to be the
unique tax base
Themain text of 7§3 provides the conceptual grounding forwhat the state does
in actual practice: economic policy; as well as for what it frames as one of the
main objectives of economic policy: the stimulation of economic growth. That
section also provides the grounds of what mainstream economic theory cas-
ually calls the reparation of (potential) ‘market failures’ – set out in Divisions
2–4.
The main text is perhaps more transparent when, as a provisional simpli-
fication, it is assumed that all taxes are levied on surplus-value – prior to any
distribution of surplus-value. (In Chapter 8, other taxes, in part substituting
for this tax, will be introduced.) This implies that surplus-value is the unique
tax base. The tax base constrains the action radius of the state – so far, that
which is presented in Chapter 6. In the hypothetical case of zero surplus-value,
the action radius would be zero (this would entail an impossibility theorem,
to the extent that capitalism cannot exist without the state). This implies that
the state for its action radius, and possible extensions of it, must be concerned
with the tax base and its growth. More generally, therefore, the state must seek
to further the conditions for the accumulation of capital and along with it
the conditions for economic growth. Note that given a certain action radius,
an increasing tax base – for now increasing surplus-value – may alleviate the
tax rate and hence the degree of conflict referred to in 7§2 (and the other way
around for a decreasing tax base).
7§3-b Amplification. A very rough proxy for the long-run development of
the tax base
Graph 7.3 shows the average real-GDP per capita growth rate for up to 21 cur-
rent OECD countries from 1870–2010 (arithmetic average; see Appendix 6A on
the OECD-21 and arithmetic averages). This should serve as a very rough proxy
for the development of the average tax base. For that purpose, and for this group
of countries, during especially the nineteenth-century period, only these data
are available. We will see later on (8D2) that until about 1913 state tax receipts
were quite below 10% of GDP for the average of the same group of countries;
then after a considerable rise between 1913 and 1920, taxes rose continuously
after 1937. The top panel of Graph 7.3 (growth rate per year) shows that prior
to 1945 the GDP per capita growth rate developed more erratically than there-
proposes its actions to be in what the state itself considers to be the general interest. Other
actors may have different views about what the general interest would be.
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after. The bottom graph shows decade averages. The bold suggestion is that the
state’s furthering of the conditions of economic growth emerged gradually –
flattening off after about 1980. This is empirically substantiated for the OECD-
21 in Amplifications of the rest of this chapter.
It should be emphasised that because business cycles are not synchron-
ous between countries, Graph 7.3 does not picture the business cycle, as this
averages picture has severely flattened these. (I return to the business cycle in
Chapter 10.)
graph 7.3 Real-GDP per capita 1870–2010, growth rate per year (top
graph) and average per decade (bottom graph); average of
20–21 current OECD countries in 2011 US$
Data source: Maddison Project Database, version 2018 by Jutta Bolt, Robert Inklaar, Herman
de Jong and Jan Luiten van Zanden. See Appendix 7A, under 7§3-b, for more information on the
data
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Division 2. The monetary framework
From taxation tomonetary regulation furthering accumulation of capital
This division presents the first of the three main levers for the state’s further-
ing of the conditions for economic growth (next to 7D3 and 7D4). The current
division is also the sequel to 2D4 on the expansion of money as grounding the
accumulation of capital.
7§4 Imposition of themonetary standard of the Central Bank
The material existence of the state requires it to appropriate means from the
economy (7§1). It is in keeping with the monetary-value dimension of the cap-
italist economy that the state enacts taxation of economic actors in monetary
form, rather than in the form of specific useful objects or services.
Recall from Chapter 2 that the extent of the domain of operation of the
money created by banks is an important determinant for the collaboration of
banks under the umbrella of a dominant bank which adopts the role of Clear-
ing Bank, grounded in monetary rules set by that Clearing Bank (2§9). Recall
also that there may be several such Clearing Banks.
This collaboration between banks, or rather the extension of the collab-
oration, is reinforced by the state. The state will likely have relations with a
dominant bank (i.e. a Clearing Bank). On the one hand, the state will require
that taxation be paid in terms of the monetary standard of its Clearing Bank.
On the other hand, the state will require that its payments be unconditionally
accepted by economic subjects. Hence the state imposes payment in terms of
the monetary standard of ‘its’ Clearing Bank. Herewith all banks are required
to adopt the monetary standard of the state’s Clearing Bank, now the Central
Bank.
All the determinants concerning the Clearing Bank and its connection to
commercial banks as presented in 2D4, apply to the Central Bank. Because
the state is a client of the Central Bank, the latter may provide money-creating
loans to the state (similar to the Clearing Bank providing such loans to its cli-
ents). TheCentral Bank tends to abstain fromcompetitionwith commonbanks
regarding all actors apart from the state (in which case the state is its only non-
bank client).
7§4-a Amplification. Legal tender
In 7§4 I have avoided using the term ‘legal tender’. This term may refer to the
type of payment that is protected by law, which is what 7§4 refers to. However,
even in the second decade of the twenty-first century, the term often also refers
to a type of money itself, especially notes issued by the Central Bank. This is
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confusing, because the US Treasury, for example, does not expect actors to pay
taxes in dollar notes (not even ‘ultimately’).
7§4-b Explication. No monopoly of money creation for the Central Bank
The last sentence of 7§4 re-establishes that the current exposition is at the
same level as that of Chapter 2. In 2D4 when the Clearing Bank was ‘merely’
presentedas thebankers’ bank, capitalistmoney (1D2)was concretised asbank-
created money. Now (7§4) this is ‘stamped’ by the state as legally enforced
capitalist money.
Regardingmoney creation the current division introduces nothing new, other
than that one Clearing Bank is now stamped as Central Bank. This merely
implies that its monetary standard (a standard such as ‘dollar’) acquires a
monopoly status. It does not imply that the Central Bank has the monopoly
of creating money, even if it may have the monopoly of issuing its banknotes
(i.e. its own bank notes). On the contrary, ordinary banks do the vast majority
of the money creation, and they may also issue their own ‘notes’, for example,
in the form of cheques. (In non-crisis times, ordinary banks do virtually all of
the money creation.)
7§5 Money and its grounding inmonetary legislation
The state’s imposition of themonetary standard of ‘its’ bank (7§4) implies that
it takes responsibility for the actions of the Central Bank (CB).
This, primarily, determines the concrete grounding of money in monetary
legislation. It is necessary because the state (Chapter 6), and hence taxation in
monetary form, is necessary to the existence of the capitalist economy.
Secondly, monetary legislation is further determined by the state’s require-
ment of furthering the conditions for economic growth, and hence the accu-
mulation of capital (7§3).
Monetary legislation includes: first, rules regarding the status of the CB;
second, rules regarding the authorisation for financial enterprises to operate
as bank; third, a general framework for the rights and duties of banks regarding
their client debtors and creditors; fourth, a general framework for the supervi-
sion of banks. (See the next three sections.)
7§5-a Explication. Supervision and banking licence
Regulation regarding the authorisation, or licence, for financial enterprises to
operate as bank, as well as the general framework for the supervision of banks
(7§5), may not be very different from the concern of the Clearing Bank (ClB)
regarding a standard for securities and liability rules (2§9; 2§9-b). (Recall that
these may include conditions on the banks’ degree of solvency, on various
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reserve ratios, onmaturity matches, on the interest rates (margins) charged, as
well as enforced loans of banks with the ClB.) The main difference now (7§5)
is that the ordinary banks that do not comply can be fined or may ultimately
lose their banking licence.
7§6 Conflicts of monetary regulation
Althoughmonetary legislation is necessary (7§5), the degree of its detail is con-
tingent. This degree of detail determines the executive room formanoeuvre for,
on the one hand, the state itself and, on the other, the CB.
This possible room for manoeuvre regards, for example, the placement of
state loans or bondswith the CB.Monetary legislationmight also be (non-)spe-
cific about the monetary accommodation of the development of the general
price level (cf. 4D3) and of monetary stabilisation regarding the business cycle
(cf. 5D2). Such (non-)legislation includes the level of the rate of interest (either
as a target or as a (semi-)instrument).
This room for manoeuvre also regards the tightness of standards for securit-
ies and liability rules (generally the composition of the banks’ balance sheet –
2§9-b), as well as the intensity of the supervision of banks. The degree of tight-
ness poses the main dilemma of the state’s monetary policy: tight prudential
regulation affects the banks’ accommodation of economic growth negatively;
loose regulation increases the risk of bank crises.
In any case – be it via legislation or via executive room for manoeuvre – the
state necessarily has to make legislative and/or executive choices (in the latter
case, thepriority, interpretation, and specificationof regulation).These choices
affect the distribution of income directly (prices, interest) as well as, indirectly,
investment and unemployment. This implies that the state has to take a side in
the (potential) conflicts between labour, enterprises and financiers. Hence – as
with restrictions on theproductionprocess in faceof labourprotection (6§16) –
the state’s reference to the ‘general interest’ (6§6) and its self-imposed (putat-
ive) impartiality (6§7) may erode, so distorting the ground for its legitimation
(6§5).
7§7 Delegation of the specific regulation, of the supervision of its
execution, and of monetary policy to the Central Bank: purification
from conflict
For its monetary regulation the state has to make regulative choices that may
distort its legitimation (7§6).Therefore the state tends to enact a general frame-
work for the objectives and tasks of the Central Bank as including its super-
vision of the other banks. Next it tends to delegate the specific regulation,
the execution of its supervision as well as monetary policy to the putatively
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(semi-)independent Central Bank (see 7§7-a). Through this delegation (and
analogous to the earlier delegation – 6§16), the state purifies its core adminis-
trative body from conflict (to some extent). Nevertheless the state is ultimately
responsible for the actions that it delegates.3 However, in case of disasters or
heavy conflict, the state can dismiss and replace the board of the CB, so evad-
ing heavy effect on its own legitimation.4
Scheme 7.4 summarises the sequence of the grounding moments presented
so far in the current division.
scheme 7.4 From taxation to conflicts of monetary regulation
and conflict delegation (systematic of 7D2, 7§4–
7§7)
3 Both the delegation and the ultimate responsibility of the state are revealed in the follow-
ing citation. In 2013 the Minister of Finance of the Netherlands, Dijsselbloem, stated to the
country’s Senate: ‘… The Netherlands decided to actualise its monetary policy by delegating
it to the European level. The state ultimately determines the “monetary constellation”. In the
theoretical case in which the euro area would cease to exist, the Netherlands would have
to decide again in what way it would want to reshape its monetary policy.’ [‘Zoals uit boven-
staandeblijkt heeftNederlander voorgekozenomhaarmonetaire beleid vormtegevendoordeze
te delegeren naar het Europese niveau. De Staat is dus uiteindelijk bepalend voor de “monetaire
constellatie”. In het theoretische geval dat het eurogebied zou ophouden te bestaan ontstaat er
voor Nederland een nieuwe situatie en zal zij opnieuw moeten kiezen op welke manier zij het
monetaire beleid vorm zal willen geven.’] (Ministry of Finance of the Netherlands 2013, p. 15).
4 It might make this more difficult when the appointment term is fixed for a number of years,
without constraints.
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7§7-a Explication. The delegation to the ‘technocratic’ CB and the
inevitable ultimate responsibility of the state.
The delegation of tasks to the CB does notmean that CB policies are cast ‘more’
in ‘the’ general interest than in the absence of such delegation. Delegation is
merely a means to protect the main body of the state from conflict. This goes
against the mainstream assumption that a Central Bank is more independent
than (the rest of) the state. This presumes, by theway, that the state is not inde-
pendent (vis-à-vis the capitalist economy, the state is indeed a capitalist state,
but I doubt that this is the quarrel). Thus, those who are sometimes called CB
‘technocrats’ have to formulate the content of their view on the (monetary)
general interest. However, these technocrats are no more disconnected from
interests (particularly those of banks – perhaps large banks) than other actors.
Yes, they like to be labelled as ‘independent’.
Because the state in fact delegates the conflict dealing to the CB (regarding
especially the distribution of income and wealth – 7§6), it is not only in the
interest of the CB but foremost in the interest of the state to ‘advertise’ the CB as
being an ‘independent’ institution.
However, this delegation goes as far as its goes. It works on an everyday basis
along withmoderate conflicts and along with perhapsmoderate failures of the
CB. Big failures regarding especially the CB’s supervision of (big) banks will
again be bounced back to the state (see 7§9).
7§8 The objective of reaching creeping inflation
Reaching creeping inflation (euphemistically called ‘price stability’) is a neces-
sary condition for the accumulation of capital (cf. 4D3). The state tends to
encode this objective and to delegate its execution to the Central Bank. Creep-
ing inflation should prevent the economic stagnation associatedwith the com-
bination of generalised price competition and speeded up technical change
(4§9). Because price competition is the impetus for the objective of creeping
inflation, this matter will be treated in Chapter 9 on ‘the imposition of compet-
ition’.
A side effect of the stagnation-prevention impetus to creeping inflation
is that workers get one step (one year) behind in wage-bargaining, as price-
inflation compensation is most often provided afterwards. I write that this is a
side effect, but it may well be a co-objective of creeping inflation.
7§9 Banking crises and themovement to ‘too big to fail’ banks
Over-optimism of enterprises as accommodated by the banks’ over-crediting
make the banking constellation vulnerable to the failure of banks, and even to
failures on a large scale, leading to a crisis of the banking constellation (2§10;
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2§10-b). Banking crises and the associated recessions (Graph 2.11 in 2§10-b)
have severely damaging effects on the capitalist economy. Nevertheless, in the
history of the capitalist system until recently, these have not threatened the
reproduction of the system. However, the 2008–12 crisis, followed by the ‘great
recession’ aftermath, did pose such threat.5 One important factor contributing
to it was the gigantic concentration of bank capital and the centralisation of
banks from the 1980s.6 This led to ‘big’ banks (so big, as wewill see in Chapter 9,
that these are organisationally too complex to supervise inmicro terms) and to
so-called ‘too big to fail’ banks. Failure of such big banks tends to trigger a dom-
ino of failures of other banks, up to the collapse of the banking constellation –
and therewith tending to the collapse of the capitalist system as a whole. This
implies that the CB and/or the state is/are enforced to save the banks that are
too big to fail.
Some commentators take the view that for the saving of such banks the
Central Bank could ‘print’money. But given the principles of double bookkeep-
ing, this is not the case. The CB can lend money, and when it lends money
against bad loans this should be reflected in the CB’s equity. Then there are
only two possibilities: the state makes up for the equity deficit of the CB, or the
state settles the finance capital of the big bad banks (via finance capital ‘injec-
tions’ in some form or another, including via the form of take-over). In both
these cases, the state is effectively the lender of last resort (not the presumed
‘independent’ CB). Directly or indirectly, this means that the state is ‘tax levier
of last resort’. Indeed, economic actors pay the price for it. To be sure, they pay
not only the price of saving the banks, but also the price of the recessive or
depressive effects of a banking crisis.
The allowance or non-allowance of the concentration and centralisation in
the banking sector is ultimately a matter of regulation and supervision, and of
the willingness of the state to put constraints on the mode of competition and
5 At the point of a threatening collapse, the state officials are constrained not to communic-
ate this publicly, because that would have a self-reinforcing effect. Because of the severe
threat of a collapse around 2008–12, a number of members of parliament were informed
(as I was, when at the time I was a member of the senate of the Netherlands, as one of its
financial spokespersons) though under the clause of strict confidentiality. Luyendijk writes
in The Guardian: ‘Herman van Rompuy waited until 2014 to acknowledge in an interview
that he had seen the system come within “a few millimetres of total implosion”.’ In 2008,
Van Rompuy was the prime minister of Belgium, and in 2009–14 the full-time president of
the EU council of heads of government. https://www.theguardian.com/business/2015/sep/
30/how‑the‑banks‑ignored‑lessons‑of‑crash.
6 By 2005, the assets of the three largest banks as a percentage of the assets of all banks reached
74% for the OECD-21 countries on average (see Appendix 9A, Graph 9.3).
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themode of capital accumulation.Moreover, ‘too big to fail’ may apply not only
to banks, but also to other key sectors (those on which a vast majority of act-
ors is dependent whilst there is no ready substitute) such as the energy sector
and the communications sector (currently ICT). Therefore this matter will be
treated in Chapter 9 on ‘the imposition of competition’.
Division 3. The labour-capacity framework
Accumulation-furthering regulation
This division presents the secondof the threemain levers for the state’s further-
ing of the conditions for economic growth (next to 7D2 and 7D4). The current
division is also the sequel to 2D2 on the expansion of labour-capacity.
7§10 Minimumwage: the reproduction of the current labour population
The state’s maintenance of capitalist legal right, and generally its action radius,
requires that it furthers the conditions for economic growth and hence the
accumulation of capital (7§3). For these and all of its (non-)actions, the state
must continuously seek legitimation in the compliance of social actors, par-
ticularly in that of, very broadly, the ‘objective classes’ of the ‘capitalist and
managerial class’ (CMC) and the subordinated working class (SWC) (6§12).
A wage below at least a subsistence wage would result in labour shortage
and impair the reproduction of the labour population.7 Whereas this is self-
destructive for enterprises, there are nevertheless insufficient forces within the
economy preventing such self-destruction in at least themedium term (7§10-a
below).
The state’s furtheringof the conditions for the accumulationof capital there-
fore requires it to impose a legal minimum wage, being at least a subsistence
wage (7§10-b).8 At the same time a legal minimumwage infringes on capitalist
economic rights, especially the extent of the employers’ legal right to employ
labour-capacity (6§11).
7 Malnutrition – as well as bad hygienic circumstances that tend to accompany it – affects first
of all children and their death rates and hence the potential labour population within a time
span of some 10 to 15 years.
8 When there are general social security provisions for the structurally unemployed (see 7D5),
thesemay contingently be the effective benchmark for non-imposedminimumwages (in this
case employers have to pay a wage at least equivalent to the level of these transfers – as was
the case, e.g., in Germany until 2014).
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A substantial legal minimum wage is in the interest of the SWC (as always,
within the confines of the capitalist system). Although in the perception of
individual CMC actors it might go against their interests, it is nevertheless in
their common interest, given the requirement of the reproductionof the labour
population. For competitive reasons, an important general consideration for
enterprises is that any minimum wage restrictions/constraints apply equally
to all.
Regarding the potential conflict about this (amplified in 7§11 below), the
delicate point is the level of the minimum wage. It might vary from minimum
subsistence to one beyond some definition of a poverty line or a ‘living wage’
(each of these always includes a socio-cultural component – 7§10-b).
7§10-a Amplification. The labour population in the absence of a legal
minimumwage
Recall that all of the exposition in this book is about the full-fledged capit-
alist system in general, independently of the contingencies of its particular
historical stages (General Introduction). Mere subsistence wages were preval-
ent throughout the nineteenth century in the current ‘strong’ capitalist OECD
countries (see Appendix 6A on these countries) and throughout the twentieth
century in many other capitalist countries.
When there is unemployment (hence labour abundance), competition will
tend to press down wages. This would affect the reproduction of the current
labour population in case the wage is pressed down below the subsistence
wage. That reproduction effect is not immediately actual. Rather, as indicated
in the last but one footnote, malnutrition – as well as bad hygienic circum-
stances that tend to accompany it – affects first of all children and their death
rates and hence the potential labour population within a time span of some 10
to 15 years. Co-depending on severalmacroeconomic conditions, the death rate
process would ultimately give rise to labour shortage and a rise of wages to per-
haps above the subsistencewage,whichwould have again a lagged effect on the
death rates and so the labour population growth. (Cf. the labour populations
theories of Classical Political Economy.) Although there are so ‘equilibrating’
forces, their long time span tends to produce stagnation rather than flourish-
ing economic growth: ceteris paribus the labour population growth being the
constraint. (It is remarkable that this matter plays no part in the conventional
neoclassical economics on the labour market and the minimum wage in par-
ticular.)
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7§10-b Amplification. Subsistence wage and legal minimumwage
It is not obvious how a subsistence wage should be defined. Ultimately meas-
ures for it might be devised on the basis of interregional comparisons of death
rates. In any case it includes a socio-cultural component, whence a definition
by exclusively nutritional components is insufficient. Quite apart from these
socio-cultural components, the subsistence wage should also include a com-
ponent for the raising of children and for sickness. Similar difficulties apply
for definitions of the poverty line (e.g. CBS/SCP 2013) or of ‘decency’ – a term
adopted in Human Rights covenants and in ILO covenants (Biermans 2012).
Whereas these problems of definition are relevant for deliberations about a
legal minimum wage (see also 7§11), the point of the main text (7§10) is that
the state is required to set some legal minimum wage, whatever it is (with the
caveat set out in the last footnote).
7§11 Delegation tominimumwage commissions or councils
A legalminimumwage infringes on the capitalist economic right to freely
employ labour-capacity – the delicate point being especially the level of
the minimumwage (7§10).
The potential social conflict about it threatens the legitimation of the state.
Therefore the state tends to delegate the determination of the level of themin-
imumwage tominimumwage commissions orminimumwage councils. This is
again an effort to purify the core administrative body of the state from conflict
(cf. the purifying delegations presented in 6§15 and 7§7).
7§12 Temporary unemployment benefits
• cyclical (temporary) unemployment benefits
The accumulation of capital develops cyclically (Chapter 5). To the extent that
cyclical unemployment would result in a deprived – hence unfit or even abor-
ted – echelon of labour reserve, enterprises would be deprived of a fresh valor-
isation potential in the upturn of the cycle.9 Therefore the state’s objective of
furthering the conditions for economic growth and hence the accumulation of
capital (7§3) requires it to impose regulation on cyclical unemployment bene-
fits. As the emergence of the downturn of the cycle is difficult to define, these
benefits tend to be extended to lay-offs in general for a limited duration.10 It
9 (Cyclical) unemployment is a statistical uncertainty, andhence it cannot be insured;when
it can, it is usually at high costs and for limited levels and duration.
10 Given that the downturn period of ‘normal’ cycles (those not particularly associated with
banking crises) is some two years – the duration of these benefits would roughly extend
to such a period.
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is contingent whether these benefits are paid out of taxation or – perhaps in
part – specifically out of contributions by enterprises.
• sickness benefits
A similar argument applies for average ‘normal’ sickness of workers.11 Enter-
prises have no interest in immediately sacking these workers, or in their dep-
rivation during a somewhat extended period of sickness. Therefore state reg-
ulation of sickness benefits is in the interest of enterprises (as well as of the
workers), so providing equal conditions of capital accumulation. The level of
these benefits is contingent. The same applies for their way of finance – in
this case, however, the finance tends to be imposed on enterprises. (In terms
of costs for enterprises this comes down to an extended minimumwage.)
For each of these benefits it applies that these are in the interest of the SWC
as well as the CMC. Again their level is the main source of conflict. Given the
resolution of aminimumwage level (7§11), the level of the benefits above tends
to be set at some percentage of the minimumwage.
7§13 Labour population growth
Population policy might seem to be generally contingent. However, in face
of the state’s objective of furthering the conditions for economic growth and
hence the accumulation of capital (7§3), population policy is a requirement in
case of a foreseen structural labour scarcity. (Note that whereas 7§10 is about
the reproduction of the current labour population, the section at hand is about
long run labour population growth.)
Given some current population growth – and given some state of tech-
nical development – that population growth, and hence the labour population
growth, ultimately operates as a limit on the accumulation of capital (cf. 2D2,
especially the interconnections summarised in 2§6 and Figure 2.5). Recall that
2§4 posited labour population growth as a contingency. In terms of themethod
adopted in this book, this is still an open end.12
Given the population growth and the labour participation (see below), the
available labour-capacity is determined by:
• the length of the working day (or week)
In case of structural labour scarcity, the state might relax the existing regula-
tion on the length of the working day or week (6§14). This, however, is highly
conflicting.
11 Average ‘normal’ sickness is distinguished from enduring disability to work (for the latter
see 7D5).
12 Recall the conclusion from 2§4, heading 1: ‘It is a problem for capitalist enterprises that
the reserve of labour is rather indeterminate and thus hard to control.’
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The available labour-capacity is also determined by:
• occupational health and safety
Equally conflicting would be for the state to relax the occupational health and
safety regulation (6§14).
Given the status of the former two regulations, the available labour-capacity
is next determined by:
• labour participation
The labour participation is the net effect of: first, the division of work within
the household; second, the duration of formal education; and third, the retire-
ment age. (1)The first of these is themost complicated as, in the case of families,
it is largely a matter of, on the one hand, socio-economic culture and, on the
other, the (non-)enforcement of multiple earning in face of the level of a single
wage. Anyway, the state might stimulate multiple earning by, for example, tax
reductions for the second earner. (2) A reduction in the duration of education
conflicts with the enhancement of the labour-capacity required by enterprises
(see below, 7§14). (3) The contingency of a (perhaps enforced) retirement age
has not been introduced (see 7D5). Should there contingently be old age/pen-
sion transfers, then the age of eligibility can be extended.
Given the status of the former three regulations, the available labour-
capacity is finally determined by:
• population growth
Population growth is the net result of birth and death ratios. Regarding death
ratios the state could adopt a wide arsenal of regulation ranging from traffic
speed limits (cheap) to a public health service (expensive). The factors oper-
ating on birth ratios are more complicated. Nevertheless the state can use
the instrument of child benefits to enhance population growth (perhaps by –
increasing – benefits beyond the second child). In this case the requirement is
for temporary stages of child benefits, as long as thepopulation growth requires
to be enhanced.
7§13-a Amplification. Importation of labour-capacity
Up to Chapter 11 the exposition is about a single isolated economy and state, or
alternatively a borderless world economy and state. In case of a multitude of
nations and states, labour scarcity regions might import labour-capacity from
labour-abundant regions.
7§13-b Amplification. State expenditure for the regulation presented in
7§10–7§13
All legislation and other regulation require state expenditure on legislation and
supervision, as well as on authorities and commissions to which the state del-
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egates tasks. In comparisonwith all other state expenditure this is aminor part
(see Chapter 10). Apart from that, the regulation of the minimum wage level
(7§10) does not require state expenditure (except for the state’s own employ-
ment). However, temporary unemployment benefits may go along with state
expenditure. The same goes for child benefits (7§13). Empirical information on
the latter two is provided in 7D5, Graphs 7.9 and 7.10.
7§14 Public education
The state is required to further the conditions for economic growth (7§3). One
means for this is the enhancement of the quality of the labour-capacity needed
by enterprises.The statemay further this bywayof public education (synonym-
ous with state education), or more generally by state-funded education. There
are several (contingent) ways of organising this (see 7§14-b).
Up to this point, the exposition was restricted to state expenditure on legis-
lation, on the maintenance of legal right, and on the quantity of the labour-
capacity. State-funded education introduces a qualitatively new moment into
the exposition, both in terms of the type of state expenditure (the quality of the
labour-capacity), and in terms of the amount of state expenditure (see 7§14-d).
Whereas state-funded education furthers the conditions for the accumulation
of capital (as contingent on the stage of technical development) a trade-off
between its costs and benefits is difficult to determine even in terms of exclus-
ively monetary objectives.
Public education is in the interest of enterprises and the CMC, whilst it is
certainly also in the interest of the SWC. (On the classes of CMC and SWC see
7§10 and 6§12.)
7§14-a Explication. Necessity of public education and of all the moments
of 7D3 and 7D4
Public education by itself is not necessary to the ‘phantom’ of a capitalist eco-
nomy that might be supposed to stand on itself (even if without public edu-
cation, profits and the rate of accumulation of capital would slacken). It is,
however, necessary to the capitalist system to the extent that the furthering of
the conditions for economic growth is a necessary objective for the capitalist
state (7§3). However, the dodgy question is not about the necessity, but rather
about the degree. The latter is inevitably amatter of opposing interests, choices
and conflict resolution in practice. A similar remark applies to all themoments
of 7D3 and 7D4.
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7§14-b Amplification. Reason for state-funded education and the
contingent main ways of organising it
Were all formal education left completely to the market, then the education
would tend to be restricted to high income earning families. The resulting
under-education of themajority of theworkers would limit the possible imple-
mentation of new techniques of production. On the job education and training
of general skills that can be used in any other job secure rents for enterprises
that abstain from providing this general education and training. Therefore it
is in the interest of enterprises that education is provided, or at least funded,
collectively.13
The specific way of doing this is contingent. One possibility is that all formal
education is provided by profit-driven private institutions (i.e. enterprises),
with the state subsidising the pupils and students via grants. The efficiency of
such a system is doubtful. Another possibility is that the state funds the edu-
cational institutions, requiring these institutions to provide the education for
free.
All this tends to be combinedwith regulation of compulsory education up to
some age. The age of compulsory education is contingently related to the state
of technical development. It is also contingent whether, and to what degree,
the state funds higher education beyond the compulsory age.
Equally contingent is whether, on top of the free education, the state
provides subsidies, grants or loans for livelihood during the education. Should
the state not provide means for livelihood during especially the duration of
the compulsory education, then the average equivalent is required to be part
of either the minimum wage (6§7) or there should be – more directly – child
benefits to cover this.
Note that – as always – the argument here and in the main text is not about
morals, and in this case about any emancipatory aspects of free education. The
‘enhancement of the labour-capacity required by enterprises’ (7§14) does not
univocally imply that the corresponding education is emancipatory (see also
2§7 about compliance with the objectives of the enterprise).
13 Ultra-freemarket proponents question this. In anarticle in the AmericanEconomicReview,
Blankenau, Simpson and Tomljanovich (2007) suggest that ‘the inability of some studies
to find a robust relationship between public education spending and growth may reflect
a failure to properly account for the method of finance’.
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7§14-c Amplification. Development of the years of average formal
schooling, and indicators of the current distribution of schooling:
case of the OECD-21
(See Appendix 6A on themere illustrative status of the OECD-21 data, here and
in the rest of this chapter.)Graph7.5 showsdata of the development of the aver-
agenumber of years of formal schooling (not particularly public schooling). For
the average of 21 current OECD countries, we see an almost linear increase in
the number of years of formal schooling from 1870–1950, followed by an accel-
erated increase from 1950–80. After 1980 the increase somewhat flattens off.
For the distribution we see a sharp decline in the skewedness from 1870–1920
and a considerable decline after 1930. (The Gini measure for the distribution is
on the scale of 0–100: the number 0 indicating complete evenness of the dis-
tribution, and the number 100maximal skewedness – all education devoted to
one person.)
graph 7.5 Years of formal schooling and distribution of schooling 1870–2010;
average of 21 current OECD countries14
Data source: Clio Infra (accessed 27 February 2016). See Appendix 7A, under ‘7§14-c’, for more
information on the data
7§14-d Amplification. State expenditure on education: case of the
OECD-21.
Graph 7.6 shows data on state expenditure as a percentage of GDP from 1870–
2014, for the average of up to 21 current OECD countries. There are some gaps in
14 These are the ‘OECD-21’ (see Appendix 6A).
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these data (these are interpolated), but, as far as I know, we have nomore espe-
cially for the period prior to 1960 (see Appendix 7A, under ‘7§14-d’.) Note that
‘general government’ is a (statistical) category denoting all levels of government
(the central plus the various levels of the local ones).
graph 7.6 State expenditure (general government) on education, 1870–2014,
in% of GDP; average of up to 21 current OECD countries
Data sources: 1870–1960 (Tanzi and Schuknecht 2000, Table II.5); 1970–2014 (UNESCO insti-
tute for statistics,May 2017 release, accessed 27December 2017). SeeAppendix 7A, under ‘7§14-d’,
for more information on the data
It can be seen from Graph 7.6 that already in 1870 there was, on average, a con-
siderable state expenditure on education of 0.6% of GDP, moving to 2.1% in
1937. After a quite steep increase between 1937 and 1970 (to 4.4%), the degree
of increase flattens off in the decades thereafter.
7§14-e Amplification. Impact of varying number of countries in historical
datasets
In order to show the possible impact of the scarce number of data for earlier
years in terms of number of counties, most of my figures show graphs for sep-
arate series of countries – in the main text or in the statistical appendix of a
chapter. See, for example, the two series inGraph 7.6. Therewe see that the data
for the 11 countries of 1937 approximate the 17 of 1960 and the 21 afterwards, so
that it may be concluded that the 1937 figure is probably a reliable proxy for the
total.
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Division 4. The infrastructural framework
Accumulation-furthering regulation
This division presents the third of the three main levers for the state’s further-
ing of the conditions for economic growth (next to 7D2 and 7D3).
7§15 Infrastructure
• Infrastructural networks
There is a category of (potential) economic activities – called infrastructural –
that substantially does or would raise the macroeconomic productivity of
labour and so does or would raise macroeconomic surplus-value (integral
profit), but that nevertheless either cannot microeconomically be profitably
produced by enterprises, or, if it could, would generate a monopoly.15 Most
often these concern very costly networks. That is, networks for the transport of
commodities and of waste, including critical nodes for the former. More spe-
cifically, networks for the transport of vehicles (for people and commodities),
for commodities (the latter including communication/information, energy)
and for waste (including sewers).
• State engagement in infrastructural networks
To the extent that these productivity raising infrastructural activities are not
undertaken by enterprises without generating amonopoly, the state’s objective
of furthering the conditions for economic growth and hence the accumulation
of capital (7§3) requires it to engage in these.
In addition, though more controversial than the former, the state might
engage in infrastructural activities that are, or could be, undertaken by private
enterprises, when these can be produced at a lower cost collectively than
competitively. Nevertheless such engagement is in line with the objective of
increasing the macroeconomic tax base.
The state’s engagement in the provision of networks can be undertaken in
various ways. Networks may be produced, maintained and owned by the state.
Alternatively these are owned by the state though via procurement produced
and maintained by enterprises. In some cases another possibility might be
to temporarily license the provision to enterprises perhaps via procurement.
Apart from this last possibility, state engagement in infrastructural activity con-
siderably raises the state expenditures and the amount of taxation (as with
15 The non-profitability might be merely contingently the case. Technical development
might change the tables such that a formerly non-profitable activity may become prof-
itable. Apart from that, Chapter 9 sets out why the state tends to put restrictions on
monopolisation.
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education), though – in face of the effect on productivity, costs and growth –
not necessarily the tax rates.
• Infrastructural supply (plant)
In many cases the supply of the commodities transported via infrastructural
networks has itself a so-called infrastructural character tending to (regional)
monopoly or oligopoly (for example, water resources, mass energy genera-
tion, communication, train connection). When in addition there are no ready
(regional) substitutes for these, the state cannot allow the possible bankruptcy
of the supplying enterprises – that is, without jeopardising the reproduction
of the (regional) economy. Because ‘too big to fail’ implies private profits com-
bined with social losses, this may be a reason for state ownership of the infra-
structural supply.
7§15-a Amplification. State expenditure on infrastructure, 1870 to current:
case of the OECD-21
For the OECD countries, internationallymore or less homogenous data for state
expenditure on infrastructure are only available from 1995. However, for state
gross investment expenditure (general government) long run data are avail-
able. Therefore I use amajor fraction (57.5%) of the latter as an approximation
for the infrastructure expenditure. In Appendix 7A (under 7§15-a) I provide
an underpinning of this proxy, by relating it to the after 1995 infrastructure
data.
In this perspective Graph 7.7 shows data on state expenditure (general gov-
ernment) on gross investment for the average of up to 21 current OECD coun-
tries, from 1870 to 2015. Judging from the data available, it can be seen that from
1870 (investment at about 2% of GDP) there is a steady increase until 1970. In
the six decades thereafter the average for investment decreases quite substan-
tially, reaching in 2015 a GDP share of just below that of 1920.
Thus the expenditure on infrastructure (as approximated by 57.5% of gross
investment) moved from 1.2% in 1870 to a top of 3.2% in 1970, and then gradu-
ally decreased to a GDP share of 1.9% in 2015. One cause of the decrease is the
substitution of state ownership for private ownership via licenses as indicated
in the main text of 7§15.
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graph 7.7 State expenditure (general government) on gross investment,
1870–2015, average of up to 21 current OECD countries
Data sources: 1870–1937 (Tanzi and Schuknecht 2000); 1960–2015 (OECD Economic Outlook
database 2017–2, June, accessed 27 December 2017). See Appendix 7A, under ‘7§15-a’, for more
information on the data
7§16 Fundamental technology research
Fundamental technology research (in contradistinction to technique and
applied technique development) is unlikely to be carried out by enterprises on
a considerable scale. Nevertheless fundamental technology research is indis-
pensable for applied research and technique development. Given the state’s
objective of furthering the conditions for economic growthandhence the accu-
mulation of capital (7§3), the finance by the state of this fundamental research
is perhaps not absolutely necessary, but it is (at least today) de facto consider-
able. The dodgy question for the state is how much and on the basis of what
criterion (there does not seem to be such a criterion).
7§16-a Amplification. The state’s fundamental technology research
In a study that focuses on research anddevelopment (R&D) afterWWII,Mazzu-
cato (2011)16 indicates that for the year 2008 in the USA, business companies
accounted for 67% of total R&D expenditure. However, regarding the basic
R&D this was 18%, the rest was undertaken by the Federal government (57%),
universities andcolleges (15%)andothernon-profit institutions (11%). (SeeFig-
ures 3 and 4 in Mazzucato 2011, pp. 51–2.) She shows that the state is ‘a lead-
16 See also Mazzucato 2013.
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ing agent in achieving the type of innovative breakthroughs that allow com-
panies, and economies, to grow’ (p. 18). It has been ‘the state not the private
sector that has kick-started and developed the engine of growth, because of
its willingness to take risk in areas where the private sector has been too risk-
averse’ (p. 23). More specifically she shows that the technological revolutions
of the computer industry, the Internet, the pharma-biotech industry, nanotech
industry and many more are the result of the ‘leading role of the state’ (p. 20;
and pp. 76ff.).17 (In the terminology of Chapters 1–2, I call the fundamental
research ‘technology research’ and the research regarding the application of
technology ‘technique research’.)
Division 5. The social security framework
The indeterminate degree of social security transfers in face of the required
compliance of subordinated labour
The legitimation of the state in the compliance of the vast majority of actors
(6D3, 6§5), grounds the state-granted economic rights (6D2) at an abstract-
general level. Inherent to the latter, this legitimation in compliance is system-
atically a high-level determinant for all of the more concrete conditions of
existence presented in the later exposition. (In this there is an analogue with
the monetary-value dimension – 1D2.) More concretely, the legitimating com-
pliance is engendered in the compliance of categories of actors that have a
particular (non-)interest in the existence and outcomes of the capitalist system
(recall the reference to the two very broad objective classes of the capitalist and
managerial class (CMC) and the subordinated working class (SWC) in 6§12).
In this perspective the current division–which focuses on the compliance of
the SWC– grounds 6D3, aswell as all the later conditions of existence presented
so far (see Scheme 7.1).
Recall that in 6§17 a distinction was made between ‘allowance rights/provi-
sions’ and ‘positive rights/provisions’. In terms of the broad category of ‘exist-
ence rights’, and especially ‘positive existence rights/provisions’, the current divi-
sion is a continuation from three moments presented in 7D3 (those of the
minimumwage, temporary unemployment benefits and child benefits). These
17 Because I will not return to this matter in Chapter 11 – when I introduce multiple nations
and multiple states – it may be noted that specific states may specialise in particular
branches of fundamental research. The R&D workers, especially those of the large enter-
prises carrying out applied research and development, must be equipped to absorb the
fundamental research wherever it is located (see WRR 2013a and 2013b).
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latter, however, serve primarily the labour-capacity requirements – the ‘posit-
ive rights/provision’ being a corollary. However, the moments presented in the
current division are ‘self-standing’ in face of the legitimation referred to.
7§17 Legitimation: compliance-dependent social security transfers
1 Seeking legitimation in the compliance of the vast majority
For its actions and non-actions the state inevitably has to seek and gain legit-
imation in the compliance of not just a majority but the vast majority of actors
(6§5; 6§18). Given that the subordinated working class constitutes the vast
majority, the state must necessarily seek their compliance.18 This may require,
first, minimum wages that are substantially higher than subsistence wages
(7§10) and, second, compensation for actors out of work aswell as for expendit-
ures that should be covered by a ‘decent’ wage but are not.
Such compensations regard these actors’ ‘existence security’, or, as it is com-
monly called (perhaps less heavily laden), ‘social security’. These are neces-
sary.19 However, their level is contingent in the sense that compliance is
dependent on a contingent degree of conflict or perhaps resistance in case of
non-materialisation of sufficient compensations.
In face of this ‘level-contingency’, this section outlines a social security
framework: first, themain prevailing categories of social security, and secondly,
the legal forms in which these can be provided. For ‘compensation’ I adopt the
common term ‘transfer’.
2 Categories of social security transfers
There are six categories of social security transfers, which can be divided into
two groups.
A. Out of work transfers, specifically regarding:
• Unemployment in general – that is, transfers for structural unemployment,
next to the temporary unemployment benefits presented in 7§12.
• Incapacity (disability) – that is, incapacity during the regular working life.
• Old-age disability or exemption to work (pensions).
18 From research by Mohun (2016) for the USA 1918–2012, it can be inferred that during this
period on average, the subordinated working class made up 82% of the total. (See also
2§15-a.)
19 Even in the period 1880–1920 there were some of these, the state expenditure amount-
ing from 0.4 to 0.9% of GDP (average of available data of current OECD countries) – see
further 7§17-a. In this early period, poor relief by especially religious institutionswas dom-
inant.
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B. Expenditures related transfers, specifically regarding:
• Health (cure & care) – these can be transfers, but can also be provided in
kind;
• Child related in general – next to transfers required in case of foreseen
scarcity of the labour population (7§13).20
• Housing – these are housing market dependent, and in fact dependent on
whether the minimum wage, or the transfers under A, are sufficient to rent
a house.
3 Legal forms of social security transfers
A. Protection of the poor
Social security transfers can be granted in the form of provisions for the poor.
This requires determination of ‘the’ poverty line. For some ideological stances
such provisions clash with their ‘free market’ principle that there should be no
such thing as a ‘free income’ – an income not deriving from either work or prop-
erty. The state can take such a stance into account, but ultimately it has to seek
and gain the ‘vast majority’ compliance.
B. Generalised social security transfers
The sting seems somewhat taken out of these ideological complaints when the
transfers above (apart from housing) are granted to all (the poor and the rich).
Such a constellation has also been defended on the basis of the argument that
it increases the general public support for these.21 Quite apart from ideological
and supportive arguments, generalised social security prevents stigmatisation
of thepoor.However, the general effect is also (aswith a so-calledbasic income)
the pumping around of large sums of money, increasing state expenditure and
taxation (directly or in the form of so-called social insurance contributions).
Within each of these two legal forms (the poor or generalised) there are
again two legal forms for these: the form of legal rights and the form of legal
provisions. In practice their main difference is that legal provisions are easier
to cut back than legal rights once the latter’s level has been determined.
The right-hand side column of Figure 7.8 provides a summary of the previ-
ous two subsections. Amplification 7§17-a provides empirical information on
social security expenditures.
20 Child benefits can also be defended on the basis of equity arguments: everybody is free
not to have children; those who have children are rewarded (bought off) for providing the
future generation.
21 For example, in the Netherlands.
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4 Social security transfers and surplus-value
The legitimation of the state – as based on vastmajority compliance – requires
social security transfers. Because the legitimation of the state is a sine qua non
for the existence of the capitalist system, these transfers are an indirect condi-
tion for the accumulation of capital.
figure 7.8 Legal forms of regulation of production and of existence security
Regulation of production Regulation of existence security
o form of legal allowance rights o form of legal positive rights
level: compliance dependent level: at least subsistence; further
compliance dependent
• consumer protection [6§14]
• environment protection [6§14]




• temporary unemployment benefits [7§12]
• temporary sickness benefits [7§12]
o form of protection of the poor; OR
o form of general regulation.
AND
o form of provisions for existence; OR
o form of legal positive rights to existence.
level for all: compliance dependent
• child related transfers [7§13]†‡




• incapacity (disability) transfers





















† Anyway required in case of foreseen scarcity of labour population (7§13).
‡ In Graph 7.9 these are covered under ‘family’.
* The exposition in Chapter 7 makes a systematic distinction between labour-capacity related transfers
(top of figure) and pure compliance related transfers. In the OECD categories this distinction is notmade.
In effect, someof the appropriated surplus-value that flows to the capitalist and
managerial classes CMC is merely handed back to pay for, mainly, the categor-
ies of health, old age and incapacity transfers (Graphs 7.9 and 7.10). ‘Some’: a
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considerable part of these transfers are paid out of gross wages – in the form
of social security contributions (see also Chapter 8, 8§9). Further, because of
the (intertemporal) redistributive effects of social security from high to low
incomes, savings tend tomitigate, which affects the validation of surplus-value
positively (Chapter 3, esp. 3§3 and 3§1, and further Chapter 8).
7§17-a Amplification. State expenditure on social security: case of the
OECD-21
This amplification presents two graphs of data of state expenditure on social
security: a detailed one for the period 1980–2010, and an aggregate one for the
period 1880–2015.
For the ‘OECD-21’ detailed internationally consistent data for social security
expenditure are only available from 1980 (detailed, that is, along the categories
distinguished in the main text of 7§17). These are shown in Graph 7.9, along
with the average rate of unemployment in that period.
graph 7.9 State expenditure (general government) on specific categories of
social security transfers 1980–2010, in% of GDP; averages of 19–21
OECD countries
Data sources: Area charts: OECD, database ‘Social Expenditure; Aggregated data (SOCX)’.
Unemployment rate: OECD database. (All downloaded in December 2017.) See Appendix 7A
under 7§17-a for data details
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It can be seen that in this period there are upward trends in the three cat-
egories at the bottom of the graph – some of the categories at the top of the
graph are in part related to the unemployment rate.
Graph 7.10 shows aggregate data for state expenditure on social security from
1880 for the current OECD-21. It can be seen that after amoderate increase from
1880 to 1930 (data for 1940 and 1950 are lacking), there is a rather steep increase
until 1990 – the increase bending off afterwards. (It can also be seen that the
trend is not very sensitive for the 17 or 21 countries in the data set.)22
graph 7.10 State expenditure (general government) on social security 1880–
2015, average of up to 21 current OECD countries
Data sources: 1880–1970 (Tanzi 2011, Table 1.2); 1980–2014 (OECD, dataset Social Expenditure –
Aggregated data, extracted 27 December 2017)23
Total state expenditure (all categories) will be systematically introduced in
Chapter 8. Anticipating that, Graph 7.11 already puts social expenditure in the
perspective of the total. It can be seen that from 1920 (and for the data avail-
able) social security expenditure developed steadier than total state expendit-
ure.
22 The OECD has also collected data on ‘mandatory private social expenditure’ (available
for 9–15 countries of the OECD-21). This expenditure, although in quantity moderate,
increased gradually from on average 0.7% of GDP in 1980 to 1.0% in 2011. On these man-
datory private expenditures, see Adema, Fron and Ladaique 2011.
23 OECD data available at: http://stats.oecd.org/index.aspx?DatasetCode=SOCX_AGG.
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graph 7.11 Social security expenditure and total state expenditure (general
government) 1870–2015 in% of GDP; averages of up to 21 current
OECD countries
Data sources: (1) Social security: see Graph 7.10. (2) Total expenditure: 1870–1937 (Tanzi and
Schuknecht 2000); 1960–1980 (Castles 2006); from 1990 onwards (OECDEconomicOutlook data-
base November 2017, details are provided in Chapter 8: Graph 8.2 and Appendix 8A)
7§17-b Amplification. (In-)decent outcomes
Recall that the exposition, in all of Part Two, is primarily one in terms of effects
of the state, rather than the motives of agents of the state (6§4-a). It might
be argued that even if social security expenditure grounds the state’s legitima-
tion, the effect – gradually from 1930 onwards – is an increasing ‘decency’. This
is correct. (‘Decency’ is a term used in the ‘human rights’ discourse, and I am
aware that this is a moral or perhaps an ethical term.) However, such an obser-
vation and judgementmight equally be formulated as a decreasing ‘indecency’,
inwhich case the perspective on the total is different, namely one of indecency.
This is relevant because, as argued in the previous sections of Chapters 6 and
7, the state de facto keeps the capitalist system going.
7§17-c Amplification. Aggregate demand effect
Although it is not the impetus for social transfers, we will see in Chapter 10
that these transfers have the important side effect of mitigating the amplitude
of the business cycle (to be sure, the latter cannot be read off fromGraph 7.11 as
it shows shares in GDP, not fluctuations in GDP).
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Division 6. Separation of the state’s administrative and judiciary
branches
Divisions 6 and 7 present the legitimation of the state from a perspective very
different from that of Division 5. Both 7D6 and 7D7 apply to the continuously
reappearing conflicts of the content of legislation and other regulation, that
is, the content of the seven regulative frameworks presented so far: capital-
ist economic rights (6D4), allowance rights to existence (6D5), public security
(6D6), money and banking (7D2), labour-capacity (7D3), infrastructure (7D4),
and social security (7D5).
Wewill see in the following two divisions that the state seeks tomitigate the
resulting conflicts, by institutional separationswithin the body of the state. The
current division presents the separated off judiciary – separated from themain
administrative body of the state.
7§18 Arbitration and sanctioning – legitimising assignment to a
separated off Judiciary, as a separation-in-unity with themain body
of the state
It was indicated in Chapter 6 that the grounding of legal right requires the state
to be the arbiter and sanctioner of deviations from the law (6§9).
Arbitrationoften entails an interpretationand/or a concretisationof the law.
This interpretation or concretisation may not be similar to the understanding
of the law by the prosecuted actor. The sanctioning in this case conflicts with
the actor’s sense of justice.
This is even further at issue for the state’s arbitration and sanctioning in case
of conflicting rights. Conflicts are especially delicate when the sources of prop-
erty are in dispute.
In all cases of conflict and senses of injustice, the state’s reference to the
(putative) general interest (6§6) and its (putative) impartiality (6§7) tend to
erode. Thus the necessary grounding of legal right at hand (i.e. arbitration and
sanctioning) may erode the legitimation of the state (6§5).
Therefore, in order to mitigate these erosive effects, the arbitration and the
sanctioning of deviations from the law, tends to be assigned to a particular sep-
arate institution of the state: the judiciary. In this way the main body of the
state – that is, its administrative branch (the latter being the unity of the legis-
lative and the executive branches) – ‘purifies’ itself from conflict. Note that this
assignment entails a higher degree of purification than, the alternative of, del-
egation (see 7§18-a).
Inevitably, however, even if the judiciary is so split off from the administrat-
ive branch of the state, it is nevertheless a branch of the state as a ‘separation-
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in-unity’within the state. (See Scheme 7.17.) This, it being a branch of the state,
is also how it is experienced by most actors.
scheme 7.12 Arbitration and sanctioning as as-
signed to the separate Judiciary: sepa-
ration-in-unity with the state’s main body
Legend
↡ grounding
7§18-a Explication. Degrees of purification: assignment versus delegation
A distinction is made between the assignment and the delegation of state func-
tions to separate bodies. Assignment regards a separation of activities within
the state (separation-in-unity) without there being a subordination – in prin-
ciple at least. With delegation (6§15, 7§7, 7§11) there is a relationship of sub-
ordination – ultimately the state remains responsible for what it delegates,
thoughatdistance andmost often in a complicatedmanner. In termsof types of
law: an assignment tends to be enacted at the level of the constitution, whereas
a delegation tends to be enacted at the level of an ordinary law.
Although both assignment and delegation serve to protect the main body
of the state from legitimation-eroding conflicts, their difference in terms of
(non-)subordination implies different degrees of purification (a higher degree
in case of assignment).
7§18-b Amplification. Purification from conflict versus ‘separation of
powers’
The exposition of the judiciary in 7§18 is one from the point of view of the state
and its concern to gain legitimating compliance (6§5) by (putatively) positing
itself above and outside the opposing particular interests (6§7). The judiciary is
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separated off because arbitration and sanctioning by the state itself might have
a negative effect on the compliance.
This exposition is very different from arguments about this separation in
terms of separation of powers (as in Montesquieu’s Trias Politica) – the latter
being an argument from the point of view of the non-state actors (‘subjects’).
Whereas the purification seems necessary, a separation of powers may merely
contribute to a moral ideal (one that I would not want to underrate).
However, in each case (purification and separation of powers) the separa-
tion requires a contingent institutionalisation that itself may not be unprob-
lematic. Think for example of the appointment of judges by some institution
of the state (e.g. by the presidency or aminister of justice or parliament), which
muddles the separation.24 Further (and perhaps related), in everyday lifemany
actors do have the feeling that the judiciary is an extension of the state. That
feeling by itself seems correct – in any case it is covered by the term ‘separation-
in-unity’.
As indicated, the argument in 7§18 is one from the point of view of the state –
so as to protect its legitimation – rather than a normative one from the point
of view non-state actors. This is in line with all of the exposition in this book,
which abstains from normative arguments and from morals (6§4-a). Having
indicated this, it may be noted that for the rest of the exposition not much
hinges on it. In each case the relevant actual effect is the separation-in-unity
between the state’s Administrative and Judiciary branches.
Division 7. Separation of the state’s administrative and deliberative
branches
This division presents the ‘Deliberative’. (I could have used the term ‘parlia-
ment’ if, today at least, this would not have the direct connotation of being
a legislative, a function that I do not exclude, but that I would want to keep
hanging for the time being.) The Deliberative is a second (and last) legitimat-
ing body within the state. As with the Judiciary, the Deliberative purifies the
main body of the state from conflict, and again it constitutes a separation-
24 I am prepared to take small or large scale dismissals of part of the Judiciary as contin-
gent aberrations. Take the case of Turkey in 2016, this country being a developed capitalist
nation that forms part of the OECD from 1961. To be sure: within the systematic exposition
of this book this is contingent because it is generally not necessary to the reproduction of
the capitalist system.
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in-unity with the latter. Again this separation tends to have the character of
an assignment (rather than delegation). The legitimation reasons for the Judi-
ciary’s separation off are rather straightforward, and it is most often also clear
what is being assigned. In the case of the Deliberative the legitimation reas-
ons are less straightforward, and the same applies for what is being assigned.
This makes that the current separation requires more space than that of the
judiciary.
The first few sections of this division (7§19–7§22) present the four main
areas of conflict for the action of the capitalist state that are explicit or impli-
cit in the previous exposition. These conflicts seem insurmountable for the
legitimation, and hence the existence, of the state as institutionalised in the
exposition so far (6D3 and 7D6). The last sectionpresents the separationwithin
the body of the state referred to above, one that should overcome this problem
of legitimation (7§23).
7§19 Taxation and the overriding of property right
The material existence of the state requires it to appropriate means from
the economy by taxation. Taxation so grounds the state’s maintenance
of legal right, including legal property rights. At the same time, taxation
overrides property right (7§2).
Thus it appears that legal full property right – in the earth, means of produc-
tion and appropriated surplus-value – is impossible: enacting property right
requires the restriction of property right. Hence we have a modified reappear-
ance of the impossibility of the actualisation of these claimed property enti-
tlements within the economy (6§4), now at the level of the state. Whilst these
claimants may will the state to grant their claims in the form of legal rights, the
latter’s activities are nevertheless experienced as an externally imposed power,
conflicting with their claims. For these claimants, stamped as right holders,
this is revealed in a continuously reappearing conflict of ‘willing’ and ‘not will-
ing’ the state. (Enlightened property owners may see that full property right is
indeed an impossibility.)
7§20 Conflicts of the form of taxation
Given that taxation inevitably impairs on property rights (7§19), any concret-
isation of taxation – that is, regarding various tax bases and the design of tax
rates – is further conflicting in that it unavoidably requires the state to take a
stance concerning the distribution of income and wealth. This applies to sales
taxes and value-added taxes as well as taxes on income and wealth (amplified
upon in Chapter 8). For example, there is no obvious reason why a flat tax on
income, wealth or succession (on either one or all) should be more impartial
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than regressive or progressive taxes, or whether the one or the other should be
more beneficial to the functioning of the economy.25
In taking such a stance about the distribution of income and wealth, the
state must inevitably introduce considerations and criteria other than those of
‘the’ market. Thus, considering the capitalist system – not merely the capital-
ist economy – the criterion of themonetary-value-form, in particular the profit
form, is insufficient. This is so even if ideologues may rightly or wrongly argue
that the one form of taxation is lessmarket disturbing than the other.
The state’s unavoidable stance on the distribution of income and wealth is
yet another source of conflict (next to those presented in the previous two sec-
tions) that threatens the legitimation of the state.
7§21 The worrying or reassuring state’s share in the economy
The capitalist state’s concern of its action radius requires it to further the
conditions for the accumulation of capital. Therewith it increases the tax
base, whence the tax rate can decrease (7§3).
However, alongwith it, state expenditure and the amount of taxation increases
(7D2–7D4).26 Indirectly, and inpart directly, this is also the case for social secur-
ity transfers (7D5).Thus directly or indirectly the state commands a larger share
of the economy, in comparison with the hypothetical case in which the state
would or could abstain from these expenditures and taxation. (Hypothetically,
because the capitalist economy and state cannot exist without the seven reg-
ulative frameworks. None of these can be dispensed with. For the last five –
presented in the current chapter – it ismerely their quantitative size, or intens-
ity, that is at issue.) Even so, the necessary impact of the state is conflicting
among economic actors, in that some perceive it as worrying, whereas for oth-
ers it is reassuring.
This is even more so for cases when the state’s furthering of the conditions
for the accumulation of capital, would (along with an increasing tax base) still
require increasing tax rates. Then, taking the case of profit taxes, the result
might still be that profits increase (7§21-a provides a simple example). The
problem for the state is that enterprises tend to isolate the tax (rate) increase as
the doing of the state, whilst perceiving the profit increase as their own doing.
25 The ongoing controversy about this – from early classical political economy onwards –
reveals that there are no obvious reasons for one or the other taxation.
26 Structurally this is in fact not the case for themonetary policy (including surveillance) del-
egated to the Central Bank, as the latter tends to make profits that are usually distributed
to the state.
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7§21-a Explication. An example of the case of increasing profits along
with an increasing tax rate
If ¤100 profits (the tax base) are taxed at 20%, the tax is ¤20, with net profits
¤80. If because of a near to costless furthering of the accumulation-conditions,
profits increase to ¤105, the same tax of ¤20 may be collected at a tax rate of
19%. This is the pure case of such a tax alleviation. Now suppose that for a fur-
thering of the conditions an extra tax of ¤3 is required (e.g. for infrastructure).
Then, if again profits increase to ¤105, a tax rate of 22% would generate ¤23
taxes (instead of ¤20% before), with net profits ¤82 (instead of ¤80 before).
Hence, in comparison with the initial situation (¤100 profits), net profits have
increased even if the tax rate increased.With someadaptationof the example it
can be shown that profits may increase along with an increasing share of taxes
in GDP.
7§22 General conflicts of legal right and of legitimation in compliance
The capitalist economy cannot exist without the core economic entitle-
ment claims being granted by the state in the form of legal rights (6§2–
6§4, 6§8). The legitimation of the state is grounded in the compliance
of actors to submit to the state for granting these legal rights (6§5), as
again, ultimately, grounded in the state’s definition of the general interest
(6§6). It is further grounded in the state’s upholding of the granted rights
by public security (6§18) and by the arbitration and sanctioning of devi-
ation from the law, as assigned to the judiciary (7§18).
In terms of the state’s (non-)regulation as serving the interests of actors, a large
part of this regulation, or their level, is experienced in opposite ways by object-
ive classes of actors. Nevertheless the statemust somehow seek actor’s compli-
ance for what it does, and at the prevailing level so.
• First, workersmust complywith: (1) the enterprises’ legal right of their being
employed (at the prevailing wage, benchmarked by the prevailing legal min-
imum wage (7§10), and at the prevailing degree of labour protection (6§15))
whilst the surplus-value that they produce is appropriatedby the enterprise; (2)
the prevailing content of their (other) rights to existence and of their property
(6§14–6§15; 6§10); (3) the prevailing public education (7§14); (4) the prevailing
level of social security provisions (7§17).
• Second, owners of enterprises (including owners of financial titles) must
comply with: (1) the state’s enacting of their employment rights (1 above); (2)
the prevailing maintenance of their rights to existence and property; (3) more
specifically concerning the latter, the restriction of their property rights via
taxation (7§2) in face of the state’s furthering of the conditions of the accu-
mulation of capital (7D2–7D4).
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The effective benefits from regulation for objective classes of actors tend
to be opposite or unevenly distributed in terms of subordination and of the
distribution of income and wealth. Therefore the constellation of these legal
rights and provisions tends to be gravely conflicting, whence the state’s ability
to present that constellation as being in (its definition of) the general interest
is not obvious.
7§23 Conflict modification – legitimising assignment to a separated off
Deliberative, as a separation-in-unity with themain body of the state
The conflicts set out in this division (7§19–7§22) threaten the state’s legitima-
tion in the compliance of actors. Nevertheless the state’s legitimation is a sine
qua non for the very existence and reproduction of the capitalist system.
Then the point is not so much whether the state’s definition of the gen-
eral interest ‘is’ but rather whether it is perceived by the actors as in keeping
with the variety of interests, or as proportional to the diversity of interests. In
this perspective the opposing interests, and conflicts thereof, require a form of
presenting the state’s particular legislative choices as a perceived settlement of
conflict in the general interest – thus conditioned, the choices are presented as
being in the general interest.
This settlement of conflict is grounded in an institutional separation within
the state between, on the one hand, the coreAdministrative Branch and, on the
other hand, the legitimising Deliberative. This is an assigned separation within
the total body of the state, whence it is a separation-in-unity (analogous to the
separation-in-unity of the Administrative and the Judiciary – 7D6).
• The Deliberative indeed deliberates over legislative choices and over the
state’s (non-)actions generally, and so seeks or establishes the compliance of
the people for these.
Its particular form is contingent. For example an appointed assembly, a
representative assembly of property owners, an assembly of delegates of
corporations, a delegated voting of a parliament, a (delegated) voting of
a parliament by constituency, or a constitutional democratic representat-
ive parliament might all gain the required compliance.
However, given one of these forms, the question of what is being assigned to
the deliberative is an open one. (It is not only an open one, in practise many
actors do not know what has been assigned – ‘them’ it is all the same dance.)
The character of the assignment is contingent. The Deliberative
might merely ‘have a say’ and so advice the Administrative. Alternat-
ively it might (in all fields, or merely in particular ones) have final vote,
or, together with the Administrative, have a final co-vote on legislative
choices.
372 part two – the capitalist state
However, ultimately theremust be a particular form and a particular assign-
ment that does adequately gain the compliance.
• The Administrative body manages – at least – the execution of the law. It
is contingent whether it has the final vote or a final co-vote on legislative
choices.
In line with the assignment above, it is contingent if the final legislative
vote is allotted to either the Administrative, or to the Deliberative, or to a
combination of these two.
It is also contingent if the draw up of proposed legislation is allotted to
either the Administrative or to a combination of the latter and the Delib-
erative.
• Hence the legislative organ may contingently consist of the Administrative,
or the Deliberative, or of a combination of the two.
Within these contingencies the necessity is that some form of the Deliberat-
ive generates the legitimationof the state in the complianceof the vastmajority
of the people. A condition for it is that at least the influential actors must suffi-
ciently feel to be represented by the legitimising apparatus. It is also necessary
that it shields the Administrative core of the state, as much as possible, from
conflicts arising from legislation, from (non-)action in general and from taxa-
tion in particular.
Hence through this separation-in-unity, the core of the state is purified from
conflict, so that it can execute, in the name of the general interest, the gran-
ted core economic entitlement claims in the form of law; and execute the
furthering of the conditions for economic growth and so for the accumula-
tion of capital. Thus the Deliberative is the political arena of conflict and so
amode for recurrent conflict settlement. Hence it is amode of existence of con-
flict.
7§23-a Amplification. Common suffrage: average of OECD-21
All the currentOECD-21 countries practice formsof representativedemocracy–
the character of the assignment differs. A common and equal suffrage for all
ethnicities (also calleduniversal suffrage) regarding the electionof parliaments
was, on average for these countries, introduced in 1940. Discriminating for eth-
nicities, a suffrage for men was on average introduced in 1894, and in 1930
also for women.27 (Before that time there were restrictions regarding, mainly,
27 The averages are calculated from an anonymous source, and I do not know how reliable
it is. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Universal_suffrage#Dates_by_country (accessed Octo-
ber 2017).
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a minimum income or property.) Regarding the removal of ethnical suffrage
discrimination there is quite some variation between individual countries,
ranging from Norway (1821) and Ireland (1829) to the USA (1965) and Spain
(1977).28
7§23-b Amplification. Purification from conflict versus ‘separation of
powers’
Again, as for the Judiciary (7§18-b), the exposition in 7§23 is one from the point
of viewof the state and its concern to gain legitimating compliance.Thus it is not
one from the perspective of non-state actors, such as in ‘separation of powers’
approaches, or the, democratically more fundamental, approaches for which
political democracy is an aspiration in itself. Again, these two are moral ideals
(and once again I remark that I would not want to underrate such ideals). And
again (Judiciary and Deliberative) a degree of separation of powers is an effect
of the purification from conflict.
Given that the exposition in 7§23 is one from the perspective of the state, the
expositionmay further be characterised as a variantof ‘democratic instrument-
alism’ (see Peter 2016, section 4) to the extent that democratic deliberation and
decisions are ameans for legitimation. However, I add the caveat that I drawnot
a single normative position from it (as is the case with quite some democratic
instrumentalists – see Peter’s outline).
7§23-c Explication. Purification from conflict by way of assignment or
delegation
In the course of Chapters 6 and 7we sawa series of ‘purifications’ – either in the
form of assigned separations-in-unity, or in the form of delegated separations
(see 7§18-a on the difference between the two). These have in common that
conflicts are encapsulated. Nevertheless that does not away with the conflicts.
These separations are summarised in Scheme 7.13.
28 For the 25 other countries listed, common and equal suffrage for all ethnicities was on
average introduced in 1950.
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scheme 7.13 Summary of the state’s purifications from conflict for its
administrative core – assigned division and delegation
(Chapters 6–7)
† The extent of the assigned division (the degree of authority) being demarcated by law.
‡ It may have (co-)legislative powers (then the powers of the Administrative vary with it).
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Summary and conclusions
The capitalist state grants core economic entitlement claims in the form of
law, and maintains these (Chapter 6). The state’s existence requires taxation,
whence it is compelled to override property right in the name of its definition
of the (putative) general interest. Because the (potential) action radius of the
state is determined by the tax base, it must seek to increase that base – so as to
reach feasible tax rates – by furthering the conditions for the accumulation of
capital and along with it the conditions for economic growth. (Division 1.)
Divisions 2–4 outlined the concretisation of this condition of existence of
the state. In terms of the general systematic of the exposition, the first two of
these divisions (the monetary framework and the labour-capacity framework)
are also the sequel to Chapter 2’s grounding of the accumulation of capital in
the expansion of money and the expansion of labour-capacity.
The state’s taxation and expenditure requires that it impose the monetary
standard of ‘its’ ClearingBank,whence all banks are required to adopt themon-
etary standard of the state’s Clearing Bank, now the Central Bank (CB). This
imposition implies that the state takes a responsibility for the actions of theCB,
as concretised in the state’smonetary legislation. Limiting banking to licensees,
the major concern of this framework is to bind banks to sound security and
liability rules (‘prudential regulation’), the ultimate penalty for deviation from
those rules being the withdrawal of the licence. A second major concern is
achieving ‘price stability’ (in fact ‘creeping inflation’ – amplified in 9D2). The
state can try to influence the interest rate, but it has virtually no means to
control the quantity of money and credit. It is the commercial banks that pre-
dominantly undertake themoney creation, and hence accommodate the accu-
mulation of capital and economic growth. This poses themain dilemma of the
state’s monetary policy: tight prudential regulation affects the banks’ accom-
modation of economic growth. This is also the main dilemma regarding the
fairly recent phenomenon of the monetary system trembling banks that are
‘too big to fail’ and moreover organisationally too complex to supervise micro-
wise (amplified in 9D2).
Monetary legislation and its execution require choices that affect not only
economic growth in general, but more specifically also the distribution of
income, investment and unemployment. This implies that the state has to take
sides in the (potential) conflicts between labour, enterprises and financiers. As
this may erode the ground of the state’s legitimation, it tends to delegate the
regulative concretisation and execution of monetary policy – including the reg-
ulation and supervision of banks – to the Central Bank. By this delegation the
statepurifies itself fromconflict. Nevertheless, aswith all delegation, the state is
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ultimately responsible for the actions that it delegates. The latter is highlighted
in times of those banking crises that are so severe that their resolution is bey-
ond the means of the CB, whence the state has to step in as ‘tax levier of last
resort’ – eroding the legitimation of the state. (Division 2.)
The state’s furthering of the conditions for the accumulation of capital
requires it to promote a sufficient labour-capacity in terms of both quantity
and quality. The quantitative aspect is concretised in regulation of minimum
wages, of temporary unemployment benefits and of (number scaled) tempor-
ary child benefits. The qualitative aspect is concretised in state-funded public
education.29 In face of the conflicting character of especially minimumwages,
the state tends to delegate its execution to minimum wage commissions or
councils. This is again an effort to purify the core administrative body of the
state from conflict. (Division 3.)
An important component of the state’s furthering of the conditions for the
accumulation of capital is also its engagement in infrastructural networks, as
well as, depending on the specific market constellation, in the infrastructural
supply itself. A final component is fundamental technology research. (Divi-
sion 4.)
For its actions and non-actions the state inevitably has to seek and gain legit-
imation in the compliance of the vast majority of actors. Given that the subor-
dinated working class constitutes the vast majority, it must especially also seek
their compliance. This is concretised in various social security provisions, their
level being dependent on contingent degrees of (potential) conflict.30 Because
the legitimation of the state is a sine qua non for the existence of the capitalist
system, these transfers are an indirect condition for the accumulation of cap-
ital. (Division 5.)
This completes the exposition of the seven main legislative frameworks:
those of legal economic rights (6D4), legal existence rights (6D5), public secur-
ity (6D6), money and banking (7D2), labour-capacity (7D3), infrastructure
(7D4), and social security (7D5).
The so far outlined action of the state that is necessary for the reproduction
of the capitalist system is experienced by large groups of actors as conflict-
ing with their interests. Firstly, the state’s requirement of taxation implies that
legal full property right – in the earth, means of production and appropriated
29 For the case of the average of the OECD-21, state expenditure on public education grew
from under 1% of GDP in 1870 to nearly 6% around 2015 (Graph 7.6).
30 For the case of the average of the OECD-21, state expenditure on social security provisions
was negligible until 1920 and grew thereafter to about 25% of GDP around 2015 (Graph
7.10).
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surplus-value – is impossible: enacting property right requires the restriction
of property right. Secondly, given this restriction, any concretisation of taxa-
tion (regarding various tax bases and design of tax rates) is further conflicting
in that it unavoidably requires the state to take a stance concerning the dis-
tribution of income and wealth. This is generally and continuously the case.
It is highlighted in times of severe banking crises, when the state as ‘tax levier
of last resort’ saves banks, and so redistributes general means to one particu-
lar sector. Thirdly, the state’s necessary action – including its furthering of the
conditions for the accumulation of capital, and its provision of social security
provisions – implies that the state commands a considerable share of the eco-
nomy. This impact of the state is conflicting among economic actors, in that
some perceive it as disquieting, whereas for others it is reassuring. Fourthly,
and generally, in terms of the state’s actions serving the interests of actors, a
large part of these actions are experienced in opposite ways by the objective
classes of actors.
All these conflicts threaten the state’s legitimation. Nevertheless the legitim-
ation of the state is an absolute requirement for the very existence and repro-
duction of the capitalist system.
The settlement of these conflicts is grounded in two major institutional
‘assigning separations’ within the state, between, on the one hand, the core
Administrative body and, on the other, the bodies of a legitimising Judiciary
and a legitimising Deliberative.
With the necessary arbitration and sanctioning of deviations from the law
(6§9), the state gets involved with conflicting claims to right, so eroding both
its reference to the general interest and its self-imposition as an extraordinary
impartial institution. This is resolved by assigning the arbitration and sanction-
ing to a separated off judiciary, whence the state’s core is purified from the
conflicts concerned. (Division 6.)
The Deliberative is the necessary political arena of conflict and so a mode
for recurrent conflict settlement. Through this separation, the core of the state
is equally purified from conflict, so that it can execute the granting of the core
economic entitlement claims in the formof law, and execute the frameworks of
furthering the conditions for economic growth and thus for the accumulation
of capital. (Division 7.)
Appendix 7A. data and data sources of the graphs in chapter 7
General note: For all years (1870 to current) I have used the maximum amount
of information that my sources provide for the OECD-21 countries. Qualifica-
378 part two – the capitalist state
tions of this are provided throughout this Appendix. (See Appendix 6A on the
‘OECD-21’, onOECD-21 averages as ‘arithmetic average’ andonmymain sources.)
[Re 7§3-b] Data information on Graph 7.3. Real-GDP per capita 1850–2010,
growth rate per year (top graph) and average per decade (bottom graph); aver-
age of 20–21 current OECD countries in 2011 US$.
The data originate from those collected by Maddison, and which, after his
death, continued in the so-called Maddison Project. The data used are those
from the 2018 revision.31 Of its two main datasets I used the real-GDP per cap-
itaCGDPpcone. (In fact for the averageof theOECD-21 countries thedifferences
with the alternative dataset of RGDPNApc are not very big.) Continuous data
for Ireland are available only from 1921.
[Re 7§14-c] Data information on Graph 7.5. Years of formal schooling and dis-
tribution of schooling 1870–2010, average of 21 current OECD countries.
The data are from Clio Infra. https://www.clio‑infra.eu/ (accessed 27 February
2016). The graph of the number of years is of 21 countries throughout. That for
the distribution is of 13 countries for 1870–80, 17 for 1890, 18 for 1900, 20 for
1910–20 and 21 for 1930 and after. The Clio Infra website also provides informa-
tion about the method of calculation of the Gini-coefficients.
[Re 7§14-d]Data informationonGraph7.6.Education expenditure, general gov-
ernment 1870–2014, average of up to 21 current OECD countries.
Data sources 1870–1960 (Tanzi and Schuknecht 2000); 1970–current (UNESCO
institute for statistics, dataset education)
Tanzi and Schuknecht (2000, Table II.5) provide data of 5 current OECD
countries in 1870, 8 in 1913, 11 in 1937 and 17 in 1960.
The UNESCO data are from their May 2017 release.32 There are some gaps in
even these recent UNESCO data (from 1970), which I have accommodated by
taking for each country the decade year or the nearest year available (in the
same way as the OECD often does for its series). This results in the following
number of country data for each decade year and for 2014:
31 https://www.rug.nl/ggdc/historicaldevelopment/maddison/releases/maddison‑project‑
database‑2018, update 11 January 2018. See also Bolt, Inklaar, de Jong and Luiten van
Zanden 2018.
32 UNESCO, dataset education (financial resources/government expenditure on education),
http://data.uis.unesco.org/OECDStat_Metadata/ShowMetadata.ashx?Dataset=EDULIT_
DS&ShowOnWeb=true&Lang=en (accessed 27 December 2017).
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[Re 7§15-a] Data information on Graph 7.7. State expenditure (general govern-
ment) on gross investment, 1870–2015, average of up to 21 current OECD countries.
For the OECD countries, internationally more or less homogenous data for
state expenditure on infrastructure are only available from 1995. Therefore, as
indicated in 7§15, I use a major fraction (57.5%) of the state gross investment
expenditure (general government) as an indicator for this category. Below I
provide an underpinning of this proxy. All figures below are averages of up to
21 OECD countries.33
Transport is the main component of infrastructural state expenditure.
Between 1995 and 2013 this expenditure stood fairly stable at an average of
1.36% of GDP.34 (Part of COFOG category 4.5.) Expenditure on communication
(COFOG 4.6) was between 1995 and 2013 negligible (though there may be state
ownership in communication corporations). Other infrastructural expendit-
ures are classified under the COFOG category 5. These are mainly expendit-
ures on waste and waste water facilities. The 1995–2013 average expenditure
is 0.67% of GDP. The sum of these is 2.0% of GDP.
State gross investment (general government) stood between 1995 and 2013
at an average of 3.5% of GDP (OECD-21). The 0.575 fraction of this is 2.0% of
GDP.35
In Chapter 10, when I use data for recent decades, the remaining 42.5% of
the gross investment is allotted to the other expenditure categories, including
33 In what follows I make use of the OECD ‘COFOG’ data (Classification of the Functions of
Government). In this classification government expenditures are categorised in ten ‘func-
tions’ (‘first digit’), and further down – below called ‘digit level’.
34 This figure is decomposed as ‘investment in transport infrastructure’ at 0.9% (data for 21
countries) and maintenance at 0.5% (data for 15–18 countries). Averages of the ‘OECD-21’
as calculated on basis of data from the OECD International transport forum http://stats
.oecd.org/OECDStat_Metadata/ShowMetadata.ashx?Dataset=ITF_INV‑MTN_DATA&
ShowOnWeb=true&Lang=en (→December 2015). (These expenditures are part of COFOG
category 4.5. The source just quoted has more data. Moreover, the COFOG 4 digit 2 level is
organised by sector rather than specifically infrastructural.)
35 Note that the infrastructure indicator regards indeed an average for the OECD-21. In the
USA, for example, an above average part of the federal government gross investment has
a military destination.
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mainly the military, health and education (as well as what in that chapter will
be called ‘hard core’ expenditure).
Graph 7.7-a shows the deviation of the investment indicator from the 1995–
2013 expenditures on infrastructure.
graph 7.7-a Infrastructural state expenditure and the infrastructure indicator
of state gross investment, 1995–2013, averages of up to 21 OECD
countries
Data sources: Infrastructural expenditure on transport, OECD International transport forum
(see the last but one footnote); waste andwaste water facilities, OECD dataset National Accounts
at a Glance 2015, General government expenditure by function, environment protection
(COFOG 5);36 state gross investment, see Graph 7.7 (main text)
[Re 7§15-a] Further data information on Graph 7.7. Gross investment expendit-
ure, general government 1870–2015, average of up to 21 current OECD countries.
Data sources. 1870–1937 (Tanzi and Schuknecht 2000, Table II.13); 1960–
current (OECD Economic Outlook database, November 2017 (Government
fixed capital formation, value, appropriation account, divided by GDP, value,
market prices)). [Denmark and New Zealand 1970=1971; Germany 1990=1991.]
For reasons of consistencywith later years I have started using the Economic
Outlook (new) series from as early as possible, which is 1960. For this last year,
however, only 6 data are available (Finland, France, Italy, Japan, Sweden, USA),
with an average of 5.3% GDP. However, as Graph 7.7 shows there is a consid-
erable fit between 6 country and 13 country averages in 1970; that graph also
shows that there is not very much deviation between the averages for 13 coun-
tries (from 1970) and for 21 countries (from 2000).
36 http://stats.oecd.org/index.aspx?DatasetCode=NAAG_2015_NOV15 (extracted 24 Dec
2015).
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[Re 7§17-a] Graph 7.9. State expenditure (general government) on specific cat-
egories of social security transfers 1980–2010, in%of GDP; averages of 19–21 OECD
countries.
Data sources. Area charts (OECD, database ‘Social Expenditure; Aggregated
data [SOCX]’).37 Unemployment rate (dataset OECD, Economic Outlook,
November 2017).38
Formost categories these social expendituredata are available of 19–21 coun-
tries – 2013 being the last reported year. The unemployment data are available
of 18–21 countries (Germany 1990=1992).
[Re 7§17-a]
table 7.9-a Specification of social security expenditure 1980–2010 in% of GDP;
averages of 19–21 OECD countries
Percent of GDP Percent linear change
(except last row)
expenditure categories 1980 1990 2000 2010 1980-90 1990-00 2000-10 1980-
2010
old age and survivors 6.5 7.4 7.9 9.2 13% 7% 17% 40%
health 4.7 4.9 5.4 6.9 4% 11% 27% 47%
family 1.6 1.7 2.0 2.4 5% 14% 19% 43%
housing 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.4 31% 10% 14% 64%
incapacity 2.4 2.5 2.4 2.4 7% -6% 3% 3%
unemployment 0.7 1.2 0.9 1.3 58% -18% 33% 74%
all social security 16.6 19.0 20.1 23.8 14% 6% 18% 44%
total state expenditure 42.4 45.4 42.4 48.6 7% -6% 15% 15%
rate of unemployment 4.9 6.4 6.3 8.3 30% -1% 32% 69%
Data source: see Graph 7.9
37 http://stats.oecd.org/index.aspx?DatasetCode=SOCXAGG (extracted 27 Dec 2017).
38 http://stats.oecd.org/index.aspx?DatasetCode=EO102_INTERNET (extracted 27Dec 2017).
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It can be seen fromTable 7.9-a that from 1980–2010 the sumof social security
expenditure increased considerably more than total state expenditure.
However, incapacity transfers and especially unemployment transfers lagged
behind from 1990–2010, and more so than the movement in the rate of unem-
ployment.
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Introduction
Chapters 6–7 set out why, and in what respect, the capitalist economy cannot
possibly exist without the state. Those chapters focused on the necessary con-
tent of the state’s activities. Chapter 8 focuses on those activities in terms of
monetary expenditures of the state and of their finance, outlining in particular
their effect on the profits of enterprises.
In economic terms the state ‘produces’ its activities, requiring wage labour
(civil servants) as well as inputs from enterprises. The concomitant expendit-
ures are a category distinct from the expenditures related to transfers, such as
those on social security. (Division 1.)
Division 2 presents a general outline of the finance of the production- and
transfers-related expenditures by way of taxation and other forms of finance.
The following two divisions present the effect of state expenditure on the
macroeconomic surplus-value of enterprises (Division 3) and of taxation on
their after-tax surplus-value (Division 4). Along with it the so-called ‘tax bur-
den’ for enterprises will be presented in a different light from how it is usually
perceived.
Taxation being necessary, the state can and must choose between several
forms of taxation and combinations thereof. This implies that in terms of the
methodological pair of necessity and contingency, necessity in this respect (fin-
ance, taxation) takes on a contingent form. This form is determined by the
state’s furthering of the conditions for the accumulation of capital as articu-
latedwith its legitimation requirements. The particular forms of taxation result
in a particular distribution of income (skewed) and in a particular distribution
of wealth (even more skewed). (Division 5.)
Division 1 (state production) and Division 2 (finance of the state) provide
conditions of existence for the exposition of Chapters 6–7. All the other divi-
sions have the status of concretising implications of these earlier chapters and
divisions. Scheme 8.1 presents the chapter outline.
In amplifications to sections of this chapter, the reader finds empirical illus-
trations in reference to averages of 21 current OECD countries, extendingwhere
possible to 1870. The reader is referred to Appendix 6A for the status of these
illustrations and especially the point that the OECD-21 average is meant to rep-
resent capitalism in its strongest version in terms of the reproduction of the
capitalist system.1
1 Generally I repeat that cognisance of the Amplifications and Addenda is not required for the
understanding of the further text (main sections and Explications).
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scheme 8.1 State expenditure and its finance (outline Chapter 8)
Legend
↡ and↠ grounded in
⥥ bottommoment derives from top moment
⥤ right moment derives from left moment
.Ṃ. manifestation of earlier moment (see introduction to 8D5).
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Division 1. State production and state expenditure
This division grounds the previous exposition of the state in its ‘production’.
In Chapters 6–7 the primary focus was on the content of the state’s legislative
frameworks. The information in Amplifications of Chapter 7 on expenditures
on these frameworks was in fact presented as an aside. The following two divi-
sions focus on the state as being also an economic actor. In the current division
the perspective is that of ‘state production’ and of ‘state expenditure’ in general.
8§1 Production inmonetary terms by state-employed labour (‘civil
servants’)
Chapters 6–7 presented the capitalist state’s granting of economic and
existence claims in the form of legal rights (6D2–6D3) and their concret-
isation (6D4–6D6), its frameworks furthering of the conditions for the
accumulation of capital (7D2–7D4) and its compliance-dependent social
security provisions (7D5). In brief this is the content of the seven legislat-
ive frameworks presented in these chapters.
Economically the state ‘produces’ the content of the seven frameworks, this
production being a condition of existence (ground) for these frameworks. For
this production the state employs wage labour (wages sumWg). For it, the state
also purchases inputs from enterprises, both floating inputs (such as paper,
transport and cleaning) and replacement investment (together Fg). (Net invest-
ment is presented in 8§2.) In monetary terms the product of the state’s labour
is a set of collective goods and services (GCOL):
GCOL = Fg +Wg [convention of the state] (8.1)
(I denote state monetary entities by the symbol G or g, for government, so
avoiding any confusion with the symbol S for savings.)
The state tends to have its labour (also called ‘civil servants’) produce these
frameworks on a pure costs basis. Thus, in contradistinction to enterprises, the
state tends to make no profits, whence wages are the sole component of its
value-added (Yg).
Yg =Wg [convention of the state] (8.2)
The reason for this is largely that it cannot sell to individuals most of its activ-
ities (e.g. legislation and public security), which so are collectively provided or
distributed for free. Even if the state generally does not sell its production, it
nevertheless partakes in the capitalist economy’s monetary-value dimension
and it so calculates its activities in monetary terms from their costs perspect-
ive.2
2 This is different from commensuration and from ideal pre-commensuration of the output of
commodities (1§4 and 1§10).
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Given some quantitative level of GCOL (defined by Fg and Wg), the relative
division between the purchases Fg and the Wg depend on the state’s
contingent preferences and ideological stance. (For example, when the state
itself no longer undertakes road construction, but instead moves to purchas-
ing roads from private enterprises, Fg increases and Wg declines. However, if
the state labour and the private labour is equally productive then – for the
same lot of roads – state expendituremust increase because enterprises require
profit.)
Equation (8.1) regards the production of the state, not the expenditures on
various transfers that do not relate to its own production – a main transfer cat-
egory being that of social security transfers (see 8§2).
8§1-a Addendum. The (non-)surplus-value producing character of the
labour of civil servants
In the state’s accounts the value of GCOL is defined by the values of Fg andWg!
There is no reason to assume that civil servants are less (or more) exploited
than privately employed labourers in physical terms, even if we have no proper
measure to account for it. Assuming that state labour is equally productive
as the labour employed by enterprises, it is likely that it contains a surplus
component, whence ‘the value’ of GCOL would be underrated in the System of
National Accounts. Even if the labour product of civil servants were to (impli-
citly) contain a surplus component (i.e. the difference between the wage and
the net product of, e.g., legislation or policing), this surplus is in fact distrib-
uted for free over production enterprises, financial enterprises and households
(collective goods and services).3
Another matter is the appropriation of the (macro)economic surplus-value.
Abstracting from any public ownership of capitalist enterprises (selling their
output via the market) there is no surplus-value other than that appropriated
by enterprises (including that which enterprises distribute to financiers). Thus
any state production of a surplus (if therewere such a thing) is expressed in the
surplus-value of enterprises.
Relevant in this respect is the particular implicit allocation of state services,
amongst others, over particular branches of enterprises. Regarding infrastruc-
turalworks, for example, somebranches benefitmore directly than others from
these being distributed for free. However, thematter of this non-market alloca-
tion seems independent of a particular theory of value. Generally we can only
3 This assumes that generally there is no direct link (in the sense of prices being a direct link)
between particular taxes and particular state services. In this sense the latter are distributed
for free.
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say something about it in very rough, imprecise, terms of implicit subsidies even
if in some cases some aspects of the allocation can bemarket mimicked (think
of port dues).
8§2 The state’s action in terms of state expenditure
The production by the state (8§1) is conditioned by its monetary expendit-
ure on wages and floating inputs from enterprises. The state’s production also
requires expenditure on investment input from enterprises. Thus we have the
following production related expenditure:
• wages of civil servants (Wg);
• floating inputs from enterprises (Fg);
• investment inputs from enterprises (Ig).4
Other expenditures – not state-production related – include various transfers:
• Legitimating social security transfers (Zg) – as indicated in 7D5, their level
depends on compliance requirements;
• Interest payments on the state debt [Qg]. These aremonetary flows from the
state to its creditors, i.e. its financiers such as banks and capital owners.
• Subsidies to enterprises, to households and to cultural institutions. I call
these transfers ‘amenities’ (Ag). These contingent subsidies are neglected in
this chapter (briefly amplified on in 10§13).
Hence we have the following sum of state expenditure (G* and G):
G* = (Wg + Fg) + Ig + (Qg + Zg) + Ag [accounting definition] (8.3Ag)
For the purposes of this chapter we have (Ag neglected):
G = (Wg + Fg) + Ig + (Qg + Zg) [definition] (8.3)
8§2-a Amplification. The trend in total state expenditure of the OECD-21
from 1870–2015
Graph 8.2 shows total state expenditure as a percentage of GDP from 1870 to
the present for the average of the current ‘OECD-21’ (see Appendix 6A on the
OECD-21). These include the amenities in equation (8.3Ag) – about 7% of GDP
in 2015 (see 10§13 – Ag being the sum of ‘general amenities’ and ‘subsidies and
other direct assistance for enterprises’).
4 Contingently some enterprises might be state owned, whilst operating on the market. This
does not affect the categories of expenditures. In that case any distributed profits flow to the
state in the form of dividends. Contingently the state might also undertake a variety works
such as the construction of roads or parks or the collection of garbage by its own staff. In this
case the state’s expenditures on wages (Wg) and on investment (Ig) are higher and those on
floating inputs from enterprises (Fg) lower (though these works will always require the pur-
chase of commodities from the private sector). This is amain reasonwhy this chapter focuses
on the total state expenditure (G).
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State expenditure as a percentage of GDP more than doubled between 1870
and 1937 (from 11 to 24% of GDP) and then again nearly doubled between 1937
and 1990 (to 45% of GDP). It then decreases (to 42%) until the outbreak of the
financial crisis in 2007–08. The fastest increase occurs between 1913 and 1920,
followed by the period 1960–80.5
Generally, data for all of the OECD-21 prior to 1960 are scarce. Therefore –
as mentioned in 7§14-e – in order to show the possible impact of the scarce
number of data for earlier years, most of my long run graphs show series for
separate numbers of countries.
Note for Graph 8.2 (and for other similar graphs to come) that the measure
of GDP share blends out variations in GDP itself. This is especially relevant for
the severe recessions of the 1930s, of the early 1980s and of 2008 to about 2013.
In this respect note also that cycles do not run synchronous internationally.
graph 8.2 Total state expenditure (general government) 1870–2015, in%
GDP; average of 10 to 21 current OECD countries
Data sources: 1870–1937 (Tanzi and Schuknecht 2000); 1960–80 (Castles 2006); from 1990
onwards (OECD dataset Economic Outlook, November 2017; extracted 28 December 2017). For
details see Appendix 8.A under 8§2-a
5 AlthoughWorldWar I expenditures play a role in the period 1913–20, there has been, on aver-
age, no cut back between 1920–37 and after until about 1995.
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8§3 State production in terms of quantity of employment: state
employment
Because the state produces no surplus-value – or does not account for it (8§1) –
gross or net value-added provides no adequatemeasure for state production in
comparison with private production. For that comparison the share of state
employment in total employment is a more adequate measure.
8§3-a Amplification. State employment in the OECD-21
Graph 8.3 shows the share of state employment in total employment for an
average of the OECD-21 between 1870 and 2015. The data that are used exclude
military employment and employment in state-owned enterprises because of
the contingency of these categories.6 We see that this share of state employ-
ment in total employment – after a steep increase between 1937 and 1980 –
stabilised after 1980 at about 19% of total employment. The graph shows this
state employment in comparison with the state expenditure of Graph 8.3 (note
thus their different bases of total employment and GDP).
8§3-b Amplification. Outsourcing of state functions
In 10D3 the major components of the bending in state expenditure will be
shown. Here I briefly consider a quantitatively minor, though ideologically
important, component, which is the state’s (states’) outsourcing of part of
its (their) ‘functions’, including outsourcing in the form of licences. Minor,
because education and social security expenditures are the largest compon-
ents. This outsourcing has often been defended in terms of cost efficiency
(private enterprises would produce cheaper). Examples range from road and
rail construction and public transport to maintenance of public parks and
monuments. This implies a moderation of state employment, but not neces-
sarily a more than proportional expenditure moderation.7
6 In the early years of the twenty-first century, the employment in state-owned enterprises
amounted, for the OECD-21 on average, to around 2% of the economy’s total employment
(see OECD, Government at a Glance 2013).
7 The two main factors that account for this are the procurement costs and the profits that
private enterprises require. Regarding these expenditures a key question is whether any
possible production efficiency gain would outweigh the profits and the procurement cost.
However, supposed gains may not be the primary motive for outsourcing. A primary motive
might be a factional ideological principle that what private enterprises might do should not
be undertaken by the state. Again, such a principle may affect the size of state production,
though not necessarily the proportional or more than proportional size of state expenditure
and taxation.
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graph 8.3 State employment as percentage of total employment8 in compar-
ison with state expenditure (each general government); averages
of up to 21 current OECD countries, 1870–2015
Data sources: for top line seeGraph 8.2; for bottom line: 1870, 1913, 1937 (Tanzi and Schuknecht
2000); 1960 (OECD 1999); 1970–2015 (OECDdataset EconomicOutlook, November 2017; extracted
28 December 2017). For further details on the bottom one, see Appendix 8.A under 8§3
Division 2. The finance of the state: taxation and other main forms
of finance
As in the previous division the current division focuses on the state as being
also an economic actor. This division grounds the previous two chapters, and
particularly also themoment of state production and expenditure (8D1), in the
finance of the state.
8§4 Taxation and othermain forms of finance of the state
We have seen that taxation is necessary for the existence of the capitalist state
and hence of the capitalist system (7D1). Whereas taxation so is a necessary
form of finance of the state, its required amount can contingently be moder-
ated by other forms of finance. A particular category amongst these is that of
‘social security contributions’ (see further 8§9). Contingently, taxation can also
8 Employment general government (excludingmilitary employment and employment by pub-
lic corporations) as a percentage of total employment (persons, civilian).
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bemoderated by state borrowing (see further 8§4-a). Thenwe have for the ‘cur-
rent finance of expenditure’ (CFg):
CFg = T + SSC + OR + B [accounting definition] (8.4)
whereT is the sumof taxes, SSC social security contributions, OR other receipts
and B is the net current borrowing flow. B is negative in case of a fiscal surplus.
In all cases we have:
CFg = G [accounting definition] (8.5)
where G denotes state expenditure. CFg and G are net categories. This means
that if the state itself pays any taxes (which are recollected by the state’s treas-
ury), these would be deducted from each side of the ‘gross budget’ to reach the
net budget. Similarly, the current borrowing flow B is net, meaning that in case
the state at the same time (year) borrows and lends, these are netted.
8§4-a Amplification. The contingent forms of finance other than
taxation and social security contributions
Division 5 expands on the finance of social security transfers, including social
security contributions (8§9) and on the various forms of taxation (8§10). The
current amplification sums up the forms of finance other than taxation and
SSC. All of these other forms are contingent.
• Borrowing
In order to finance its expenditures – and especially in order to finance tem-
porary extra expenditures as well as investment expenditures – the state may
borrow from banks, from other financial institutions, from enterprises with
temporary surplus funds and from rich individuals. This can be short-term bor-
rowing through the issuance of treasury bills, or also medium- to long-term
borrowing through the issuance of bonds.
Recall that any new borrowing of money (that is, any macroeconomic
increase in the sum of money borrowed) must derive from money creation by
banks and so originates with banks (2§8, 3§2). The state may also borrow from
the Central Bank concomitantly on which the latter creates money (7§4).
Although in practice both ‘temporary’ extra expenditures and investment
expenditures can be flexibly defined, the general idea is that the costs of these
expenditures are recovered from future tax amounts without raising tax rates
now.
This borrowing itself might approach a quasi-form of taxation to the extent
that the rate of inflation increases, or increases above its expected rate.9
9 Inflation indexed rates of interest may prevent this implicit quasi-taxation.
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• Enforced lending
Borrowing by the state other than for the finance of temporary extra expendit-
ures aswell as investment expenditures (see above) canbe considered as apost-
ponement of taxation. However, when the state manages to issue perpetual
bonds (consols) taxation is postponed indefinitely.10 Enforced perpetual lend-
ing at a (near to) zero rate of interest approaches taxation.
• Royalties on licences
In principle, royalties on licences could be extended for any (commercial)
activity. The broader its base, the more it approaches a quasi-taxation.
• Sale of state services, often in the form of dues
• Dividends on state-owned enterprises
• Rent on state-owned property including land
The degree to which these latter three might contingently substitute for taxa-
tion depends on the state’s economic constellation in this respect.
• Fines
In 7§2 I introduced the fundamental conflict of taxation, in that it overrides
property rights. Some of the other finance categories mentioned may also be
conflicting. This applies especially to state-owned enterprises when these are
considered to compete with private enterprises. This may be different when
state-owned enterprises are restricted either to specific sectors (such as bank-
ing or power provision) or enterprises with (potential) extreme market power
(e.g. monopolies).
In any case within capitalism it is not plausible that the state might finance
its expenditure without any taxation, and empirically this has not been the
case.
8§4-b Amplification. The trend in taxes and other state receipts in the
OECD-21, 1870–2015
Graph 8.4 shows the trend in total state receipts from 1870 to 2015 (current
OECD-21 average) as a percentage of GDP.
The average of the total state receipts quadrupled between 1870 and 2015
(from nearly 11 to 43% of GDP). The fastest increase occurs between 1913 and
1920 (12% to 19%), and from 1937 to 1970 (18% to 35%). After 1970 the rates of
increase gradually fade off. For the early decades data are available only for 7–8
countries. However, it can be seen from the thin solid line in the graph that the
data for the 8 countries of 1870 roughly approximate those of the up to 21 coun-
10 For a brief description of British consols see http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Consol_(bond).
On enforced temporary lending see a 2012 proposal by the German DWI: http://www.diw
.de/documents/publikationen/73/diw_01.c.405701.de/12‑28‑1.pdf; for an abstract in Eng-
lish see http://www.diw.de/sixcms/detail.php?id=diw_01.c.405712.de.
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tries afterwards. From 1965 more specific data are available for tax and social
security receipt (the two dotted lines). We see that the growth of these bends
off after 2000.
graph 8.4 State receipts (general government) 1870–2015, in% GDP: (a)
total current receipts; (b) tax and social security receipts; (c) tax
receipts. Averages of 8–21 current OECD countries
Data sources: 1870–1960 (Tanzi & Schuknecht 2000); 1960–2015 (OECD data base). For details
see Appendix 8.A under 8§4-b
Given that social security expenditures were 10.4% of GDP in 1960 and 1.7% in
1930 (Chapter 7, Graph 7.10), it is likely that around 1930 the sum of ‘tax and
social security receipts’ (the middle dotted line in Graph 8.4) nearly coincided
with ‘tax receipts’ (the bottom dotted line).
‘Total receipts’ includes tax and social security receipts (together the main
part) and (chiefly) state receipts from state enterprises (dividends) and from
concessions, as well as from retributions, dues and fines (see 8§4-a).
Graph 8.5 combines Graph 8.2 and Graph 8.4. Hence this graph also shows
the budget deficits. (Note that, depending on the rate of growth of GDP, the
state’s fiscal deficitmay but need not result in gross debt increases as a percent-
age of GDP.) Note again that because these graphs are in terms of GDP shares,
cyclical movement is not shown. Moreover, these would anyway be levelled
out due to the OECD-21 average and the international non-synchronisation of
cycles.Withinone country the tax receipts as apercentageof GDP tend to rise in
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upswings and decrease in downswings. Nevertheless, OECD-wide heavy reces-
sions or depressions do show up to some extent in Graph 8.5 in the difference
between expenditure and receipts. See the (decade) years 1937 and 2010, and
to a lesser extent the 1980s.
graph 8.5 Total state expenditure and total current receipts (general gov-
ernment) 1870–2015, in% GDP; averages of up to 21 current OECD
countries
Data sources: see Graph 8.2 and Graph 8.4
Division 3. The effect of state expenditure on the enterprises’
macroeconomic production and validation of surplus-value
After the exposition of state expenditure and finance in general (8D1–8D2),
both of the following two divisions present their implications for the enter-
prise’s production and validation of surplus-value (the current division) and
for the after-tax surplus-value (8D4). See Scheme 8.1. The current division is
the sequel to Chapter 3’s 3D5, ‘The validation of macroeconomic surplus-value
by macroeconomic expenditure’.
8§5 State expenditure and production of enterprises
• Recapitulation of state expenditure
Recall from 8§2 the following definition of state expenditure (G):
G = (Wg + Fg) + Ig + (Qg + Zg) (8.3)
See the left hand side of Table 8.6 for the recapitulation of the categories.
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• Production of enterprises
For their production, enterprises anticipate the validation of production by the
expenditure of economic actors (3§10; see also Chapter 5, Figure 5.2).With the
introduction of the state into the systematic exposition, this also applies for the
expenditure by or via the state.
table 8.6 Expenditure and current finance account of the state
Expenditure Finance
wages (civil servants) Wg taxes T
floating inputs (from enterprises) Fg social security contributions SSC
net investment
(fixed inputs from enterprises)
Ig other receipts OR
interest on state debt
(net payments)
Qg
social security transfers Zg
other expenditure: amenities† Ag net current borrowing flow B
Sum of expenditure G* Sum of current finance CFg
† Neglected in the current chapter. G = G*– Ag.
8§5-a Explication. Direct and indirect monetary flows from the state to
enterprises
Merely for analytical purposes I record that in the absence of savings, all of
the expenditures of the state (in whatever way these are financed) end up as
sales of enterprises, and so generate income of enterprises.Circuit 8.7 visualises
this.
8§6 State expenditure and validation of macroeconomic surplus-value
This section shows the effect of state expenditure on the macroeconomic
validation of the surplus-value produced in enterprises. For the latter the integ-
rated production and primary income account of enterprises and banks
are considered – that is before taxes – recalling that part of the enterprises’
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surplus-value is distributed to banks. (Amplification 8§6-b outlines a formally
more complete presentation of the current section. Instead of going through
the rest of 8§6, the reader might immediately turn to 8§6-b.)
circuit 8.7 Destination of state expenditure: purchases
from enterprises at zero savings
• Recapitulation from Chapter 3
It was shown in Chapter 3 (3§10) that given the production of surplus-value
(ΠP), themacroeconomic validation of surplus-value (Π) is determined, on the
one hand, by the investment of enterprises (I) and the consumption expendit-
ure of capital owners (Ck), and, on the other hand, by the (dis)saving by labour,
that is, the quantitative difference between their consumption and their wages
(Cw–W).11 With the introduction of the state and state expenditure, the nota-
tion of Chapter 3’s enterprises sector is amended by adding extensions ‘e’ (amp-
lified in 8§6-b.) In this amended notation we had:
Π 🢔 = [Ie + Ck] + [Cwe –We] (3.10*)12
Π 🢔 = [Ie + Ck] – Swe (3.12*)
11 Borrowing by labour (which is contingent) is another determinant (Appendix 3B, section
3B-3).
12 Henceforth an asterisk indicates the changed notation of an earlier equation. Recall that
🢔means that the determination is from the right hand side to the left hand side.
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Thus the validation of surplus-value is positively determined by the net
expenditure of enterprises and capital owners (Ie+Ck) and negatively by the
saving of the labour employed by enterprises (Swe).
• Expenditure with enterprises by and via the state
We had for state expenditure (8§5):
G = {Fg + Ig} + {Wg + Qg + Zg} (8.3)
The expenditure on floating inputs (Fg) – the latter inclusive of replacement
investment – and on net investment (Ig) directly accrue to the enterprises sec-
tor. For the other three categories this is indirectly so via the consumption –
and depending on the degree of savings – out of these incomes of wages (Wg),
interest (Qg) and social security transfers (Zg). For the consumption (Cxx) and
savings (Sxx) we have:
Cwg =Wg – Swg [definition] (8.6)
Cqg = Qg – Sqg [definition] (8.7)
Czg = Zg – Szg [definition] (8.8)
These three savings categories together, I call the ‘state-mediated savings’ (Smg)
Smg = Swg + Sqg + Szg [definition] (8.9)
Focusing on the total of state expenditure (G), it can then be shown (cf. 8§6-b)
that
Π 🢔 = [(Ie + Ck) – Swe] + G – [Swg + Sqg + Szg] (8.10)
or
Π 🢔 = [(Ie + Ck) – Swe] + G – Smg (8.11)
Here the term in square brackets is analogous but quantitatively not the same
as equation (3.12*). This is so because with the state expenditure (minus Smg)
the production of enterprises increases. With it at least the investment also
increases. To account for the distinction in comparison with Chapter 3 (and
all of Part One), the terms [(Ie + Ck) – Swe] and Π are written in italics. (This
applies for the rest of the current chapter.)
All of the expenditures and savings in 810 and 8.11 are themselves independ-
ent of surplus-value (Π) and in that sense autonomous quantities (see 5§3 and
5§5 on the autonomy of Ie and Ck).
In sum, all of the state expenditure (G) has a positive effect on the surplus-
value produced and validated (Π), whereas any saving out of the transfers
(Smg) moderates the positive effect. See also Circuit 8.8. (When, in 8D4, I
present the effect of taxation on the after-tax surplus-value, the (dis)savings
by the state itself will also be accounted for.)
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circuit 8.8 Destination of state expenditure: purchases and
saving
8§6-a Explication. A methodological comment on the production, the
validation and the distribution of surplus-value
Onwards from the introductionof capitalist production (1D5), a distinctionwas
made between the production of surplus-value and the distribution of surplus-
value. At first this distinction was only implicit (1D5), but in the course of
Chapter 2 and especially Chapter 3 (3D1–3D3) it became explicit, and gradu-
ally more detailed (see Figure 3.2b).
With the state’s appearance within the exposition (6D2) the activities of the
state became explicit. In 8D1 these activities were, economically, conceptual-
ised as production by the state’s civil servants. For that production, the state
requires inputs from enterprises, and so expends with enterprises. This also is
what is made explicit (made explicit, because the capitalist economy can have
no existence without the state). In that sense the introduction of the state into
the exposition does not give rise to extra production by enterprises. Neverthe-
less it is the case that an impetus to extra expenditure by the state does give rise
to extra production of enterprises – and hence (ceteris paribus) of production
of extra surplus-value.
8. state expenditure and its finance [8§6] 403
Only in the next division (8D5), which expands on taxation, will it become
explicit that, via the taxation of enterprises, the distribution of surplus-value is
also affected.
8§6-b Amplification. The effect of state expenditure on the (before tax)
macroeconomic validation of surplus-value – a formal derivation
Here themacroeconomic validation of production through expenditure is con-
sidered and therewith the generation of primary income: surplus-value and
wages.Only after that is the secondary distributionof incomeconsidered: espe-
cially the distribution of surplus-value as including taxation (the latter in 8D4).
Two distinct macroeconomic sectors are treated: the enterprises sector (the
integration of enterprises and the non-lending and borrowing part of banks)
with symbol ‘e’, and the state sector (with symbol ‘g’).
Equation numbers refer to those of the main sections (equations 8.1–8.11).
Equations added in this amplification are numbered 8.6b.1, 8.6b.2, etc. (6b
refers to the current amplification, and the last digit to the equation added).
1 Reconceptualisation of the domain: someminor changes in notation
With the incorporation of the state into the systematic exposition, we have
formally a domain extension. In order to keep the formal presentation trans-
parent and concise, I redefine the notation of 3§10, now introducing extensions
‘e’ for the enterprises sector and extensions ‘g’ for the state (g for government) –
see Table 8.9. I could have introduced this notation in Chapter 3, but I did not
want to anticipate Chapter 8 too much.
table 8.9 Notation for the formal domains of Chapters 3 and 8
Enterprises sector Formal domain
notation 3§10 notation Ch. 8 extension Ch. 8
value-added (net) Y Ye Y = Ye + Yg
investment (net) I Ie I = Ie + Ig
wages (sum) W We W =We +Wg
consumption out of wages Cw Cwe Cw = Cwe + Cwg
saving out of wages Sw Swe Sw = Swe + Swg
Because the state produces no surplus-value and capital, I keep for the con-
sumption by capital owners: Ck = Ck. Because surplus-value is produced only
in enterprises (Π ≡ Πe) I keep Π, but write this in italics (Π), so as to make
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explicit that, as we will see, the introduction of the state formally implies an
expansion of surplus-value. Along with it the other Chapter 3 components are
put in italics (Table 8.9, column 4).
Above and below all the time indices are omitted (implicitly these are all ‘t’).
In this new notation I recapitulate two main equations from Chapter 3:
Π 🢔 = Ie + Ck + (Cwe–We) (3.10*)
Π 🢔 = Ie + Ck – Swe (3.12*)
(Henceforth an asterisk indicates the changed notation of an earlier equation.)
2 Amacroeconomic two-sector approach for the enterprises and state
sectors
I adopt a macroeconomic two-sector approach in which the enterprises sector
and the state are not being integrated (hence a separate, though interconnec-
ted, Ye and Yg).
Y = Ye + Yg (8.6b.1)
(where Y in italics is total net value-added when the state is explicit).
2a The state (and state-mediated) sector
Yg =Wg (8.2)
We have for state expenditure (8§2):13
G = {Fg + Ig} + {Wg + Qg + Zg} (8.3)
The expenditure on floating inputs inclusive replacement investment (Fg) and
net investment (Ig) directly accrues to the enterprises sector. For the other
three categories this is indirectly so via consumption, and depending on the
degree of savings out of these incomes of wages (Wg), interest (Qg), and social
security transfers (Zg). For the consumption (Cxx) and savings (Sxx) we have:
Cwg =Wg – Swg (8.6)
Cqg = Qg – Sqg (8.7)
Czg = Zg – Szg (8.8)
These three savings categories together I call the ‘state-mediated savings’ (Smg)
Smg = Swg + Sqg + Szg (8.9)
2b The enterprises sector
From the side of the realised net production of the enterprises sector we have
the value-added of:
Ye 🢔 = [mLα] (1.8*)
13 Here the pure case is considered in which the state does not own enterprises that sell. If
it does, then these are subsumed under enterprises, the state receiving dividends.
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where m is the realisation constraint resulting in the unit monetary value of
labour.
Ye =We + Π (3.5*)
Π = Ye –We (3.5*′)
From the side of expenditure we have the following three equations.
For the final expenditure of the non-state sector with the enterprises sector
(Ee):
Ee = Ie + Ck + Cwe (3.6′* and 3.9*)
For the direct and indirect spending of the state sector with the enterprises
sector (Eg):
Eg = [Ig + Fg]+[(Cwg + Cqg + Czg)] (8.6b.2)
Taking the last two equations together we have the determination of:
Ye 🢔 = Ee + Eg (8.6b.3)
Themacroeconomic surplus-value is the sum of these expenditures minus the
wages of the enterprises sector:
Π 🢔 = (Ee + Eg) –We (8.6b.4)
Substituting (3.6′*) and (8.6b.2), into (8.6b.4) we have:
Π 🢔 = [(Ie + Ck) + (Cwe–We)] + [Ig + Fg] + [(Cwg + Cqg + Czg)] (8.6b.5)
where the shaded part is analogous to equation (3.10*) above.
Substituting 8.6, 8.7. and 8.8 we get:
Π 🢔 = [(Ie + Ck) + (Cwe–We)] + [Ig + Fg +Wg + Qg +Zg] –
[Swg + Sqg + Szg] (8.6b.6)
Here the second term on the right hand side is the state expenditure (equation
8.3 above). When substituting this we get:
Π 🢔 = [(Ie + Ck) + (Cwe–We)] + G – [Swg + Sqg + Szg] (8.10)
or
Π 🢔 = [(Ie + Ck) – Swe] + G – Smg (8.11)
These expenditures and savings are themselves independent of surplus-value
(Π) and in that sense autonomousquantities (see 5§3 and5§5on the autonomy
of Ie and Ck).
Thus the validation of surplus-value (Π) depends positively on the final
expenditure by the enterprises sector and by capital owners (Ie+Ck) as well as
on the state expenditure (G), and negatively on the saving out of enterprises
wages (Swe) and out of the state-mediated saving (Smg).
This is most transparent for the case in which there would be no savings
(that is, for Cwe=We and Smg=0, whence wewould have Π* = Ie + Ck + G). Para-
phrasing Kalecki, we then have: capitalists earn what they spend and what the
state directly and indirectly spends.
Recall that enterprises cannot determine the validation of their surplus-
value (3§10). Given the production of surplus-value – that each individual
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enterprise can control separately – the macro validation of surplus-value (Π)
is determined by the expenditure components above (8.6b.5 and the derived
8.11), which the individual enterprises cannot control, even if they can control
their own individual investment expenditure.14
8§6-c Amplification. From surplus-value to the before tax internal profit
of enterprises
Having outlined the validation of surplus-value in 8§6 and 8§6-b, we can now
turn to the first stage of the distribution of surplus-value (prior to taxation).
This regards the distribution of surplus-value (Π) as interest, whence wemove
from Π to the internal profit of the enterprises sector (R, now in italics). (At the
level of Chapter 3, the internal profit of enterprises was introduced briefly 3§1,
cf. Figure 3.2b, and more extended in Chapter 5, 5§1.)
Given the determination of surplus-value validated,
Π 🢔 = [(Ie + Ck) – Swe] + G – Smg (8.11)
we have for the internal profit of the enterprises sector:
R = Π – Qe {for net interest payments Qe>0} (8.6c.1)
where Qe is the net interest paid by enterprises to their external financiers.15
Hence we have for the enterprises’ internal profit:
R = [(Ie + Ck) – Swe] – [Qe] + [G – Smg] (8.6c.2)
8§6-d Addendum. A comment on the System of National Accounts
(SNA 2008)
The ordering of categories above can be connected to that of the System of
National Accounts 2008 (SNA 2008; see UN 2009), which, in general terms,
roughly adopts the same order regarding the generation of income versus its
distribution. This, however, does not imply that I would agree with all of the
SNA’s ordering decisions; especially I disagree with almost all of its ordering
when this requires an ‘imputation’ of one economic category to another. (I
especially distance myself from the imputation of owner-occupied dwellings
to a nominal entrepreneurial branch – fromwhich the owner is a nominal ten-
ant – the branch securing an operating surplus via the imputed rentals (see the
very last section of Appendix 3C). I also especially take distance from the way
14 This is a Kaleckian argument.
15 Recall that for the latter we had in equation 5.1 of 5§1 the notation iεK. This is also
adequate at the current point. The notation Qe merely serves to make the reader aware
that ‘net’ interest now may be net of also interest payments to enterprises from the
state.
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the value-added of banks is accounted for, that is, via the imputation of inter-
mediate uses (bank services) to interest receipts and payments of banks.)16
Apart from these imputations my ordering is different from the SNA’s in
that I consistently treat all taxation (the direct on incomes and the indirect
on products) at one and the same level. A rather minor point is that I treat net
rather than gross investment (the SNA accounts allow for each one).
Quite a different point is that (at the current general level of exposition)
international relations are yet abstracted from. Together this means that – in
SNA terminology – I start from macroeconomic production and the realisa-
tion of macroeconomic production at the level of ‘net value-added’ or the ‘net
domestic product against factor costs’, with all international related items put
to zero.
Division 4. The combined effect of state expenditure and taxation
on the enterprises’ macroeconomic after-tax surplus-value
This division presents, first, the combined effect of state expenditure (8D3) and
of taxation of enterprises on the latter’s after-tax surplus-value (8§7). Next it
presents, more specifically, the effect of a fiscal deficit of the state on the enter-
prises’ after-tax surplus-value (8§8).
8§7 A profits tax: taxation of surplus-value
• Finance and pre-finance of state expenditure
Enterprises usually pay taxes after having realised the surplus-value to pay
these. This may seem an obvious statement. Behind it, however, is the per-
haps less obvious fact that – depending on savings and other taxes – the state
expenditure (G) largely generates the before tax surplus-value equivalent for
the enterprises taxes. The state makes the required expenditure and, given the
going tax rates, it must await how much tax revenue the two generate (this is
how the statemakes its budget and carries it out; itmay estimate the tax collec-
tion, but the outcome is uncertain). Pending this tax collection, the state must
(pre-)finance its expenditure via borrowing (directly through banks or indir-
ectly via the issue of short-term bonds or treasury bills).
16 Even if for the SNA 2008 (UN 2009) the composers may have made a number of arbitrary
choices, it seems by and large an impressively consistent and precise whole (of over 600
pages). The sequel representing the accounts in excel (UN 2008a) is a useful leading sum-
mary even if that is a summary consisting of many thousands of entries.
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• The effect of a tax on surplus-value
Total taxes (T) aremade up of the ‘taxes on surplus-value realised’ (Tsv) and all
other taxes (To). The latter (To) are specified in 8D5.
T = Tsv + To (8.12)
The before (Π) and the after-tax surplus-value (Πat) are related as:
Πat = Π – Tsv (8.13)
Recall from 8§6 the equation for the realisation of surplus-value (Π):
Π 🢔 = [(Ie + Ck) – Swe] + G – Smg (8.11)
(with Swe for the saving out of enterprises wages and Smg for the saving out of
the state-mediated spending).
Substituting the last equation into the former we get:
Πat = [(Ie + Ck) – Swe] + [G – Smg – Tsv] (8.14)
Consider the second term in square brackets [G – Smg – Tsv].
First. The taxes (Tsv) are the costs for enterprises of the state’s actualisation
in terms of production and expenditure (8D1) of the seven legislative frame-
works (Chapters 6–7). Regarding the latter, specifically the state’s upholding of
the granted legal economic rights for enterprises (Chapter 6).
Secondly, however, these costs (Tsv) go along with benefits in the form of
state expenditureon the frameworks, benefits that directly or indirectly expand
the output of enterprises (G–Smg), and so their surplus-value.
Given the state and its actualised accommodation of the production of
surplus-value, the effect of this tax (Tsv) is that part of the pre-tax surplus-value
is distributed to the state (see Figure 8.10).
Recalling that the savings of the enterprises’ labour are the difference
between their wages and consumption (Swe = We–Cwe) we can also write
(8.14) as
Πat = [(Ie + Ck) + Cwe –We] + [G – Smg – Tsv] (8.14′)
In sum, therefore, we see that whereas each of the enterprises’ wages (We) and
taxes (Tsv) are costs for the generation of surplus-value, labour and the state
also generate expenditure benefits (Cw and G–Smg).
A corollary of this tax is that ‘the tendency to equalisation of average inter-
sector rates of integral profit’ (4§2) takes the form of ‘the tendency to equalisa-
tion of average inter-sector after-tax rates of integral profit’.
The figure on the next page is a completed version of Figure 3.2b (3§1).
8§7-a Amplification. The effect of a tax on the profit of enterprises
The main text presented the taxation of surplus-value (Π). Contingently the
state may allow enterprises to deduce interest payments (that is, this distribu-
tion of surplus-value) from the surplus-value tax, whence we have in fact a tax
on internal profit.
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figure 8.10 The distribution of surplus-value to financiers and to the state
Following on from an earlier amplification on the internal profit of enterprises
(8§6-c) the current amplification considers a tax on the internal profit (R), that
is, Π after the distribution of interest (thus we now have a smaller tax base).
Recall from 8§6-c:
R = Π – Qe {for net interest payments Qe>0} (8.6c.1)
R = [(Ie + Ck) – Swe] – [Qe] + [G – Smg] (8.6c.2)
Total taxes (T) aremade up of the taxes on the internal profit of enterprises (Tr)
and other taxes (To*).
T = Tr + To* (8.7a.1)
The after-tax internal profit (Rat) is defined as:
Rat = R – Tr (8.7a.2)
Substituting (8.6d.2) into the last equation we have:
Rat = [(Ie + Ck) – Swe] – [Qe] + [(G – Smg) – Tr] (8.7a.3)
The last term in square brackets represents the benefits (G–Smg) and costs (Tr)
that the enterprises sector derives from the state, for the former’s accommod-
ation of the generation of the profits of enterprises.
A corollary of this tax is that ‘the tendency to equalisation of average inter-
sector rates of internal profit’ (5§1) takes the form of ‘the tendency to equalisa-
tion of average inter-sector after-tax rates of internal profit’.
The information provided by equation (8.7a.3) is not much different from
that of the last but one in the main text of 8§7:
Πat = [(Ie + Ck) – Swe] + [G – Smg – Tsv] (8.14)
8§8 The effect of a fiscal deficit of the state on the after-tax surplus-value
Although the state’s fiscal stance (surplus or deficit) is contingent, the state
tends to run structurally a fiscal deficit. (See, for example, the earlier Graph 8.5,
in 8§4-b, for the OECD-21 between 1870 and 2015. Given the available data it
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seems that the period of fiscal surpluses between just before 1960 and just after
1970 is exceptional.) It is therefore relevant to consider the effect of a (struc-
tural) fiscal deficit, on the after-tax surplus-value of enterprises, which is the
subject of the current section. We get to this in subsection (3) below. Subsec-
tion (1) serves to simplify the notation. Subsection (2) introduces the concept
of saving by the state.
1 Hybrid taxes
A fiscal surplus of the state is equivalent to the state’s ‘saving’, and a fiscal deficit
to its ‘dissaving’. This is not simply the difference between its expenditure (G)
and taxes (G), because the state has also other incomes.
Recall from 8§4 the equation for the ‘current finance of expenditure’ (CFg).
CFg = T + SSC + OR+ B (8.4)
(T for taxes, SSC for social security contributions, OR for other receipts and B
for the net current borrowing flow.)
Recall from 8§7 the equation of taxes (with To for ‘other taxes’):
T = Tsv + To (8.12)
Substituting (8.12) into (8.4) we have:
CFg = Tsv + To + SSC + OR + B (8.4′)
In order to simplify the notation below, I introduce the term ‘hybrid taxes’ (TH),
defined as:
TH = Tsv + To + SSC + OR (8.15)
The last three terms are taken together as ‘other hybrid taxes’ (THo).
TH = Tsv + THo (8.16)
2 Saving by the state, or a fiscal deficit as reflected in dissaving
Substituting (8.12) and (8.15) into (8.4) we have
CFg = TH + B (8.17)
In case of a fiscal surplus, B is negative (thus the state pays off part of its debt).
Recall that the sum of state expenditure (G) equals its current finance.
CFg = G (8.5)
The current savings of the state (Sg) are defined as
Sg = TH – G (8.18)
Or: G – TH = –Sg. For a fiscal deficit (thus G > TH and B > 0) the saving Sg is
negative (thus we have dissaving by the state).
3 The effect of a fiscal deficit on the after-tax surplus-value
In the previous section (8§7) we had for the after-tax surplus-value:
Πat = [(Ie + Ck) – Swe] + [G – Smg – Tsv] (8.14)
By substituting (8.16) into (8.14) we make explicit both the taxation stance of
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the state (G–T) and the sum of the ‘other hybrid taxes’ (TH), as each determin-
ing the after-tax surplus-value of the enterprises sector.
Πat = [(Ie + Ck) – Swe] + [(G–TH) – Smg + THo] (8.19)
Thus to the extent that the state acts such that the appropriators of surplus-
value ‘share’ the total burden of the hybrid taxationwith other payers of hybrid
taxes (THo), the after-tax surplus-value is larger – that is, given the other com-
ponents.
By substituting (8.18) into (8.19), the (dis)savings of the state aremade expli-
cit (its fiscal surplus or deficit) as
Πat = [(Ie + Ck) – Swe] + [– Sg – Smg + THo] (8.20)
Thus the after-tax surplus-value is negatively affected by a fiscal surplus
(Sg>0).17 Conversely, a fiscal deficit (Sg < 0, hence –Sg > 0) has a positive effect
on the after-tax surplus-value.
However, although the statement in the last sentence is formally correct, the
total of the state debt – and the interest payments along with it – has a second-
ary effect on the savings by the state bondholders. (Recall from equation 8.9,
in 8§6, that this saving, Sqg, is part of the ‘state-mediated savings’ Smg.) To the
extent that the total state debt would keep increasing (say, as a percentage of
GDP) then at some point the savings effect of bondholders (Sqg) is going to
outrun the budget deficit effect (Sg).18 (In considering this, it should be kept in
mind that as long as the state’s budget deficit as a percentage of GDP, e.g. 2%,
is smaller than the rate of growth of GDP, e.g. 2.5%, then the total state debt as
a percent of GDP decreases.)
8§8-a Addendum: Kalecki on the state budget deficit and profits
The idea that the budget deficit of the state positively affects profits stems from
Kalecki (see, e.g., his 2003 [1954], pp. 48–9), although he does not go into sim-
17 The form of equation (8.20) is in essence no different from the result reached in 3§10
(equation 3.12). This is transparent for the case inwhich all taxationwould be levied on the
enterprises sector (THo = 0). Thus profits are positively determined by the final expendit-
ures of enterprises (Ie) and of capital owners (Ck), and negatively by the savings of all
other actors (now including the state). Recall that the exposition in this book takes dis-
tance from the orthodox view of investment being a saving (3§9).
18 On the basis of twentieth-century data for the average of the OECD-21 of before and after
the early twentieth-century financial crisis on the one hand, and a number of plausible
savings assumptions on the other, it can be inferred that this ‘outrunning’ does not occur
for state debts below 100% of GDP. However, this would far from imply that the term [–
Sg – Smg + THo] in equation 8.20 would become negative. For the OECD-21, and at least
over the last 50 years, the THo has kept increasing from 28.2% of GDP in 1979 to 32.2%
in 2015. (Taxes on profits of corporate enterprises in terms of GDP changed from 2.3% in
1970, via 3.7% in 2000, to 2.9% in 2015.)
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ilar detail as in the main section. Minsky remarks: ‘Ever since the early work
of Kalecki it has been known that gross profits equals gross investment plus
the government deficit …’. And: ‘Although sustaining and increasing business
profits has never been an avowedobjective of active fiscal policy – employment
or income have been the avowed policy objectives – a major effect of the big
deficits that big governments generate when income falls is to sustain profits’
(Minsky 1982, pp. 389 and 388).
Division 5. Forms of taxation: the distribution of income and
wealth
The previous division presented the effect of taxation on the after-tax surplus-
value. In principle the state might levy all the required taxes on surplus-value.
Given that the state acts such that enterprises ‘share’ taxationwith households,
this final division presents the effect of the particular actual form of taxation
on the distribution of the income of households (8§11), and on the distribu-
tion of the wealth of households (8§12). These sections are preceded by some
categorising outlines (8§9–8§10).
A methodological remark is appropriate at this point. Whereas taxation is
necessary, the specific forms of taxation are contingent. Their outcome in the
distributions of income andwealth are in fact a ‘manifestation’ of the capitalist
system (presented in Chapters 4–5 and 9–10). However, as these distributions
relate qua theme to the current chapter, I have included it here, at the end of
this chapter.
8§9 The finance of social security: taxes and social security contributions
In 7D5 the framework of legitimating social security provisions (or ‘transfers’)
was presented in general terms. Recall the transfer categories presented in Fig-
ure 7.8 and Graph 7.9 (7§17).
Social security provisions are financed in two ways. Mostly one part is fin-
anced out of taxation and the other part out of social security contributions
(SSC), which are most often in part paid by employers and in part by work-
ers.
SSC-related provisions are considered to have a collective insurance char-
acter and to be work-related (e.g. non-structural unemployment, sickness pay,
and wage-related pensions). In a way these are not ‘pure’ social transfers, but
rather a collective insurance for which only those who work are eligible, and
only those who worked can receive benefits. Regarding wage-related pension
benefits in particular, it is to be mentioned that these are either the result
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of a formal insurance, or have the character of a postponed wage. (Recall-
ing that for the OECD-21, in 2010, pensions constitute about one-third of the
social security transfers – see Graph 7.9 – it is indeed dubious whether the
wage-related, or premium-related, part of these should be classified as ‘social’
transfers.)
This is thus different from transfers that are not work related, such as fixed
amount (equal for all) state pensions that are financed out of taxation, as well
as child and other allowances, social assistance, and state serviced (contribu-
tions to) health provisions – all these are most often financed by taxation.
Social security contributions paid byworkers are inevitably paid out of their
grosswage. However, employers SSC are also part of the grosswage. (This is also
how the System of National Accounts, SNA 2008 accounts for these.)19 For the
employer these are ‘wage costs’.
The distribution of the SSC between employers and workers is contingent
on wage bargaining, and in several countries contingent on economic policy
decisions. However, to a large extent the outcome is merely an ‘optical’ matter
of take home pay (to the extent that the workers SSC part is larger, the gross
wage paid can be larger). What does matter, though, for the distribution of
income is any wage bargaining or economic policy decisions that either set an
upper threshold for SSC (making the distribution of income more skewed) or
that set an upper threshold on the transfers/benefits (making the distribution
of income less skewed) – in each case given the total wages sum that employers
are willing to pay.
It is contingent (and country dependent) if, and which, social transfers are
taxed.
8§9-a Amplification. The finance of social security in the OECD-21:
1970–2015
Graph 8.11 shows how social security in the OECD-21 is financed on average.
There is quite some variation among these countries. For example, in Australia
and New Zealand 100% is financed out of taxation and in Denmark nearly
100%, whereas in France, Germany, Japan, and the Netherlands over 50% is
financed out of SSC (year 2010).
From the point of view of social security contributions (SSC) and for the
OECD-21 on average, about one-third of the social security transfers (SST) are
in fact a wages component – one that may or may not be taxed – as shown in
Table 8.12.
19 SNA 2008 (UN 2009), chapter 7B, Compensation of employees, in particular Table 7.4 and
the text on pp. 138–9. See also OECD 2013.
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graph 8.11 Finance of social security provisions 1970–2015, shares of social
security contributions (SSC) and taxes; averages of OECD-21
Data sources: Social security contributions (SSC) (OECD dataset Revenue Statistics – Compar-
ative tables, series 2100, 2200, 2300 and 2400);20 Social security expenditure (see Graph 7.10)
table 8.12 Finance of social security, and social security contributions as part
of the gross wage
Employers Workers State
finance of social security x% y% (1-x-y)
contributions contributions out of taxation
component of the ‘gross wage’
(regarding previous row)†
yes (wage costs)‡ yes no
taxation of social sec. transfers n.a. varies between countries
for different transfers
† This is also how the System of National Accounts 2008 (SNA 2008) conceptualises this matter (see the
previous footnote).
‡ This is also the difference between the concept of ‘wages’ and ‘wage costs’. These contributions are
directly paid to the institution administering the social security – hence workers do not receive this in
cash, although it is theirs (the same applies most often for the next column).
20 http://stats.oecd.org/OECDStat_Metadata/ShowMetadata.ashx?Dataset=
REV&ShowOnWeb=true&Lang=en (last updated August 2017; accessed 28 December
2017).
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8§10 Forms of taxation
Recall from 8§5’s Table 8.6 (and Graph 8.4 in 8§4) the forms of finance of the
state. Given that there are limits to contingent borrowing and to other non-tax
incomes of the state, taxation is the main and necessary form of finance of the
state (8§4). However, the particular form of taxation is contingent. The ‘pure’
form of taxationwould be taxes on the enterprises’ property and surplus-value,
that is, when taxation would be connected to the initial ground of the state
(6§1 and 6§11). In actual practice labour ‘shares’ in the taxes, regarding both
their labour income and their spending. Hence there are four main categories
of taxation:21
1. Taxes on profits
• taxes on corporate profits (legal corporations);
• taxes on other profits (non-incorporated firms);
2. Taxes on property value and property income
• property value taxes (taxes on wealth);
• property income taxes (taxes on distributed interest and on dividends
and rent);
• taxes on the succession of property;
3. Taxes on labour income and its derivatives
• labour income taxes;
• taxes on social security transfers;22
• taxes on benefits from pension funds (cf. Chapter 3, Appendix 3A-2);
4. Taxes on products (indirect taxes)
• taxes on the value of products (at production, sale or transfer; or at final
use); these include the indirect value-added tax (VAT);23
• taxes per unit of goods or services (excise).
In case all these four forms prevail, all classes of actors are subject to levies of
the last category and, depending on their roles, they might fall into one or all
of the first three categories.
The state can – up to its discretion in face of its legitimation requirement –
in principle choose between degrees of these various forms of taxation.
21 Precise definitions can be found in the SNA 2008 (UN 2009).
22 Among current OECD countries there is quite some diversity as to their taxation. See
Adema, Fron and Ladaique 2011.
23 Collected in stages by enterprises; ultimately charged in full to the final purchases.
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8§11 Forms and design of taxation, and their legitimation in compliance
to a particular distribution of income
As with all main state actions, the form and the specific design of taxes must
ultimately be legitimated in the compliance of actors. In the end this concerns
the compliance to a particular distribution of income and wealth via taxation.
The current section focuses on the distribution of income and the next one on
the distribution of wealth.
1 Taxation inevitably takes a stance
I make a distinction between the forms of taxation (the categories outlined in
8§10) and their design (tax rates and the tax base for these rates). There cannot
be ‘neutral’ taxes or neutral tax rates. More specifically regarding tax rates, flat
rates are no more neutral than progressive or regressive ones. Propagating flat
rates would seemingly imply a normative judgement regarding the outcome of
‘the market’ and the resulting distribution of income and wealth before tax-
ation. However – and quite apart from the moral or ethical norm – such a
judgement is based on the illusion that ‘the market’ could exist at all, and spe-
cifically so independently of the state and its expenditure. Independently of
judgements about the formand the design of taxes, ‘themarket’ is a phantom to
the extent that it has no existence without the rights frameworks and the eco-
nomic frameworks presented in Chapters 6–7.24 Moreover, because the state
exists, ‘markets in a vacuum of non-taxation’ do not exist. There can be tax
shifts, though no tax shift can be actualised in a vacuum of non-taxation. In
sum, any actual form and design of taxation is inevitably based on a normat-
ive stance of the state, and only shifts in taxation and/or their design can be
identified as being redistributive.
2 Tax rates
The particular formof taxation being contingent, at least one formmust neces-
sarily be implemented. The same applies for their design: there must necessar-
ily be some tax rate (regressive, flat or progressive) that affects the distribution
of income or wealth. An important difference between the four main forms
of taxation (8§10) concerns their potential for changes in the distribution of
income and wealth via progressive, flat or regressive tax rates.
24 The so-called ‘general equilibrium theory’ and the supposed norm of market efficiency
is based on this phantom. However, even if we were to bracket this phantom character,
that theory is based on non-neutral assumptions. These have been set out by Hahn, for
example in his 1981. (This source is relevant because Hahn was an expert working himself
in the field of general equilibrium theory.)
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• Regarding taxation of products it is difficult or even impossible to build
progression into the taxes other than in a rough way, such as a lower rate for
common foods.
• For corporate profit taxes progression is possible, for example if the progres-
sion would start at a threshold related to the number of labourers employed
or via so-called tax brackets. (Nevertheless beyond such brackets the usual cor-
porate taxes are most often a flat percentage.)25 Another possibility would be
to differentiate the rate for retained versus distributed profits.
• The design of a fine-tuned progressive taxation is easiest for awages tax, and
generally for any final income tax of households.
3 Progressive tax rates: profits and savings
In terms of the effect of taxes on the profits of enterprises, the exposition in
8D4 implies that a progressive tax on personal income assists integral profits.
Themore skewed the distribution of this income, themore savings press down
profits.26 Thus progressive personal income taxes support enterprises: their
rate of profit and so investment and employment.
This puts on the state’s agenda the dilemma as to whether it is primarily
concernedwith the interests of enterprises or rather with the high-income cat-
egories. Essential in this respect is the long-standing ideological supposition
that investment would require savings (3§2, 3§3, 3§9). For many this ideology
functions as an argument to favour a skewed distribution of income.27
4 Contingency of the redistribution of income and wealth?
Seemingly the existence of the capitalist system does not pertain to a particu-
lar personal distribution of income and wealth. The capitalist system provides
plenty of opportunity to purposely build in inequality of income and wealth.
On the other hand, it might seem that the capitalist system is compatible with
25 Sometimes small corporations are favouredby a flat lower rate up to some thresholdmeas-
ured for example in amount of profit.
26 This is different for wages income (including that of themanagement) and current capital
income. However, to the extent that the income categories fall under the same ‘income
taxes’ this difference is not effective in practice. Regarding capital income, and to the
extent that the consumption out of this income is stable (as, in a Kaleckian vein, has
been assumed throughout) saving out of capital income is reflected in the issue of new
bonds and shares of enterprises (see 3§6, Circuit 3.13). For this category, however, and to
the extent that enterprises issue relatively more bonds than shares, the liabilities position
of enterprises is affected.
27 Keynes was very much aware of this, calling ‘the rentier’ a ‘functionless investor’ (Keynes
1936, Chapter 24, section II). (He means a functionless financier or ‘portfolio investor’.)
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an equal distribution of income or ‘even’ one where the unattractive work (for
example, garbage collection – in general the bottom of the current wages lad-
der) is better paid than the more attractive work.
In fact the interest of the upper income and wealth classes has been served
in the past, and is served currently, by the building in of a considerable skewed-
ness in the distribution of income and wealth.28 However, this skewedness is
constrained by the compliance of the majority of the people (2§5, 2§7, 2§7-b,
6§5, 7§17), and particularly also a wages ladder and a disposable income lad-
der that gains the overall compliance of also the upper-lower and the middle
classes (say, the middle 60% of the income distribution – income deciles 3–
8). However, whereas this requirement is not contingent, the gaining of this
compliance is.
For this gaining of compliance, ideology is a prominent factor: the higher
income classes do (not) deserve their income for such and such reasons. The
key part of this ideology is the phantom of themarket, which in all official stat-
istics is taken as a point of departure, and so as a reference point.When that is
taken as the reference point, income is seen to be taken away from the upper
classes so as to be redistributed to the lower ones. It is a crucial part of this ideo-
logy that the prior production and appropriation of surplus-value is neglected:
the market outcome of it is the statistical starting point and reference point.
8§11-a Amplification. Examples of distributions of household income in
the OECD-21 around 2015
Graph 8.13 shows an example of a deciles distribution of the income of house-
holds for various income measures. (In a deciles distribution the population
of households is ranked from low to high income, and next divided into ten
groups, each of 10% of the population.) ‘Market income’ (or primary income)
is the income before any redistribution. ‘Gross income’ is the market income
after social security transfers. ‘Disposable income’ is the gross income after dir-
ect taxes. These threemeasurewhat households actually receive at some point.
There is also a fourthmeasure around,which is ‘equivaliseddisposable income’.
For this measure households are standardised as to the number of members in
a household; adults have a higher weight than children. If these four measures
are compared, it makes a difference which one is the basis for the ranking of
the deciles.
The example is of the UK (Graph 8.13) – seeTable 8.18 for its OECD-21 income
rank.
28 As before, I take class as an objective category – in this case statistical classes of the dis-
tribution of income and wealth.
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graph 8.13 Distribution of income: Market, Gross and Equivalised disposable
income households by deciles, case of the UK 2015
Data source: Office for National Statistics (UK), Dataset ‘The effects of taxes and benefits on
household income’ 2015/16, Table 2a (release date 25 April 2017)
table 8.14 Decile shares in total income of each category: UK 2015 (re. Graph
8.13)
Shares D1 D2 D3 D4 D5 D6 D7 D8 D9 D10
market inc. 1% 3% 3% 5% 7% 9% 11% 14% 17% 31%
gross inc. 3% 4% 5% 6% 7% 9% 10% 13% 16% 27%
eq. disp. inc. 3% 5% 6% 7% 8% 9% 10% 12% 15% 25%
Data source: As for Graph 8.13
We see in Graph 8.13 and Table 8.14 that on average the largest redistributive
effect results from social security transfers (SST) rather than from taxes. This
can be better seen from Graph 8.15. This graph shows for an average of up to 20
OECD-21 countries the Gini measure for each income category. The Gini index
(or Gini coefficient) is a common measure for the skewedness of a distribu-
tion. It adopts a scale of 0 to 1, the number 0 indicating complete evenness of
the distribution, and the number 1 maximal skewedness (all income is owned
by one unit of the population). This graph shows that social security transfers
(SST) are the main factor bringing about a less skewed distribution of income
(the difference between the top and themiddle bar for the data since 2000). In
2015 it accounted for ¾ of the difference.
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graph 8.15 Distribution of household income (equivalised): Gini indices of
(a) market income; (b) income post social security transfers; (c)
income post direct taxes; 1985–2015; averages of 4–20 OECD-21
countries
Data source: OECD, dataset IncomeDistribution and Poverty; accessed 8 October 2017.29Year
as indicated or nearest year available30
Graph 8.15 also shows that in the three decades from 1985 to 2015, the Gini for
market income increased by 21% and that for disposable income by 13%. This
is also the period in which the increase in state expenditure on SST moderated
(see 7§17-a, Graph 7.10).
Note that the Gini measure is not very sensitive to the extremes of the dis-
tribution. These are more properly measured by, for example, the ratio of the
top decile over the bottom decile or of the top quintile (20% groups) over the
bottom quintile. Nevertheless, even for the Gini we see in terms of the change
in these decades a redistribution of income from the broad bottom to the broad
top.
The social security transfers in the OECD-21 do not prevent that a consider-
able part of the households has an income below the poverty line. The poverty
line is variously defined. Here I show data for the poverty line that is defined as
29 http://stats.oecd.org/viewhtml.aspx?datasetcode=IDD&lang=en. The following link
provides brief OECD definitions of various distributional measures: https://data.oecd.org/
inequality/income‑inequality.htm.
30 The Gini for gross income before 2000 is only available for one or two countries (data
accessed in October 2017). The data used for the graph are those of the income definition
2012 from when it is available for a country (most often the effects of the 2011 versus 2012
definitions are rather small).
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half themedian household income of the total population. This measure takes
account of the degree of access to the goods and services that are regarded as
customary in any county in a particular year. (Here the average of the OECD-
21.) The poverty rate is defined as the number of households below this line
relative to the total population of households. Graph 8.16 shows this poverty
rate before and after transfers and direct taxes – again for equivalised house-
holds.
graph 8.16 Poverty rate before and after transfers and taxes, 1985–2015; aver-
ages of 9–21 OECD-21 countries
Data source: See Graph 8.15. Year as indicated or nearest year available31
Graph 8.16 shows that between 1985 and 2015, the before and the post trans-
fers and taxes poverty rates increased by 36% and by 52%.32 It is certainly
relevant that in the OECD-21, 11% of households lived under the poverty line.
It is also relevant that without social security provisions this would be 30% of
households, which, presumably, would be unsustainable in terms of legitima-
tion.
Table 8.17 shows for three OECD-21 countries the social security transfers
(SST) as a percentage of households’ gross income. The last column indicates
the average for all households, and the other columns indicate the distribution
over the household income deciles. These countries are chosen on the basis
of the diversity of their OECD-21 skewedness ranking of gross income in 2015
(top, middle and bottom, as shown in Table 8.18). For each of these countries
31 The data are those of the income definition 2012 from when it is available for a country.
32 In 2010 the poverty gap – that is, the average shortfall from the poverty line – was for the
OECD-21 at 30%. In 2010 the median disposable income (equivalised household) for, e.g.,
Germany was €20,535 per year, with its poverty gap at 24%. Thus the poverty line for this
country was at €856 per month, and the average poor household disposed over €650 per
month. (For the USA this last figure was $920.)
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the SST design is quite different. In each case, however, it is the 6th decile that
receives about the country’s average SST. Thus it is roughly D1–D5 that benefits
from average increases in SST (ceteris paribus the design), and vice versa for
decreases. I will further comment on this in Chapter 10 (10§12).
table 8.17 All household share (%) and deciles share (%) of social security
transfers in gross income: UK 2015, Netherlands 2014 and Norway
2015
D1 D2 D3 D4 D5 D6 D7 D8 D9 D10 All
UK 60% 47% 48% 36% 25% 17% 13% 8% 5% 2% 15%
Netherlands 122% 99% 93% 76% 45% 24% 16% 11% 7% 6% 25%
Norway 53% 42% 34% 27% 22% 19% 16% 13% 11% 6% 18%
Data sources: UK (as for Graph 8.13); Netherlands (Statistics Netherlands (CBS), Inkomens-
groepen; particuliere huishoudens naar diverse kenmerken);33 Norway (Statistics Norway,
Statbank, Income and wealth statistics for households, Composition of total household income
andequivalent after-tax income (per cent), by contents, timeandequivalent after-tax income).34
Accessed 21 October 2017
table 8.18 OECD-21 income rank of the UK, Netherlands and Nor-
way in 2015 (rank 1 is very skewed, rank 20 is skweded)35
Market income Gross income Disposable income
UK 5 3 2
Netherlands 15 11 10
Norway 19 18 19
Data source: OECD, Dataset Income distribution and poverty (accessed 8 October 2017)
33 http://statline.cbs.nl/Statweb/publication/?DM=SLNL&PA=71013NED&D1=0‑2&D2=
a&D3=0‑10&D4=0&D5=l&HDR=G4,G1,T&STB=G3,G2&VW=T (data 8 February 2017;
accessed 10 October 2017).
34 https://www.ssb.no/statistikkbanken/selectout/pivot.asp?checked=true (accessed 21
October 2017).
35 No 2015 data for Japan.
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8§11-b Amplification. The development of the top 5% and the top 10%
shares of income between 1910 and 2010 for averages of current
OECD-21 countries
The great advantage of data from the OECD is that country data are based
on uniform definitions that guide the work of the national statistical bur-
eaus. For long run historical data this is quite different, because data collec-
tion from the past cannot be remade. We have what we have, and efforts
at uniformity must be made via estimates. Income data of the non-recent
past are mostly based on data from taxation authorities, which have been
devised not on the basis of theoretical definitions (such as the components
of ‘gross income’), but rather on the varying legislation of taxation (tax codes)
between countries and over time. Thus, for example, the ‘tax units’ (individual,
household and household composites) diverge between countries and over
time.
The data used for Graph 8.19 are based on the painstaking work of many
people fromdifferent countries that got together to construct the ‘Worldwealth
and income database’ (best-known amongst the general public is Thomas
Piketty, andamongeconomists alsoEmmanuel Saez andTonyAtkinson). Incid-
ental data on top incomes (andwealth) go back to the early nineteenth century,
but more or less continuous series for several countries date from the early
twentieth century. (See Roine and Waldenström 2014, pp. 12–22, or Roine and
Waldenström 2015, section 2.1, for a brief description of the data and the prob-
lems thereof.) In sum, the data used are of an approximation of ‘gross income’,
the tax unit being mostly individuals (personal income). The focus is on top
incomes because given the historical tax codes, these are the most reliable
(though for top income shares, the income of the total population has to be
estimated).
Graph8.19 shows that each of the top sharesmoderately decreased until 1950
and next far more steeply from 1950 to 1980. In the following three decades
we see a steep increase, reaching in 2010 to above the 1950 levels (considering
three-decade periods this steep increase moved faster than the earlier steep
decrease).
Very roughly the steep decrease period coincided with the steep increase in
SST that was shown in Graph 7.10 (probably, as SST data for 1940 and 1950 are
lacking) – the SST increase turning to a moderate one after 1990. Whilst this
does not explain all of it, it does seem to explain some of it.
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graph 8.19 Distribution of income: shares of the top 10% and the top 5% in
the total personal income, 1910–2010; averages of up to 14 current
OECD countries36
Data source:World wealth and income database (decade years or nearest year available)37
8§12 The after-tax resulting distribution of wealth
• The distribution of wealth
The constellation of taxes and their design (8§11) results in a particular dis-
tribution of wealth. Given that taxation on wealth is usually accounted as a
deduction fromcurrent income, the prevailing distribution of wealth is the end
result of:
• first, the revaluation or devaluation of previous wealth;
• second, taxation of wealth and current income;
• third, current income saved.
The distribution of wealth tends to be farmore skewed than the distribution of
income (Amplification 8§12-a).
• The distinction between capital and wealth, and the distribution of capital
‘Wealth’ refers to all durable entities or claims that have amonetary value. ‘Cap-
ital’ is a form of wealth. However, this does not mean that all wealth is ‘capital’.
Capital is a form of wealth geared to production, with the purpose of selling
36 Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal,
Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, USA. (There are data available for other countries: Denmark,
New Zealand and the UK. However, their base of households differs too much from that
of the current group for calculating a consistent average.)
37 http://www.wid.world/ (accessed 20 October 2016).
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that production so as to make a profit. Directly this applies to ‘active capital’
(Figure 3.2a, in 3§1, summarises the distinctionbetween active andpassive cap-
ital). In one of these active or passive forms of capital, a category of households
is the owner of capital (for the non-incorporated enterprises these households
are the owner of active capital).
Note that whereas bonds issued by enterprises are a form of passive capital,
bonds issued by the state are not capital (from the point of viewof the financier
this regards merely a matter of degree of risk).
Capital ownership tends to be concentrated at the top of the distribution of
wealth – in fact the top 10%.38 Thus within the wealth skewedness, the distri-
bution of capital is even more skewed (Amplification 8§12-b).
The distribution of wealth is amatter of monetary distribution. If we look at
its capital component it is still a monetary distribution, but it is also a distribu-
tion of potential or actual economic power.
Unless stated otherwise, ‘wealth’ in the amplifications of this section refers to
‘net wealth’, that is, assets minus debts. These amplifications are:
8§12-a. An estimate for the distribution of wealth of the OECD-21 for 2015.
8§12-b. The distribution of wealth and its components: case of the Nether-
lands 2015.
8§12-c. Top wealth shares of 19 OECD-21 countries around 2014.
8§12-d. The top 5% and top 10% shares of wealth between 1910 and 2010.
8§12-e. Taxation of inheritance of wealth.
8§12-a Amplification. An estimate for the distribution of wealth of the
OECD-21 for 2015
Country data about wealth distribution are most often not collected on an
internationally standardised basis. Shorrocks, Davies and Lluberas (2015)
provide an estimate of the global distribution of wealth. In Graph 8.20 I have
used their estimates for the OECD-21 countries. It can be seen that the wealth
distribution over deciles is far more skewed than the income distribution over
deciles (compare Graph 8.13 in 8§11-a). For example, whereas in 2010 the ratio
of the mean to the median disposable income is 1.1, the ratio of the mean to
median wealth is 2.6 (2010 and 2015 estimate).
38 The relative concentration increases to the extent that we consider the top 5%, the top 1%
and so forth. For the top 10%, 5% and 1%Murtin andMira d’Ercole show this for 18 OECD
counties around 2010 (see Murtin and Mira d’Ercole 2015, Figures 2 and 3).
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graph 8.20 Wealth distribution: shares of deciles and of top 5% and top 1%,
estimate for 2015; average of OECD-21
Data source: Shorrocks, Davies and Lluberas 2015, p. 149, Table 6–5
The distance between the median and the mean is a simple measure for the
skewedness of the (wealth) distribution.
The following amplifications are about the factual distribution of wealth.
The next two sentences are on facts about beliefs. According to research on
beliefs about the distribution of income and of wealth in the USA, the average
interviewee (in 2011) thinks that these distributions are far less skewed than
they are in fact.39 On the other hand, 61% of interviewees (in 2013) believe that
the USA economic system favours the wealthy.40
8§12-b Amplification. The distribution of gross wealth and its
components: case of the Netherlands 2015
This amplification presents the distribution of the main components of gross
wealth for the Netherlands in 2015 – assets and debts (seeGraph 8.21). Of the 19
39 https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/economic‑inequality‑it‑s‑far‑worse‑than‑
you‑think/ (Nickolas Fitz, Scientific American, 31 December 2015).
40 http://www.pewresearch.org/fact‑tank/2013/12/05/u‑s‑income‑inequality‑on‑rise‑for‑
decades‑is‑now‑highest‑since‑1928/ (Drew Desilver, Facttank, 5 December 2013).
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OECD-21 countries for which the OECD has data available for around 2014, the
Netherlands ranks, regarding the wealth share of each of the top 10%, top 5%
and top 1%, second in skewedness after the USA.41
The general picture of this graph is no different from the previous one.
However, its main point is that we now see the degree of concentration of the
capital component of wealth at the top of the distribution: in 2015 the top 10%
owns 89% of the total capital of households.
graph 8.21 Deciles distribution of gross wealth and its components: the Neth-
erlands 2015
Data source: Statistics Netherlands (CBS): ‘Vermogen van huishoudens; huishoudenskenmer-
ken, vermogensbestanddelen’, 2015 (release date 7 February 2018)42
The D10 liabilities reveal, mainly, that the wealthiest class uses debt as an amp-
lifier of wealth (in Chapter 3, Appendix 3B-4, I called this ‘finance doubling’).
41 OECD datasetWealth (net wealth) http://stats.oecd.org/index.aspx?DatasetCode=
WEALTH (accessed 29 Jan 2018).
42 Accessed 7 February 2018. http://statline.cbs.nl/Statweb/publication/?DM=SLNL&PA
=83834NED&D1=1‑3&D2=0,51‑60&D3=0‑14&D4=9&HDR=G3,T&STB=G1,G2&VW=T.
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The negative wealth share of the first two deciles reveals an insufficient
dwellings coverage of mortgages. Especially for the D1 it also reveals over-
crediting to small non-incorporated enterprises.
(In 2015 the total net wealth of households was 160% of GDP; for D10 this
was 108%.)
8§12-c Amplification. Top wealth shares of 15 OECD-21 countries around
2010
The OECD remarks on its website that until it issued guidelines for the collec-
tion of wealth data in 2013, there was no agreed standard that statistical offices
could use for collecting these data.43 The data that I have used in Table 8.22 for
the top-wealth shares are probably the only ones currently available that have
been collected on a uniform base.
Table 8.22 shows, as usual, OECD-21 averages (insofar as they are available).
However, as an exception this time I also specify the top and bottomdeviations
from the average.
table 8.22 Top wealth shares of 19 OECD-21 countries in or around 2014†
Share top 10% Share top 5% Share top 1%
average OECD-19 52.4 38.6 18.6‡
top skewed distributions (with their rank in brackets)
USA (2013) 78.2(1) 65.9(1) 37.6(1)
Netherlands (2015) 68.3(2)44 52.5(2) 27.8(2)
Denmark (2015) 64.0(3) 47.3(3) 23.6(5)
Germany (2014) 59.8(4) 46.3(4) 23.7(4)
Austria (2014) 55.6(5) 43.5(5) 25.5(3)
43 See also Murtin and Mira d’Ercole [OECD] 2015.
http://www.oecd.org/std/household‑wealth‑inequality‑across‑OECD‑countries‑
OECDSB21.pdf.
44 This figure deviates from that shown in Graph 8.21 (67.1%), which stems from a different
release date. For the country comparison only the OECD data are relevant.
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Table 8.22 Top wealth shares of 19 OECD-21 countries (cont.)
Share top 10% Share top 5% Share top 1%
least skewed distributions (with their rank in brackets)
Finland (2014) 45.2(15) 31.4(15) 13.3(14)
Italy (2014) 42.8(16) 29.7(17) 11.7(16)
Belgium (2014) 42.5(17) 29.7(16) 12.1(15)
Greece (2014) 42.4(18) 28.8(18) 9.2(18)
Japan (2014) 41.0(19) 27.7(19) 10.8(17)
† OECD-21 minus Sweden and Switzerland (and for the top 1% of wealth also New Zealand).
For each of these countries only 1–3 observations are available between 2009 and 2015. The
table is based on the data nearest to 2014 (which is the year for which data are most fre-
quently available).
‡ This column regards 18 countries (no data for New Zealand).
Data source: OECD DatasetWealth (net wealth)45
Because of their social security constellation, the Netherlands, Germany, and
Austria have been classified as ‘Rhineland capitalist countries’. It can be seen
fromTable8.22 that sucha constellation is far fromdetrimental to their, in terms
of wealth, capitalist upper class.46
45 http://stats.oecd.org/index.aspx?DatasetCode=WEALTH (accessed 29 January 2018).
Anticipating the next amplification, the following table compares twoOECDdata from
the second row of Table 8.22 with the figures of amplifications 8§12-a and 8§12-d.
Top shares wealth (%)
Source top 10% top 1%
OECD data, 18–19 countries [around 2014] 52.4 18.6
Roine andWaldenström (WWID data), 6–7 countries
[around 2010]
58.9 21.9
Shorrocks, Davies and Lluberas, estimate 21 countries
[for 2015]
58.7 26.0
46 See also Bavel and Frankema 2013.
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8§12-d Amplification. The top 5% and top 10% shares of wealth between
1910 and 2010
The historical OECD averages that I present in this amplification are based on
data collected by Roine and Waldenström (2014). As these authors indicate,
‘the empirical literature on wealth inequality is still limited, particularly when
it comes to the long run perspective’ (p. 40). For various problems of the data I
refer to these authors, and forwhat they did about thesewhenpossible (pp. 40–
9).47 However, many of these problems do not just relate to long run historical
data.48
graph 8.23 Distribution of wealth: top wealth decile and percentile as share of
the total private wealth, 1910–2010; 6–10 current OECD countries49
Data source: Roine and Waldenström 2014. Country decade years or the nearest year avail-
able50
47 Roine and Waldenström 2015, pp. 40–9. For the sources of the data that the authors col-
lected, see their Table A1, pp. 141–2.
48 For the detection of problems of recent data (such as those collected by the EU), see Sal-
verda 2015, pp. 7–14.
49 Topwealth decile: Denmark, Finland, France, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, UK, USA. Top
wealth percentile, idem plus Australia and the Netherlands. The ‘Nordic’ countries are
Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden.
50 http://www.uueconomics.se/danielw/Handbook.htm. The authors closed off their study
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Comparing the 2010 data fromRoine andWaldenströmwith those of the OECD
nearest to 2010 (see the table in the last but two footnote), it appears that for
the data that overlap qua country (5–6), the OECD data are 10% lower for the
top 10 and 20% for the top 1 (these are in percent, not percentage points of the
shares). Hoping that the deviations are more or less consistent over time, the
data from Roine and Waldenström can be used as an indicator of the trend –
see Graph 8.23.
The Nordic countries (Denmark, Finland, Norway, Sweden) make up 19% of
the OECD-21 countries. However, for these wealth data this is 50% (top decile)
and 40% (top percentile). Therefore Graph 8.23 also shows the averages of the
non-Nordic countries (dotted lines). Throughout this period the Nordic coun-
tries entertained above OECD-21 average social security provisions, but that
did not impair their wealthiest classes in comparison with the OECD aver-
age.51
We see in Graph 8.23 that around 1910 the wealth share was starkly con-
centrated at the top. Throughout the period thereafter we see a continuous
decrease in this concentration, and relatively more so for the top 1% (1910–
2010: a fall of 55%; against a fall of 30% for the top 10%). A substantial part of
these shares decreases presumably has to do with the increase in the value of
owner-occupied dwellings in the other deciles (especially deciles 7–9). Another
important factor is taxes. Graph 8.24 shows how the top wealth share varies (or
at least coincides) with total tax receipts (for details about the latter, see the
text around Graph 8.4 in 8§4-b).We see especially that with the bending off of
the tax receipts from 1980 onwards, the top wealth share more or less stabil-
ises. (Regarding the shares of wealth at hand, taxation seems amore important
determinant than financial crises – see 2§10-b, Graph 2.11, for their occurrence
in this period.)
This again would suggest not only the thesis that the state bought off the
legitimation for the capitalist system, but that, in particular, the rich – that is,
those who generally have a vested interest in the capitalist system – had to pay
a price for it.
in 2014. For reasons of data consistency I have refrained from adding data for 2010 that are
now available from other sources.
51 As indicated earlier, the same applies for ‘Rhineland’ countries such as Germany, the
Netherlands and Austria, though for these from about 1960 – and for the Netherlands
until about 2000 when its social security provisions moved below the OECD-21 aver-
age.
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graph 8.24 Distribution of wealth: the share of the top wealth decile as con-
nected with total taxes, 1910–2010; averages of 7–8 current OECD
countries
Data source: Top wealth share, see Graph 8.23; Taxes and other state receipts, see Graph 8.4
8§12-e Amplification. Taxation of inheritance of wealth
It is often argued that taxation of wealth and of the inheritance of wealth is
‘unfair’ because taxes have already been levied on income. This argument neg-
lects that the tax burden for the average household consists of two main com-
ponents, namely direct taxes on income and indirect taxes on income spent.
Thus the income spent is taxed twice. The non-spent income, that is, savings,
is taxed once. The contra argument is that when savings are spent, the second
round (indirect taxes) comes in. However, this contra argument neglects the
fact that most of the top of the wealth (the top 10% and above) is never actu-
ally spent and is instead bequeathed.
Another contra argument is based on the presumed benevolence of saving
as based on the loanable funds theory – this was already dealt with (3§6, 3§6-a,
3§6-d).
Anyway, whereas direct taxes (including those on current wealth) are sub-
stantial for the top incomes and wealth layers, inheritance taxes seem mod-
erate in the perspective of indirect tax rates (which are thus not levied on
savings).
Unfortunately, long run data of effective inheritance tax receipts are lacking
for the OECD-21.52Graph 8.25 showswhat is available for estate and inheritance
52 Piketty (2014) shows longdata for top statutory inheritance tax rates (1910–2010 for France,
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taxes for the average of the OECD-21: data from 1965 onwards.53 It can be seen
that the receipts from estate and inheritance taxes are not tremendous.
graph 8.25 State receipts from estate, inheritance and gift taxes in% of GDP,
1965–2015; average of OECD-21
Data source: OECD dataset Revenue Statistics – Comparative tables, series 430054
Summary and conclusions
This chapter’s Division 1 (state production) andDivision 2 (finance of the state)
provided concretising conditions of existence for the exposition of Chapters 6–
7. All the other divisions presented concretising implications of these earlier
chapters and divisions.
Economically, the state ‘produces’ the content of the economic rights frame-
work and the frameworks furthering the accumulation of capital as presented
in Chapters 6–7. For it, the state employs wage labour (i.e. civil servants) and
purchases inputs from enterprises, but it tends to make no profits. Moreover,
Germany, UK and the USA). These are not irrelevant, but in the end it is the effective
tax rates that count. https://www.quandl.com/data/PIKETTY/TS14_2‑Top‑inheritance‑tax
‑rate‑in‑rich‑countries‑1900‑2013 – updated 29 April 2014; accessed 13 September 2017.
53 ‘An estate tax is applied to an estate before the assets are given to the beneficiaries. In con-
trast, an inheritance tax applies to assets after they have been inherited by someone. In
the case of inheritance tax, each beneficiary may have to pay a different amount, depend-
ing on howmuch is inherited.’ (Investopedia, January 2016 http://www.investopedia.com/
terms/e/estatetax.asp.)
54 http://stats.oecd.org/OECDStat_Metadata/ShowMetadata.ashx?Dataset=
REV&ShowOnWeb=true&Lang=en (last updated August 2017; accessed 21 January 2018).
Investopedia (source previous footnote) mentions for the USA: ‘As of 2016, the Internal
Revenue Service (IRS) only requires estates with combined gross assets and prior taxable
gifts exceeding $5.45 million to file a federal estate tax return and pay estate taxes.’
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it distributes its produce for free as collective goods and services. Next to the
state’s expenditure on its production, its expenditures include transfers in the
form of, mainly, social security and interest. (Division 1.)
Taxation is a necessary, and main, form of finance of the state. Next to this
finance, the state may contingently collect social security contributions, and
it may contingently collect other receipts (mainly) from royalties, sale of state
services, and dividends of state-owned enterprises. Finally, the state may con-
tingently borrow to finance any budget deficit (or lend in case of a surplus).
The state’s finance, in its particular forms, grounds the state’s expenditures and
hence the moments prior to it. (Division 2.)
All of the state’s expenditures – though apart from the savings out of the
state’s wages and transfers – end up as expenditures with enterprises, and so
also realise a major part of their surplus-value. Increases in state expendit-
ure increase the production and validation of surplus-value – vice versa for
expenditure decreases. (Division 3.)
Part of this state-accommodated surplus-value is distributed to the state via
taxation of surplus-value (or narrower, taxation of profit). Thus, for enterprises
in macroeconomic perspective, the benefits from state expenditure are in part
offset by these taxes.
These taxes are the enterprises’ costs of the state’s granting and upholding
their legal core economic rights toproperty and to the appropriationof surplus-
value, as well as of its accommodation of the accumulation of capital (that
is, the costs of the seven legislative frameworks as presented in Chapters 6–
7). Thus these are the costs for the state’s accommodation of the enterprises’
appropriation of surplus-value in general – not merely those that stem from
extra surplus-value along with extra state expenditure.
In principle, all state expenditure might be financed by taxation of surplus-
value. In actual capitalist practice, however, the state acts such that enterprises
‘share’ the taxation with taxation of the wages income of labour, as well as
of taxation of the surplus-value that enterprises distribute to owners of fin-
ance capital. From the perspective of labour, it is in fact immaterial where the
taxes on surplus-value are levied (either at the point where these are generated
within enterprises, or at the point where these are distributed). Thus in sum,
the state acts such that enterprises and capital owners ‘share’ the taxation of
surplus-value with the taxation of wages. (Division 4.)
Herewith the grounding of the capitalist state vis-à-vis the capitalist eco-
nomy is completed.
At this point the exposition moves to the particular forms of taxation and
their manifestation in the distribution of the income of households and in the
distribution of the wealth of households. Households as such are, without fur-
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ther specification, not directly identified as workers’ or capital owners’ house-
holds, but rather as households that have some share in the income fromwages
or from surplus-value (recall 2§15-a’s Graph 2.14 about the historicalmovement
of the totals in the USA).
The main forms of taxation include taxes on profits, on property value and
property income, on labour income and on products. In principle, the state
might choose between these forms or combinations thereof. Some form of
taxation being necessary, it is contingent which particular form or forms are
actually applied, and to what extent.
Taxation has inevitably non-neutral distributive effects on income and
wealth. This applies for the particular form of taxation and also for the design
of tax rates (regressive, flat, progressive). More specifically, a flat tax rate is not
more neutral than a non-flat one. Any actual form and design of taxation is
inevitably based on a normative stance. This leaves unaffected the fact that
with a more skewed distribution of income, more savings press down profits.
Thus progressive taxes support enterprises: their rate of profit and so invest-
ment and employment. This puts on the state’s agenda the dilemma as to
whether it is primarily concerned with the interests of enterprises or rather
with the privileges of the wealthy and high-income categories. The ideological
supposition that investment would require saving is of key importance here.
The legitimation of the state in the compliance of the actors – and hence the
legitimation of the capitalist system– tends to be shaped in at least some redis-
tribution of income in favour of the lower echelons. However, this redistribu-
tion is mainly engendered via social security transfers rather than via effective
progressive rates of taxation.
Appendix 8A. Data and data sources of the graphs in chapter 8
[Re 8§2-a.]Graph 8.2. Total state expenditure (general government) 1870–2015, in
% GDP; average of 10 to 21 current OECD countries.
The graph shows the development of the
average for: (1) a set of 10 countries for
which data are available from 1870 to
present (Australia, Austria; France, Ger-
many, Italy, Japan, Norway, Switzerland,
UK, US); (2) a set of 14 countries for which
data are available from 1937 to present (the
former plus Canada, Ireland, New Zealand
and Sweden); (3) the OECD-21 from 1960 to present.
436 part two – the capitalist state
Data sources. For 1870–1937 (Tanzi and Schuknecht 2000, Table I.1). I have
omitted their data for ‘central government’ only, as this would disturb the com-
parison. For 1960–80 (Castles 2006, Table 1). To his data I have added the data
for New Zealand, Norway and Switzerland from Tanzi and Schuknecht. For
1990–current (OECD, http://stats.oecd.org/OECDStat_Metadata/
ShowMetadata.ashx?Dataset=EO102_INTERNET&ShowOnWeb=
true&Lang=en extracted 28 December 2017).
I have considered using data from Cusack and Fuchs 2002, who for the
period 1870–1950 collected total expenditure data from various sources (differ-
ent fromTanzi and Schuknecht’s) of 12–17 current OECD countries –more than
the number of 10–14 that I have used from Tanzi and Schuknecht. Moreover,
they also provide data for the years that I have interpolated. However, the dis-
advantage of their data (as for the full set that Tanzi and Schuknecht provide)
is that these are mixes of General government and Central government data.
Therefore I have declined using theCusack and Fuchs data.55Graph 8.2A shows
the data differences (I have included for all series the 1960 data from Castles),
andTable 8.2B shows the various numbers of data for each year of the three sets.
graph 8.2a Total state expenditure 1870–1950 in% GDP for current OECD
countries: comparison of data from Tanzi and Schuknecht with
data from Cusack and Fuchs
Data sources: Tanzi and Schuknecht 2000, Table I.1 and Cusack and Fuchs 2002, Table 1 and
Appendix
55 For this graph – and the following ones – I have also declined using the database of Jordà-
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table 8.2b Number of expenditure data 1870–1950: Tanzi and Schuknecht
(2000) and Cusack and Fuchs (2002)
1870 1880 1890 1900 1910/13 1920 1930 1937/38 1950
T&S, General Government 10 .. .. .. 10 13 .. 14 ..
T&S, mix of Gen. and Centr. Gvt. 12 .. .. .. 13 17 .. 17 ..
C&F, mix of Gen. and Centr.Gvt. 12 11 11 11 14 14 14 16 18
Data sources: see Graph 8.2A
Comparing theT&S set for general government that I have used (row 1)with the
C&F set, the main differences are for 1870 and 1920. Because for one and the
same country the datum for central government expenditure is smaller than
that for general government expenditure, more central government data for
one year generally implies that the average is pressed down further. C&F have
generally more data for one year; however, it is also the case that for 1870 T&S
have (row 1) data of Australia and Switzerland, and for 1920 of Australia and
Ireland that C&F do not have. This intensifies the general versus central gov-
ernment diversity for those years.
However, given these differences it is comforting to learn from the C&F data
that my decade interpolations seem not to miss up and downs for these inter-
vals.
[Re 8§3] Graph 8.3. State employment as percent of total employment56 in com-
parison with state expenditure (each general government); averages of up to 21
current OECD countries, 1870–2015.
Employment general government, as a
percentage of total employment (per-
sons, civilian); average of 11–15 OECD
countries 1870–2015. For 1870 and 1913:
OECD-21 minus Canada, Denmark, Fin-
land, Greece, New Zealand, Portugal,
Spain. 1937: as for 1913, minus Aus-
tralia and Belgium. 1960: OECD-21 minus Australia, Denmark, France, Greece,
Schularick-Taylor because it only pertains to central government. (Between states there is
quite a divergence in what is allotted to the central or the lower government levels.)
56 Employment general government (excluding military employment and employment by
public corporations), as a percentage of total employment (persons, civilian).
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Ireland, Japan, Norway, Spain. 1970–80: OECD-21 minus Australia, Austria,
Germany, Greece, Ireland, New Zealand, Switzerland (Norway 1970=1972;
UK 1970=1971. 1990 onwards, as for 1980, plus Ireland).
Data sources: 1870, 1913, 1937 (Tanzi and Schuknecht 2000, Table II.2); 1960
(OECD 1999, Table 2.13), though with Australia omitted (datum includes pub-
lic enterprises) and with Canada and Italy added from Tanzi and Schuknecht;
1970–current (OECD http://stats.oecd.org/OECDStat_Metadata/
ShowMetadata.ashx?Dataset=EO102_INTERNET&ShowOnWeb=
true&Lang=en – accessed 28 December 2017).
[Re 8§4-b] Graph 8.4. State receipts (general government) 1870–2015, in % GDP:
(a) total current receipts; (b) tax and social security receipts; (c) tax receipts. Aver-
ages of 8–21 current OECD countries.
The two top lines show the develop-
ment of the average total state receipts
(general government) for two sets of
current OECD countries: (1) a set of 8
countries for which 1870 data are avail-
able (Australia, France, Ireland, Italy,
Japan, Norway, UK, USA); (2) the set of
these counties, togetherwith a through
time increasing number of countries – though with a gap for Japan in 1920
and in 1937, and for several countries in 1970 and 1980. (As follows: 1920 as
for 1870 plus New Zealand minus Japan; 1937 plus Austria, Canada, Germany,
Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland; 1960 plus Belgium, Finland, Japan,
though minus New Zealand; 1970 as for 1960, minus Australia, Germany, Ire-
land, Sweden – Denmark 1970=1971; 1980, as for 1970 plus Norway and Portugal;
1990 OECD-21 minus Greece – Germany 1990=1991; 2000 onwards, OECD-21.)
The bottom lines show the total tax and social security receipts for the full
OECD-21. Note that there are these full data only from 1965. In the bottom
graphs 1960=1965.
Data sources. 1870–1960 (Tanzi and Schuknecht 2000, Table III.1). I have
omitted their data for ‘central government’ only, as this would disturb the
comparison. Their data for 1960 have been updated for those countries for
which the OECDEconomicOutlook (2017–2) provides these. Total receipts 1970
onwards: OECD Dataset: Economic Outlook No. 102 – November 2017, General
governments current receipts http://stats.oecd.org/index.aspx?DatasetCode=
EO102_INTERNET. Tax and social contributions: OECD http://localhost/
OECDStat_Metadata/ShowMetadata.ashx?Dataset=REV&ShowOnWeb=
true&Lang=en (updated 23 November 2017 – accessed 28 December 2017).
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A framework of constraints on themodes of market interaction
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Introduction
The previous chapter completed the grounding of the capitalist state vis-à-vis
the capitalist economy. As with the last two chapters of Part One regarding the
economy,Chapters 9–10present the concretemanifestationsof the state.These
concrete manifestations are about the reproductive strength of the capitalist
system, but also its vulnerabilities (General Appendix on SystematicDialectics,
section A§12).
This chapter presents the state’s concrete manifestation in its imposing a
framework of constraints on the modes of market interaction of enterprises
and banks, and of constraints on the outcomes of that interaction.
Division 1, which is a sequel to Chapter 4, surveys the state’s engagement
in constraints of market interaction that is ‘conventionally’ regarded as ‘com-
petition policy’ as encoded in competition law. It will be seen that the state’s
rationale for such a legislative framework is rather ambiguous. In the form of
‘competition policy’ the state imposes on enterprises and banks its view about
‘proper’ competitive interaction.
Division 2 presents two main effects of market interaction on the market
constellation, ones that when left unconstrained would generate vulnerabil-
ities for the reproduction of the capitalist system. The first one regards the
competitive constellation that would result in (potential) generalised price
deflation (4D2) and the state’s response to it. This response takes the form of a
monetary policy engendering ‘creeping inflation’.
The second vulnerability regards a phenomenon that was only thrown into
relief with the emergence of the 2008 financial crisis, that is, entities, especially
banks, that have grown ‘too big to fail’. The state’s response to this phenomenon
is as yet (at the time of completing this book) insufficient, although the germ
of an instrument more adequately dealing with it seems in the making. Even
if such a (potential) instrument were to exist, its effective implementation
would require big entities to break up into several smaller ones. This is highly
conflicting as it puts in fact a penalty on the successful accumulation of cap-
ital.
The latter point is dealt with in a single section of Division 2. An appendix
deals more extensively with its empirical background.
Scheme 9.1 presents the outline of this chapter.
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scheme 9.1 The imposition of competition (outline Chapter 9)
Legend
.Ṃ. concrete manifestation
Division 1. The imposition of competition
A framework of prohibitive regulation of the enterprises’ market interaction
This division sets out the state’s engagement in constraints of market inter-
action that is ‘conventionally’ regarded as ‘competition policy’ as encoded in
competition law.
9§1 The state’s manifestation in competition policy: engendering a
particularmode of existence of the capitalist system
The primary aim of enterprises is the production and accumulation of capital
(Chapters 1–2). In achieving this, the particular form of market interaction is
purely instrumental to enterprises (4§5). Thus competition, cartel formation
and centralisation of capital aremere instrumental alternatives. (See Figure 9.2
for a recapitulation.)
With a framework of ‘competition law’ the state might be concerned to
impose competitivemarket interaction. Such a framework is not obvious to the
extent that non-competitivemarket behaviour does not interferewith, first, the
production and accumulation of capital, and, second, thematerial existence of
the state (7D1). The state’s entertainment of a framework of competition law
seems rather the manifestation of a particular mode of existence of the cap-
italist system. Even so, it is a mode that – in a variety of forms – is ubiquitous
among capitalist nations.
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figure 9.2 Recapitulation of the forms of market interaction as set out in
Chapter 4
Forms of interaction Degree of rivalry (top: top rivalry)
rivalry interaction competition† 1a. deflationary price competition:
resignation to rotating price-
leadership (4D2)
1b. inflationary ‘structural overcapacity
competition’: resignation to rotating
price-leadership (4D3)
non-rivalry interaction‡ cartel formation 2. tacit price-leadership (implicit cartel)
(4D4)1
3. cartel (4D4)
rivalry tending to non-
rivalry interaction
centralisation of capital 4. oligopolisation (via merger or take-
over): tacit or agreed price-leadership
(4D5)
annulment of interaction centralisation of capital 5. monopolisation (via merger or take-
over) (4D5)
† 1a and 1b are alternative general constellations. 2–5 in particular sectors coexist with each of the general
constellations in other sectors.
‡ This layer (as based on stagnant innovation in a sector, 4§13) is a recurrently evanescent one, next being
‘replaced’ by new stagnant ones.
9§2 The imposition of competition: the fairy tale’s ‘freemarket’ turned
into ‘unfree freemarkets’
We have seen that the capitalist economy cannot stand on itself and requires
the state for, so far, seven regulatory frameworks.2 In fact the capitalist ‘free
market economy’ is a phantom that can only figure in fairy tales of so devised
models (cf. 8§11, under 1). On top of these seven frameworks the state might
1 Tacit price-leadership need not involve ‘collusion’ in a legal sense; nevertheless it is often
categorised under ‘tacit collusion’ (Ivaldi, Jullien, Rey, Seabright and Tirole 2003, see esp.
footnote 2).
2 (1)The capitalist economic rights framework (6D4).Thiswas successively grounded in: (2) the
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engender a framework of pro-competitive legislation. However, the state’s
rationale for such a framework is troublesome, because with it the state openly
declares that the capitalist economy cannot stand on itself. (A major capitalist
state promulgated this as early as 1890 with the USA Sherman Act of that year.)
If ‘competition’ as generated by the ‘free market’ were supposed to be inher-
ent to the capitalist economy (the fairy tale that many entertain), then it is
rather paradoxical that when the ‘free market’ is left to itself, this should lead
to the evaporation of competition (cartels, and non-rivalry oligopolisation and
monopolisation).
If, instead (or therefore), the state uses its voice to teach ‘free market’ enter-
prises what competition is or should be, this is paradoxical. In fact the state
does teach enterprises, by imposing its view of competition on enterprises.
Thus in the fairy tale jargon we seem to have unfree free markets.
With the regulation of competition the unity of the capitalist economy
and state reaches its most concrete manifestation regarding the functioning
of ordinarymarkets (that is, all markets apart from the labour andmoneymar-
kets).
In practice the field of ‘competition law’ is not about competition but rather
about the prohibition of, so-called, ‘anti-competitive conduct’ (see amplifica-
tions 9§2-b and 9§2-c). This is quite far-reaching, as it limits property rights
(6§10) and especially ‘free contract’ – ‘free contract’, that is, ‘free’ cartel agree-
ments (nowdeemed ‘collusion’) and ‘free’ share purchase agreements in case of
mergers and take-overs (those that would entail excessivemarket dominance).
9§2-a Amplification. A twofold fairy tale
Neoclassical general equilibrium theory is a fairy tale within a fairy tale. The
first one is that it ignores even the first two frameworks and its consequences.
Within that fairy tale it constructs a world of firms none of which has anymar-
ket power. Rather more immanently, Blaug (2001) indicates that it is rather
ironic to denote something that cannot exist (general equilibrium) as ‘perfect
competition’. He argues how general equilibrium theory entertains an ‘end-
state’ notion of competition in which rivalry has come to a rest, rather than
a dynamic notion of competition as a process.
framework of allowance rights to existence (6D5); (3) the public security framework (6D6);
(4) the monetary framework (7D2); (5) the labour-capacity framework (7D3); (6) the infra-
structural framework (7D4); (7) the legitimating social security framework (7D5).
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9§2-b Amplification. ‘Free competition’ – the EU’s objective of a
non-defined goal
The European Union is an interesting case for the currentmatter, first, because
it is predominantly an economic and monetary union, and second, because it
started building its legislation from scratch. To begin with, it is one of the few
state-like constellations that has warranted a free market economy in its ‘con-
stitution’ (i.e. the Lisbon Treaty, as entered into force in 2009):3
‘… the activities of the Member States and the Union shall include … the
adoption of an economic policy which is based on the close coordination
of Member States’ economic policies, on the internal market and on the
definition of common objectives, and conducted in accordance with the
principle of an open market economy with free competition.’
European Union, Treaty on European Union, art. 119, emphasis added4
This is quoted from the general part of the Lisbon Treaty. A second part, the
‘Treaty on the Functioning of theEuropeanUnion’, contains six brief articles on
competition (arts. 101–106 TFEU). It is remarkable – and indicative of the tricky
problematic of thematter – that these articles abstain fromoutliningwhat con-
stitutes ‘free competition’ (art. 119 TEU just quoted); instead these describe, in
general terms,what it isnot. Similarly, the EuropeanCommission abstains from
setting out what free competition or even what competition is (Senate of the
Netherlands 2014, p. 3).
Arts. 101–102 TFEU use normative qualifications such as ‘restriction or dis-
tortion’ of competition; ‘abuse’ of a dominant position; and ‘unfair’ purchase
or selling prices or other trading conditions.
9§2-c Amplification. Prohibitive competition law
Theduality of defining ‘competition’ versus ‘non-competition’ is expressed suc-
cinctly in an OECD ‘background paper’ by Schwalbe, Maier-Rigaud and Pis-
arkiewicz:
‘The role of competition law is to assure that effective competition prevails by
preventing the creation or the strengthening of market power or to prohibit the
3 The signification of a ‘freemarket economy’ already applies for theMaastricht Treaty of 1992.
4 Official Journal C 83, 30.03.2010 or http://www.lisbon‑treaty.org/wcm/the‑lisbon‑treaty.html
Article 3 (3) states: ‘The Union shall establish an internal market. It shall work for the sus-
tainable development of Europe based on balanced economic growth and price stability, a
highly competitive social market economy, aiming at full employment and social progress,
and a high level of protection and improvement of the quality of the environment. It shall
promote scientific and technological advance.’ A brief ‘Protocol on the Internal Market and
Competition’ states: ‘the internal market as set out in Article 3 of the Treaty on European
Union includes a system ensuring that competition is not distorted’. (All emphases added.)
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abuse of a position of substantial market power (monopolisation). Competi-
tion authorities have to assess the competitive effects of decisions concerning
mergers or potential anticompetitive conduct.’ (2012, p. 24, emphasis added.)
9§3 The proclamation of moral economic norms
Legislation enacts norms. All the legislative frameworks that were presented in
Chapters 6–8 are conditions for the capitalist economic rights granted by the
state (6D2) including the right to employ labour and to appropriate the surplus-
value produced by that labour.
‘Competition law’ is no such condition.With its terminology such as ‘restric-
tion or distortion’ of competition; ‘abuse’ of a dominant position, ‘unfair’ mar-
ket practices, and ‘anti-competitive conduct’ (9§2-b and 9§2-c), the state pro-
claims moral economic norms. Seemingly this puts on the agenda the ques-
tion of why the state entertains these particular moral economic norms, whilst
seeing apparently no harm in the employment of labour (in the sense of
exploitation of labour). However, these aremoral norms aboutmarket interac-
tion, not about production. Under normal conditions of unemployment (2D2,
7D3) the level of the market wage allows for the production of surplus-value.5
Moreover – quite consistently – ‘market power’, ‘dominant market power’ and
‘monopoly power’ in itself is not the target of competition policy. The target is
rather the ‘abuse’ of such power (documented later on in 9§6-b). Although this
is consistent, it is also ambivalent.
9§4 Execution of competition regulation as delegated to an ‘independent’
market authority: purification from conflict
Regulation of competition is generally highly conflicting as it infringes on free
contracts betweenenterprises (9§2), aswell as again in its required elaboration.
The state therefore tends to phrase the legislation on competition in fairly gen-
eral terms, and to delegate its execution – as including the design of specific
(discretionary) rules – to an ‘independent’ market authority (or several market
authorities).6 By way of this delegation, again, the state purifies itself, at least
to some extent, from conflicts of right in concrete situations. (This fits into a
series of similar purifications as summarised in Scheme 7.13.)
5 Considering as a main example the EU legislation on competition: none of the formulations
in its two key articles (TFEU arts. 101 and 102) stands in the way of the exploitation of labour.
6 See 7§7-a on the term ‘independent’ in the context of delegation (in that section delegation
to an ‘independent’ Central Bank). As with the CB, market authorities like to be labelled as
independent. However, as the state delegates conflict dealing, it is foremost in the interest of
the state to label (in this case) the market authority as being an ‘independent’ institution.
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Conflicts of right are especially opportune for prohibitions, or non-
permission, of mergers and take-overs and of monopolies (as conflicting with
state-granted rights to property). Furthermore, regarding prohibitions of collu-
sion and tacit or agreed price-leadership, its legal proof is most often difficult
(besides, actors may perceive several types of agreement to be fair, if perhaps
not legal or on the verge of it). It is equally difficult to define and to prove when
a (reshuffling of a)market constellation should result in a too dominantmarket
power of an enterprise or a group of enterprises.7
In face of the often considerable financial interests involved, much of the
market authority’s decisions are disputed before a court and so end up as (devi-
ating) court rulings and hence case law. Again the ‘independent’ court shields
the state from conflict.
Division 2. Constraints on the mode of competition and (potential)
constraints on the mode of capital accumulation
This division moves beyond conventional ‘competition policy’ in the strict
sense. It rather regards two key (potential) effects of the market interaction of
enterprises and banks, that, when left unconstrained, would generate vulner-
abilities for the reproduction of the capitalist system. The first one, in 9§5, is
the sequel to 4D2 (on deflationary price competition). The second one regards
an open end in 7D2 (too big to fail banks), one that in 9§6 is specified, rather
than it being the exposition of a systemic resolution, because it is actually not
resolved (at the time when this book was completed).
9§5 Precluding a deflationary constellation: creeping inflation
Section 4§9 outlined how the combination of generalised price competition
and speeded up technical change tends to generate economic stagnation. It
was also indicated that there are no economy-inherent forces that turn a defla-
tionary constellation into an inflationary one.
Because of this major economic-system continuity impediment, the state is
forced to prevent this combination. (For reasons of general legitimation, 6§5,
and for reasons of furthering the conditions of the accumulationof capital, 7§3.
See 4§11 on the advantages of creeping inflation for enterprises and banks.)
As it is practically difficult to impose limits on technical change, the way
out is to lay the conditions for ‘creeping inflation’ – in practice its euphemistic
7 See Schwalbe, Maier-Rigaud and Pisarkiewicz 2012, pp. 21–103 for a review of the problems.
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name is ‘price stability’. The state tends to delegate to the Central Bank the task
of realising this price stability (i.e. creeping inflation).8
Even if creeping inflation is a ‘target’ for the CB (though see 9§5-c), in order
to reach this target the CBmerely has the instrument of influencing the rate of
interest. When despite the efforts of the CB price deflation is nevertheless on
the verge, extra state expenditure is more effective than monetary policy.
9§5-a Explication. The systematic position of the creeping inflation
objective
The policy of creeping inflation regards competition policy carried out with
monetary instruments. That is the reason why it is treated in this chapter.
Because of the monetary instrument and because the policy tends to be del-
egated to the CB, it is usually subsumed under ‘monetary policy’ (I merely
‘nominally’ posited it as such in the brief section 7§8).
9§5-b Amplification. A target of creeping inflation at close to 2% – the
cases of the EU’s ECB and the USA’s Fed
TheCBs of the USA and of the EU interpret theirmandate to seek price stability,
by aiming at a rate of inflation of 2% per year (at the time of writing). For each
this target is motivated by the avoidance of price deflation.
The ECBwrites: ‘In the pursuit of price stability, the ECB aims atmaintaining
inflation rates below, but close to, 2%over themedium term.’ The stated reason
is: ‘It avoids that individual countries in the euro area have to structurally live
with too low inflation rates or even deflation.’9
The USA’s Federal Reserve states: ‘The Federal Open Market Committee
(FOMC) judges that inflation at the rate of 2 percent … is most consistent over
the longer run with the Federal Reserve’s mandate for price stability and max-
imum employment. … Having at least a small level of inflation makes it less
likely that the economy will experience harmful deflation if economic condi-
tions weaken.’10
8 Creeping inflation is commonly defined as an inflation below 3%per year. (‘Walking infla-
tion’ as one of 3–10%, ‘galloping inflation’ as one of 10–50% and ‘hyperinflation’ as one
exceeding 50% per year.)
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9§5-c Amplification. A price inflation target – from systemic
contingency to systemic necessity
Within the history of full capitalism the state’s monetary policy stance regard-
ing price inflation or deflation is contingent. However, a policy target of creep-
ing inflation (a term that the state itself evades by calling it ‘price stability’)
is an important case of a contingency’s ‘becoming necessary’ – here that of a
particular monetary policy stance (see the General Methodological Appendix
A§13, point 5). Such a ‘becoming necessary’ also applies to regulation regarding
banks and other enterprises becoming too big to fail, which is the subject of the
next section.
9§6 Themovement to oligopolies as entities being too big to fail and
(potential) constraints on themode of capital accumulation via its
capping
Capital may be so concentrated within a single enterprise that enterprises in
key sectors of the economy become too big to fail. (By itself this is a phe-
nomenon that was only thrown into relief with the emergence of the 2008
financial crisis.) Key sectors are those on which a vast majority of actors is
dependent whilst there is no ready substitute. This regards primarily the bank-
ing sector, the energy sector, and the communications sector (currently ICT).
Potential bankruptcy of main enterprises in such sectors –without the ready
possibility of other enterprises in the same sector taking over the production –
would severely affect the general conditions for the accumulation of capital.
This requires the state to financially assist those potentially bankrupt enter-
prises. In effect this means that in good times profits are private, whereas in
bad times losses are socialised.
In the context of the monetary framework, the exposition in Chapter 7
already alluded to this matter for banks (7§9). However, the threat of too big to
fail applies also, at least potentially, for other sectors, such as those mentioned
above.
So as to prevent the failure of big entities through the socialisation of losses,
these ‘big’ entities would require to be intensely and effectively regulated and
supervised. For banks such regulation and supervision would have to apply to
entities that together make up 80–90% of the banking sector (Appendix 9A,
section 9A-1). However, at least for the banking sector, and given the complex
internal structure of big banks, this is practically unachievable. (See Appendix
9A, section 9A-2. Providing a gist of that section I mention here that in 2014
Andrew Haldane – as chief economist at the Bank of England responsible for
the stability of the financial sector as a whole – declared that the balances of
the big banks are ‘the blackest of black holes’.)
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The alternative would be for the state to put a cap on the accumulation of
capital in single banks and enterprises – as a general form of regulation. (Such
a cap would put absolute limits on the size of banks and enterprises, such that
they become small enough to fail.) However, a cap on the accumulation of cap-
ital in single banks and enterprises would be highly conflicting, as it would
castigate the success in the accumulation of capital, which in fact clashes with
the economic rights granted by the state.
Moreover (or therefore), such a cap does not fit the long-standing practice
of market regulation in which (since the 1890 USA Sherman Act) the focus is on
regulation in terms of the aspect of competition in the sense of market power
(as measured by market shares or more sophisticated alternative tools), rather
than economic power in a broader sense, whichmight include the absolute size
of enterprises and banks, as measured by the capital accumulated. (Amplifica-
tion 9§6-b.)
Nevertheless, a cap on the accumulation of capital in single banks and enter-
prises could – in principle – be endeavoured indirectly, by a regulation that
‘discriminates’ between ‘normal’ banks and enterprises, and those that pose a
so-called ‘systemic risk’ (too big to fail). This can take the form of imposing on
the ‘systemic risk’ entities much tighter reserve ratios than for ‘normal’ entit-
ies. To the extent that this would effectively and substantially affect their rate
of profit, big entitiesmight choose to break up into smaller entities of their own
‘free will’. (See Amplification 9§6-c about the Basel III, 2014, rules that might,
still modestly, foreshadow this).11
However, whereas a focus on a (tighter) regulation of the liabilities side of
balance sheets makes sense, its reliability keeps on depending on the unre-
liable valuation of the ‘black hole’ assets side. This is so because too highly
valuated assets (an insufficient valuation of their risk) inevitably shows up in
too highly evaluated equity, the latter being the ‘bookkeeping result’ on which
the (tighter) reserve ratio applies.
At the same time, modestly tighter reserve ratios for big banks especially
pose anenormousdilemma for the state, as –prior to their breakingup– tighter
reserve ratios affect the profit and credit capacity of the big banks, and hence
the credit-conditions for economic growth.12 For the state this is not amatter of
a simple trade-off between economic growth and the statistical risk of another
11 When I completed this book such (still modest) regulative norms were agreed within the
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, being only partly implemented in regulation,
and not yet effective. (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 2014.)
12 Bankers are aware of this dilemma for the state, and use it in their lobbying against tighter
rules. See the not more than 12 lines in a statement of the European Banking Feder-
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overall banking crisis. It is rather a matter of the uncertainty about it. Yet mod-
estly tighter reserve ratios for big banks may indeed result in lower structural
rates of growth. However, alternative to structurally lower growth rates, the
state would have to accept the uncertainty of a (sooner or later) next overall
banking crisis that may go along with an output loss of 100% to 500% of GDP
(Appendix 9A, section 9A-3).
9§6-a Explication. A cap on the accumulation of capital in single
enterprises?
Section 9§6 is in fact the observation of a vulnerability of the capitalist sys-
tem as associated with the accumulation of capital as concentrated in single
banks and enterprises. Putting a cap on this single entity concentration of cap-
ital would be alien to the capitalist system as it has existed hitherto. However,
it seems necessary for the reproduction of the system.
9§6-b Amplification. Market power in contradistinction to ‘big’
economic power
The conventional competition policy is concernedwith economic power in the
sense of relative market power, not with the power of enterprises and banks in
terms of their absolute size. For (conventional) competition policy I already
referred to Schwalbe, Maier-Rigaud and Pisarkiewicz (2012, pp. 21–103) who
provide an overviewof the fieldwith ample attention for the legal aspects. They
remark (quotes within the following quote are their references to case law):
‘In EU competition law, a firm is assumed to have a dominant position
if it can “… prevent effective competition being maintained on the relev-
ant market by affording it the power to behave to an appreciable extent
independently of its competitors, its customers andultimately of the con-
sumers …” Under US competition law, a firm is considered to havemono-
poly power if it has “… the power to control prices and exclude competi-
tion.”A dominant position or monopoly power is not per se illegal as a firm
could have achieved this position because it wasmore efficient than its com-
petitors, supplied superior products or outperformed its rivals through some
ation’s complaint about the tightening of the rules: http://www.ebf‑fbe.eu/wp‑content/
uploads/2016/07/EBF_022191‑Statement‑Basel‑banking‑reforms.pdf. This regards the pro-
posals under a supplement of Basel-III, and what they misleadingly call Basel IV. In a
statement of the CEO of ING (a world top-10 bank in 2007, in 2016 down to a rank of about
25) this is phrased in terms of a specific cash nexus: ‘If you want that banks keep on sup-
porting the economy, then theymust be able tomake a rate of profit of above 10% – if not
there will be contraction.’ (Het Financieele Dagblad, 4 October 2016.)
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other legitimate means. Nevertheless dominant firms will tend to have a
wider range of instruments to their disposal to abuse market power to
exclude competition.’
SCHWALBE, MAIER-RIGAUD and PISARKIEWICZ 2012, pp. 73–4, emphasis added
I quote this in order to emphasise that, at least within competition law, dom-
inant relative market power seems by itself no reason to force enterprises to
break up into smaller entities (small enough to fail). Thus the breaking up of
banks and enterprises for reason of their absolute size – their being too big to
fail – will require a brand new field of legislation, and one that is bound to be
highly conflicting.
An enforcement for corporations to break up by itself would be no novelty,
if it were for reasons of abuse of market power. There is the famous case of the
1911 breaking up of Standard Oil in the USA into about forty smaller entities.
Another famous case is the 1982 breaking up of AT&T, again in the USA, into
eight smaller entities. (In 1999–2000 there was an unsuccessful effort to break
up Microsoft.)
9§6-c Amplification. The proposals of the Basel Committee on Banking
Supervision (2014) as an indirect instrument for putting caps on
the accumulation of capital in single entities.13
The proposals of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2014) put to
some extent, and indirectly, a cap on the accumulation of capital within single
banks.14 The proposals entail a tighter regulation of the ‘too big to fail’ systemic
risk banks in comparison with ‘normal’ banks. The required tighter reserve
ratios for the former, for example (there aremore requirements), dampen their
potential profit rates, and so also change the competitive relations between the
13 The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision of the Bank for International Settlements
(BIS) sets rules for the regulation and supervision of banks. Its members are the 13 largest
(GDP) OECD-21 countries, plus Argentina, Brazil, China, European Union, Hong Kong
SAR, India, Indonesia, Korea, Luxembourg,Mexico, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, South
Africa and Turkey. https://www.bis.org/bcbs/index.htm?m=3%7C14.
In 2011 the ‘Basel-III’ rules were agreed upon, together with a phase-wise implement-
ation between 2013 and 2019 (https://www.bis.org/bcbs/basel3.htm?m=3%7C14%7C572;
the table referred on its first page summarises the key rules). Basel-III replaces the 2004
Basel-II agreement, and reflects the 2008 crisis and its aftermath. In 2014Basel-IIIwas sup-
plemented by a ‘Supervisory framework for measuring and controlling large exposures’.
14 See also theproposedEU implementation inNovember 2016: http://ec.europa.eu/finance/
bank/crisis_management/index_en.htm#161123. The USA was much ahead of this (and in
fact of the Basil 2014 proposals). For a summary see, e.g., http://www.shearman.com/~/
media/files/newsinsights/publications/2014/06/basel‑iii‑framework‑large‑exposures‑
framework‑fia‑061614.pdf.
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big and the less big banks. Such a precautionary regulative discrimination is
unprecedented. Although the proposed tightened regulation of the ‘too big to
fail’ banks seems as yet moderate (it may take another financial crisis before a
heavier discrimination is proposed and implemented), it is, when less mod-
erate, an indirect instrument to enforce big banks to break up into smaller
entities, as that would positively affect the rate of profit of each smaller entity.
One major hot regulative issue is the ‘identification’ – by exact regulat-
ive rules – of a bank being too big to fail (one posing a ‘systemic risk’) or of
approaching it.
Potentially the Basel instrument for banks could, as modified, in principle
be applied to all sectors of the economy, by putting restrictions on the propor-
tion between equity and loans (thus affecting leverage ratios and so the rate
of profit on the internal capital). Potentially it could be applied to other key
sectors of the economy with too big to fail risks. Connecting it to conventional
competition policy in the narrow sense (9D1 and 9§6-b) it could also be applied
to enterprises with ‘merely’ a large market power. However, this would require
quite an increase in regulation, as well a change of the scope of competition
policy.
As indicated in themain text, putting directly or indirectly a cap on the accu-
mulation of capital in single banks and enterprises would be highly conflicting,
as it would put restrictions on being successful in the accumulation of capital.
Nevertheless the ‘discrimination’ as entailed in the regulation agreements of
the ‘2014 Basel III Supplement’ seems a cautious first move towards it.
Summary and conclusions
This chapter presents the state’s concrete manifestation in its imposing a
framework of constraints on the modes of market interaction of enterprises
and banks, and of constraints on the outcomes of that interaction. Division 1
sets out the state’s engagement in constraints of market interaction that is ‘con-
ventionally’ regarded as ‘competition policy’ as encoded in competition law.
Division 2 sets out two main effects of market interaction on the market con-
stellation – that is, generalised price deflation and entities that have become
‘too big to fail’ – ones that when left unconstrained would generate vulnerabil-
ities for the reproduction of the capitalist system.
The state’smanifestation in competition policy engenders a particularmode
of existence of the capitalist system. This manifestation is paradoxical as, in its
prohibition of free contracts of cartel formation and of a category of take-overs
and mergers, the state teaches enterprises what ‘proper’ market interaction is.
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With the state’s imposition of its view on proper market interaction, the unity
of the capitalist economy and state reaches its most concrete manifestation
regarding the functioning of ordinary markets. Nevertheless this is so conflict-
ing that the state sets out the framework in general terms, delegating its details
and execution to ‘independent’ market authorities. (Division 1.)
So as to prevent a market constellation associated with generalised price
deflation (cf. 4D2), the state ordains a monetary policy resulting in creeping
inflation (which is labelled by the state as ‘price stability’). It tends to delegate
its concretisation and execution to the ‘independent’ central bank. (Division 2,
9§5.)
Whereas the state has engendered an effective monetary instrument for
countering price deflation (even if its proportions, euphemistically called
‘quantitative easing’, may at times be grandiose), this is as yet (when I com-
pleted this book) not so for the enormous problem of the ‘too big to fail banks’,
and, potentially, the too big to fail entities in other key sectors. The gradual
movement to ‘too big to fail’ is an effect of market interaction that was only
thrown into relief with the emergence of the 2008 financial crisis.
Regarding especially the banking sector, the complex internal structure of
big banks has evolved such that effective regulation and supervision is practic-
ally unachievable. They have become ‘too big to know what is going on’, or the
balances of the big banks have become ‘the blackest of black holes’. Therefore
the system vulnerability stemming from ‘too big to fail banks’ can be countered
only by putting a cap on the accumulation of capital such that entities become
small enough to fail. However, this would be highly conflicting, as it would cas-
tigate the success in the accumulation of capital, which in fact clashes with the
economic rights granted by the state.
Nevertheless it seems that the state (via the 2014 supplement to the Basel III
agreements) is cautiously preparing the way for it. That is, by a ‘discrimina-
tion’ betweenbig and small banks regarding leverage- and risk-weighted capital
ratios. Such a precautionary regulative discrimination is unprecedented. This
is not to say that, as yet, the ‘discrimination’ is heavy enough to compel big
banks to break up into smaller entities. What is more, the cautious halfway
house will merely press down the profits and the credit capacity of the big
banks and so generate structurally lower growth rates – without solving the
too big to fail threat. There seems no way out other than intensifying the dis-
crimination, thereby enforcing a ‘small enough to fail’ constellation, even if its
effectuation may ‘require’ another trembling financial crisis. (Division 2, 9§6.)
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Appendix 9A. Too big banks: too big to fail and too big for
supervisors
It was stated in 9§6 that putting a cap on the concentration of capital in single
banks seems inevitable for the survival of the capitalist system. This statement
is based on the incapability of the ‘conventional’ regulation of the banking sec-
tor as revealed in the 2008banking crisis. Themain objective of this appendix is
to provide an underpinning of this incapability (section 9A-2). This is preceded
by empirical information on the degree of centralisation and concentration of
capital within the banking sector, and on the ‘systemic risk’ characteristics of
big banks (section 9A-1). In the last section (9A-3) I provide empirical informa-
tion on the social costs of the 2008 crisis and on the average bank rate of profit
from 1996–2015 in the OECD-21.
9A-1 Centralisation and concentration of capital within the banking
sector, and characteristics of big banks
1 Centralisation within the banking sector
A large bank failing causes bigger damage than a small one. I first present the
commonmeasure formarket authorities of the relative size of entities in amar-
ket – in this case the banking sector. That is, the degree of centralisation in
the banking sector is relevant. (I use the, in my view adequate, marxian term
‘centralisation’ as introduced in Chapter 4; the mainstream term is ‘concentra-
tion’. Inbrief,my term centralisation refers to the relative size in comparisonwith
other entities in the same sector; my term concentration refers to the absolute
size of an entity –measured in absolutemoney terms, or in percentage of GDP.)
Graph 9.3 shows the average degree of centralisation within the banking sector
for the OECD-21, asmeasured by the assets of the top-5 banks – and of the top-3
banks – over the assets of all banks in an OECD-21 country.
The most important point about Graph 9.3 is that after 2007 the centralisa-
tion has hardly changed (some increase for the top-5 and a slight decrease for
the top-3). It can further be seen that on average there is a huge difference
between the share of the top-3 banks, and those that rank 4 and 5. Over the
last five years shown, a top-3 bank is on average 3.5 times bigger than banks
ranged 4–5.
Becausewe know that the banking sector is a ‘large’ onewithin the economy,
the data above provide some relevant information for the degree of ‘too big to
fail’ banks. However, this measure does not account for the degree of intercon-
nectedness of banks, and hence not for possible domino effects. Nevertheless,
assuming that all banks are equally interconnected, the failure of a large bank
has a larger domino effect than the failure of a smaller one.
458 part two – the capitalist state
graph 9.3 Centralisation in the banking sector: assets of the five and three
largest banks, as% of the assets of all banks – average of the
OECD-21, 1996–2015
Data source:World Bank databaseGlobal Financial Development, ‘5-bank asset concentration’
and ‘Bank concentration’ (each updated 16 June 2017)15
2 Concentration of capital within the banking sector:
money-creating banks
Too big to fail depends especially on the absolute size of banks as an indicator
of the costs of saving a failing bank. It could be argued that a bank that is too
big to fail must be saved at all costs (in that sense ‘too big to save’ does not
exist, or it should be a terminology to describe a situation of collapse). Graph
9.4 relates the average asset-size of a country’s top-3 bank to its GDP. Thismeas-
ures themaximal direct costs of saving a large bank –maximal because when a
bank fails, not all of its assetsmay be foregone and some of these can be sold to
other parties. (This is about the direct costs – see section 9A-3 on the indirect
costs.)
It can be seen from Graph 9.4 that the size of a top-3 bank as a proportion
of GDP somewhat decreased from 2007 to 2012, moving back to near the 2007
level in 2015. This means that the degree of direct damage that goes along with
the saving of a large bank is about the same in those two years.
15 http://databank.worldbank.org/data/reports.aspx?source=global‑financial‑development.
Most years are for 21 countries, some for 16 to 20 countries.
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graph 9.4 Assets of one bank (top-3, or range 4–5) as a proportion of GDP –
average of the OECD-21, 1996–2015
Data source:World Bank databaseGlobal FinancialDevelopment, ‘5-bank asset concentration’;
‘Bank concentration’; ‘Deposit money banks’ assets to GDP’ (all updated 16 June 2017)16
3 Characteristics of big banks
In an IMF paper, Laeven, Ratnovski and Tong (2014) study the connection
between bank size and systemic risk (systemic risk is described as ‘the external-
ities of bank distress onto the rest of the financial systemor the real economy’ –
p. 14). They use a sample of 1,250 banks in 54 countries, among which 137 large
banks (11%), the latter being defined as banks with assets of over US$50 bil-
lion in 2011. (The sample includes 15 OECD-21 countries.) The banks in the
sample are money-creating banks (called ‘deposit-taking’ banks). The authors
find (among other things):
• ‘First, large banks today engage disproportionately more in market-based
activities.17
• Second, large banks hold less capital than small banks, as measured either
by risk-weighted capital ratios or a simple leverage ratio.
• Third, large banks have less stable funding than small banks, asmeasured by
the share of deposits in total liabilities.
• [Fourth], large banks are more organizationally complex, as measured by
the number of subsidiaries.’ (Laeven, Ratnovski and Tong 2014, p. 8.)
16 http://databank.worldbank.org/data/reports.aspx?source=global‑financial‑development.
For the number of countries information see the footnote with the previous graph.
17 That is, they do not (as in traditional banking) restrict to lending and borrowing – I add
this because the latter is also a market activity.
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• ‘This [1–4] suggests that large banks may have a distinct, possibly more fra-
gile, business model.’ (Laeven, Ratnovski and Tong 2014, p. 3.)
Focusing on 2007–08 in comparison with 2006 they also find:
• ‘Size per se is an independent factor that drives individual bank risk. Large
banks are riskier than smaller ones.
• However, among large banks only (over US$50 billion in assets), size per se
ceases to be an independent risk factor. Instead, risk is driven by insufficient
capital.’ (Laeven, Ratnovski and Tong 2014, p. 14.)18
This is an important study. However, the big question for researchers and for
supervisors is the reliability of the valuation of the assets of banks, and hence
of a leverage ratio or of risk-weighted capital ratios. This is the subject of the
next section.
9A-2 Big banks: too big to knowwhat is going on
It was indicated in 9§6 that putting a cap on the concentration of capital (‘big-
ness’) in single banks seems inevitable for the survival of the capitalist system.
But why would ‘conventional’ regulation and supervision of banks not be suf-
ficient? It is insufficient because regulators and supervisors, but also the man-
agement and the internal supervisors of banks, lack information of what they
are supposed to supervise.
In 2014 Andrew Haldane (as chief economist at the Bank of England
responsible for the stability of the financial sector as a whole) declares to Der
Spiegel: The balances of the big banks are ‘the blackest of black holes’.19 The
18 The authors ‘proxy systemic risk through an SRISKmeasure, defined as a bank’s contribu-
tion to the deterioration of the capitalization of the financial system as a whole during a
crisis.’ (Laeven, Ratnovski and Tong 2014, pp. 14–15.) Using this measure they find:
• ‘Large banks contribute more to systemic risk when they have less capital;
• Large banks contribute more to systemic risk when they have fewer deposits;
• Large banks contributemore to systemic risk when they engagemore inmarket-based
activities, asmeasured by the share of noninterest income in total income or the share
of loans in assets;
• The economic effects are substantial, especially for bank capital.’ (Laeven, Ratnovski
and Tong 2014, p. 17.)
• ‘… large market-oriented banks may not be more volatile than traditional banks on a
stand-alone basis, but they are more likely to fail together, and this creates risks for
the financial system and the economy as a whole.’ (Laeven, Ratnovski and Tong 2014,
p. 18.)
19 Luyendijk 2015, ch. 13 and The Guardian: https://www.theguardian.com/business/2015/
sep/30/how‑the‑banks‑ignored‑lessons‑of‑crash. Thus, as Luyendijk remarks, a main
responsible actor tells us that supervisors have no idea of what the banks have on their
books.
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blackness in fact mainly applies to the (unknown) risks – or rather ‘uncertain-
ties’ – taken by banks on the assets site of their balance sheet. However, the
valuation of the assets is reflected in the value of the equity, which ‘blackens’ a
leverage ratio or risk-weighted capital ratios.
In what I consider an important document on the 2008 financial crisis, Luy-
endijk (2015) sets out views from inside the banking sector and its supervisors.
It is based on over 200 interviews with its actors (many of which also appeared
in The Guardian). Below I quote from this book in the perspective of the super-
visors’ lack of information on the ‘object matter’ of their activity.
In the early twenty-first century at least, supervisors, as well as the manage-
ment of banks, lost a grip on the valuation of the assets of banks, and hence on
the total of banks’ balance sheets. This valuation is (or is supposed to be) an
important focus of the ‘prudential’ regulation and supervision.20
I quoted Haldane’s statement that the balances of the big banks are ‘the
blackest of black holes’. In the same vain, Alistair Darling, in 2007–10 UK min-
ister of finance (Chancellor), wrote in 2011: ‘There is much talk about whether
[financial] institutions are too big to fail, or even too big to save, but there is
another category too: too big to know what’s going on.’21
An anonymous senior regulator (supervisor) interviewed by Luyendijk
states: ‘Ultimately, as supervisors, we rely upon self-declaration, upon what is
presented to us by a bank’s internal management. But often they don’t know
what’s going on, because banks today are so vast and hugely complex. … The
real threat is not a bank’s management hiding things from us: it’s the manage-
ment not knowing themselves what the risks are, either because nobody realises
it or because somepeople are keeping it from their bosses.’22 (Emphasis added.)
Apparently affirming this, an anonymous internal accountant (financial report-
ing) of a mega bank states: ‘The question is not only how much risk you are
running as a bank. The question is if you even knowwhat you own at any given
point.’23
An anonymous former head of structured credit at a large bank explains to
Luyendijk:
20 In quite some countries the so-called ‘prudential’ regulation and supervision is institu-
tionally separated from the ‘conduct’ regulation and supervision, each so with separate
authorities and delegations. In that case the CB adopts only the prudential part.
21 In Back from the Brink: 1000 Days at Number 11 (2011) – cf. Luyendijk 2015, ch. 7. Too big to
fail is a phenomenon that gradually developed from the mid-1980s via mergers and take-
overs (Luyendijk 2015, ch. 4).
22 Luyendijk 2015, ch. 8 and The Guardian: https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/
joris‑luyendijk‑banking‑blog/2012/jun/25/senior‑fsa‑regulator.
23 Luyendijk 2015, ch. 7.
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‘… most in the bank didn’t understand our products. Even the risk and
compliance peoplewhowere supposed to be our internal checks and bal-
ances … We began to realise that we had to teach them how to monitor
us. Then there were the people I reported to, who were getting calls from
the people they reported to. I learned that the people high up know just
enough for the role they’re in. “Just enough” is not enough in an emer-
gency. I would be on the phone for hours explaining to people of increas-
ing seniority what we were doing. And I realised, they don’t understand,
not on a fundamental level.’24
If banks themselves are, to an unknown degree, ignorant about the risk-
weighted value of their assets, could supervisors improve on this? Luyendijk
mentions that about one million people work in the UK’s financial sector,
against 5,000 for supervisors (0.5%).
I guess that even by a tenfold increase of the latter, ‘the blackest of black
holes’ will not turn grey. Only when we have at least ‘grey’, sensible regulation
of the assets side of banks’ balance sheets could come in. However, supervisors
supervise on the basis of the existing rules. A former treasurer at a collapsed
bank tells Luyendijk: ‘Regulation to keep the City in check? Don’t hold your
breath. No matter what rules you put in place, they’ll always find ways around
it.’25 (Many other commentators have observed this. Regulators are not one
step ahead, but rather one or more steps behind the financial sector ‘innov-
ations’.)
The focus in the last paragraphs has been on the assets side of the bank bal-
ance. But, as indicated, the valuation of the assets is reflected in the leverage
ratios.
9A-3 Social costs of an encompassing banking crisis, and the temporary
decrease in bank profit rates
1 Estimates of the costs of the 2008 crisis
Estimates of the losses associated with the 2008 financial crises are quite
diverse, depending on what variables are taken into account and on the hori-
zon beyond 2008.
In general terms an EC paper (European Commission 2014, pp. 41–2) refers
to a 2010 study by a working group of the Basel Committee on Banking Super-
vision (BCBS), which reviewed ‘the literature estimating output (measured
24 Luyendijk 2015, ch. 7 and The Guardian: https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/
joris‑luyendijk‑banking‑blog/2012/apr/05/former‑head‑structured‑credit‑voices‑finance.
25 Luyendijk 2015, ch. 12 and The Guardian: https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/
joris‑luyendijk‑banking‑blog/2012/mar/12/former‑treasurer‑voices‑of‑finance.
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cumulatively in present value terms and as the deviation from trendGDP). Con-
sidering only the studies that assume a permanent level change in output, the
median is 158%.’
The EC paper also refers to a 2010 paper by Haldane who suggests that ‘the
output loss resulting from this crisis could amount to anything between 100%
to 500% of GDP, depending on assumptions about how permanent the drops
in output will be.’
The EC paper itself estimates that ‘output losses in the EU may end up as
high as 100% of EU GDP, measured cumulatively in present value terms going
forward.’
But there is more to take account of than output losses. Laeven and Valen-
cia (2012) also include variables such as fiscal costs, increased public debt, and
monetary expansion.26 However, there are also a variety of other important
aspects of the 2008 crisis (and all crises), which are difficult to catch in mon-
etary terms. Not least the effect that unemployment has on the lives of the
unemployed and their children.
In a staff paper of the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas, Atkinson, Luttrell and
Rosenblum (2013) tried to incorporate a wider variety of measures to estimate
the costs of the 2007 financial crisis for the USA. (Note that in the USA and the
UK the crisis started in 2007.) These authors conclude that:
‘40 to 90 percent of one year’s output ($6 trillion to $14 trillion, the equi-
valent of $50,000 to $120,000 for every U.S. household) was foregone due
to the 2007–09 recession. We also provide several alternative measures
of lost consumption, national trauma, and other negative consequences
… This more comprehensive evaluation of factors suggests that what the
U.S. gave up as a result of the crisis is likely greater than the value of one
year’s output.’
They also refer to the legitimation affect (in other terms):
‘Similarly to reduced opportunity, the financial crisis resulted in a signi-
ficant loss of trust in government institutions and the capitalist economic
system. (…) [T]he officials they entrusted to govern and to impartially
regulate the financial services industry offered massive support and pref-
erence to a handful of the largest institutions. (…) [F]inancial institutions
aggressively pursued profits and growth strategies that benefited man-
agement and, to a degree, owner-shareholders and creditors. Subsequent
26 The EC paper does refer to the latter IMF paper. These authors studied the effects of a vari-
ety of financial crises from 1980 onwards, but regarding the 2008 crisis, and within their
framework, they refrained from estimates beyond the last year of their data (2011).
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losses when the boom turned bust were disproportionately borne by tax-
payers. Privatized gains, socialized losses …
However, saving the system in itself – especially with extraordinary
government assistance provided to a handful of giant financial institu-
tions – reinforced a perception that public support exists primarily for
large, interconnected, complex financial entities.’
ATKINSON, LUTTRELL and ROSENBLUM 2013, p. 14
2 The bank rate of profit
How were banks themselves affected by the 2007/08 crisis and its aftermath?
Graph 9.5. shows the bank rate of profit for the OECD-21 in the lead up to the
crisis and afterwards.
graph 9.5 Bank rate of profit on equity, before and after tax – average of the
OECD-21, 1996–2015
Data source: World Bank database Global Financial Development, ‘Bank return on equity (%,
before tax)’ and ‘Bank return on equity (%, after tax)’ (updated 16 June 2017)27
Although the effect on the profit rate of the crisis has been enormous, the rates
of profit in especially 2004–07 were also enormous. Various authors that have
observed banking from the inside (e.g. Luyendijk 2015) conclude on the basis
of their sources – as against mainstream textbook economics – that the struc-
ture of banking is such that the aim is not the realisation of long-term profits,
but rather short-term profits, which has to do with the incentive structure of
27 http://databank.worldbank.org/data/reports.aspx?source=global‑financial‑development
(21 countries throughout).
9. the imposition of competition 465
bonuses and ‘shareholder value’. Having said this, it can be seen from Graph
9.5 that, at least over the period 1996–2015, the average rate of profit has not
been too bad. One can only fall deep from a high top – this remark is not help-
ful when the trough is reached. However, especially large banks did (or could)
know, or guess, that they were taking high risks in the pre-2008 years.
The following regards a detail. I suppose that the differences after 2006
between the pre- and after-tax profits have to do with the often very complic-
ated tax rules about the carrying back and the carrying forward of (subsidiar-
ies’) losses. (For one part losses of after 2007 are carried back to 2007, whence
that year shows a small difference between the pre- and after-tax profit rate.
The volatile pre- and after-tax differences between 2009 and 2013 are presum-
ably the effect of the carrying forward of earlier losses.)
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Introduction
This chapter presents the reach of the capitalist state in three of its concrete
manifestations.
The first division – which is the sequel to Chapter 5 – shows how the devel-
opment of the size of the state in terms of its expenditure modifies the cyc-
lical accumulation of capital. More specifically, a structurally increasing state
expenditure decreases the amplitude of the cycles.
Whereas Chapters 6–9 presented the content of the state’s regulation, Divi-
sion 2 presents the manifestation of the state in the character of legislation
and other regulation. It will be shown that, for various reasons, not only does
the amount of regulation increase over time, but also the dynamic of regula-
tion inevitably results in more complicated as well as more complex regula-
tion.
Division 3 presents a synthetic overview of the state’s manifestation in its
expenditure. Although all expenditure categories will be briefly reviewed, the
main focus in this division will be on social security expenditure and the prob-
lematic thereof for the state and hence for the capitalist system.
A brief final division, called ‘the vulnerabilities of the capitalist state’s reach’,
takes some threads of Divisions 2 and 3 together. Whereas Chapters 6–8 suc-
cessively presented the conditions of existence of the state – vis-à-vis the cap-
italist economy with which it constitutes a separation-in-unity – the final divi-
sion detects themajor vulnerabilities in these conditions of existence. In other
words, it detects the potential impediments to the continued reproduction of
the capitalist system.
Scheme 10.1 presents the outline of this chapter.
Division 1. The size of state expenditure and its effect on the
amplitude of the capitalist economic cycle
This division considers how the state and its expenditure aremanifested in the
cyclical movement of capital as set out in Chapter 5. As such it is the sequel to
that chapter.
10§1 The size of the state: state expenditure asmitigating economic
recessions
This section briefly outlines the general effect of state expenditure on the cyc-
lical accumulation and over-accumulation of capital (Chapter 5).
[continued]
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scheme 10.1 The reach of the capitalist state (outline Chapter 10)
Legend
.Ṃ. concrete manifestation
⥥ bottommoment derives from top moments
† The three manifestations regard the first three moments (10D1–10D3). The last moment
(10D4) builds on 10D2 and 10D3 in a particular synthetic manner.
10§1 Continued
Generally the degree of state expenditure (measured as a percentage of GDP)
affects the potential degree of its mitigating the amplitude of the cycle.
‘Potential’, that is, when the state does not expend pro-cyclically. Thus to the
extent that in a recession the state maintains its expenditure, it puts a con-
siderable floor in the general cyclical expenditures (that is, state expenditure
together with private investment and the consumption that is independent
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of social security transfers). Then, to the degree that state expenditure is struc-
turally large in comparison with the private sector, the composition of the
potentially non-volatile general expenditure (that of the state) and the poten-
tially volatile expenditures (those of private investment and the transfers-
independent consumption) structurally changes in favour of the non-volatile
expenditures, so that the general cyclical volatility decreases. In other words,
state expenditure acts as an automatic stabiliser. (See further Amplification
10§1-a.) This effect is independent of any discretionary counter-cyclical policy
(see 10§2).
Given the floor of state expenditure (and provided the state abstains from
pro-cyclical policy) the course of the capitalist business cycle is broadly as
presented in Chapter 5, though with a moderated amplitude of the cycle. This
would be one aspect that positively contributes to the legitimation of the state
and so the capitalist system as a whole (that is, amongst the negative and other
positive aspects). Actors, however, tend to evaluate the cycle ‘within their own
times’ – that is, given the ‘normal’ size of the state within their own times.
10§1-a Amplification. Historical changes in the amplitude of the cycle
along with changes in state expenditure
In the first two sub-sections of this amplification there is no mention of state
expenditure; these two sub-sections are merely on observations about amp-
litudes.
(1) The amplitude 1870–1989. For a sample of 16 current OECD countries,1
Maddison (1991, pp. 3–4) shows ‘that peacetime business cycle history has been
much milder since the Second World War than before, and that the 1920–38
period was generally much worse than 1870–1913.’ He produces the following
average ‘amplitude of recessions in aggregate output, 1870–1989: maximum
peak–trough fall in GDP or lowest rise (annual data)’.
1870–1913 1920–38 1950–73 1973–89
amplitude in % of GDP: arithmetic
average for 16 current OECD countries
–5.5 –12.1 +0.2 –1.8
1 OECD-21 minus Greece, Ireland, New Zealand, Portugal and Spain.
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Maddison mentions that this average for the group is dampened by the fact
that individual country cycles are not synchronised.
(2) The amplitude 1990–2000. In a 2002 OECD working paper, Dalsgaard,
Elmeskov and Park observed that for a sample of 13 OECD countries,2 the amp-
litude of the business cycle for most of these, when proxied by the average size
of output gaps over ten-year periods, declined in the period 1980–2000 in com-
parisonwith the decade of the 1970s (Dalsgaard, Elmeskov and Park 2002, p. 7).
‘Divergencies of output gaps across OECD countries havediminished since 1960
with a particularly strong tendency since the early 1990s’ (Dalsgaard, Elmeskov
and Park 2002, p. 23).
In an IMF publication, Kannan, Scott and Terrones (2009) show that from
the mid-1980s (and until 2007) there was an even further moderation. (See
10§2-a for their findings concerning financially driven crises.)
As an illustrationGraph 10.2 shows, for a much longer period, the amplitude
in growth rates of real-GDP per capita for the USA.3
(3) Amplitude and size of government expenditure. As the thesis that the
increasing size of government expendituremitigates the amplitude of business
cycles (main text 10§1) does not quite fit in with most mainstream economic
models, this sub-section quotes empirical research in this field. In an OECD
working paper empirically assessing government budgets in relationwith busi-
ness cycle amplitudes in the 1990s for 20 OECD countries (OECD-21 minus
Switzerland), Van den Noord observes:
‘The most important factor determining the cyclical sensitivity of the
fiscal position is the size of the general government sector. For the most
part, the larger the share of government expenditure in domestic output,
the greater is the sensitivity of the fiscal position to fluctuations in eco-
nomic activity … The tax structure also has a significant impact on the
size of automatic stabilisers: the higher the taxation of cyclically sens-
itive tax bases, the more the tax take will vary with the business cycle
and hence the greater will be the cyclical sensitivity of the fiscal posi-
tion. The progressivity of taxes, the generosity of unemployment bene-
fits and the cyclical sensitivity of various tax bases and unemployment,
2 OECD-21 minus Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Greece, Ireland, Netherlands, Portugal, Switzer-
land.
3 We also see a considerable decrease in amplitude for Japan and especially France. In
some countries, such as the UK and Italy, the decrease is much less pronounced. In Ger-
many, the decrease is also considerable compared with the period 1920–38; for this country,
however, the amplitudes in the period 1870–1913 were rather moderate (between +6% and –
4%).
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graph 10.2 Growth amplitudes as measured by the growth rate of real-GDP
per capita, USA 1870–2015 in 2011 prices (annual data). Panel 1: all
years; panel 2: the world wars related years (1914–19 and 1939–49)
dropped
Data source: Maddison Project Database, version 2018 by Jutta Bolt, Robert Inklaar, Herman
de Jong and Jan Luiten van Zanden4
finally, are other significant factors in determining the cyclical sensitivity
of the fiscal position.’
2000, p. 7, italics in original5
Earlier Galí (1994) showed that for a sample of 22 OECD countries (OECD-21
minus New Zealand plus Iceland and Luxembourg), 1960–90, ‘both taxes and
government purchases seem to be effectively working as “automatic stabil-
izers”.’ Economieswith ‘large governments’ ‘have experiencedmilder economic
fluctuations than economies with “small governments” ’ (Galí 1994, pp. 130–1).
Galí considered the stabilising effect of the ratio of government purchases over
GDP (government expenditure minus wages and transfers).
Fatás andMihov (2001) consider the total of government expenditure for 20
OECD countries covering the years 1960–97. They find:
‘a strong negative correlation between government size and output volat-
ility … This correlation is robust to the inclusion of a large set of con-
trols as well as to alternative methods of detrending and estimation. In
4 https://www.rug.nl/ggdc/historicaldevelopment/maddison/releases/maddison‑project
‑database‑2018 (CGDPpc set), update 11 January 2018. See alsoBolt, Inklaar, de Jong andLuiten
van Zanden 2018.
5 Van den Noord also observes that in some countries governments’ “discretionary actions …
have reduced, or even offset, the effect of automatic fiscal stabilisers” (abstract).
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the international sample, a one percentage point increase in government
spending relative to GDP reduces output volatility by eight basis points.’
Their abstract
They also observe (in reference to Van den Noord 2000):
‘Traditionally, the stabilizing role of fiscal policy has been associated to
the size and volatility of the budget deficit and not the budget itself.
Although, as we have argued before, there is evidence that overall size
and responsiveness of fiscal variables are strongly correlated, our results
raise the question whether the size of governments is important in itself.’
FATÁS and MIHOV 2001, p. 18
Fatás and Mihov (2002/2003) reach similar results for a sample of 51 countries
covering 1960–99.6 (In the same paper they also study the effect of pro-cyclical
policy.)7 By the year 2008, Andrés, Doménech and Fatás (2008) can refer to
the thesis that large governments are associated with less volatile economies
as being an empirically well-established ‘stylized fact’ that has been refined
by several recent studies.8 They confirm the earlier results for 20 OECD coun-
tries (OECD-21, minus New Zealand and Switzerland plus Turkey) covering the
period 1960–2004. (Much of this paper – as is Fatás and Mihov 2002/2003) as
well as other literature in the field since Galí (1994) – is concerned with the
question of how this empirical fact could (or cannot) be accounted for in an
amended ‘real business cycle’ model.
I close this sub-section by noting that, generally, international synchronisa-
tion of business cycles would, by itself, have an amplitude increasing effect.
Dalsgaard et al. (2002) observe: ‘international divergencies of cyclical positions
have diminished but, outside the euro area, there is little evidence of increased
synchronisation of cycles’ (their abstract; see also p. 9 and especially note 15).
This is different for recessions with financial origins, to which I briefly turn in
the next section.
6 See esp. working paper version (2002) pp. 15 and 27.
7 They somewhat misleadingly define ‘discretionary policy’ as ‘changes in fiscal policy that do
not represent reaction to economic conditions.’ They add: ‘In theory, it is useful to think about
fiscal policy as consisting of three components: (a) automatic stabilizers, (b) discretionary
fiscal policy that reacts to the state of the economy, and (c) discretionary policy that is imple-
mented for reasons other than current macroeconomic conditions.’ (working paper version
pp. 3–4) Regarding the last component (c) they find that the volatility of output induced by
[this] discretionary fiscal policy lowers economic growth by 0.6 percentage points for every
percentage point increase in volatility, and that ‘there is evidence that the increase in volatil-
ity is in part due to electoral cycles; nevertheless, we do find that political constraints restrain
fiscal policy beyond their impact on the traditional election-year volatility’ (abstract).
8 Abstract and working paper version p. 13.
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10§2 State policy in recessions versus depressions
Given the capitalist state’s furthering the accumulation of capital (7§3) and
given that the incentives for the accumulation of capital result in cyclically
recurrent over-accumulation of capital (5§8), it seems that the state is bound
to passively await the cyclical curing of that over-accumulation (5§9).9 With
considerable automatic stabilisers there is, in ordinary recessions, generally
no necessity for additional state policy. Keeping state expenditure and state
expenditure commitments as well as tax rates unaffected puts a floor into the
general macroeconomic expenditure during recessions (10§1).
However, when a recession takes on the character of a depression (a pro-
longed recession – often triggered by a financial crisis and bank failures and
often in combination with price deflation), the mere state expenditure floor
may not be a sufficient base for getting to a recovery via restructuring of cap-
ital (5§9).10 Then the reproduction of the capitalist system requires a sub-
stantial discretionary state policy. As Keynes (1936) indicated, monetary policy
is not likely to be sufficient in a depression, whence the state is required to
engage in substantial additional spending.11 (See also Kannan, Scott and Ter-
rones 2009.)
10§2-a Amplification. Frequency of recessions/depressions associated
with financial crises, and their severity and duration comparison
with non-financial ones
In an empirical IMF study, Kannan et al. conclude that:
‘recessions associated with financial crises tend to be unusually severe
and that recoveries from such recessions are typically slow. Similarly,
globally synchronized recessions are often long and deep, and recover-
ies from these recessions are generally weak. Countercyclical monetary
policy can help shorten recessions, but its effectiveness is limited in fin-
9 Though see Addendum 10§2-b on indicative planning.
10 In a 2008 IMF working paper, Claessens, Kose and Terrones characterise a depression as
‘an extremely severe recession, in which the peak-to-trough decline in output exceeds 10
percent’ (2008, p. 15). Kannan et al. (2009, p. 5) also take this view.
The threeperiods of 1873–96 (esp. for theUKand somewhatbriefer for theUSA), of 1929
until WWII, and of 2007/08 and after have been identified as depressions (see, e.g., http://
www.nytimes.com/2010/06/28/opinion/28krugman.html?_r=0). Note, however, that the
state expenditure floor has considerably increased since the second depression.
11 In much of the post-WWII period, Keynes has been looked upon as a business cycle the-
oretician (this is what at least the Neo-Keynesians made of him). In my view – and apart
from its theoretical innovations – his 1936workmakes Keynes primarily a depression eco-
nomist.
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ancial crises. By contrast, expansionary fiscal policy seems particularly
effective in shortening recessions associated with financial crises and in
boosting recoveries.’ (2009, abstract)
These conclusions are based on evidence from a sample of 21 OECD countries
(the OECD-21) for the period 1960–2007, excluding emerging financially origin-
ating recessions in their last year (2007). Of the 122 recessions in their sample,
15 are associated with financial crisis (i.e. 12%).12
graph 10.3 Average number of recessions per decade and per country 1870–
2008, for a sample of 14 current OECD countries13
Data source: calculated from Jorda, Schularick and Taylor 2012, Table 1
Jorda, Schularick and Taylor (2012) go back to 1870 for a sample of 14 OECD
countries.14 They do take into account the 2007/08 financial crises. For their
sample 22% of the recessions/crises in this period are of financial origin.
However, doing a calculation from their sample, which restricts to the 1960–
12 Kannan et al. 2009, p. 8. The last financially associated crisis within their sample dates
from 1997q2–1999q1 in Japan.
13 See the previous note.
14 The OECD-21 minus Austria, Belgium, Finland, Greece, Ireland, New Zealand, Portugal.
(See 7§3-c for the ‘OECD-21’).
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2007 period (and excluding the 2007/08 financial crises as do Kannan et al.)
results in 11% of the recessions/crises in this 1960–2007 period being of finan-
cial origin. This is not far removed from the 12% of the Kannan et al. data for 21
countries.
In this light – and given that this chapter is confined to broad outlines that
go back to early full capitalism – Graph 10.3 shows decade averages that I have
calculated from the sample of Jorda et al.
Noting that severity of recessions (10§1) is at least as important as their fre-
quency, it can be seen from Graph 10.3 that, roughly, there is a downward trend
in the averagenumber of cycles per decade, and that, especially after 1910, crises
from financial origin are an irregular phenomenon.15
Kannan et al. (2009, p. 10) indicate – for the period 1960–2007 – that credit
growth during the expansions preceding financial crises is higher than dur-
ing other expansions, and that credit booms have frequently followed financial
deregulation.
10§2-b Addendum: French and Japanese indicative planning
Given the cyclically recurrent over-accumulation of capital, which gives rise
to recession and destruction of capital, it is not a ludicrous idea for a capitalist
state to try to prevent such over-accumulation. Throughout the 1960s and 1970s
the French and the Japanese states institutionalised, in various ways, an ‘indic-
ative investment planning’ (non-binding investment schedules that combine
forecasts and planning). On the French variant see, for example, Dalton (1974,
pp. 154–60), Bonnaud (1975, pp. 93–110) and Nielsen (2008). On the Japanese
variant see, for example, Caves and Uekusa (1976a; 1976b), Trezise and Suzuki
(1976) and Nielsen (2008).
Division 2. The increasing size and complexity of regulation
The state’s eight regulative frameworks (Chapters 6–7 and 9), as well as the
forms and design of taxation (Chapter 8), engender an increasingly complic-
ated, as well as complexity of, regulation. This division is not about the content
of regulation and tax legislation; rather it concerns the characteristics that
determine their reach. Because this division will introduce a lot of intercon-
nected concepts within few pages, it is probably one of the more difficult ones
15 For graphs of theGDP growth effects of financial crises 1975–2015 see https://knoema.com/
xflgvk/40‑years‑in‑financial‑crises.
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of this book. At the same time it is a key one. In the conclusions to this chapter I
will state that the inevitably increasing quantity, complication and complexity
of regulation within capitalism is one of the latter’s core vulnerabilities.
10§3 Regulation: laws and delegated regulation
Much of the organisation and terminology of the legislative and regulatory
frameworks is country-specific. Generally the ‘rules framework’ includes ‘pri-
mary legislation’ (laws/acts), which is passed at the highest administrative
level, and ‘secondary legislation’ (other rules), which is passed at lower admin-
istrative levels (including field-specific regulatory bodies). The former formally
provides the delegation for the latter, and may also withdraw this delegation.
Secondary legislation is often more detailed or field specific.
Though in most countries (and all of the OECD-21) there is this distinc-
tion, what is allotted to different levels is highly contingent (also within one
country).16 This is a matter of institutional organisation and of the possible
speed of change of a rule (speedier for delegated legislation). Further, for actors
the level makes no difference: the required compliance is independent of the
level.
For the purposes of the current division, therefore, I adopt the following ter-
minology. I use the term regulation for the entirety of laws and of the ‘delegated
regulation’. When I explicitly refer to the latter I always use the adjective ‘del-
egated’. When I refer to ‘regulation’, as said, this refers to the entirety. I refer to
one particular regulation as ‘a’ regulation or, in case of a set, ‘regulations’.
10§3-a Amplification. Execution of delegated regulation: ‘orders’
This amplification is not relevant for the furthermain text, though it is relevant
for especially Amplification 10§5-a.
Delegated regulation may be promulgated by executives (such as presid-
ents), governments, ministers or other executive bodies (especially regulatory
agencies), always depending on the type of delegation as formulated in the
laws (sometimes in the constitutional law). Specific types of delegated regu-
lation go under different names in different countries. In this division I merely
use the term ‘order’: presidential order, government order (or order in council),
ministerial order, field order (the latter referring to the orders of a designated
authoritywithin, or under the supervision of, aministry – also called regulation
agencies or authorities).
16 Parliaments may in some cases require detailed primary legislation (on which they have
more influence); in other cases their concern is to delegate detail.
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In what follows I will not refer to further various country specific names for
these, such as ‘regulation’ (for the entirety of the delegated regulation), ‘stat-
utory instruments’, ‘codes’, ‘rules’ or ‘decrees’.17
10§4 A conceptual outline of the reach of regulation: lack of operational
measures
This section is a preview. Clarifications are set out in the sections to come. Fig-
ure 10.4 provides a conceptual outline of the rest of this division. The following
10§5 starts with the quantity of regulation. (See the section indications at the
left handborder of the figure.) Nextwemove to the degree of complexity of reg-
ulation (10§6) and finally to the change of regulation (10§7). Almost all of the
concepts outlined concern ‘degrees’ (of complexity, for example) as indicated
at the right hand border of the figure.
The economy-wide total quantity of regulation is determined by the ‘densit-
ies’ of regulation in regulation fields (e.g. banking, telecommunication or shoe
repair); the density being determined bywhether a field is covered at all by reg-
ulation, and inwhat degree of intensity (highly or barely regulated; this regards
the degree of detail of regulations).
The degree of complexity of the regulation in a field – and, summed, the
total complexity – is determined by the degree of ‘complication’ of regulation,
and the degree in which the regulations in one field (e.g. regarding competi-
tion) are ‘interwoven’ with other regulations in that field or adjacent fields (e.g.
taxation). Additionally, complexity is also determined by the degree in which
economic actors (the subjects of regulation) dynamically ‘fuse’ fields of regula-
tion (especially by product and process innovations). Despite the importance
of the latter two, I will show that ‘complication’ is in effect the key concept for
the reach of regulation.
The dynamics regarding regulation come together in the factors that drive
the continuously changing regulation. These drives (unintended loopholes in
regulations; and new or re-perceived social-economic problems) tend to in-
crease not only the (initial) density of regulation – by its determinants of cov-
erage and intensity – but especially also the complication of regulation. (See
the dotted arrows in Figure 10.4.) Despite factional political efforts and wide-
ranging actors’ demands to roll back regulation, or (in my view rather naïve)
demands to at least decrease complication, I will conclude in 10§7 that, for the
[continued]
17 For the US case see, e.g., http://dictionary.law.com/Default.aspx?selected=1771 (or http://
legal‑dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/regulation.)
For the UK see, e.g., https://www3.law.ox.ac.uk/lrsp/overview/legislation.php.
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figure 10.4 Conceptual outline of the reach of regulation
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10§4 Continued
capitalist system to survive, a continuously increasing complexity of regulation
is inevitable.
All along the following exposition we will be confronted with the problem
that – apart from the mere quantity of regulation – this research field lacks
operational measures for key concepts.
10§5 Quantity and density of regulation: (too) simplemeasures
A fair amount of attention has been given to complaints about the amount of
regulation and, along with it, efforts to push the state back.18 Note, however,
that there are also pressures to increase regulation (pulling the state in). Think
of various property claims and of tax and non-tax subsidies. In the field of com-
petition policy we have the push and pull pressures on the same terrain. Enter-
prises seek to push out the state for their own non-rivalrous (anti-competitive)
supply activities, though they pull in the state for their own purchasing activ-
ities for which they seek competition. The same applies for regulation of the
quality of output and production, including for concerns of health and a sus-
tainable environment such as the climate: regulate them, not us! However, once
regulation is generally deemed inevitable, enterprises want parity. Simultan-
eous push and pull pressures, and next parity requests, also apply for social
security.
More generally, change of the economic structure calls for extension of reg-
ulation (for example, the evolution of traffic and of ICT). As ‘old’ processes and
products only gradually die off (if at all), we have an increase in the quantity
of regulation. Scrapping of regulation is rare (unless some surviving together
with an evolving field is covered by a brand new law).
MereQuantity. The simple question of howmuch regulation there is in force
in a country is already difficult to answer (see Amplification 10§5-a). However,
counting titles of laws and other regulation is not particularly telling because
their size is highly divergent, ranging from tens tomany thousands of pages for
one title (the latter, for example, for the ‘Code civil’ in French oriented codes).19
18 See, for example, the OECD publications on administrative simplification http://www
.oecd.org/gov/regulatory‑policy/administrative‑simplification.htm as well as its series of
country studies on regulatory policy http://www.oecd.org/gov/regulatory‑policy/by
‑country.htm and KPMG International (2011). The latter document includes a question-
naire amongworldwide top-management on complexity of management in general. Com-
plexity of non-tax regulation rankedhighest (71%of respondents) and that of complex tax
regulation somewhat lower (57% of respondents). For these managers at least, it seems
that the coping with regulation dominates much of their job.
19 See Amplification 10§5-a for numbers of titles of codes around 2010.
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Some researchers propose to add up the sections of regulation,20 but their
sizes also highly diverge, especially between country traditions. A better simple
measure seems to count pages, though with the qualification that these are
layout dependent.21 Even if the stock of regulation at some initial date were
unknown, one could still count the rate of mutation of the quantity of regula-
tion (Amplification 10§5-a provides an example.)
Whatevermeasure one adopts, the commonopinionbetween researchers in
this field is that the quantity of regulation has enormously increased between
the end of the nineteenth century, or between halfway through the twenti-
eth century, and the early twenty-first century. The main question is merely
whether or not in some periods the speed of increase has slowed down.22
Density. As indicated in 10§4, the total quantity of regulation is determined
by the density of regulation in each field. The latter is again determined by, first,
the fields that are covered at all by any regulation, and second, by the degree of
intensity of regulation in those fields, that is, the degree of detail.23|24 (See the
first block of Figure 10.4.)
Each of these could in principle be counted, the latter (intensity) in a very
rough way by the number of pages of regulation, assuming for the time being
that – in one country – these are of equal complication (see the next section).
Quantity, impact and measures. Measures of mere quantity of regulation
are defective inmeasuring the impact of regulation because these donotmeas-
ure the complexity of regulation (see the next section). For the latter, however,
adequate operationalmeasures are lacking so that for long run and for between
country comparisons we have no more than simple quantity measures.
20 For example, de Jong and Herweijer 2004, p. 57.
21 The best simplemeasure would be a word count (supposing digitalisation), but I have not
seen word count based quantifications.
22 Note though that towards the end of the coming into office of a government, the quantity
of legislation passed is usually higher than at the beginning (due to legislation preparation
effects).
23 For ‘field’ one can refer to the SNA (Systemof National Accounts) economic sector division
at some digit level. Next there is the general regulation that applies across fields (Chapters
6–7 and 9).
24 VanGestel andHertogh (2006, p. 31) andVanGestel (2011, p. 8 n. 5) adopt the term ‘density
of regulation’ for the combination of Quantity (Coverage and Intensity) and Interweaving.
They do not cover Complication and Fusion, and hence not Complexity of regulation.
10. the reach of the capitalist state [10§5] 483
10§5-a Amplification. Some examples of simple quantifications of the
amount of regulation
Even themere adding up of the titles of all of the regulation in force is painstak-
ing work that is not often undertaken (however, recent mutations are well
known).
Limited country-wise information about the total quantity of regulation in
force. In terms of estimating the number of USA federal laws in force, Shamee-
ma Rahmana, a senior legal research specialist at the USA Library of Congress,
writes in 2013: ‘trying to tally this number is nearly impossible’.25
A 2013 report of the UK Office of the Parliamentary Counsel mentions: ‘It is
extremely difficult to estimate howmuch legislation is in force at any one time.’
(p. 6; the difficult estimation is not undertaken by the office.)26
Graph 10.5 shows some data for the laws in force of the Netherlands. (This
is an example; in 2015 the country ranked 17th in terms of world GDP.Whereas
that rank does not seem important for the quantity of regulation – any country
has to regulate – there can be cultural differences in the degree of delegation –
including ‘orders’.)
graph 10.5 Number of laws in force, the Netherlands 1980–2015 (central gov-
ernment, exclusive delegated and EU regulation)
Data sources: 1980 and 1988 (Overhoff andMolenaar 1991, pp. 5–6);27 2005 and 2010 (Govern-
ment of the Netherlands 2013; 2015; Vester 2017)
25 http://blogs.loc.gov/law/2013/03/frequent‑reference‑question‑how‑many‑federal‑laws
‑are‑there/.
Apparently in the USA around 2010, each year some 100 brand newbills are passed into
law http://www.kowal.com/?q=How‑Many‑Federal‑Laws‑Are‑There%3F.
26 On the mutation it states: ‘Every year, new legislation and amendments result in over
15,000 (over 30,000 when considering secondary legislation) legislative effects’ (p. 7).
27 Quoted in de Jong and Herweijer 2004, p. 19.
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Regarding primary laws there is limited historical information (Graph 10.5).
It can be seen that in the 35-year period 1980–2015, the number of laws in
force increased by 76%. Information on delegated central government regu-
lation is even more limited (available only from 2004). In 2015 there were for
this country 9,136 central government regulations in force (exclusive regulatory
agencies and exclusive EU regulation). These comprised 1,939 laws (21%) and
7,197 orders in council and ministerial orders (79%).28|29
I now turn to the EU regulation that is not included in the numbers above.
Quantity of regulation in force: the EU. EU regulation consists of two main
categories. One category regards the so-called ‘directives’. Because national
governments are obliged to implement these directives in their national reg-
ulation, these should not be added to the national quantities of laws in force
(thus the ‘implementations’ are included in the numbers of the example of the
Netherlands above). All the other EU regulation is not implemented in national
regulation, thus this is regulation that is additional to the national ones. This
other EU regulation is summarised in Graph 10.6. Note that the EU jurisdiction
ismainly economic andmonetary, excluding jurisdiction on especially taxation
and social security legislation (though there are exceptions).
The area charts at the bottom of Graph 10.6 show the quantitative develop-
ment of the delegated EU regulations newly issued from 1967. These come in
two main types. The fist type includes orders with usually a general character
(the EU calls these ‘Regulations’ that I write with a capital R to differentiate
these from the genus ‘regulations’). The second type includes orders with usu-
ally a specific character (‘Decisions’). The three bottom charts show that after a
considerable increase from 1967–95 (a factor of 8 for the total) – which relates
to the EU’s establishment – the issue of new regulation slows down afterwards,
but nevertheless keeps forthcoming considerably (a number of 1,864 in 2012).
As an indicator for the stock of delegated regulation in force, we can use the
delegated general regulations (‘Regulations’) without an expiry date, corrected
for repeals – see the columns in Graph 10.6. In 2012 their total was 21,792. Their
increase from even 1995–2012 amounts to a factor of 9.
28 See Vester 2017.
29 For another example I point to information related to a pages count regardingnewly issued
central government laws and delegated regulation of Finland (excluding regulatory agen-
cies and excluding EU regulation). As such this is not about the stock of the regulation in
force. This newly issued regulation increased from 1,000 pages per year in 1920 to just over
2,000 pages in 1985 and to 3,500 pages in 2000 (de Jong and Zijlstra 2009, p. 139; from the
Finnish Government 2002).
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graph 10.6 Number of total delegated regulations issued each year, and
cumulative total of the delegated general regulations without
expiry date; European Union 1967–201230
Data source: Toshkov 201431 and House of Commons [UK] 2010, p. 1332
Stock of delegated federal regulation in the USA: number of pages. Even if, as
noted above, for the USA the stock of federal laws is apparently unknown, there
are data for the stock of the federal ‘delegated regulation’ that not only go back
to 1950, but also provide this information in terms of number of pages (see
Graph 10.7).
The USA Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) annual edition is ‘the codifica-
tion of the general and permanent rules published in the Federal Register by
the departments and agencies of the Federal Government.’33|34
30 A restricted forerunner of the EU dates from 1957. The starting date for the Graph below
is 1967, the year of the creation of a single Commission and a single Council to serve the
then three European Communities (EEC, Euratom, ECSC).
31 http://www.dimiter.eu/Eurlex.html / http://www.dimiter.eu/Data.html [February 2014→19
December 2015].
32 From the repeal of regulation (all regulations) provided by the last source for 1997–2009,
an average repeal ratio of 25% can be calculated. To be on the safe side I have applied
this ratio to Regulations without expiry date from Toshkof’s database. (Their repeal ratio
is probably less than the average for all Regulations.)
33 https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/browse/collectionCfr.action?collectionCode=CFR.
34 The CFR is a stock measure that is to be distinguished from the Federal Register’s data on
the annual flow of new regulation. Measured in pages this flow increased considerably
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graph 10.7 Development of the quantity of delegated regulation in force at the
federal state level in the USA: total number of pages 1950–2015
Data source: USA Federal Register, Code of Federal Regulations (2017/04)35
Graph 10.7 shows that the pages increase of the delegated regulation in force is
quite enormous (between 1950 and 2015 there is a factor increase of 18). If the
increase were to continue at the same rate, then the number of pages will have
increased to onemillion by 2050. Note, however, that the 178,000 pages of Fed-
eral delegated regulation in force in 2015 far from measures the total quantity
of regulation for the actors in some US state. In a 2015 OECD report, it is men-
tioned that of the total number of laws (i.e. federal plus local state), only 1.7%
are national, i.e. federal – a number for the similar proportion of the delegated
regulation is not provided.36
from 1937–70. From 1970–80 the increase accelerated, next dropped until 1985 and then
again gradually increased afterwards. However, from the mid 1970’s the flow of the num-
ber of new ‘final rules’ decreased (with fluctuations) from 7,401 in 1976 to 3,281 in 2017
(the latter numbers reveal that the pages count is relevant). Carey, 2016, provides qualify-
ing comments on these flowmeasures. For a pages count of the stock (CFR), and especially
the long term trend thereof, these qualifications are less relevant (one of his correct points
is that the elimination of an existing rule is executed by a new rule; however, in terms of
pages this is usually not weighty, and it is likely that such drops occur throughout time).
35 https://www.federalregister.gov/reader‑aids/understanding‑the‑federal‑register/federal
‑register‑statistics → Code of federal regulations, Total Pages and Volumes 1936–2016 (xls)
→ tab CFR volumes (2017/04, accessed 1 February 2018). See also https://www
.federalregister.gov/blog/learn/tutorials, Federal Register & CFR Publication Statistics –
Aggregated Charts. A similar graph can be found at the website of the Regulatory Stud-
ies Center, George Washington University; Regulation statistics http://regulatorystudies
.columbian.gwu.edu/reg‑stats.
36 OECD 2015a, Annex A. [OECD Regulatory Policy Outlook 2015.]
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In conclusion of this amplification. Even the data we have on merely the
quantity of regulation is limited. The available information points to consider-
able increases over time.
10§6 Complexity of regulation: the combination of complication,
interweaving and field fusion
The degree of ‘complexity’ of regulation lies in the combination of the ‘com-
plication’ of single laws or orders, and of the ‘interweaving’ of several laws
and their lower level orders. Additional complexity arises through ‘field fusion’.
(Sub-sections A–C below.)
A The degree of complication of regulation: the apparent paradox of
equity of simple regulation
Regulation must apply at the same time to actors that are merely engaged in
simple (economic) processes and to actors engaged in complicated processes.
The degree of complication of regulation is determined by three main com-
ponents.
• First, the degree of complication of concepts and of language;
• Second, the degree of complication of the application of rules, that is, the
requirement of (non-)action of the actors (the does and don’ts);
• Third, the degree of complication of the required record-keeping and report-
ing (for example, for taxation, assets of banks, or compliance with environ-
mental norms).
Each of these three determines thedegree of expertise that is required for taking
cognisance of the regulation that is relevant to an actor, as well as their compli-
ance. Along with it, the degree of complication and of required expertise also
determines the degree to which enterprises and other actors have to hire legal
experts for the cognisance of and compliance with regulation (as determining
the cognisance costs and the compliance costs).37
The alternative to complicated regulation is simply formulated as well as
broad regulation. A degree of precision is then substituted by more vague-
ness and ambiguity, contributing to multi-interpretative regulation. This can
only be resolved by leaving the filling in of detail and precision to the courts –
that is, in case of conflict between actors and regulating authorities over the
37 See also Partlow 2013, pp. 307–8.Where Partlow in this excellent article uses the termcom-
plexity I use the term complication. I reserve the term complexity for additional intricacy
(see below). Partlow focuses on the legislation and regulation of taxation, from which he
also takes his examples.
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interpretation of rules. As courts interpret the law and other regulation, the
latter’s ‘simple’ formulations become again complicated, so coming full circle.
And as long as the regulation is not adapted into complicated formulations
there has to be continuous reference to ‘case law’ (the courts’ interpretation).
In themeantime, because court procedures, including appeals,most often take
an enormous amount of time (quite apart from their being expensive), ‘simple’
regulation introduces uncertainty into the regulative constellation.38
This is the apparent paradox of equity of regulative complication. On the
onehand, equitywould require that the reading of regulationnot be amatter of
high judicial expertise, whilst on the other hand, the interpretation of ‘simple’
regulation always ends up with high judicial expertise before the courts and
such expertise for reading the case law.39
Note that especially for taxation, the complication of legislation/regulation
increases in degree due to taxation ‘instrumentalism’, that is, the use of taxation
not merely for the collection of money, but also for all kinds of incentives and
compensations.40 The result is a wide range of often complicated tax subsidies
(tax deductions, also called ‘tax expenditures’).41
B Interweaving of regulation
Interweaving of regulation refers to the interconnection between separate reg-
ulations at the same level or at different levels. Almost all laws refer to other
laws for (at least) definitions and various specifications. In those other laws
there are most often again references to still other laws. (See Graph 10.8 in
Amplification 10§6-a.)The same applies for delegated regulation.The degree of
these cross-references determines the degree of interweaving of regulation. As
a consequence a new law, or an amendment of a previous one, induces a series
of required amendments of other laws andof delegated regulation (hoping that
none is missed).
38 Partlow 2013, pp. 314 and 320–1.
39 Perhaps there might be a way of simplifying the concepts and language of regulation by
explaining these in more common language within the law or regulation (it would never-
theless have to be unambiguous common language). However, apart from the problem of
the interweaving of regulation (the next sub-section), this will lead to a huge extension of
the length of regulation, which also does not contribute to equity because length requires
perseverance.
40 Such as for proper environmental behaviour, the hiring of disabled workers, technical
innovations, mortgage-type dependent interest deductions, pension-type dependent pre-
mium deductions, loss carry back deductions. Much of the instrumentalist objectives
could be reached by straight subsidies or by straight prohibitions and injunctions.
41 See also Partlow 2013, pp. 316–17.
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If one, even very complicated, law were to stand on itself, this would be
‘doable’. It is the interweaving of several or a series of complicated laws that
multiplies into the complexity of the body of laws and their derived regulation.
(See the second block of Figure 10.4.)
In practice the interweaving can be quite desperate, even for a legal expert,
when the understanding of one section of a law requires the consultation of a
series of other laws and delegated regulations.42 In principle at least, thismight
be overcome by integrating the cross references within each one law. However,
its ‘price’ would be an exponential growth of the quantity of regulation (along
with experts each time having to go through lengthy repetitions when they go
from one law to the other).
C The fusion of fields of regulation by economic actors
Additional complexity occurs when the field of operation of an actor is a
(new) fusion of fields covered by the existing regulation of fields. (See the
second block of Figure 10.4.) Thus it is the actors who dynamically fuse fields.
Field fusion occurs, firstly, along with product and especially production pro-
cess innovations (including, for example, ICT driven innovations). It occurs,
secondly, through the integration of formerly separate functions – such as
banks’ fusingwith insurance functions, or car producers’ or real estate compan-
ies’ integrating shadow banking (the point is not different divisions within an
enterprise, i.e. conglomeration, but rather full integration). This is not uncom-
mon within technical and organisational dynamic constellations. For both of
these types of field fusion, there may be inconsistent rules from different exist-
ing regulation fields. Thus the regulation lags behind such changes, though it
may eventually catch up – for the time being.
10§6-a Amplification. Interweaving of regulation, an illustration from the
UK
In a report about legislation in the UK by the UK Office of the Parliamentary
Counsel, it is indicated that:
42 There are field experts. However, experts of ‘the’ law and other regulation do not exist.
Wilhelmina Thomassen, judge in the Supreme Court of the Netherlands, said in a 2011
interview: No one knows even all the laws and each year 29,000 relevant court decisions
are being published (case law relevant) – amongst a total of each year about 1.8 million
decisions (in the Netherlands the decisions to population ratio in 2011 was 11%; the ‘relev-
ant’ decisions to population ratio was 0.2%). http://www.nrc.nl/rechtenbestuur/2011/04/
09/niemand‑kent‑alle‑wetten‑en‑regels/.
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‘new and existing legislation can appear inconsistent. Regulation eman-
ating fromdifferent sources sometimes overlaps and commencement can
be difficult to follow. Every year, new legislation and amendments result
in over 15,000 (over 30,000when considering secondary legislation) legis-
lative effects. The statute book therefore is an ever-evolving network of
complex information that expands organically and is extremely difficult
to map.’
UK Office of the Parliamentary Counsel 2013, p. 14
The legislative effects are indeed convoluted by their interweaving (‘network’).
Graph 10.8 visualises an example of this interweaving for one single Act (the
Companies, Audit, Investigations and Community Enterprise Act 2004).
graph 10.8 Visualisation of the interweaving of the UK ‘Companies,
Audit, Investigations and Community Enterprise Act 2004’
with other earlier and later Acts43
Source: UK Office of the Parliamentary Counsel 2013, p. 16
10§7 Change: the tendency to increasing complexity of regulation
This section presents change of regulation, starting from some state of regu-
lation (and hence a state of complexity of regulation) at one point in time.
There are two very different impulses for a change of regulation. Each of these
43 As the Office notes: ‘It represents the proportion of the statute book to be taken into con-
sideration when looking at the current in-force state of just that one Act.’
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separately engenders an increasing complexity of regulation. However, in com-
bination these reinforce the increase in complexity. (A and B below, and A and
B in the third block of Figure 10.4.)
A Increasing complexity as driven by new or re-perceived
social-economic problems
Changes of regulation – as driven by new, or re-perceived, social-economic
problems – are an ongoing aspect of regulation. For one part these stem from
legitimation problems. For another part these stem from changes in the eco-
nomic structure and product and process innovations, as well as the fusion
referred to at the end of the previous section. These affect the ‘coverage’ and
the ‘intensity’ of regulation, and so the density and quantity of regulation (see
the dotted lines in Figure 10.4). Themore convoluted the social-economic prob-
lems, the more complicated regulations tend to be. (Think of new problems
within the financial sector such as those of ‘too big to fail’, re-perceived prob-
lems of the climate andother environmentalmatters, of new technologies such
as those regarding communication and health, and of redesigns of taxation
in face of changes in the organisational structure of enterprises.) This results,
together with the interweaving, in an increasing complexity of regulation.
B Increasing complexity as driven by unintended loopholes in
regulation
However, changes of regulation – and especially continuous amendments of
existing regulation – are also determined by unintended loopholes in regula-
tion. Their reparation continually increases the complication of single regula-
tions, and in connection with the interweaving of regulations, multiplies into
further complexity of regulation.
I define ‘loopholes’ in laws and/or delegated regulation as rules or stipu-
lations that, unintended by the legislator, permit actors (e.g. enterprises) to
achieve goals, or more specifically advantages or benefits, not contemplated
by the legislator.44
Especially when large financial interests are at stake, enterprises’ lawyers –
and, for taxation, also accountants – painstakingly search the relevant laws and
other regulations for ways to take advantage of gaps and ambiguities. By way
of borderline (non-)compliance the rules are then tested, and when regulators
accuse actors of abuse, perhaps imposing fines, this is often followed by appeal
44 I do not exclude that there are also ambiguities in laws as a result of lobbying pressures
(there are even cases in which specific articles of laws derive from lobbyists). Below,
however, the focus is on unintended ambiguities.
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procedures before courts. (Note that anticipating all this, regulators themselves
also continuously search the law and other regulation for gaps and ambigu-
ities.)
The outcome is a continuous amendment of laws and delegated regulations
so as to repair the gaps and ambiguities. ‘Because the devices used to take
advantage of loopholes are intricate, the amendments addressing loopholes
must also be intricate.’45This increasing complication– togetherwith the inter-
weaving of increasing complication – results in a tendency to cycles of gaps and
ambiguity search, amendments and further complication and complexity.46
C The combined reinforcement of complexity increase
Whereas increasing complication and complexity stemming from the ‘loop-
holes amendments’ (heading B) is a continuous process, any new regulation
stemming from new problems (heading A) opens new cycles of loopholes
amendments (heading B). The already enormous number of regulations in-
creases (shown in Graph 10.6 for the EU) and the ditto pages of regulation
increase (shown in Graph 10.7 for the USA) merely measure the quantity in-
crease, not the complication and complexity increase.
In conclusion. Regulation is inevitable for the reproduction of the capital-
ist system (Chapters 6–9). However, social-economic changes, and especially
the dynamic interaction of the complication and interweaving of regulation,
means that an increasing complexity of regulation is inevitable. This is rein-
forced by the enterprises’ profit-driven search for gaps and ambiguities in exist-
ing regulation, whence much of the increasing complexity is immanent to this
profit drive.
45 Partlow 2013, p. 316.
46 Complication and complexity are not the object of governments, but inevitable. As an
anecdote in this respect I might add that when I served as a senator in the parliament of
the Netherlands and when in 2015 a complicated seven-page amendment to the corpor-
ate taxation law was proposed (with direct repercussions for four other taxation laws) –
requiring an explanatory memorandum of no less than 52 pages – I asked the secretary
of state in official written communication if he himself considered this a proposal that
would result in a further complexity of the corporate taxation law. His written answer
was (in brief) that ‘the complexity increase is undeniable’ but that, in the cabinet’s opin-
ion, ‘this complexity increase is just about acceptable’ (Government of the Netherlands,
Secretary of State for Finance 2015, p. 22). I retorted by asking whether the cabinet ever
proposes laws that it considers just not acceptable.
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Division 3. The capitalist state’s hard core and its manifestation in
expenditure as quantitatively dominated by social security
transfers
The previous division presented the reach of the capitalist state as manifested
in the character of regulation. The current division presents the manifestation
of the state in the development of its expenditure. All of themain expenditure
categories will be briefly reviewed. However, the focus will be on the develop-
ment of the quantitatively dominant category of social security expenditures
and its interconnection with public education and the communications part
of infrastructure – in the division’s last section (10§12).
10§8 Themanifestation of the state: the actors’ experience of the state’s
existence
• The hard core of the capitalist state
The existence of the state ismanifested in processes of legislation, public secur-
ity and the upholding of the law. As indicated in 6§2–6§3, the existence of the
capitalist economy requires that these processes regard primarily state-granted
legal rights of:
(a) claims of entitlement to private property in the earth;
(b) claims of entitlement to private property in means of production other
than for production by the claimant;
(c) claims of entitlement to employ labour as combined with the appropri-
ation of the surplus-value produced by that labour;
(d) claims of entitlement to existence (in the sense of ‘allowance’).
In granting particularly these claims as legal rights, the state is identified as the
capitalist state (6§3). In this division this constellation, together with the other
moments of the exposition in Chapter 6, will be denoted as the capitalist state’s
‘hard core’ (HC).
• The hidden hand of the capitalist state
Formany people the economic rights that the state grants (a–c above), and the
legislation about them, are not part of their conscious experience. For them
‘the state’ is an abstract entity. They are aware of the state as persons staffing
the coming and going governments, associated with ‘them’ in the capital city,
with ‘them’ in the municipality’s building, and with the police or other author-
ities rapping people on the knuckles.
At the same time they may feel, or know, that ‘the state’ consolidates a
skewed ‘economic’ distribution of power, property, income and esteem. In fact
they experience the granted legal rights (a)–(d) in the form and at the site
of the actually claimed property and employment entitlements, that is, their
494 part two – the capitalist state
everyday workplace – if they have paid work. They also experience it in the
level of their pay cheque at the end of the week or month – one that, if they
are lucky, allows them to live a life above the poverty line, or a comfortable
one. Thus in this everyday experience, the hard core of the state is a ‘hidden
hand’.
• The experience of the capitalist state in terms of its expenditure
Most people experience the reachof the state predominantly in its expenditure
and the allocation thereof. That is, in the supervision of the safety of produc-
tion and products (10§9), in public education (10§10), in infrastructure (10§11),
in the public goods part of social security (especially health) and in the other
components of social security (10§12).
10§8-a Amplification. Notes on the synthetic overview of state
expenditure in the OECD-21, 1870–2015, in the amplifications of the
current division
The amplifications in this division present a most brief synthetic overview of
the components of state expenditure for the average of the current OECD-21
in the period of full-fledged capitalism hitherto (1870–2015). Most of the space
will be devoted to the social security expenditure (10§12), which, as wewill see,
appears as one of the twomain ‘inevitable vulnerabilities’ of the capitalist sys-
tem (the other one being the increasing complexity of regulation).
The overview in the amplifications is merely one in terms of graphs of the
decade development since 1870, the idea is that in each one single decade (e.g.
1920) the state is manifest in its expenditure on the Hard Core (the hidden
hand) and in the other, experienced, expenditure. Many of the amplifications
of Chapters 7–9 anticipated on the synthesis in the current division. As much
as in those amplifications, the current ones refer to an average of the hitherto
‘strong’ capitalist countries as empirically exemplified in the average of the cur-
rent OECD-21 countries (see Appendix 6A, section 6A-1).
The overview will – to the extent that empirical statistics are available – fol-
low the order of the eight regulative frameworks presented inChapters 6–7 and
9. The Hard Core frameworks (Chapter 6) have a special status regarding their
necessary intensity. The other frameworks are necessary, whereas their regulat-
ive intensity and thedegreeof expendituremayvaryover time. In fact, however,
to a large extent these seem to have a ratchet character: substantial expendit-
ure decreases are rare.47 Capitalism is a dynamic system that may generate
47 Infrastructure is an exception (with a decrease in % of GDP from 3.2% in 1970 to 1.9% in
2015). See 10§11.
10. the reach of the capitalist state [10§9] 495
outcomes threatening its continued existence, thence requiring new necessary
action of the state.
For all of the categories that were presented in the eight regulative frame-
works of Chapters 6–7 and 9, empirical statistics are available from 1995. In
this division, however, state expenditure is put in the long-term perspective of
1870–2015, for which the detailed data are most often lacking. This implies a
reliance on compromises and sometimes rough estimates. These are set out in
Appendix 10.A, under 10§8, see especially Table 10.13.
10§9 The necessary state expenditure on the Hard Core and Inspectorates,
and the contingentmilitary and interest expenditure
The term Hard Core was explained in 10§8. ‘Inspectorates’ regard those of pro-
duction (working conditions and the minimum wage), of products, and of the
environment.
The military expenditure and interest expenditure of the state are taken as
contingent.
10§9-a Amplification. State expenditure on the Hard Core, Inspectorates,
and the contingent military and interest expenditure of the
OECD-21, 1870–2015
As explained in Appendix 10.A under 10§9-a, for throughout the 1870–2015
period I pragmatically adopt constant expenditure figures for the Hard Core
and Inspectorates (3.3% and 0.1% of GDP, as an estimate derived from actual
1995–2015 data). This means that these expenditures absolutely increase (or
decrease) with GDP.
Graph 10.9 is the first one of a series of four graphs on the OECD-21 state
expenditure in the period 1870–2015. This is an introductory graph, which is
not interesting in terms of the constant reference figures for the Hard Core and
the Inspectorates (3.3% and 0.1%). The main point of this graph is the incor-
poration of the two contingent expenditures referred to: military and interest
expenditures. It can be seen that these two contribute considerably to the relat-
ive decline (in percentage of GDP) of total state expenditure between 1990 and
2000. (A separate graph for military expenditure is included in Appendix 10.A
under 10§9.Military expenditure already steadily declines after 1960; sufficient
data for 1950 are lacking. The same location provides a separate graph for (the
rather volatile) interest expenditure.)
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graph 10.9 Total state expenditure (general government) and expenditure
on the Hard Core, as well as on contingent military and interest
expenditure, 1870–2015, in% of GDP; averages of up to 21 current
OECD countries†
† Inspectorates ppe = Inspectorates of production, of products, and of the environment.
Data sources: For total expenditure, seeGraph 8.2. Formilitary expenditure: 1870–1980 (main-
ly Sabaté 2013); 1990–2015 (World Bank database, details are in Appendix 10.A under 10§9). For
interest expenditure: 1870–1937 (Tanzi and Schuknecht 2000); 1960–current (OECD Economic
Outlook database, details are in Appendix 10.A under 10§9)
10§10 Expenditure on themonetary and labour-capacity frameworks
Theprimary conditions furthering the accumulation of capital regard themon-
etary framework (7D2) and the labour-capacity framework (7D3). Net state
expenditure on the monetary framework (supervision of banks and other fin-
ancial institutions) can be neglected.Themain part is carried out by the central
bank, which on average makes profits that are distributed as dividends to the
state.48
The main expenditure on labour-capacity regards public education.
10§10-a Amplification. The labour-capacity expenditure of the OECD-21
The expenditure on this category will be shown later on in Graph 10.10. Regard-
ing the labour-capacity framework, the expenditures associated with tem-
porary unemployment and labour population growth (child benefits), will
48 This distribution may not be the case in all countries.
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pragmatically be subsumed under the social security transfers. Equally for
pragmatic reasons, the expenditure on minimum wage ‘inspectorates’ (and
commissions) has been subsumed under Inspectorates (see Appendix 10.A,
Table 10.13).
This leaves the substantial state expenditure on public education and its
increase from 1870 to 2015 (see also Graph 7.6). Its content and the degree of
expenditure may generally change along with technical change. As shown in
Graph 7.5, the average of the total years of education increased between 1870
and 2010 from 3.5 to 12 years.
10§11 Expenditure on the infrastructural framework
As with education, state expenditure on infrastructure may generally change
along with technical change (cf. 7D4). Think of the introduction of new energy
carriers (e.g. electricity), transport (e.g. rail) or communications (telephone,
ICT), which require new networks. (These and other technical changes also
require extensions and changes of public education for at least themiddle and
higher levels.) Regarding state expenditure proper, it should be noted that quite
some infrastructural provisions may be carried out by state-owned enterprises
or by (for that purpose regulated) private enterprises – perhaps via concessions
or licenses. In such cases these provisions are not shown in the figures as state
expenditures but rather, conversely, as state revenues (dividends, royalties).
10§11-a Infrastructural expenditure of the OECD-21
The last remark in 10§11 is relevant for the interpretation of the relative decline
of infrastructural expenditure after 1970. State expenditure on infrastructure is
approximated by a factor 0.575 of state gross investment (Graph 7.5 in 7§15 and
Graph 7.5-a in Appendix 7.A).
Graph 10.10 shows the state expenditure on education and infrastructure in
the total expenditure context.
As measured in percentage of GDP, expenditure on education rose continu-
ously from 0.6% in 1870 to 4.8% in 1980, and after that year somewhat fluc-
tuated, though with still an upward trend (5.7% in 2014). The expenditure on
infrastructuremoved from 1.2% in 1870 to a top of 3.2% in 1970 and then gradu-
ally decreased to a level of 1.9% in 2015.
Regarding the labour productivity increases that can be reached for the pro-
duction of these two categories themselves (that is, apart from their labour
productivity effect for other sectors), it is noted that these are quite different
(see Amplification 10§11-b on ‘Baumol’s cost disease’).
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graph 10.10 Total state expenditure (general government) and the expendit-
ure on education and infrastructure, 1870–2015, in% of GDP;
averages of up to 21 current OECD countries
Education 1920 is interpolated and 2015=2014
Data sources: for education see Graph 7.6; for infrastructure see Graphs 7.7 and 7.7a; for the
other categories see Graph 10.9
10§11-b Amplification. Diverging labour productivity changes: ‘Baumol’s
cost disease’
Labour productivity increases that can be reached for the production of infra-
structure and for education are quite different. Think of road construction and
of a class in economics nowand 100 years ago (for the latter themain difference
is the use of PowerPoint instead of chalk and a blackboard). Baumol’s theorem
of ‘cost disease’ refers to the phenomenonof structurally enduring productivity
differences between particular economic sectors. The theorem originated with
a paper by Baumol and Bowen (1965), which illustrated differences in labour
productivity change with the example of a symphony orchestra whose pro-
ductivity for performances today is pretty much the same today as in 1870. In
various different degrees, similar labour productivity obstacles apply for many
state expenditure categories, such as the Hard Core processes, Inspectorates,
Education and the care part of the Health sector.
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10§12 Expenditure on social security as connected with the development of
the accumulation of capital
• Social security transfers
In the terminology of the current division, the legitimation for the state’s ‘hard
core’ may require ‘the price’ of considerable generalised social security trans-
fers (henceforth SST). The expenditure categories presented so far in this divi-
sion are in a way straightforward: the bare accumulation of capital requires
these. The SST are necessary to the extent that the legitimation of the state
requires these, and so have ‘become necessary’ for the existence of the state
and hence the capitalist system.49
• Three discourses of the appreciation of SST
In the appreciation of the development of the SST there are three discourses.
The first one applauds SST fromamoral or ethical perspective (assistance to the
poor, although generalised SST goes beyond that). The second one complains
about the SST’s lack of ‘market conformity’ or ‘economic efficiency’ (much of
the instrumentalist public choice approaches). The third discourse conceives
of SST as the failure of a production and market system that is incapable of
providing a major part of the population with the opportunities to make a
decent and equitable living of their own, including provisions for their old age.
In the state’s argumentation for a particular degree of SST being in the putat-
ive ‘general interest’ (6§6), it has to take account of each of these discourses.
Regarding the reproductionof the capitalist system,however, it is in the endnot
these discourses that count, but rather the compliance of the vast majority.50
The current level of SST is one thing, another is its future level. Each time
in the history of full-fledged capitalism it was considered that ‘today’ we have
reached a level of SST that for the future sufficiently safeguards this component
of the state’s (hence the capitalist system’s) legitimation. In hindsight erro-
neously so. In 1960, 1980 or 2000 there was such a ‘today’. Even if erroneous
in hindsight, nevertheless SST as a percent of GDP cannot feasibly increase
forever. (The end point would be reached when 50% of the aggregate dis-
49 See also the General methodological Appendix, A§13, point 5, on the notion of ‘becoming
necessary’.
50 I am not arguing that SST is the only component of the state’s legitimation. However, it
is a predominant one within the complex of legitimation determinants. After 6D3 (when
introducing the state’s legitimation requirement in general terms in 6§4 and 6§5) I expli-
citly referred to legitimation in the context of: (1) the introduction of the state’s furthering
of the conditions for the accumulation of capital and economic growth (7§3 of 7D1); (2)
the social security framework (7D5); (3) various institutional assignations and delegations
(7D6–7D7); (4) the forms and designs of taxation (8§11 of 8D5); and (5) the framework of
competition (9D1–9D2).
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posable income of households consists of transferred income. Depending on
the exact distribution of this 50%, this wouldmean that the skewedness in the
distribution of disposable income would fade. I mention this only as a brief
‘thought experiment’ that has little to do with the exposition of the actual cap-
italist system.)
• Accumulation of capital and the trend in SST
The state’s hard core legislation allows enterprises and their owners to mono-
polise the property of the earth and other means of production, and to appro-
priate the surplus-value produced by labour (6D2). Onemain result is a skewed
distribution of income – and, derived from it, of wealth (8D5) –which is exten-
uated by SST. Along with it, SST is a dominant component of the vast-majority-
compliance that the state’s existence requires for its legitimation.
In re-distributional terms ‘generalised SST’ – rather than ‘mere’ assistance
to the poor – tends to positively affect roughly the bottom 50% of the income
distribution (Table 8.17).51
Trends in the distribution of income and in SST do not stand on their own.
Widespread information (knowledge and its communication) about the distri-
bution of income is a key catalyst for SST. This information correlates, on the
one hand, with public education – especially also its distribution (cf. Graph
7.5) – and, on the other, with means of communication. These two, again, cor-
relate with the development of the macroeconomic accumulation of capital.
Thus, in brief, the capital accumulation requirements of increasing public edu-
cation and of the communication parts of infrastructure (7§14; 7§15; 10§10;
10§11) engender SST. Thus, even briefer, the state of the accumulation of capital
determines the state of SST. This is a major destiny of the capitalist system.
Increasing SST as a percentage of GDP is thus generally driven by the artic-
ulation of two factors: on the one hand, the state’s vast-majority-legitimation
requirement, and, on the other, the degree of widespread information as asso-
ciated with the accumulation of capital. It is the thus determined information
that catalyses the necessity for the state to raise the SST.
Given that SST tends to positively affect roughly the bottom 50% of the
incomedistribution, a raising SST thus primarily contributes to the compliance
of thebottom.However, the question iswhere theburden for the increasing SST
is going to fall. (Effectively this question is less urgent to the extent that the aver-
age per capita growth rate structurally booms. The deciles mean-income lays
51 I derive this from data about recent years for OECD countries. Perhaps this borderline
has gradually moved from a lower one to the current one. For many non-OECD countries
the borderline might perhaps (still) lay at 20% to 40%. For countries with (yet) non-
generalised SST, assistance to the poor may regard the bottom 20%.
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well above the median income.)52 If the burden of the increasing SST initially
is going to fall on the upper-middle classes (income deciles D6–D9), the state
risks a fading legitimation in this echelon.53 If it is going to fall on the upper
class (D10), members of this class may wonder about the further rationale of
the capitalist system for them.
There seems to be no obvious way to evade this dilemma.
10§12-a Amplification. Social security expenditure of the OECD-21,
1870–2015
Graph 10.11 shows the OECD-21 state expenditure on SST in the context of total
state expenditure from 1870–2015.54 As for similar graphs before, this graph
shows a per decade summary of the manifestation of the reach of the state
in terms of its expenditure.
graph 10.11 Total state expenditure (general government) and state
expenditure on social security, 1870–2015, in% of GDP; averages
of up to 21 current OECD countries†
† Social security 1870=1880. SST interpolations are for 1937 and 1950 only
Data sources: for social security see Graph 7.10; for the other categories see Graph 10.10
52 For OECD-21countries it lays in 2015 around decile 7.
53 See the one but last footnote. At a lower borderline of generalised SST, this may stretch to,
for example, D4–D9.
54 Including temporary unemployment benefits and child benefits – see Appendix 10.A
under 10§12 for details.
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Graph 10.11 shows that in 1920 the average of the SST amounted to 1% of GDP,
increasing to 24% in 2015.Total state expenditures in this period increased from
20% to 45% of GDP. (See also Graph 7.10, which is somewhat more detailed.)
From 1930–90we see a rather continuous and stable upward trend in SST. After
1990 the increase bends off, but at least until 2015 it kept increasing (very mod-
erately after 2010).55
10§13 ‘Other state expenditure’: contingent expenditure and required
expenditure on especially ‘too big to fail’ banks
Under ‘other state expenditure’ I classify the so far (10§9–10§12) notmentioned
state expenditures. I subsume these under the following two categories.
• Subsidies and other direct assistance for enterprises
Most of these can be considered as contingent. However, the direct assistance
also includes assistance related to ‘too big to fail banks’ which, as an expendit-
ure, is definitely necessary given the phenomenon (cf. 9§6).
• General amenities
This is a rather heterogeneous category, which includesmainly expenditure on
culture, religion, community, recreation, foreign aid, and research and devel-
opment of a general character. Much of the last one is necessary (7§16). For the
others I refrain fromscrutinising their (non-)contingent character, alsobecause
their degrees of contingency may evolve over time. (Expenditure on religion,
for example, may at certain times and in certain places serve an indispensable
function, which at other times fades.)
55 Although there are quantitative level differences for different OECD-21 countries, these
have, with some fluctuation, all moved in the same direction.
SST of current OECD-21 countries as % of GDP, 1880–2015: SST range
Take the example of the USA. In 1920 its SST was a fraction 0.81 of the OECD-21 average. In
1980 the fraction was 0.77 and in 2015 it was 0.78, which is a rather stable deviation from
the average. Thus its SSTmoved at about the same pace as the OECD-21 average. Including
the USA there was a stable increase in nine countries. In eight countries there were slight
fluctuations, and in the remaining four there were some heavy fluctuations (Ireland, the
Netherlands, New Zealand and Norway).
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10§13-a Amplification. Contingent and required ‘other expenditure’ in the
OECD-21, 1995–2015
Graph 10.12 provides the movement of the two main categories of ‘other ex-
penditure’mentioned in 10§13.56 (Graph 10.12-b, in Appendix 10.A, under 10§13,
is a more detailed one; Graph 10.12-a provides a subdivision for the ‘subsidies
and other direct assistance for enterprises’.) Internationallymore or less homo-
geneous data for these expenditures are only available for the years 1995–2015.
Their total stood at a relative low around 1960 (in fact 1.6% of GDP – not much
above the 1870–1913 levels). In 2015 it had increased to 6.8% of GDP, though
with fluctuations in between.
It appears that most of the fluctuation in total state expenditure from 1990–
2015 can be traced to the ‘other direct assistance for enterprises’ and to interest
expenditure.
graph 10.12 Total state expenditure (general government) and state
expenditure on ‘general amenities’ and on ‘subsidies and other
direct assistance for enterprises’, 1870–2015, in% of GDP; aver-
ages of up to 21 current OECD countries
Data sources: for General amenities and Subsidies and other direct assistance for enterprises:
OECD COFOG data (for these two subcategories 1990=1995) – see Appendix 10.A under 10§13 for
further details. For the other categories see Graph 10.11
56 The two result from a regrouping the OECD’s COFOG categories – for details about this see
Appendix 10.A under 10§13.
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Division 4. The vulnerabilities of the capitalist state’s reach
This is a brief single sectiondivision that builds on the threads of the exposition
in theprevious twodivisions.WhereasChapters 6–8 successively presented the
conditions of existence of the state vis-à-vis the capitalist economy, this final
division detects the flaws, the loose ends in these conditions of existence. In
other words, it detects the potential impediments to the continued reproduc-
tion of the capitalist system.
10§14 Vulnerabilities and impossible necessities
• The vulnerability of increasing complexity of regulation
As indicated inDivision 2, the capitalist systemhas been and is being sustained
not just by regulation, but rather by a continuously increasing amount of com-
plicated as well as complex regulation. There is no evidence that this trend
could be countered. This means that each year a ‘free market economy’ will
become further removed from the economics textbook phantom (‘phantom’
because it never existed anyway).57
• ‘Too big to fail’: the vulnerability of the banking constellation – countered
by capping the accumulation of single capitals?
The last section of Division 3 coloured amain part of the state’s ‘other expendit-
ure’ with the somewhat anonymous ‘other assistance to enterprises’. Behind it
lurks, whatwill be for the future, rather unpredictable state expenditure on ‘too
big to fail’ banks (7§9 and 9§6). Within the history of capitalism this is a new
phenomenon, one unprecedented in the proportions of its system-wide con-
sequences. It might seem that the solution – a cap on the size of banks – is
rather obvious. However, capping capitalist success – success that, by all pre-
vailing standards, is not illegal – would seem to be alien to the capitalist logic
and to the capitalist state’s hard core. (Moreover, concretising such a cap in
watertight legislation will be complicated.) Regarding banks, the solution – for
the time being – is that of tighter, discriminating regulation of the too big to
fail banks (those that pose a ‘systemic risk’) as opposed to the regulation of the
not so big banks (see 9§6). In fact this is a (yet moderate) indirect regulative
movement towards putting a cap on the size of big banks.58
57 Recall from 10§5-a that, countingmerely the size (numbers of pages), the number of pages
of the USA Code of federal regulations stood at 22,877 in 1960 and 178,277 in 2015. Their
average rate of growth was 4.9% per year, which was 1.5 times faster than the annual GDP
growth. Recall that at the same rate of growth, the number of pages of regulationwill have
increased to one million in 2050.
58 Although this is what it does, a moderate indirect cap (as in Basel Committee on Banking
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• Over-accumulation of capital: the unresolved environment restoration
Protection of the environment (including the climate) is a systematically high-
level requirement, albeit an apparently ‘elastic’ one (6§14). Whereas this is
a continuous and structural requirement, its aberrations are cyclically high-
lighted. Chapter 5 showed the manifestation of the capitalist economy in the
cyclical accumulation, over-accumulation anddestruction of capital. I focus on
this because it is key to the dynamic of the capitalist system: its way to get out
of the inevitable economic crises of capitalism. Along with it we have a recur-
rent destruction of the earth’s resources. We also see the despair of recurrent
super-unemployment, which, in terms of family lives, extends further than los-
ing income. State expenditure, as we have seen in 10D1, does not annihilate this
process, but rather mitigates it, which is a blessing in disguise.
Given the social security transfers (yet especially in the capitalistically devel-
oped countries), it would seem that the capitalist system generates a mode of
coping with the unemployment side of the cyclical over-accumulation of cap-
ital. It has not done similar for its environmental side (at least at the time of
writing). However, when a sustainable environment withers away, it is not just
that capitalism will also come to an end; so too will humankind.
This is the ‘tragedy’ of the private property of the earth associated with the
structural accumulation and the cyclical over-accumulation of capital. Never-
theless the capitalist system could in principle cope with it at the ‘price’ of a
further increase in the size of complicated and complexity-raising regulation –
an unprecedented further increase in such regulation. By now all the even
slightly enlightened topmanagement of enterprises knows that the earth is vul-
nerable. Nevertheless, the motivational structure of profit-seeking, engrained
within the capitalist system, leads actors to test and retest the loopholes of the
law, seeking what they regard as a better way for enterprises to share the bur-
dens of the tragedy (10§7 of 10D1).59
• Vast majority legitimation: the vulnerability of increasing social security
transfers
We have seen in 10D3 (10§12) that widespread information (knowledge and
its communication) about the distribution of income is a key catalyst for SST.
Supervision, 2014)may not do awaywith too big to fail banks. Itmay take another banking
crisis before the indirect cap becomes sufficiently tight so as to force the too big banks to
partition into smaller entities in face of their rate of profit.
59 It is one thing to make a target agreement (as in the 2015 Paris Agreement on climate
change); it is another to carry it out in practice. (A major drawback of the 2015 Paris
Agreement is that it includes no instruments through which to enforce the reaching of
its targets.)
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Increasing SST as a percentage of GDP is driven by a complex of, on the one
hand, the state’s requirement of a vast-majority-legitimation, and, on the other,
the degree of widespread information as associated with the development of
the accumulation of capital. The state expenditure on public education that
is necessary for the accumulation of capital forms a core element within this
complex.
Whereas the thus catalysed increasing SST as a percentage of GDP is neces-
sary for the vast-majority-legitimation of the state (this regards the large bot-
tom of the income distribution), the bearing of its burden (by the large upper
part of the distribution) implies that the increases’ fading off is equally neces-
sary for the state’s vast-majority-legitimation.
• Impossible necessities
Parts One and Two of this book set out an exposition of the conditions of
existence of capitalism’s ‘dissociated outward bifurcation into households and
privately owned enterprises’. Throughout this book, so far, I have avoided using
the term ‘contradiction’ (see the last addendum of 1D1). In the current con-
text a contradiction is a constellation that is at the same time necessary and
impossible. For two of the four vulnerabilities of the state’s reach, presented
above, capitalism is moving toward such impossibilities that stand on their
own: the increasing size and complexity of regulation and the increasing social
security transfers. The other two major vulnerabilities might perhaps reduce
to a further increasing size and complexity of regulation – especially for the
climate and natural resources that would be better for the future of humanity.
10§14-a Explication. Further on the main vulnerabilities
I have not argued that capitalism is at, or near to, the point of collapse. I argue
that even if the vulnerabilities of the environment and of too big to fail entities
could be mitigated or perhaps resolved, the capitalist system that existed from
1870 to the present ismoving toward being an impossible constellation.
This is based on the state’s legitimation requirement (and because capital-
ism cannot exist without the capitalist state, this is a system requirement). I
have also not posited that a representative democracy is necessary for capital-
ism (alas). However, I posited that the legitimation of the capitalist state in the
vastmajority of the population is necessary (7§23).Ultimately this requirement
is connected with the material limits of the state’s legalised violence on a large
scale (6§18). (However, I have not argued that such large-scale violence cannot
exist for a ‘relatively’ short period – of perhaps one or even two decades – as
history has shown.)
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Summary and conclusions
This chapter set out three key manifestations of the state, which together
determine its reach.
The first of these manifestations applies to the cyclical movement of capital
accumulation (which so is the sequel of Chapter 5). State expenditure mitig-
ates the amplitude of ‘regular’ economic cycles. The degree of this automatic
stabilising effect depends on the structural size of state expenditure in com-
parison with private expenditure. This is different for the ‘irregular’ economic
downturns triggered by financial crises and bank failures. Then the mere state
expenditure floor may not be a sufficient base for getting to a recovery via ‘nor-
mal’ restructuring destruction of capital. Reproduction of the capitalist system
then requires substantial discretionary state policy. (Division 1.)
The second manifestation regards the character of the state’s regulation
of the capitalist economy. The mere quantity of regulation in force increases
over time, as driven by new, or re-perceived, social-economic problems. For
one part these stem from legitimation problems. For another part these stem
from changes in the economic structure and product and process innovations,
including process fusions. These affect the ‘coverage’ and the ‘intensity’ of regu-
lation, and so the density and quantity of regulation. The more convoluted the
social-economic problems, the more complicated regulations tend to be. This
results, together with the interweaving of regulations, in an increasing com-
plexity of regulation.
However, changes of regulation are also prominently determined by ‘unin-
tended’ loopholes in regulation, that is, gaps and ambiguities – as tested byway
of profit-drivenborderline (non-)compliance.The legislative andother regulat-
ive reparation of these loopholes by amendments of the regulation increases
the complication of single regulations, and in connection with the interweav-
ing of regulations, multiplies into further complexity of regulation. This results
in inevitable continuous cycles of finding loopholes,making amendments, and
further complication and complexity. (Division 2.)
The third manifestation regards the expenditure of the state. For many
people the hard core of the capitalist state – in brief the property and exploit-
ation rights that it grants and the legislation related to this – is not part of
their conscious experience. The majority of employed actors experience the
state primarily indirectly via their everyday workplace, whence the state’s hard
core operates as a ‘hidden hand’. For most people the state’s reach is instead
directly manifested in the materialisation of its expenditure, especially in the
supervision of the safety of production and products, in public education, in
infrastructure, and in social security provisions, including health provisions.
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Among the main expenditure categories of the state, spending on social
security transfers (SST) is the quantitatively dominant category and it tends
to increase over time. SST is a major factor through which the state gains the
vast-majority-legitimation that it requires (that is, legitimation for ultimately
the hard core property and exploitation rights that the state grants). However,
trends in the SST do not stand independently.Widespread information (know-
ledge and its communication) about the distribution of income is a key catalyst
for SST. This information correlates, on the one hand, with public education
and, on the other, with means of communication. These two, again, correlate
with the development of the macroeconomic accumulation of capital. Thus
the capital accumulation requirements of increasing public education and of
the communication parts of infrastructure engender SST.
Whereas the thus catalysed increasing SST as a percentage of GDP is neces-
sary for the vast-majority-legitimation of the state (this regards the large bot-
tom of the income distribution), the bearing of its burden (by the large upper
part of the distribution) implies that the increases’ fading off is equally neces-
sary for the state’s vast-majority-legitimation. (Division 3.)
The final Division 4 draws together some threads of Divisions 2 and 3 under
the title of ‘the vulnerabilities of the capitalist state’s reach’. This division sets
out the four main vulnerabilities of the reach of the capitalist state and that,
as such, comprise potential impediments to the continued reproduction of the
capitalist system. The first one is the inevitably increasing amount and com-
plexity of regulation. Thus the so-called ‘free market economy’ will become
unlimitedly further constrained by the steering of the capitalist state. The
second vulnerability regards the ‘too big to fail’ entities – especially banks. This
vulnerability can perhaps be resolved by rounds of complex regulation, but for
the time being this is insecure. The third vulnerability relates to the deteriora-
tion of the environment. This is in fact themost far-reaching one. But perhaps a
recuperation is possible by, again, rounds of complex regulation – rounds that
will have to be far more stringent than the regulation in prospect (at the time
of writing). The fourth vulnerability regards the required state expenditure on
social security transfers. Whereas increasing transfers as a percentage of GDP
are necessary for the vast-majority-legitimation of the state, the increases’ fad-
ing off is equally necessary for the state’s vast-majority-legitimation.
For the continued reproduction of the capitalist system, the state inevit-
ably has to deal with these vulnerabilities. The second and third vulnerabilities
are ‘imaginably’ resolvable. However, for the first and last ones, the capitalist
system is moving toward a constellation of, what I called, ‘necessities that are
impossible’.
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Appendix 10.A. Data and data sources of the graphs in chapter 10
General note: For all years (1870 to 2015) I have used the maximum amount of
information that my sources provide for the OECD-21 countries.
Re 10D3 Limitations of empirical-statistical expenditure categories, and how
these have been accounted for
For all of the categories that were presented in the eight regulative frameworks
of Chapters 6–7 and 9, empirical statistics are available from 1995. In 10D3,
however, state expenditure is put in the long-term perspective of 1870–2015, for
which the detailed data aremost often lacking. This implies a reliance on com-
promises and sometimes rough estimates. The rough estimates regard espe-
cially the Chapter 1 categories. One minor compromise pertains to the labour
capacity and social security frameworks. Table 10.13 summarises how the lack
of data for pre-1995 has been accounted for.
table 10.13 The regulative frameworks and empirical-statistical expenditure




Capitalist state’s hard core (HC) 6D2
1. Capitalist economic legal rights 6D4 10§9
2. Legal existence rights (allowance) 6D5 10§9 Divided as:
• public security†
• inspectorates††
3. Public security 6D6 10§9
+ executive (all frameworks) 6D3 10§9 ‡
+ judiciary (all frameworks) 7D6 10§9 *












4. Monetary 7D2 10§10
5. Labour capacity 7D3 10§10
• minimumwage 7§10-§11 10§10 inspectorates††
• temp. unemployment 7§12 → 10§11 subsumed under SST
• lab. population growth 7§13 → 10§11 subsumed under SST
• public education 7§14 10§10
6. Infrastructure 7D4 10§11
7. Social security transfers (SST) 7D5 10§12
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8. Competition 9D1 10§13
Regulation and regulative failures 10§13
† Component of forbearance of direct violence regarding the person: under public security.
Components of protection of the consumer (products), of the environment, and of labour
during production: under ‘inspectorates’.
†† One single figure for all inspectorates.
‡ In 6D3 (prior to the presentation of the legislative and the judiciary in Ch. 7) it is implicit
that the state in general encompasses the state as ‘executive’.
* Subsumed under hard core (for details see this Appendix 10.A, the text around Graph 10.9-
a).
Re 10§9 State expenditure on the Hard Core: general remarks
Hard Core expenditure: granted rights to property, employment of labour and
appropriation of surplus-value. For an estimate of the Hard Core expenditure
1870–2015, Imakepragmatic use of the detailed data thatwehave for the period
1995–2015 and project these on the full period as a ‘reference figure’. For the
hard core expenditures (except one category amplified on below) this is 3.3%
of GDP. (See below for the details.)
Hard Core expenditure: granted rights of or provisions for allowance exist-
ence. Part of this is subsumed under public security and the other part under
‘inspectorates’ (see Table 10.13). For pragmatic reasons I take the latter together
with inspectorates on minimumwages. For these inspectors together I equally
use a single reference figure throughout the 1870–2015 period, in this case of
0.1% of GDP.
[Re 10§9] Expenditures on the hard core, inspectorates, military and interest
The following two graphs and the sur-
rounding information form the basis
for the bottom and top of Graph 10.9
(left).
The reference figures for the Hard
Core and for Inspectorates. The refer-
ence figure for theHardCore expendit-
ure is a rough estimate, based on a cautious use of 1995–2015 data for leg-
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islative and administrative expenditure as well as for expenditure on public
order and security.
General data information: COFOG classification. The data derive from OECD
‘COFOG’ data (Classification of the Functions of Government). In this classific-
ation government expenditures are categorised in ten ‘functions’ (‘first digit’).
The first digit information has been used for ‘Public security expenditure’. This
regards COFOG category 03 (Public order and safety). For a (further) limited
number of countries a subdivision is available (‘second digit’), which has been
used for ‘Legislative and executive expenditure’. This regards COFOG category
01.01 (‘Executive and legislative organs’). See also the manual COFOG, Eurostat
(2011); its Appendix (pp. 155–81) sets out the COFOG structure.
Graph 10.9-a shows for these two categories the data available. For legislat-
ive and administrative expenditure these regard 9–16 countries, and for public
security expenditure 16–19 countries.
graph 10.9-a Hard core expenditures 1995–2015, averages of 9–19 OECD-
21 countries
Data source: Public security (OECD dataset, National Accounts at glance – general govern-
ment, expenditure by function; accessed 25 January 2018);60 Legislative and executive (OECD
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It can be seen from Graph 10.9-a that the averages of the data available are
hardly fluctuating for these years (taking into account the recession years of the
early 2000s andof about 2008–13).Thedata available (early 2018) are geograph-
ically biased to European countries (public security OECD-21 minus Canada
and New Zealand, legislative and executive OECD-21 minus Australia, Canada,
New Zealand, Switzerland and the USA).
As a rough estimate for the reference figure for the full 1870–2015 period
I adopt a Hard Core expenditure of 3.3% of GDP. This means that I clas-
sify expenditure above 3.3% as contingent (appearing in my category ‘other
expenditure’ – see this Appendix under 10§13).
The reference figure for inspectorates concerning production processes, prod-
ucts and the environment. In principle these expenditures are classified under
COFOG category 4: Economic affairs. However, for this specific category there
are no data available. The reference figure of 0.1% of GDP (main text) is a rough
estimate based on expenditures for these inspectorates for the Netherlands
around 2010. These regard mainly inspectorates for labour safety, of food and
consumer safety, of environmental health, of fire prevention and protection
from floods, and of construction. As indicated in the main text of 10§10, all
these are mainly a matter of expenditure on civil servants’ wages. (That main
text also indicates why financial supervision is not included in the 0.1% num-
ber.)
The upshot is that – as with Hard Core expenditure above 3.3% – I clas-
sify expenditure above 0.1% as contingent (appearing in my category ‘other
expenditure’ – see this Appendix under 10§13).
Re 10§9 Graph 10.9: Military expenditure
It can be seen from Graph 10.9-b that from 1950 the averages of the different
sets of countries converge. In 2015 the military expenditure as a percentage of
GDP approaches the 1870 level.
Data for 1870–1937 are mainly from Sabaté (2013), Figures 7–12. Added to
these are data for various years from 1900 to 1937 from Tanzi and Schuknecht
(2000, Table II.3) concerning Austria, Australia, Belgium, Ireland, Japan and
New Zealand.
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graph 10.9-b Military expenditure 1870–2015, average of up to 21 current
OECD countries
Data sources: for 1870–1937 (Sabaté 2013 with additions from Tanzi and Schuknecht 2000).
For 1960–2015 (World Bank database, World Development Indicators, updated 19 January 2018,
extracted 23 January 2018)
Re 10§9 Graph 10.9: Interest expenditure
The data frombefore 1970 are rather scarce. Tanzi and Schuknecht provide data
for 7–8 countries for 1870 and 1913, and for 13–16 countries for 1920 and 1937.
Some of these data are for central government only (the data for Australia,
Canada, UK and USA are for general government).
TheOECDdata from 1960 are for ‘gross government interest payments, value’,
divided by GDP (Spain 1960=1964; Switzerland 1960=1965; Denmark 1970=1971;
Germany 1990=1991). To the OECD data for 1970 and 1980 I have added the
data for Australia, Germany, Ireland and the Netherlands fromTanzi and Schu-
knecht (they provide no data for 1960).
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graph 10.9-c Gross interest expenditure 1870–2015, average of up to 21 current
OECD countries
Data sources: 1870–1937 (Tanzi and Schuknecht 2000); 1960–current (OECD Economic Out-
look database, November 2017, extracted 13 January 2018)
Re 10§12 Social security transfers 1880–2015
The available data for this category go back to only 1880, not 1870.
Chapter 7 distinguished between the social security transfers that are neces-
sary as regulation of labour capacity (7§12–7§13), and the ‘generalised’ transfers
that may be necessary for the state’s legitimation – and hence for the capit-
alist system. (See the summarising Figure 7.13.) Unfortunately the statistical
data – and especially long-term historical data – are insufficiently applicable
to this distinction. In 10§12, therefore, I take the ‘temporary unemployment
transfers’ together with the other social transfers. In 2015 the major transfers
regard public pensions, health (cure and care), and transfers to the working-
age unemployed (broadly including disablement). However, only from about
1980 does the available statistic (internationally common based) allow for a
distinction between these (see Graph 7.9). InGraph 10.11, therefore, I show data
for the sum of the average ‘OECD-defined’ state expenditure on social security
transfers.
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[Re 10§13] ‘Other expenditure’ 1995–2015
The following information regards
Graph 10.12here reproduced in reduced
form (Total state expenditure (general
government) and state expenditure on
‘general amenities’ and on ‘subsidies
and other direct assistance for enter-
prises’, 1870–2015, in% of GDP; averages
of up to 21 current OECD countries). That graph shows, from 1990 (in fact 1995),
a subdivision of the category ‘other expenditure’.
OECD total expenditure data from 1995–2015 are available of 21 countries.
OECD expenditure data at COFOG digit 1 level are available of 16–18 countries
(and at digit 2 level of 9–16 countries) (COFOG: Classification of the Functions
of Government).62
Graph 10.12-a shows the statistical difference of the total expenditure of the
21 and the 16–18 countries (top of graph). This graph also shows the average
expenditure of the digit 2 level 9–16 ‘COFOG countries’ on General amenities
and on Subsidies and other direct assistance for enterprises.
It canbe seen that at theCOFOG first digit level, the statistical differencewith
the total non-COFOG data for 21 countries is for some years rather large. This
may also apply for the second digit level (bottom categories). In Graph 10.12 of
the main text I therefore applied from 1990 the proportions of the two specific-
ations (shown at the bottom of 10.23-a) to the category of ‘other expenditures’
of the dataset of 21 countries.63 See rubric D of Table 10.14.
• The category of ‘direct subsidies’ within the category of ‘subsidies and other
direct assistance for enterprises’. Subsidies to enterprises, and especially in
international comparison, are (perhaps surprisingly) a rather unexplored
terrain.64 Internationally comparable data can be traced back to 1960, as
shown in Graph 10.12-b. Subsidies are defined as transfers to enterprises,
including public corporations, and are exclusive of loans and loan guaran-
tees.
62 This applies for when I consulted this database in January 2018. The countries for which
COFOG data are available at the first digit level are the OECD-21 minus Canada and New
Zealand. On top of these, second digit level data are also lacking for Australia, Switzerland
and the USA.
63 This includes COFOG category 06, housing and community amenities.
64 In a 2010 OECD paper, Spector writes that the delineations of state aid are ‘based on het-
erogeneous definitions’, and that ‘themost comprehensive data about state aids are those
covering the European Union’ and that ‘data about non-EU countries are less available
and usually lack homogeneity’ (Spector 2010, pp. 18–19).
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graph 10.12-a Expenditure on general amenities and on subsidies and other
direct assistance for enterprises (COFOG data) and statistical
difference between the COFOG and total dataset, 1995–2015,
various OECD-21 averages
Data sources: (1) Total expenditure 21 countries, see Graph 8.2; (2) Total expenditure, COFOG
data, OECD dataset National accounts at glance – general government, expenditure by function
(accessed 25 January 2018);65 (3) Bottomcategories, OECDdatasetNational Accounts, 11. Govern-
ment expenditure by function (COFOG) (accessed 25 January 2018)66 – see Table 10.6 for further
specification of my categorisation of the data
Quantitatively this category is not aminor one. At the beginning of the twenty-
first century this was more important, in terms of its size, an expenditure cat-
egory than infrastructure (average OECD-21). It can be seen from Graph 10.12-b
that in 2010 the average direct expenditure on subsidies was back to the 1960
level in percentage of GDP. It is very difficult to judge to what extent their
downturn after 1981 has been substituted indirectly by tax subsidies (tax deduc-
tions).67 In international comparison these tax subsidies (for example, R&D





67 Frommy practice as a senator in the parliament of the Netherlands (2007–15) I know that
such deals are made with enterprises’ organisations.
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graph 10.12-b State expenditure (general government) on explicit direct sub-
sidies for enterprises, 1960–2010, in% of GDP; average of up to
20 OECD-21 countries†
† OECD-21 minus Switzerland. Data source: DICE Database (2013).68 (Canada and New Zeal-
and 1960=1961; Denmark 1970=1971)
Reconsidering the main Graph 10.12 it can be seen that from 1960 the category
of ‘Other expenditure’ increases considerably. From Graph 10.12-b it can be
inferred that the 1960–81 increase in subsidies was a major component of this.
Graph 10.12-c shows for 1995–2015 the expenditure on ‘subsidies and other
direct assistance for enterprises’ together with its share of the direct subsidies.
graph 10.12-c State expenditure (general government) on subsidies and other
direct assistance for enterprises, and on competition policy,
1995–2015, in% of GDP; average of 16–19 OECD-21 countries
Data sources: Subsidies and other assistance (OECD, COFOG data, OECD dataset National
Accounts at a glance – general government, expenditure by function, accessed 25 January 2018 –
category 4, minus expenditure on Infrastructure and on Supervision (inspectorates) of produc-
tion). Subsidies: see Graph 10.12-b (with projections by DICE for 2012–14)
68 General Government Outlays by Economic Category: Subsidies as a Percentage of GDP,
1960–2014, Ifo Institute, Munich, http://www.cesifo‑group.de/DICE/fb/3FRjkpsh8 (ac-
cessed 27 January 2018).
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‘Other direct assistance’ includes aid for particular sectors and especially
also loans to enterprises. In the three years between 2007 and 2010 this rises by
1.6 points of GDP, which is due to assistance to the financial sector (‘too big to
fail’) and to crisis-related assistance to other sectors.69 (Note that this state aid
far from reflects the total of the social-economic costs of the early twenty-first
century financial crisis, which has been estimated at 100% of GDP and over –
see Chapter 9, Appendix 9A, section 9A-3.)
Re 10D3 Connection between the categories adopted in 10D3 and the COFOG
categories
See Table 10.14. The major purpose of this table is to show how the categories
adopted in 10D3 are connected to the COFOG categories (table rubrics A–C).
Recall from the clarification General data information: COFOG classification in
this Appendix under 10§9 that the first digit classification of COFOG is one in
ten categories.
table 10.14 Connection between the categories adopted in 10D3 and the
COFOG categories (table rubrics A–C); and the proportions of
General amenities and Additional amenities for enterprises in








1 General public service 6.4 1
1a legislative and executive‡ 1.8 1.1
1b debt transactions (mainly interest)‡ 2.3 1.7
1c other public services of COFOG 1 (row 1 minus 1a and 1b) 2.2
2 Defence 1.3 2
3 Public security 1.6 3
4 Economic affairs 4.6 4
5 Environment protection (infrastructural) 0.7 5
6 Housing and community amenities 0.5 6
7 Health 7.0 7
8 Recreation, culture, religion 1.0 8
69 Spector indicates that EU data show ‘that in spite of a strict control over state aids, their
total amount, excluding measures related to the financial crisis, was still €113.4 billion in
2008, or 0.94% of EU GDP. Not taking aid to railways into account, the volume of aid has
been halved between 1992 and 2008, from 1% to 0.54%. The inclusion of crisis measures
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9 Education 5.2 9
10 Social protection 18.3 10
11 Total expenditure: OECD average, COFOG data 18
countries (2015) (row 1 to 10)
46.6 = 1 to 10
12 Total expenditure: OECD average 21 countries (2015) 45.5
13 Statistical difference (row 12–11) -1.1
B Regrouped COFOG categories
14 Defence (row 2) 1.3 2 Military
15 Debt transactions (mainly interest) (row 1b) 2.3 1.7 Interest
16 Legislative plus public security (row 1a plus 3) 3.4 1.1+3 Hard Core
17 General services, foreign aid, culture, recreation,
community (row 1c plus 6 and 8)
3.7 1 – (1.1+1.7) +
6+8
General amenities
18 Infrastructure plus Inspectorates plus subsidies and
other assistance to enterprises and competition policy
(row 4 plus 5)
5.3 4+5
19 Education 5.2 9 Education
20 Social security 25.3 7+10 Social security
21 Total expenditure, OECD average COFOG data
(row 14 to 20)
46.6 = 1 to 10
C Other categories Ch. 10
22 Inspectorates production, product and environment
(reference figure)
0.1 Inspectorates
23 Infrastructure indicator (57.5% gross investment) 1.9 Infrastructure
24 Subsidies and other economic policy amenities for




25 sum of other categories (row 22 to 24 = row 18) 5.3
changes the picture dramatically, since they amounted to €212.2 billion, or 1.7% of GDP.’
And: ‘Aid to agriculture inOECDcountries alone amounted to $318billion in 2002’ (Spector
2010, pp. 18–19).
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D Estimate of General amenities and Subsidies and
other economic policy amenities for the total of 20–21
countries (accounting for statistical differences)*
26 ‘Other expenditures’ (average of 21 countries) 6.8
27 ‘Other expenditures’ (COFOG average) row 17 plus 24 7.0
28 Proportion of General amenities in Other expenditures
COFOG (row 17 / row 27)
0.53
29 Proportion of Subsidies etc. in Other expenditures
COFOG
(row 24 / row 27)
0.47
30 General amenities: estimate for 21 countries
(row 26 ⁕ row 28)
3.2
31 Subsidies a.o. economic policy amenities: estimate for 21
countries (row 26 ⁕ row 29)
3.2
† The 2015 data listed in the third column may slightly deviate from the data provided in various graphs
because the former data for 2015 are the average of 19 countries and the latter of 21 countries.
‡ Data for these two COFOG level 2 categories are available for 9–10 countries for 1995–2000 and for 15–16
countries onwards.
* Note that proportions of rows 28–29 (and hence those of rows 30–31) are not constants, but different for
each single year (as can be seen from the bottom figures of Graph 10.12-b).
Data source rubric A: OECD, Datasets: National Accounts at a glance, and Government expenditure by
function (COFOG)70
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Introduction to part three and chapter 11
This Part, and chapter, presents the internationalmode of existence of the cap-
italist system. As before, this chapter keeps on abstracting from contingencies.
Division 1 outlines the chapter’s focus and its methodological status. Along
with that mode of existence, nations are introduced: national economies and
nation-states. The two substantial divisions of this chapter, in terms of content,
focus on the twomain forms of international economic relations: international
trade (Division 2) and the international movement of capital as manifested
in the international migration of production (Division 3). We will see that in
the character of its effects, international trade is not fundamentally different
from intra-national regional sector-wise specialisation of production.However,
the consequences of the international migration of production are rather far-
reaching.
All of the systematicmain sections of Chapters 1–10 apply to any full-fledged
capitalist nation. This also applies for the current chapter. It is merely in the
non-systematic amplifications of the earlier chapters that I have referred to
averages of particularly the OECD-21 between 1870 and 2015, one reason being
that only for this country group are such long run data available. In the amp-
lifications of the current chapter data on a world scale and for world country
groups will be presented. Their availability is limited, in terms of both the cat-
egories that pertain to this chapter and the number of years.
Scheme 11.1 presents the outline of this chapter. The chapter can be relatively
brief because it builds on all the earlier chapters in the way as set out in Divi-
sion 1.
Division 1. The international mode of existence of the capitalist
system
11§1 The exposition of the international capitalist system: programmatic
delineations andmethod
I begin with a terminological note. As before I always use the term ‘state’ in ref-
erence to a ‘central state’.1 For the purposes of this chapter I define a ‘nation’ as
the geographical territory over which a state (i.e. central state) has jurisdiction.
[continued]
1 Some central states result from a union or federation of (what I call) ‘subordinate states’ in
terms of full jurisdiction.
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scheme 11.1 The international capitalist system (outline
Chapter 11)
Legend
.ɱę. concretising mode of existence
.ɱɱ. mode of manifestation
11§1 Continued
Most often this coincides with a ‘country’, though a state may have jurisdiction
over more than one country. In this chapter I will not use the latter distinction,
whence the terms ‘nation’ and ‘country’ are used interchangeably.
Theexposition in themain systematic sectionsof PartsOneandTwo is about
each full-fledged capitalist nation. In the exposition of Part Three, nations are
‘merely’ different regarding:
(1) their geographical location;
(2) the historical point in time at which they became full-fledged capitalist
(encompassing capitalist production and the accumulation of capital res-
ulting from it), which implies especially also the adoption of their state’s
granting of the Hard Core rights and legislative framework as presented
in Chapter 6;
(3) the degree of intensity of all the other legislative frameworks as presented
in Chapters 7–9;
(4) given thepopulationof a country, thedegreeof the reachedaccumulation
of capital – that degree being co-determined by the legislative ‘accumu-
lation of capital frameworks’ (7D2–7D4).
Next to these, PartThreemerelymakes explicit that for reasons of profit capital-
ist enterprises (or rather one category of capitalist enterprises) seek to expand
across national borders. Rather than revisiting all of the exposition of PartsOne
11. the international capitalist system [11§1] 529
and Two in this international perspective, my investigative question for Part
Three (i.e. the present chapter) is whether, and if so how, the earlier system-
aticexposition of the conditions for the reproduction of the capitalist system –
as well as the conclusions drawn from it – are affected by the capitalist sys-
tem’s international mode of existence. Most of this question will be answered
implicitly. That is, I implicitly posit that the earlier exposition is not affected
by this mode of existence, except for the matters that I do treat in the current
chapter.
As it turns out the main exception regards one form of the international
movement of capital (this form being the international migration of produc-
tion), which I treat in 11D3. This also regards one aspect of international trade
(11D2) that I nevertheless treat as more encompassing than that one aspect, so
as to contrast the international movement of capital with it.
The above regards the programme for the exposition in the current Part (and
chapter). I will not go into matters of the international financial constellation
that in fact derive from the two forms mentioned. In particular the exposition
keeps on abstracting fromhistorical and prevailing contingencies, that is, entit-
ies and processes that are not necessary for the reproduction of the capitalist
system (Explication 11§1-a). It might be argued that, strictly speaking, there is
no outright necessity for international trade and international movement of
capital. However, as we will see later on, there are system-inherent tendencies
towards it. Implicitly it is posited that such system-inherent tendencies do not
apply for the matters that I abstract from (Explication 11§1-a).
In this perspective the current Part (chapter) presents no necessary con-
ditions of the existence of the capitalist system (these were completed with
Chapters 1–3 and 6–8), but rather a main mode of existence of capitalism as
well as manifestations of that mode. However, as we will see, the actualisation
of each of the tendencies to international trade and to internationalmovement
of capital require as a condition particular state-granted rights.
11§1-a Explication. Abstraction from contingencies
Parts One and Two of this book did not deal with contingencies – not even
with all kinds of discrimination regarding gender, ethnicity and religion, and
even if these co-determine the concrete existence of the capitalist system.
The reason is that capitalism can exist without these. For the current Part
the same applies for war, international power politics (hegemonies) and (vari-
ants of) colonialism, and for similar phenomena not listed. All the phenom-
ena just mentioned are tremendously important. And all these may be more
important for the lives of people than the exploitative character of capital-
ism. The self-imposed restriction for this book, again, is that capitalism can
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exist without these, though it should be borne in mind that capitalism has not
done away with these.
11§2 The world’s nations and their economic ranking in terms of the per
capita income
Indirectly this chapter will refer to the international trade (11D2) and the inter-
national direct investment (11D3) of all the 217 countries of the world. I will
not pronounce if, and to what extent, these countries are characterised as full-
capitalist (including capitalist production) in the sense of Chapters 1 and 6 –
that would require a full study of its own. Because of the organisation’s mem-
bership criteria, the 34 OECD countries and the 7 non-OECD countries of the
European Union are definitively capitalist – but that is very far from an inclus-
ive list.
For pragmatic reasons I will assume that the vast majority of the 217 coun-
tries is full capitalist. For pragmatic reasons I will also assume that these have
reached in divergent degrees the capitalist maturity of the OECD-21 – with its
maturity problems – as set out in Chapter 10.
Recall the diachronicmovement of theOECD-21 state expenditure 1870–2015
as presented in Graph 10.12. I propose that contemporary capitalist nations can
be variously characterised in terms of not only their accumulation of capital,
but also of the intensity of their state’s regulative frameworks and expenditure.
Roughly we could think of a classification of nations according to the latter as
in Graph 11.2 (replacing the horizontal diachronic axis of Graph 10.12 by a syn-
chronic classification).
[continued]
graph 11.2 Stylised synchronous country classification
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11§2 Continued
However, this does not imply that all these capitalist nations go through the
same history as the OECD-21. This has to do with the diffusion of technology
and techniques of production as well as with distinct mixtures of the intensity
of regulative frameworks. Technology, techniques and especially also the state
of public education and the communications part of infrastructure are import-
ant accelerators thatmake their histories different. (To be sure, the histories are
also different because of historical contingencies such as those of colonialism,
imperialism and wars.)
In order tomake this chaptermanageable as a broad outline, I pragmatically
assume that the economic level of a nation can be captured by its GDP per cap-
ita in international comparison. I add immediately that (as with the OECD-21’s
1920 or 2015 GDP per capita) this tells us nothing at all about the degree of the
appropriation of surplus-value or the distribution of income and wealth. A rel-
atively lowGDPper capitamay go alongwith a distribution of income that is far
more skewed than with a relatively high GDP per capita (recall, for the OECD-
21, the development of the top 10% income shares between 1910 and 2010 as
shown in Graph 8.23).
For the per capita income of countries I make use of the classification by
the World Bank into four income categories of ‘High Income’, ‘Upper Middle
Income’, ‘Lower Middle Income’ and ‘Low Income’. See Amplification 11§2-a,
which defines these categories and shows their shares in the world GDP. See
Table 11.3 for the abbreviations of income country groups that are used through-
out this chapter (HIC, UMC, LMC and LIC).
table 11.3 World Bank definitions of four country income cat-
egories from high to low income (2015)
Income groups Abbreviation GNI per capita (2015)
income range
High income HIC $12,476 or more
Upper middle income UMC $4,036 $12,475
Lower middle income LMC $1,026 $4,035
Low income LIC $1,025 or less
Source: World Bank, database World Development Indicators (Updated 17 No-
vember 2016)
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11§2-a Amplification. Ranking of nations into four categories in terms of
their per capita income, and the shares of these categories in
world GDP
The World Bank classifies countries in terms of their per capita income, as
shown in Table 11.3. (GNI is the abbreviation for gross national income.)
Table 11.4makes the link from the OECD-21 to the ‘high income’ category. This
table shows for 2015 that whereas the OECD-21 encompassed 13% of the world
population, it acquired 56%of theworldGDP.At theother end, 9%of theworld
population categorised as ‘low income’ acquired 1% of the world GDP.
table 11.4 World country income groups: shares of world GDP and average
per capita income in 2015















































































OECD-21 21 0.9 13% 56%
Other OECD: high income** 11 0.1 1% 3%
Non-OECD: high income 46 0.1 1% 2%
High income (sum row 1–3) 78 1.2 16% 64% 41,366 39,577 44,696 27
Upper middle income 56 2.6 35% 28% 8,186 7,834 15,832 10
Lower middle income 52 2.9 40% 8% 2,035 1,988 6,423 4
Low income 31 0.6 9% 1% 620 616 1,645 1
Total 217 7.3 100% 100%
† Current US$ (Atlas method).
‡ Current US$
* Current international $.
** Mexico and Turkey are UMC countries.
Data source: World Bank, database World Development Indicators (Updated 17 November
2016)2
2 Accessed 4 December 2016.
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Graph 11.5 shows the development of the world GDP shares of the high-,
middle- and low-income categories – for as far as World Bank data go back
(1960). It can be seen that from 1960–2015 the share of the 78 high-income
countries (HIC) decreased from 78% to 64%. Most of this decrease was ab-
sorbed by a share increase of the 56 upper-middle income countries (UMC) –
and a veryminor part by the two lower categories. That seems good for these 78
countries (35% of the world population in 2015). However, as Graph 11.6 shows,
84% of the UMC share increase was absorbed by the share increase of China
from 1995 (an UMC, with 19% of the world population in 2015), which is quite
an achievement within two decades.
graph 11.5 World GDP shares of the high-, middle- and low-income categories:
1960–2015
Data source: World Bank, database World Development Indicators (Updated 21 December
2016)
graph 11.6 World GDP shares of the upper-middle income category and of
China: 1960–2015
Data source: see Graph 11.5
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The final Table 11.7 of this section shows a brief overview of the countries’
conditions of most elementary decent life. In comparison with high-income
countries, people in low-income countries live shorter (¾) and inmuch poorer
conditions.Many of themeasures in this table have improved over the years for
which data are available. However, it will not do to tell someone that he should
be happy because he received only 10 cane strokes today, in comparison with
yesterday’s 20. The same applies for any comparison between full-capitalism
and prior modes of production.
table 11.7 Indicators measuring lack of most elementary conditions of life:
high-, middle- and low-income countries around 2015
Year HIC UMC LMC LIC
% of world population 2015 16 35 40 9
Prevalence of underweight, weight for age
(% of children under 5)
2014 1.1 2.5 22.4 20.4
Prevalence of undernourishment
(% of population)
2015 8.2 14.0 26.1
Poverty headcount ratio at $3.10 a day (2011 PPP)
(% of population living ≤ this norm)
2013 0.9 9.9 46.3 72.0
Life expectancy at birth, total (years) 2014 80.6 74.4 67.3 61.3
Physicians (per 1,000 people)3 2011 2.92 1.99 0.75 0.07
Children out of school
(% of primary school age)
2013 3.7 4.4 10.2 16.2
Improved water source
(% of population without access)
2015 0.5 5.0 10.5 34.4
Improved sanitation facilities
(% of population without access)
2015 0.6 20.0 48.0 71.7
Population living in slums
(% of urban population)
2014 23.3 32.0 65.2
Source:World Bank, databaseWorld Development Indicators (Updated 17 November 2016)
3 Physicians include generalist and specialist medical practitioners.
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Division 2. The tendency to international trade
11§3 The tendency to international trade
The enterprises’ cross-national border sale of output is called export, and the
cross-national border purchase of input is called import. In principle the profit-
seekingmotives of enterprises for interregional-national trade or international
trade are not different. They seek expansion at the output side and minimal
costs at the input side. It is just the case that enterprises are forced to trade in
general, but not necessarily forced to trade internationally.
There are various obstacles to international trade. One is that this trade
requires agreement between agents – that is, enterprises and banks – to accept
at some exchange rate each other’s money (now ‘currency’). In principle this
is similar to the domain extension set out in 2§9 prior to the introduction of
a Clearing Bank and especially prior to the latter’s imposing its currency on
other (now national) banks. Especially for long-term contracts, international
exchange rates imply risks and uncertainties. Another (initial) obstacle for
international trade is that enterprises are confronted with different state regu-
lations about products and trade.
A particular impetus for enterprises seeking output expansion internation-
ally relates to their economically optimal technical scale.Dependingon the size
of a country – thus limits of the ‘extent of the market’ – this scale may require
international expansion. Another (which may but need not be related to the
former) is the national market limits to the further concentration of capital
within a single enterprise (this is ‘concentration’ in the sense of absolute size).
11§4 The state-granted right to export and import
In principle it is at the discretion of the state to (not) put confines on inter-
national trade. It is a matter of a particular state’s ‘framing’ this, whether
it encodes non-confines (‘freedom’) as an extension of enterprises’ property
rights (that might be repealed), or contrariwise any confines as a restriction of
property rights (thatmight be repealed). The framingmatters ideologically, but
the effect is the same.
Whereas an actual right to export will usually not be conflicting for a state
(contingently theremight be strategic reasons to repeal such a right), this is dif-
ferent for imports. For the latter there are, or theremay be, conflicting interests
between the potential importing enterprise and the nationally operating enter-
prises (as imports affect their output). The ‘framing’ referred to matters for the
dealing with such conflicts.
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11§4-a Amplification. International trade in historical perspective
The following two graphs show the historical development of international
trade from 1870 measured in percentage of GDP. Graph 11.8 shows for world
trade a steady increase until the First World War. From 1917–45 protectionist
measures caused a considerable decline, the 1917 level being paralleled only
in 1974. Afterwards international trade takes further up – with troughs during
recessions (severely in 2009).
Trade data decomposed for the fourWorld Bank income classifications (see
11§2-a) are available from 1960, though for the low-income countries only from
1990. Generally the data for the high-income category parallel those for world
trade (note that in 2015 their share of world GDPwas 64%) – seeGraph 11.9. The
trade of the other categories is much more volatile. That graph shows this for
the low-income countries. (An additional graph for these and the other income
categories is included inAppendix 11.Aunder 11§3–Graph 11.8-a – togetherwith
their export–import balances.)
graph 11.8 Sum of world exports and imports in% of world GDP (divided by
two), 1870–2011
Data source: Ortiz-Ospina and Roser 2017 (based on Klasing and Milionis 2014, and Penn
World Tables Version 8.1)4
4 Retrieved from: https://ourworldindata.org/international‑trade (5 November 2017).
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graph 11.9 World exports, HIC and LIC exports, as% of their GDP, 1960–2015
Data source:World Bank,World Development Indicators; updated 16 December 2016
(accessed 20 December 2016)
11§5 The effect of international trade on the sector-structures of
production
One main effect of international trade is a degree of specialisation of produc-
tion between nations, thus affecting the sector-structures of production.
In principle this is not different from regional specialisationwithin a nation.
During that process regionalwage structureswill generally be affected, but after
a period of adaptation the process does not necessarily affect average regional
wages. The same applies for international specialisation.5 A main difference is
that for regions of a nation, workers might – instead of adapting their skills
to the new regional production structure – migrate to other national regions.
Internationally this is most often excluded (see further 11D3, 11§10-a).
Whereas intra-nation regional specialisationmaintains thenational produc-
tion diversity, international trade generates non- or restricted versatile struc-
tures of national production. Once a nation has given up sectors of production,
it is often very difficult to recuperate these, and if possible at all, this will take
much time. This implies that once a nation has ‘freely’ opted for a non- or
restricted versatile structure of production, voluntary (‘free’) trade turns into
enforced trade.
5 To be sure, this chapter does not deviate from the general a-moral discourse of this book in its
main systematic sections. Sector-structure changes are often dramatic for the workers con-
cerned.
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11§6 The (uneven) effect of international trade on surplus-value
International trade is, like any trade, driven by profit motives of enterprises.
Mainstreameconomists sinceAdamSmith andDavidRicardohave argued that
international trade is also advantageous for nations, to the extent that they spe-
cialise in the production in which they are relatively efficient (exporting those
products and importing products that they do not or scarcely produce). This
theory of ‘comparative advantage’ has beenquestioned onboth theoretical and
empirical grounds.6
One major empirical point is that regarding the world GDP shares of the
high-, middle- and low-income countries, hardly any convergence was to be
observed from 1960 (the first year for which country income aggregates are
available) until about 2005 – that is, when China had joined the international
trade scene (andwith the exclusion of China that was still the case in 2015). See
11§2-a, Graphs 11.5–11.6.
Nevertheless, international trade is ‘advantageous for nations’ if this means
the enterprises of nations. This is so, because, as argued below, international
trade has a positive effect on the ratio of surplus-value to wages (e = Π/wL).7
More specifically international trade has the general effect of a relative de-
crease in the price of the real-wage bundle – that is, given the general rate of
inflation.
For what follows it is recalled that the average national real-wage level (now
‘national’) is determined, in brief, by the interconnection of the productive
power of labour, the rate of accumulation of capital, and the rate of unemploy-
ment (2§6). Given these determinants and the prevailing sector production
structure (11§5) the real-wage is taken as given at each point in time.
International ‘free trade’ deals are geared at removing trade barriers, espe-
cially import duties and import prohibitions (or various substitutes for it).
However, at each given production structure – and when some commodity or
a close substitute is still produced within a country, enterprises in that country
are not forced to import: they will import only when the import price is lower
than the national price. Thuswhen there are national substitutes, imports have
a price decreasing effect. This affects the price of the real-wage bundle – either
directly for wage goods or indirectly for means of production as inputs for the
production of wage goods.
6 See, e.g., Went 2002, ch. 2, Samuelson 2004, and Smith 2006, ch. 2, section 4.
7 Section 2§5, equation 2.5.What I set out below is, against the background of 2D2, an interna-
tional variant of what Marx posited as a tendential increase in ‘relative surplus-value’ (Cap-
ital I, Part Four).
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The previous paragraph also indicates the constraints for a particular nation
of the surplus-value effects. The less versatile a nation’s production structure
has grown, themore it is forced to import at whatever theworldmarket price is
(11§5). This means, or maymean, that the international trade effect on surplus-
value is an uneven one for nations.
11§7 International trade: ‘structural national conservation of capital
accumulated’
With both national and international trade we have a, what I call, ‘structural
national conservation of capital accumulated’. That is, structurally the capital
accumulated nationally covers national production and employment (expan-
ded on in Explication 11§7-a).
As we will see in the next division, this is different for the secondmain lever
of the internationalisation of the capitalist system – internationalisation of
production. There this conservation no longer holds, making it fundamentally
different from international trade.
11§7-a Explication. National structural conservation of capital
accumulated
We have seen in Chapter 5 that the capitalist system is characterised by a recur-
rent cyclical over-accumulation and destruction of capital. ‘Structural national
conservation of capital accumulated’ applies on the capital accumulated over
cycles.Thepoint of this structural conservation is thatwehave a (nownational)
structural accumulation of capital vis-à-vis a (now national) growth of the
labour force, to which the exposition of 2D2 applies.
With international trade this remains to be the case, irrespective of changes
in the sector-structure of production (11§5) or in the relative surplus-value
(11§6). Changes of these also occur independently of international trade,
though perhaps on a smaller or slower scale. When exports and imports of
commodities, or commodified services, are roughly in balance, this national
conservation of capital is not affected.
This balance is relevant because it indirectly measures national production
and national employment. Regarding the period 1960–2015 (for which we have
data differentiated for World Bank country income categories), this conserva-
tion as measured by the ‘external balance on goods and services’ in percentage
of GDP, occurred on a world scale and for the HIC category within a small mar-
gin, though not for the other income categories.Table 11.10 shows the 1960–2015
average per year for that measure.
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table 11.10 External balance on goods and services in% of GDP;WB income
categories, average per year 1960–2015
Category External balance World GDP share Countries
goods and services
% of GDP
World + 0.1% 217
HIC (high income) + 0.1% 64% 78
UMC (upper middle income) + 1.1% 28% 56
LMC (lower middle income) - 2.2% 8% 52
LIC (low income) - 14.2%8 1% 31
Data source: World Bank, World Development Indicators, External balance on goods and
services (% of GDP), updated 16 December 2016
11§8 The unsustainability of (international) distance trade
International trade has been stagnating and staggering for quite a period
(Graph 11.8); however, its increase from about 1970 to 2015 was enormous.9
Alongwith it goes the transportation of the trade.Their environmental (includ-
ing climate) costs are not accounted for in the monetary-value dimension
(MVD). It is unlikely that this level of international trade (and all the more
any further increase) is sustainable in terms of the aggravating environmental
damage.10However, given the developed international sector-structures of pro-
duction (11§4), this poses an enormous problem that cannot be resolved in the
medium-term, and in some cases not even in the long-term.11
8 1990–2015: earlier data are not available.
9 Ortiz-Ospina and Roser (2017) suggest that a considerable amount of this increase was
due not to international inter-sector trade (e.g. exportation of manufactures and import-
ation of coffee), but rather to international intra-sector trade (e.g. France both importing
and exporting cars to and from Germany).
10 The following data regard greenhouse gas emissions in the European Union. The share of
transport in the total of these emissions was 14.9% in 1990. In 2014 this had increased to
23.3% (Eurostat 2016, Figure 3). To be sure, not all of this regards trade. On the subject
of international trade specifically, Erickson et al. (2013) quote a study from Peters, Minx,
Weber and Edenhofer, reporting ‘that the emissions embodied in [internationally] traded
goods and services had increased from 4.3 Gt CO2 in 1990, or 20% of global emissions, to
7.8 Gt CO2 in 2008, or 28% of global CO2’. This, on the other hand, does not tell us how
much emissions reduction could be gained from international trade reduction.
11 It can be resolved for international intra-sector trade – see the one but last footnote. Con-
sidering the long run, the question is towhat extent the implementation costs of a possible
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However, this is not ‘merely’ an international problem, but also a regional
problem within large area nations (Amplification 11§8-a).
11§8-a Amplification. The seven largest countries of the world in terms of
land area
The seven largest countries out of 217 are (ranked in order of land area): the
Russian Federation, China, the United States of America, Canada, Brazil, Aus-
tralia and India. The following table shows the sums of their world shares in
land, population and GDP.
World shares of the 7 largest countries in land area
land area population 2015 GDP 2015 (in US$)
42% 46% 50%
This table merely serves as a ‘blow-up’ for any nation in the world that has spe-
cialising regions of production, and hence transportation costs thatmay not be
accounted for in the MVD. Thus transport associated with international trade
is a huge problem, but it is in fact a problem of any distance trade and traffic
whose costs are not fully accounted for.
Division 3. The tendencies to international movement of capital
and to international migration of production
11§9 The tendency to the international movement of capital
Enterprises seek to increase their rates of profit by the processes of produc-
tion and accumulation of capital (1D5, 2D1). These processes are manifest in a
number of tendency forces of the enterprises’ market interaction. One mani-
festation takes the form of plant-wise capital movements within a sector of
production, or of capital movements between sectors of production (4D1).
Another manifestation regards the (conglomerate) centralisation of capital
(4D5).
emergence of sufficient emissions-reducing transport techniques would be smaller than
the implementation costs of reversals of the international sector-structures of produc-
tion.
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Because these are tendency forces in general, these operate – in principle –
also internationally in the formof a tendency to the internationalmovement of
capital, though under more complicated conditions than nationally (see 11§11
and 11§12).
11§10 The state-granted right to the international movement of capital
The international movement of capital (IMC) is conditioned by a two-sided
expansion of the enterprises’ property rights as granted by the state.
First, in legally granting enterprises or any other agents the right to IMC, the
emigrant state expands (fully or limited) the legal right to property (cf. 6§10).
Second, in allowing foreign enterprises to immigrate capital, the immigrant
state expands the property right (fully or limited) for the immigrant enter-
prise(s) or other agents.
Aswith international trade, it is amatter of a particular state’s ‘framing’ these
rights, whether it encodes non-confines (‘freedom’) as an extension of enter-
prises’ property rights (that might be repealed), or contrariwise any confines
as a restriction of property rights (that might be repealed). The framing mat-
ters ideologically – especially in case of conflicting interests regarding IMC (see
11§13) – but the effect is the same.
11§10-a Amplification. The asymmetric freedom of international
movement/migration for capital and labour
Although inmost nations labour (any person) is free to emigrate, most nations
put severe restrictions on the immigration of labour (persons). Thus in the
states’ granting of (expanded) claimed rights, enterprises and workers (per-
sons) are again treated asymmetrically.Thismeans indeed that thepropagation
of economic freedom is partisan and ideological.
This does not imply that immigration of labour is prohibited altogether. It
rather depends on the interests of enterprises in face of the available labour
capacity – thus the potential migration of labour is used as a reservoir so as to
guarantee a degree of unemployment (2§6). (I add that this asymmetry means
that there is no free labour market even from the mainstream economics per-
spective.)
11§10-b Amplification. International movement of capital as measured by
‘Foreign Direct Investment’ (FDI) and its pattern 1970–2015
The international movement of capital on a considerable world scale is a fairly
recent phenomenon, dating from the middle of the 1980s. Prior to this, most
states controlled and limited cross-border movement of capital – and many
still do, in full or above a threshold.
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As amainquantitative indicator for it I adopt the ‘ForeignDirect Investment’
(FDI). Most of my data on FDI are from the World Bank, which defines FDI as
follows.
‘Foreign direct investment are the net inflows [or outflows] of invest-
ment to acquire a lasting management interest (10 percent or more of
voting stock) in an enterprise operating in an economy other than that
of the investor. It is the sum of equity capital, reinvestment of earn-
ings, other long-term capital, and short-term capital as shown in the
balance of payments.’ The series show either ‘net inflows (new invest-
ment inflows less disinvestment) in the reporting economy from foreign
investors’ or ‘net outflows of investment from the reporting economy to
the rest of the world’. And: ‘FDI data do not give a complete picture of
international investment in an economy. Balance of payments data on
FDI do not include capital raised locally … In addition, FDI data omit
non-equity cross-border transactions such as intra-unit flows of goods
and services.’ Finally, the WB uses the ‘weighted average’ as ‘aggregation
method’.12
Source: WBmetadata for the series
Because theWBuses the term ‘net’ to account for disinvestments, I use the term
‘netted’ FDI or FDI ‘sum’ for the inflows minus outflows. All FDI country group
averages as presented below are weighted averages as calculated by theWorld
Bank.
World FDI is much dominated by the FDI of the high-income countries
(HIC) – their share of world GDP being 64% in 2015. It can be seen from Graph
11.11 and Graph 11.12 that world inflows and outflows of FDI beyond 1% of world
GDP take off only from the second half of the 1980s, and that the same applies
for the FDI of the HIC in terms of their GDP. (Similar graphs for themiddle- and
low-income countries are shown in Appendix 11.A under 11§10.)
It can also be seen from these graphs that the fluctuations from about 2000
are considerable. One reason is that FDI also reflects internationalmergers and
take-overs – including vast banking mergers and take-overs prior to and after
the 2007/08 financial crisis.
12 However, for purposes of characterising ‘average capitalist nations’, unweighted averages
are often preferable (as I did in Part Two). In order not to complicate the graphs below, I
have declined to present two measures.
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graph 11.11 FDI inflows and outflows as% of GDP, world average; 1970–2015
Data source: World Bank, database World Development Indicators (updated 21 December
2016; accessed 26 December 2016). Weighted averages
graph 11.12 FDI inflows and outflows as% of GDP, average of high-income
countries; 1970–2015
Data source: see Graph 11.11
Relevant for this division, however, are foremost the ‘netted’ FDI inflows and
outflows (the black line in Graphs 11.11 and 11.12) and especially also those for
the middle- and low-income countries.13 These are shown in Graph 11.13. It can
be seen that for all of the middle- and low-income country groups, the netted
13 I make a distinction between ‘net’ and ‘netted’ as was explained above.
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FDI was positive since data are available – though with quite some fluctuation
throughout.14 (For the low-income countries a restricted number of full data
are only available from 2005.)
graph 11.13 Netted FDI inflows and outflows as% of GDP of the country group;
averages of the high-income, middle-income and low-income
countries (HIC, UMC, LMC, LIC); 1970–2015
Data source: see Graph 11.11. At the time of retrieving the data, those for the low-income coun-
tries on both inflows and outflowswere available only for a scarce number of years (2005–07 and
2009–14)
11§11 International movement of capital and the tendency to the
international migration of production
There are two main forms of the international movement of capital (IMC) –
summarised in Table 11.14.
The first form is the ‘international centralisation and concentration of cap-
ital’, which is associated with ‘economic power driven mergers and take-overs’.
This form and the drive are no different from the national centralisation of
capital (4D5). However, in international form the size of the resulting entities
(that is, the concentration of capital) may grow much beyond what would be
possible nationally. The resulting entities tend to operate multinationally (as
14 The post-2007 decrease for the upper-middle countries is, to a considerable extent, due to
a decrease for China.
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multinational corporations) and to bring together assets and finance capital
frommultinational origin.15
Equity transactions are the main process through which this centralisation
and concentration of capital is reached.
The second form of IMC involves an ‘international migration of production’
(IMP).16 The process through which it is reached is via a gradual ‘restructur-
ing of capital’ (cf. 4§2-b): the new plant investment in the original country is
damped, substituting it by investment in another country.17 This second form
encompasses two variants.
One variant is primarily ‘commodity markets driven’. It relates to the geo-
graphical distance of selling markets and/or to the supply chain structure as
including the related networks. In this case enterprises move (part of) their
production to nearby the selling or the supply markets. In this case the inter-
national migration of production in effect substitutes for international trade.
In principle this variant is not different from intra-national regional relocations
of enterprises.
The other variant is primarily ‘labour market driven’, that is, wage-costs
driven. In fact this regards the seeking of relatively abundant labour-capacity
markets (as applying on one of the two main conditions for the accumulation
of capital – cf. 2D2).
In the remainder of this division the focus will be on the general precondi-
tions for the international migration of production and on its labour-market
and wages effects. Although in the two variants distinguished the primary
drives are different, each one (also) has similar labour-market effects. It is just
that when the labour market is the primary drive, the wages effects are lar-
ger than when commodity markets are the primary drive. Further, although
the drives may be different, empirically we cannot read off from international
migrations of productionwhat the drives are. In the remainder of this division,
therefore, I take these variants together as ‘international migration of produc-
tion’ in general.
15 TheUNCTADWorld InvestmentReport 2017 shows in its AnnexTables 24 and 25 ameasure
of this for a top 200 non-financial enterprises for the year 2016.
16 In the medium- or long-term, a migration of production (relocations from one country to
another) might also result from mergers and take-overs. However, these do not start this
way.
17 I note that the international ‘outsourcing’ of production has the effect of a partial migra-
tion of production, but it is not a movement of capital. In fact this is a particular form of
international trade, and the importation of the goods or services at hand is alsomeasured
as international trade.
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Another focus in the remainder of this division is on this migration of pro-
duction from the high-income countries (HIC) to the middle- and low-income
countries (UMC, LMC and LIC) and from the middle-income countries (UMC
and LMC) to the low-income countries (LIC). (See the details of this country
classification in 11§2-a.)
International migration of production only most rarely takes the form of
full migration of an enterprise – at least it does not start that way. Instead it is
most often carried out bymultinational enterprises, taking the formof a partial
migration via subsidiary corporations (the initial corporation being the hold-
ing company), either via take-overs, or via participations, or via establishing a
complete new branch (the latter are called ‘greenfield investments’).18
The generation of each of these forms of the ‘international movement of
capital’ (IMC) has in fact a tendency character (as forces engendering these that
may be counteracted).
Eachof these formsof IMC is a component of the ‘ForeignDirect Investment’
(FDI – cf. 11§10-b) – see further 11§11-a.
table 11.14 The forms of the ‘international movement of capital’
International movement of capital (IMC)
Forms Drives Main process
(1) international centralisation




(2) international migration of
production (IMP)
(a) commodity markets driven restructuring of
capital (ROC)(b) labour market driven
{ }
11§11-a Amplification. The forms of the ‘international movement of
capital’ as components of the FDI
Information about the decomposition of FDI as to the type of FDI is limited,
and especially so for country groups (at least the WB and UNCTAD databases
do not provide these). In an Annex of the UNCTAD World Investment Report
2017 there is some limited information about the FDI subcategory of Green-
field investments from 2003–16. A greenfield investment is a form of FDI where
a parent company builds its operations in a foreign country from the ground
up (see also the last footnote). This subcategory is relevant for the ‘interna-
18 https://www.investopedia.com/terms/g/greenfield.asp.
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tional migration of production’. However, the UNCTAD information regards
announced greenfield investment projects. In this regard, it remarks: ‘The value
of announced greenfield projects indicates the capital expenditure planned by
the investor at the time of the announcement. Data can differ substantially
from the official FDI data as companies can raise capital locally and phase their
investments over time, and a project may be cancelled or may not start in the
year when it is announced’ (p. 39, n. 2). Because limited information is often
better than no information, Table 11.15 brings together the relevant UNCTAD
data. Because of the reasons stated in the quotation above I use 2003–16 aver-
ages.
Developing economies are roughly all the world economies apart from the
World Bank’s category of high-income countries (11§2-a). Table 11.15 shows, as a
rough indicator, that greenfield investments are the dominant part of the FDI
inflow into developing economies (89% for the indicator).19
table 11.15 Total FDI inflows and announced greenfield FDI inflows;World
and developing economies, 2003–16
Announced greenfield FDI projects = AG-FDI







total FDI inflow:World 1363
total FDI inflow: Developing economies 543
total FDI inflow: ratio DE to world inflow 40%
share of DE in world AG-FDI 60%
AG-FDI: World 811
AG-FDI: Developing economies 486
World ratio of AG-FDI to total FDI inflow 60%
DE ratio of AG-FDI to total FDI inflow 89%
Data source: UNCTAD 2017, Annex Tables 1 and 1920
19 As an aside, I note that in its World Investment Report 2017 the UNCTAD has a graph (its
Figure I.12) headed as ‘External sources of finance for developing economies, 2007–2016’,
in which it includes (next to FDI) a line graph for ‘Portfolio investment’. I do not under-
stand how this is a source of finance unless this would solely regard newly issued shares,
bonds or direct placements.
20 http://unctad.org/en/Pages/DIAE/World%20Investment%20Report/Annex‑Tables.aspx.
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11§12 The constellation of an immigrant state as condition for the
international migration of production – the perspective of
potentially migrating enterprises
The inward bifurcation of commodities and of the production process (1§7,
1§11) means that enterprises are indifferent to physical-geographic location:
all that counts is the criterion of the integral and the internal rate of profit
(1§13, 5§1), be it in a national or international context. However, that same cri-
terion implies that enterprises are not indifferent to the particular state that
best serves that interest. For multinational enterprises, a national state is an
instrumental entity.
A general condition for the actualisation of international migration of pro-
duction (11§11) is that the state in those nations can gain compliance for defin-
ing the interests of capital as being in the putative general interest (6§6). This
merely means that migrating enterprises will migrate to capitalist nations. For
the more specific conditions of movement, Figure 11.16 categorises the regulat-
ive frameworks of Chapters 6–9 into three broad categories.
figure 11.16 Division of regulative frameworks into three main categories as
relevant for Chapter 11
Hard Core frameworks (HC-FW) 1. Capitalist economic rights 6D4
↓
2. Allowance rights to existence 6D5
3. Public security 6D6
Capital accumulation frameworks (CA-FW) 4. Monetary 7D2
5. Labour-capacity (incl. publ. educ.) 7D3
↓ 6. Infrastructure 7D4
8. (mode of) Imposition competition 9D1
Legitimating compliance SWC* (LC-FW) 7. Social security framework 7D5
Legend
↓ grounded in moment below.
* SWC: subordinated working class.
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For potentially emigrating enterprises, the immigrant state’s Hard Core
frameworks and their full upholding are an absolute precondition for the
migration.TheCapital Accumulation frameworks are also a requirement.How-
ever, as a precondition for the immigration of capital their intensity is flexible
in face of thewage level differencebetween thenations of migration.This – and
particularly formal education and infrastructure – again varies for different sec-
tors of production and for the particular type of investment (as, for example,
requiring different types and degrees of education). A relatively intensive regu-
lation of competition is (merely) important for the suppliers of the immigrant
enterprise.
The category of the social security framework is no direct consideration for
the emigrant enterprises for the following two reasons.
First, this framework is relevant for the legitimation of the state (and hence,
as argued in 7D5, for the legitimation of the capitalist economy vis-à-vis which
the state constitutes a separation-in-unity – 6§7). However, immigrant enter-
prises are ‘footloose’ to the extent that they calculate a relatively brief pay-back
period of, say, 3–5 years. That is, they can re-migrate their investment when the
legitimation of the state under consideration is actually under threat.
Second, the actual social security framework (and the concomitant trans-
fers) are only indirectly relevant for immigrating enterprises to the extent
that these would affect employers’ social security contributions and corporate
taxes.21
The level of the latter (corporate taxes) is a final main determinant of the
international migration of production. This regards not so much the statutory
tax rates, but rather the effective tax rates – also in face of accounting streams
within the international branches of a corporate holding.
In face of the frameworks, and other relevant factors, potentially migrat-
ing enterprises calculate the costs and benefits of an international migration
of production. Especially because of the comparative frameworks assessment,
this is far more complex than for an intra-national migration of production.
11§12-a Amplification. Other determinants
Apart from the conditions indicated in the main text (in brief the intensity
of frameworks, wages and taxation), the (non-)migration of enterprises is also
determined by differences in:
• institutional labour relations (management–labour, labour-unions, local
management vis-à-vis international management);
21 The income taxes of the top management are also relevant, but the bulk of these may be
anticipated in the gross wage paid.
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• local/regional networks of enterprises;
• networks of enterprises and governments (state and local);
• regional markets.
In face of the international movements of production (IMP) between the four
grand country categories distinguished by theWorld Bank (11§2), the following
three amplifications expandon the three categories of the state framework that
are most relevant for the remainder of this division.
11§12-b Amplification. Formal education
Formal education is a main component of the Capital Accumulation frame-
works. In 2015 the formal education differences between high-, middle- and
low-income countries were considerable and it seems that these are a major
obstacle forwidespread IMP to themiddle- and low-incomecountries.Mislead-
ingly the state expenditure on formal education, as shown in Graph 11.17, might
suggest that the gap is nearly bridged (even the LIC level for 2005 is above that
for the OECD-21 in 1960).
graph 11.17 State expenditure on formal education as% of GDP, 1970–2015;
high-, middle- and low-income countries
Data source: UNESCO database (December 2016 release; accessed 8 December 2016). 1970–
2010 nearest year available; 2015 or last year available.22 (I categorised the UNESCO data for
countries according to theWorld Bank income classification for the year 2015. See Appendix 11.A
under 11§12 for more information on the data.)
22 UMC 2015 (sample value 3.5 omitted because of too many not with 2010 coinciding coun-
tries). LIC excludes Zimbabwe because of several figures that are difficult to interpret,
including the education expenditure of 44% of GDP in 1994.
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However, Graph 11.18 shows that behind the previous flattering figures lurks
a distribution of formal education that is more skewed than that of the OECD-
21 between 1870 and 1910 (Graph 7.10). Thus it seems that in 2015 the education
in many of the middle- and low-income countries is perhaps fitting for an elite
top ormiddlemanagement, but less so for those production floors that require
at least moderately skilled labour. On the other hand, in recent decennia the
spread of education among the population in those countries increased steeply
(as measured by the decrease in their Gini index in Graph 11.18).
graph 11.18 Average years of formal schooling, and spread of education in the
total population aged 15 years and older (Gini index); averages of
high-, middle- and low-income countries 1950–2010
Data source: CLIO Infra database (accessed 12 December 2016).23The CLIO data for countries
were categorised according to theWorld Bank income classification for the year 2015.24
Graph 11.18 shows averages. China, to take amajor example, was in 2010 down to
a Gini of 14.5 (scale 100–1), that is, below the HIC average (and not far removed
from the USA’s 13.5). The Russian Federation (15.2 in 2010) and Argentina (15.7)
also stand out among the UMCs. Among the LMCs Tajikistan, Cambodia, Mol-
dova, Kenya and Armenia are outstanding (ranging from 9.4 to 15.8 in 2010).
Given the actual FDI inflow to middle- and low-income countries, there are
apparently niches for these (in face of average wage differences).
23 https://www.clio‑infra.eu/datasets/indicators.
24 HIC: 34–39 countries. UMC: 32–38 countries. LMC: 28–34 countries (34 from 1970). LIC:
15–26 countries (25–26 from 1960).
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11§12-c Amplification. The communications part of infrastructure
I found no aggregate data for infrastructure (recall from 7§15 that these are also
a gap in the long-run OECD-21 data of before 1995). However, there are data
on the communications part of infrastructure (and, as we will see in the final
section of this chapter, these are very relevant). Graph 11.19 shows the propor-
tions of the population in the high-, middle- and low-income country groups
using the Internet. (Together with formal education this is an important indic-
ator for the degree of widespread information among the population.) In 2015
the middle- and low-income countries indeed move behind the high-income
countries, but especially the upper-middle-income countries kept up fast in the
decade leading up to 2015.
graph 11.19 Individuals using the Internet (% of population); averages of
high-, middle- and low-income countries, 1990–2015
Data source:World Bank, databaseWorld Development Indicators (last updated 15 November
2017; retrieved 17 November 2017)
11§12-d Amplification. Social security transfers
In 11§15 I will refer to social security expenditure (SSE) in the middle- and low-
income countries. There are few standardised data on these. However, the ILO
provides data on SSE between 2000 and 2011 for nearly all world countries.
To these data I have applied the World Bank country income classification.
Table 11.20 shows the results. It can be seen that in 2000 and 2011 there is quite a
gap between the levels of the OECD-21 and other HICs and those of themiddle-
and low-income countries, but that during this period there has been a very
fast increase for the latter (of 24 and 35%).
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table 11.20 State social security expenditure in% of GDP, 2000–11; averages of
World Bank country income categories




high income OECD-21 21/21 21.1 24.7 17.5% 2011
high income HIC* 55/78 15.4 17.4 12.9% ± 1980
upper middle income UMC 44/56 8.0 9.9 24.4% ± 1955
lower middle income LMC 46/52 4.7 6.3 35.5% ± 1945
low income LIC 23/31 3.2 4.4 35.5% ± 1940
† x/x = actual/potential maximum number of countries;
‡ Or nearest year available.
* Including the OECD-21;
** This regards the year around which the OECD-21 reached a similar expenditure (interpol-
ated for 1940 and the semi-decades).
Data source: ILO, database Social Protection25
11§13 International migration of production: diversity of conflicting
interests
International migration of production has very diverse, and conflicting, effects
within the country of emigration as well as within the country of immigra-
tion. This section endeavours to sum these up in a broad manner (precision
would require a single country to single country comparison, as well as a host
of assumptions).
In any case–andpredicatedon theunity of capitalist economies and states –
the state that permits the IMP must conceive this as either being in the dir-
ect interest of the national enterprises and their owners, or indirectly in their
interest because of the state’s requirement of legitimation in the vast major-
ity of the labour population. I note already that the state’s appreciation of
this ‘either/or’ may be different for capital emigrant and capital immigrant
nations.26
25 http://www.socialsecurityextension.org/gimi/gess/ShowSearchIndicators.action
(retrieved 1 November 2017). Excluding the ten countries for which only one datum (2000
or 2011) is available. (Country income classification fromWB; see Table 11.3.)
26 I also note that China – as a main example of a nation that seems to approach these mat-
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Generally there is a positive effect of IMP inflow on the GDP growth and tax
receipts of the nation of immigration of production, and a converse effect on
the nation of emigration.
The opposite wages effects are the essence of the differences (in the emig-
rant nation there is a downward wages effect, and in the immigrant nation
an upward wages effect). This implies that the workers of the different coun-
tries are played out against each other. However, in principle this is not unlike
intra-national inter-sector or regionalmovements of capital. In each case, rates
of unemployment and wage rates tend to equalisation (these are tendencies;
actual equalisation is an often long-run gradual process).
States are not driven by altruism vis-à-vis other states. The opposite effects
on the tax receipts of the nations’ states might give rise to the idea that the
interests of states are counter-posited. However, reasoning from the point of
view of the nation of emigration of production, this would assume that the
state is an actor independent of the capitalist economy and the interests of
capitalist enterprises. In fact the capitalist state grants enterprises the claimed
economic rights (of property in means of production and of exploitation) as
set out in Chapter 6. The expansion of granted property rights to international
migration of production (11§10) is in line with this. This expansion is not only
in the interest of the migrating capital (the holding) but also in the interest of
the non-emigrant enterprises (wages are pressed down) – that is, provided that
with the remaining taxation the level of the accumulation frameworks can be
maintained. The possible downside (and trade-off) is the effect on the state’s
legitimation in the compliance of labour (see 11§15).
From the same point of view (capitalist economic rights) it is rather the pos-
ition of the states of immigration of production (capital inflow) that requires
further consideration.Those states have to convince the current national enter-
prises that even if they are confronted with upward wages, they will benefit
from the future GDP growth effect, and especially from the amelioration of
the ‘capital accumulation frameworks’ (11§12) made possible by the increasing
GDP and the state’s taxes. (When wages increase, taxation of wages is facilit-
ated.)
Ultimately, however, the raising of wages somewhat nearer to theworld aver-
age seems a condition for a stable compliance during production and for the
legitimation of states in the compliance of their national working class.27 (This
ters in a discretionary rather than in a general way – had its netted inflow of FDI peaking
to 5.6% of GDP in 1994, which was down to 0.6% in 2015.
27 ‘World’ average is the general formulation. Much of the FDI regards intra HIC flows
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is indeed a key important factor in a world that has become engrained by inter-
national communication and hence knowledge of world-relative income and
wealth levels.)
Figure 11.21 roughly summarises the various conflicting interests (Amplifica-
tion 11§13-a sets out some qualifications).
figure 11.21 Diversity of conflicting interests upon global migration of pro-
duction
Positive (+), no (0) or negative (–) effect:
changes
Migration of production




tax receipts – + when dominated by
wages-tax effect†
tax associated accumulation of capital
frameworks
– +









n.a.* – frameworks effect‡
of non-migrating enterprises (x/x = same







+/0 –/0 competition effect
0/– 0/+ supply chain effect
–? + framework effect
(whence wages are raised towards the HIC average) and, to a lesser extent, intra MIC flows
(whence wages are raised towards their averages).
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Figure 11.21 Diversity of conflicting interests (cont.)
effect on growth
investment ? +
consumption (labour) – +
state expenditure – +
GDP – +
† Including indirect taxes
* n.a.: not applicable
‡ See 11§12
11§13-a Explication. Some qualifications regarding the IMP conflicts of
interest
Within the confines of the broad outline in this chapter, Table 11.15 is not
very detailed. In general, international immigration of production (netted FDI
inflow) is GDP expanding, like any investment. There are two main issues that
co-determine its effect on the existing enterprises.
First the degree of hidden unemployment and the degree of substitution
between self-employment and wage labour. Whereas netted FDI inflow would
generally increase the wages sum (wL) and each of the wage rate (w) and the
amount of employment (L), their degrees are dependent on the factors just
mentioned. The wage rate will increase at least to some extent because the
immigrant will compete for the best qualified labour.
A second main factor is whether the FDI is fitted into an existing sector-
stratification (Chapter 4) whence it would probably move into its top and
directly compete with the existing national enterprises. (By itself this is not
spectacular because that is also a normal process in the absence of FDI, though
the mechanisms are somewhat different because along with the FDI goes the
technical knowledge.) If, on the other hand, the FDI inflow regards a new sec-
tor (for this economy), there would not be such direct competition. On the
contrary, this would probably be import-substituting and evoke a multiplier
of supply chain effects.
Regarding the first factor above it is to be noted that the amount of poten-
tial wage labour (the ‘extent of the labour market’) is dynamically determined
by population growth as well as by the competition determined overflow of
self-employment to wage-labour. So as to provide an idea about the quantit-
ies involved Table 11.22 provides some ILO data that are categorised regionally
rather than by country income group.
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table 11.22 Wage-labour as a share of wage-labour plus
self-employment; world regions and developed
economies 1999–2013
1999 2013 Change
Africa 24.6 26.2 6%
Asia 30.7 40.2 31%
Latin America and the Caribbean 59.0 62.8 6%
Middle East 71.9 80.3 12%
Eastern Europe and Central Asia 74.9 78.3 4%
Developed economies 84.1 86.4 3%
Data source: ILO, GlobalWage Report 2014/15, Figure 1428
11§14 International migration of production: rupture of the ‘structural
national conservation of capital accumulated’
Recall from 11§7 the ‘structural national conservation of capital accumulated’
in case of international trade. The international movement of capital along
with the international migration of production means that this form of exist-
ence of the international capitalist system is fundamentally different from
international trade.29 With this migration the ‘structural national conserva-
tion of capital accumulated’, vis-à-vis the labour population growth within a
nation, no longer holds. We have effluxes of capital from where it was pro-
duced by labour and appropriated and accumulated by the owners of capital
(cf. 1§12). Concomitantly we have equivalent influxes of capital into the immig-
rant nations. Alongwith itwehave, as indicated (11§13), in the emigrant country
a downward pressure and in the immigrant country an upward pressure on
wages.
28 http://www.ilo.org/global/research/global‑reports/global‑wage‑report/2014/lang‑‑en
/index.htm (excel file data).
29 This also applies for the international capital movement form of international mergers
and take-overs (11§11) in case this is going to result in an international migration of pro-
duction.
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11§14-a Amplification. Winners, losers and winners: national ‘structural
conservation of capital accumulated’ versus its international
breach
Capital is produced by labour, the surplus-value (integral profit) being appro-
priated by the owners of the enterprises (1§14, heading 7). Accumulation of
capital requires labour and it also requires unemployment. This is a harsh core
characteristic of the capitalist system (2D2, in particular 2§6). In a high con-
juncture, when unemployment is waning, labour reaps increasing wages. This
is so when the national ‘structural conservation of capital accumulated’ holds,
that is, in the absence of international migration of production (IMP). With
IMP, however, potentially increasing wages in the country from which capital
emigrates are reaped in the country of immigration. Workers in the country
of emigration feel that this happens behind their backs. They know that the
law (i.e. the rights granted to ‘their’ capitalist) is such that they cannot effect-
ively claim the surplus-value that they produced. Owners of enterprises will
tell them that the international economic constellation enforces emigration of
production.
This is the basis of the workers of the different countries being played
out against each other. Those politically responsible, or commentators, might
argue and judge that this process is morally desirable because in this way inter-
national wages levels become closer. The latter is correct. However, such a
judgement is a partial one in two respects.
First, within the country of emigration the employment effect hits one par-
ticular layer of the labour population, namely those that become unemployed.
This would be different if unemployment would be distributed over the total
labour population viaworktime reduction. (However, as indicated above, accu-
mulation of capital requires unemployment.)
Secondly, the migration of capital is not motivated by this moral judge-
ment (even when the argument and judgement suits enterprises), but rather
by profits higher than the current profits. This means that workers in the coun-
try of emigration bear its downside, whereas the enterprises and their owners
reap extra profit benefits.
11§14-b Amplification. Comparison of international wage rates
Wage rate comparisons for large world country groups are scarce. The ILO
provides such data for the years 2000–15 (but even those are restricted as to
the number of countries). Table 11.32 shows these for the full period as well as,
in face of the crisis-years, decomposed for three sub-periods.
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table 11.23 Average annual real-wage growth 2000–15;World country groups†
%Change: averages per year
Country group Number 2000–15 2000–07 2008–11 2012–15
OECD-21 21/21 0.3 0.5 0.1 0.1
High Income‡ 45/78 1.3 2.0 0.4 0.9
Upper Middle Income 33/56 3.8 4.8 3.1 2.2
Lower Middle Income 22/31 4.7 5.2 3.4 4.1
† Non-weighted averages. For the 12 low-income countries included in the ILO data there are
too many gaps for a proper averages calculation.
‡ Including the OECD-21.
Data source: ILO, GlobalWage Report 2016/1730
It can be seen from the table that for both the total period and all the sub-
periods, real-wages grew on average faster the lower the group income.
11§15 Implications of the tendency to international migration of
production for the constellation of capitalist nations
The tendency to international migration of production has far-reaching con-
sequences for the constellation of capitalist nations.
1 The single nation’s balance of forces as determining the nation’s
reproduction of the capitalist system
Conditioned by state-granted capitalist economic rights, enterprises are ulti-
mately driven by profit and the accumulation of capital, their comparative
success being measured by the rate of profit (Chapters 1 and 6). The reproduc-
tion of the capitalist systemwithin each single nation is at each historical con-
juncture determined by a particular balance of forces. This balance of forces is
different in e.g. 1920, 1980 or 2010. These forces are, most briefly:
(a) The monetary-value productivity of labour, together with the labour-
market-related determinants of wages, as resulting in the rate of surplus-
value (the rate of labour exploitation) and the rate of accumulation of
capital (Chapters 1–2).
(b) The state’s regulatory frameworks of the accumulationof capital and their
articulation with taxation and rates of taxation (Chapter 7).
30 http://www.ilo.org/global/research/global‑reports/global‑wage‑report/2016/lang‑‑en
/index.htm (‘data from the report’).
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(c) The legitimation of the state and hence of the capitalist system in face
of the structure of market wages (cf. point 1) as articulated with taxation-
requiring social security transfers (Chapters 2, 7 and 8).
Very broadly (b) reinforces (a) and the latter again accommodates (c). These
three result in after-tax rates of profit and in the after-taxdistributionof income
and wealth among households (Chapter 8). The degree of widespread inform-
ation about these (engendered by the degrees of widespread public education
and of infra-structural means of communication especially in the form of ICT)
again affects the state’s legitimation and are a catalyst for increasing social
security transfers (10§12; compare Graphs 11.17–11.19).
The resulting single-nation balance of forces stands on itself. However, it is –
given the contingent internationally diverging cultures and politico-economic
ideologies – co-determined by the degree of widespread information about, in
brief, the income and wealth levels and distributions in other nations.
2 The tendency to international migration of production – general
remarks
Even if international trade has, ormay have, uneven effects on nations (11§6), it
does not fundamentally affect a nation’s system-reproductive balance of forces,
especially regarding the ‘structural national conservation of capital accumu-
lated’ (11§7). This is different for the international migration of production
(IMP) – 11§14.
Below I will not further stress that a proper state’s Hard Core framework is
an absolute condition for IMP (11§12).
In what follows I will for convenience keep on using the analytical distinc-
tion between high-, middle- and low-income countries; in fact IMP applies
across the full continuumof single countries, that is, between each of the high-,
middle- and low-income categories, as well as within these.
3 IMP: the effect on wages, taxes and the accumulation of capital
frameworks
I start from the balance of forces components (1) and (2) of the first sub-section
above. Improvements of the state’s capital accumulation frameworks are accel-
erators for the accumulation of capital. The main problem is their take-off.
For many middle- and low-income countries the with IMP-associated general
growth increase, wages increase and along with it the taxation increase, trig-
gers the take-off (cf. 11§13, Figure 11.21). Once this is on substantial track, the
two act as self-reinforcing (yet, further IMP would still step-up the process).
For the countries from which capital emigrates we have contrary effects.
Average wages and the concomitant taxes and framework expenditures
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become gradually under pressure (which need not immediately imply their
actual decrease).
This way the tendency to IMP engenders regarding these factors a very
gradual process of convergence between high-, middle- and low-income coun-
tries.
4 IMP: legitimation in face of the structure of market wages as
articulated with social security transfers
I now turn to the third component of the system-reproductive balance of forces
mentioned in the first sub-section. That is, the legitimation of the state and
hence of the capitalist system in face of the structure of market wages as
articulated with taxation requiring social security transfers (SST). The more
skewed the structure of market wages and of incomes generally, the more are
SST required for the vast-majority-legitimation of the state. As indicated, the
degree of this requirement is catalysed by the degree of widespread informa-
tion about these skewed structures. Thus the development of the accumulation
frameworks (especially widespread public education and the communication
part of infrastructure) affects the SST requirement (cf. Graphs 11.17–11.19 and
Table 11.20).
In the context of the international migration of production (IMP) the inter-
national convergence of SST will move much behind the very gradual conver-
gence of wages and the accumulationof capital frameworks.Nevertheless,with
continued IMP the SST convergence is on the horizon.
For the IMP immigrant nations (especially the middle- and low-income
countries) this causesmeremoderate problems thatmay fit a restructured bal-
ance of forces for these – coming froma relative low, gradually increasingwages
and SST will contribute to the vast-majority-legitimation.31
However, this is quite different for the IMP emigrant nations (especially the
HICs). For these thewages convergencemeans thedampeningof their increase,
and in the end perhaps even their decrease. This by itself affects their vast-
majority-legitimation. Along with the downward pressure on wages and the
concomitant taxation revenue, the finance of SST squeezes (affecting either
the transfers to the broad bottom, or their burden for the broad top of the dis-
tribution of income). The question is for how long this will be sustainable for
the vast-majority-legitimation of the IMP emigrant countries (see also 10D4, to
31 Nevertheless, the further requirement for SST increases with the difference between the
wages of the employed and the resources of those that have no work. Especially the
requirement of pension income transfers also increases with increasing life expectancy –
see Table 11.7 for the different life expectancies around 2015.
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which IMP adds a new dimension). For these countries the balance of forces
regarding the reproduction of the capitalist system risks to be moving to dis-
ruption.
11§15-a Amplification. Risk of disruption of the system-reproductive
balance of forces
Wehave seen in 10D4 (yet abstracting fromthe international constellation) that
continuously increasing SST as a percentage of GDP is for the capitalist system’s
vast-majority-legitimation requirement a necessity as well as an impossibility
(10§12 and 10§14).
International migration of production gradually speeds up for the HICs the
capitalist system’s SST vulnerability, and adds to this a dampening of wage
increases, and perhaps even wage decreases. It seems not unlikely that at least
these IMP consequences evoke the repeal of the state-granted right to the emig-
ration of capital (11§10).
Summary and conclusions
The exposition in the main systematic sections of Chapters 1–10 was about
each full-fledged capitalist nation.The current chaptermade explicit that these
nations are different regarding: (1) their geographical location; (2) the historical
point in time at which they became full-fledged capitalist as conditioned by
their state’s granting of capitalist Hard Core rights as concretised in the Hard
Core legislative frameworks; (3) the degree of intensity of all the other legislat-
ive frameworks; (4) given the population of a country, the degree of the reached
accumulation of capital – that degree being co-determined by the legislative
‘accumulation of capital frameworks’.32 This chaptermade further explicit that
for profit reasons capitalist enterprises seek to expand across national borders.
Given the exposition inPartsOne andTwo, the current Part (chapter)merely
focused on the capitalist system’s ‘international mode of existence’ insofar as
it affects the earlier exposition of the conditions for the reproduction of the
capitalist system – as well as the conclusions drawn from it. Abstracting from
contingencies – as in the earlier exposition – this regards mainly ‘the tendency
to the international migration of production’ (one form of the international
32 The Hard Core frameworks are those of ‘granted legal capitalist economic rights’, ‘granted
legal allowance rights to existence’, and ‘public security’ (Ch. 6). The Capital Accumula-
tion frameworks regard the ‘monetary’, ‘labour-capacity’ (including formal education) and
‘infrastructural’ frameworks (Ch. 7).
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movement of capital), and one aspect of ‘the tendency to international trade’.
Throughout the chapter – and especially its Amplifications – these tenden-
cies were presented in reference to theWorld Bank country income classifica-
tion of ‘High Income’, ‘UpperMiddle Income’, ‘LowerMiddle Income’ and ‘Low
Income’. (Division 1.)
In much of its impetus, international trade is not fundamentally different
from intra-national regional sector-wise specialisation of production. As a res-
ult, it does not affect the ‘structural conservation of capital accumulated’ vis-à-
vis the labour population growth within a nation. However, much of the inter-
national trade has uneven effects between nations.
International trade affects the degree of versatility of the national sector-
structures of production. This implies that once a nation ‘freely’ decided to
engage in international trade, voluntary (‘free’) trade turns into enforced trade,
together with the concomitant terms of trade. Any intended re-increase of ver-
satility, if possible at all, will takemuch time; and along with it the establishing
of (selective) trade barriers will meet counter measures.
International trade has a positive effect on the world average surplus-value
of enterprises because this trade presses down – directly or indirectly – the
price of the real-wage bundle. However, the less versatile a nation’s production
structure has grown, themore it is forced to import at whatever the worldmar-
ket price is. This means, or may mean, that the international trade effect on
surplus-value is an internationally uneven one for national enterprises.
Finally, because of the concomitant transport, international trade reinforces
environmental damages. Given the developed international sector-structures
of production this could be resolved only in a distant future (via rounds of ‘gen-
eral non-trade agreements’). (Division 2.)
The ‘internationalmigrationof production’ (IMP) is, next to the ‘international
centralisation and concentration of capital’ (ICC), one of the two main forms
of the ‘international movement of capital’. On a substantial world scale these
are fairly recent phenomena. (Until about 1990 the international movement of
capital, measured as ‘foreign direct investment’, stayed within bounds of 1% of
world GDP.)
Whereas ICC greatly affects the degree of economic power as concentrated
within single enterprises, the latter as a tendency force and its results is not
specifically an international phenomenon affecting the reproduction of the
capitalist system. This is different for the tendency to international migration
of production (IMP).
With actualmigrationof production, the ‘structural national conservationof
capital accumulated’ vis-à-vis the labour population growthwithin a nation no
longer holds.We have effluxes of capital fromwhere it was produced by labour
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and appropriated and accumulated by the owners of capital. All the further
specificities and effects of IMP in fact result from the rupture of this ‘conserva-
tion’.
The world’s nations can be classified as ‘High Income’, ‘Upper Middle In-
come’, ‘Lower Middle Income’ and ‘Low Income’ counties. More specifically
these can be pictured as a stratification of nations characterised by the fol-
lowing factors that are most relevant to the IMP perspective: (1) average wages
levels; (2) taxation of wages (tax receipts being dependent on the wage levels);
(3) levels of the state ‘accumulation of capital frameworks’ (the state’s means
for it being tax-dependent); (4) the degree of legitimation of the state and
hence of the capitalist system in face of the structure of market wages (cf.
factor 1) as articulatedwith taxation-requiring social security transfers. A coun-
try’s population’s degree of widespread information about the skewedness-
structure of wages levels, and of incomes generally, is a catalyst for the required
level of social security transfers (SST).
The profit-driven IMP (movements along the stratification) is – given the
required Hard Core framework – primarily determined by the (potentially
migrating) enterprises’ weighing up of factors (1) and (3): wage levels against
‘accumulation of capital frameworks’. Actual IMP pushes up the growth of
factors (1) through (3) in the country of immigration, and down in the coun-
try of emigration. For each of these countries – on a larger scale country
groups – the (1) through (3) effects are self-reinforcing.Thisway the tendency to
IMP engenders, regarding these factors, a very gradual process of convergence
between high-, middle- and low-income countries.
This gradual convergence also affects factor (4) above. For the IMP immig-
rant nations (especially themiddle- and low-income countries) not only wages
but also SST levels tend to be pushed up. This is so because the accumulation
frameworks encompass the components of public education and of the com-
munications part of infrastructure (especially ICT); these affect the degree of
widespread information in general, and so also the SST-catalysing widespread
information about the skewedness-structure of wages and other income levels.
This implies that also a gradual convergence of international SST levels is on the
(far) horizon. Coming from a relative low, each of the gradual increases in aver-
age wages and in SST will contribute to the vast-majority-legitimation in the
middle- and low-income countries.
As a tendency the legitimation effects are opposite for IMP emigrant nations
(foremost the high-income countries). For these the wages convergence im-
plies the dampening of their increase, and in the end perhaps even their
decrease. This by itself affects their vast-majority-legitimation. Along with the
downward pressure on wages and the concomitant taxation revenue, the fin-
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ance of SST squeezes (affecting either the transfers to the broadbottom, or their
burden for the broad top of the distribution of income). This means that with
further increasing IMP, the vast-majority-legitimation in these countries tends
to become increasingly under pressure. (Division 4.)
Conclusions in reference to themain conclusions of Chapter 10
Chapter 10 (10D4) summed up the four main vulnerabilities of the reach of the
capitalist state and hence of the reproduction of the capitalist system. Here I
briefly return to these in international context – given that Chapter 11 merely
focused on the capitalist system’s ‘international mode of existence’ insofar as it
affects the earlier exposition.
(1) The inevitably increasing quantity and complexity of regulation. For many
middle- and low-income countries (MLIC) this may as yet not be acute, but as
for the high-income countries (HIC) they will increasingly be confronted with
it.
(2) The insecurities regarding the sufficient regulation of ‘too big to fail’ entit-
ies – especially banks. Here the same applies as under (1). (Note that in 2015 the
MLIC China hosts four of the five largest banks in the world, and 13 of the 50
largest.)
(3) The insecurities regarding the environment restoration. The HICs have
been the primemovers of the damage. TheMLICs can claim that the HICs have
to take the lead in a major degree, the MLICs themselves having other prior-
ities. In any case, for the survival of the capitalist system (and humankind in
general), a vast restructuring of at least theHIC economies is inevitable (68%of
world GDP in 2015). Chapter 11made explicit that, in face of long distance trans-
port, international trade engendered the snare of decreasing versatile national
sector-structures of production and hence of enforced international trade and
enforced long distance transport.
(4) The increase in the level of the social security transfers in percentage of
GDP. It was concluded that whereas increasing social security transfers (SST)
as a percentage of GDP is necessary for the vast-majority-legitimation of the
state, the increases’ fading off is equally necessary for the state’s vast-majority-
legitimation. The 11D3 outline of the ‘tendency to the international migration
of production’ added to this the tendential downward pressure on HIC aver-
age wages, and conversely for MLIC average wages. Given the world nations’
unevenGDP per capita levels, the tendency-convergences of averagewages and
of SST tend to be associated with a process of conversely uneven vast-majority-
legitimation. This adds to the future system-reproductive vulnerability of the
(yet) HICs. In the (very) long-term, however, the HICs show amirror to the (yet)
MLICs: ‘De te fabula narratur’ (of you the tale is told).
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Appendix 11.A. Additional detailed graphs and data information
Re 11§4-a International trade 1960–2015
Graph 11.8 presented the development of world exports 1960–2015.Graph 11.8-a
decomposes these for the high-, middle- and low-income countries (including
their export–import balances). We see that from 1960 until 2007 the exports
of all four country categories fluctuate, though in the same upward direction.
Thereafter we see a flattening off or a decline (it is too early to judge whether
this marks a structural change).
graph 11.8-a Exports and External Balance of high-, middle- and low-income
countries, as% of their GDP; 1960–2015
Data source:World Bank,WorldDevelopment Indicators; update: 17November 2016 (accessed
9 December 2016). LMC 2015=2014
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Re 11§10-b International movement of capital asmeasured by ‘Foreign Direct
Investment’ (FDI) and its pattern 1970–2015
graph 11.12-a FDI inflows and outflows as% of GDP, average of upper-
middle-income countries; 1970–2015
Data source: see Graph 11.11
graph 11.12-b FDI inflows and outflows as% of GDP, average of lower-middle-
income countries; 1970–2015
Data source: see Graph 11.11
graph 11.12-c FDI inflows and outflows as% of GDP, average of low-income
countries; 1970–2015
Data source: see Graph 11.11
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Re 11§12-b Expenditure on formal education (Graph 11.17)
Below are the number of data that are available for each year and country cat-
egory.
Countries Number of data for Graph 11.17
1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015
HIC 78 25 31 35 38 46 49 56 56 58 55
UMC 56 14 14 22 23 28 30 40 41 41 33
LMC 52 19 19 19 16 18 29 41 39 44 31
LIC 31 7 6 12 12 15 12 22 21 27 27
The robustness tests that I did (for example, excluding countries with less than
four data) did not fundamentally change the pattern of the graph.
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chapter 12
General summary and conclusions
Note: ‘c.o.e.’ abbreviates conditions of existence and ‘manif.’ manifestations
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576 part four – summary and additions
Subject and general aim
This book is about ‘full-fledged’ capitalism, which emerges when not merely
trade but also the production process is dominated by themonetary dimension
and profit. The book’s aim is to systematically identify the interconnection of
the relations, institutions and processes that are necessary for the continued
reproduction of the capitalist system – that is, the capitalist economy together
with the capitalist state. This results in a synthetic outline of the constellation
and functioning of the capitalist system. In short, the aim is to comprehend the
capitalist system. Conscious change within and beyond the capitalist system
requires its comprehension – in this I am an ardent pupil of Marx. In line with
the systematic-dialectical method adopted to achieve this systematic compre-
hension, the book is therefore restricted to a systematic synthetic exposition of
the capitalist system. The exposition’s systematic entails the abstraction from
contingencies.
Part One presents the ‘capitalist economy’, and Part Two the ‘capitalist state’.
In Part Three, these are considered in international context. Each of the sub-
sequent chapters of Part One has its sequel in each of the subsequent chapters
of Part Two.
In this summary of the book I adopt its rigorous order of the exposition,
which is the zigzag one, that is the chapter order of the expositional levels [1;6],
[2;7] and so on (General Introduction C§4).
The use of some uncommon terms cannot always be evaded in this sum-
mary; for a brief explanation the reader might turn to the Glossary. Some foot-
notes in this summary are addressed to readers acquaintedwithMarx’s Capital
and currentmarxian political economy. These footnotes are starred (*) and can
be skipped by other readers.
1 The starting point: dissociated outward bifurcation (1D1 and 6D1)1
The starting point of the book is the ‘dissociated outward bifurcation’ (insti-
tutional separation) between households and privately owned enterprises.
Enterprises claim the entitlement to property in the earth and other means
of production. The capitalist state as extraordinary social institution grants
these claims in the form of rights (1D1, 6D1, 6D2).2 The rest of the book sets
out how this separation is bridged such that the capitalist system can be
a potentially continuous (a ‘reproducing’) constellation. The main elements
1 The reader who turns to this summary before having read anything else of the book is
informed that 1D1 (etc.) refers to Chapter 1, Division 1; 1§1 (etc.) refers to Chapter 1, section
1.
2 The first ground of the state being an extraordinary social institution is presented in 6D3.
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of this bridging are called the ‘conditions of existence’ or the ‘grounding mo-
ments’ of this separation.
2 Capitalist production and its grounding by the capitalist state
(Chapters 1 and 6)3
The poles of the outward bifurcation are apparently bridged via trade rela-
tions. However, the inherently multifaceted dimensions of goods and capacit-
ies require commensuration in terms of a common denominator.4* The latter
derives from the everydaymarket ‘trans-abstraction’ that ascribes to goods and
capacities the super-sensuous dimension of ‘value’ as mediated by money –
money, which itself has no inherent content or value. Entities are made com-
mensurate in termsof this super-sensuous valuedimension thatwe ‘know’ only
through money as its quantifier, a quantifier whose physical form is insignific-
ant. The market interaction thus constitutes goods and capacities as commod-
ities, that is, as dual (or inwardly bifurcated) entities – duality along the mul-
tifaceted dimensions of usefulness on the one hand, and the mono-dimension
of monetary-value on the other.5*
The monetary-value dimension and the commodification of goods and la-
bour-capacity determine the market-interconnection of the poles, the enter-
prises being driven bymonetary profit. Themarket-interconnection engenders
the duality of things and capacities. (1D1–1D4.)
Thismono-drive of monetary profit is concretely dominant for what is (not)
produced andhow it is (not) produced in enterprises. It affectswhat counts and
what does not count. Astonishingly the super-sensuousness of the monetary-
value of things and capacities affects their sensuous being, and coming into
being. Further: sensuous physical-technical productionbecomes amere instru-
ment for valorisation – the production of monetary-value, or value-added. This
characterises the general formof the capitalist production process (1D5, subA).
3 The general summary of Chapter 1 below is not much different from the summary at the end
of that chapter.
4 *In the current context the main capacity is labour-capacity (the capacity to labour). Here
I revert to the term that Marx used until about 1865, instead of his later ‘labour-power’. One
reason for adopting the term ‘labour-capacity’ is that, in my view, the term more appropri-
ately covers the concept (i.e. of potential activity). Another reason is that I introduce later on
the term ‘productive power of labour’ (a refinement of labour productivity), which I would
not want to have confused with ‘labour-power’.
5 *When henceforth I use the terms ‘value’, ‘value-added’, ‘surplus-value’ and ‘profit’ tout court,
these are without exception in the ‘monetary-value dimension’. (The concept and term of so-
called ‘labour values’ form no part of my vocabulary. Incidentally it is worthwhile to remind
the reader that Marx never used this term in Capital.)
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However, this general form lacks a criterion for determining what instru-
mental guise – what physical commodity and what physical technique – is
most efficacious for profit. This requires: first, a common measure for the
amount of investments, which is ‘capital’; secondly, the grasping of time of
investment as ‘production time’; and thirdly, ameasure for the duration of cap-
ital investment in terms of a standard time, which is the calendar year.6* The
profit – more precisely the surplus-value – gained during a year, over a year’s
capital investment, that is, the ‘rate of integral profit’, delivers the criterion.7*
Given the enterprises’ profit drive, the productionmust encompass the equi-
valent of the value-added component of profit. Even if the general form of the
capitalist production process is dominated by monetary-value and valorisa-
tion, it necessarily also remains a physical-technical process, hence it remains
a dual process. Within this duality the main distinction between means of
production and labour-capacity (L) is that the former are inherently static ele-
ments, whereas labour-capacity in operation, that is labour (Lα), is the active
element. Means of production can merely be operated or not be operated.
Labour-capacity operates means of production, and so exerts labour at some
productive power (α), including a component of the intensity of labour. At zero
intensity (in effect a strike) there is no production, either physical or valorisa-
tion. Along with its physical production, labour creates the (as yet potential)
value and value-added and so the surplus-value. (More precisely labour cre-
ates the value-addedmLα, where ‘m’ is the actual unitmonetary-value of labour.
Whence we have for the surplus-valueΠ =mLα –wL, whereΠ denotes surplus-
value and wL the wages sum.) Thus alpha (α) is the ‘parameter’ of the product-
ive transformation: the productive power of labour in both of the dual aspects.8
Whereas capital constrains the possible production, the power of labour (α)
determines how much output is actually produced. The implication is that
labour–more specifically, the actual productivepowerof labour– is theunique
source of valorisation. Nevertheless this productive power is always based on a
going technique of production. Technology and its application in specific tech-
niques is inevitably the result of social labour.9*
6 * This part of the exposition in Chapter 1 (production time and duration of capital invest-
ment) incorporates in a condensed way the problematic of Marx’s Part Two of Capital II.
7 * Thus the rate of integral profit = (surplus-value)/(capital). I wished that I could have called
this (less artificial) ‘the rate of surplus-value’. Novice readers would have understood this, but
it would have been most confusing for marxian political economists.
8 Labour is not merely in capitalism but also transhistorically the sole determining factor of
physical production as indicated in the previous paragraph. However, only when production
is dissociated as in full-fledged capitalism is it also the creator of monetary-value-added.
9 * Readers acquainted with marxian political economy (MPE) will see how this diverges from
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Labour being the creator of value-added, it is ‘compensated’ just by the
wage, with the enterprise appropriating the surplus-value, that is, the differ-
ence between value-added and the wage. Surplus-value is generally the source
of the growth of capital. Because labour is the unique source of valorisation
and hence of surplus-value, labour essentially produces the equivalent of its
ownwage as well as that of the growth of capital. Hence labour essentially pro-
duces capital. (1D5.)
With labour’s production of surplus-value as appropriated by the enter-
prises, the enterprises’ driving force has been given content. It appears to
resolve in a major degree the enterprises’ dissociated production and so the
starting point’s dissociated outward bifurcation (so concludes Chapter 1).
However, enterprises can merely claim to be entitled to this appropriation
of the surplus-value produced by labour. The state grants this claim in the form
of a right to this appropriation. I called this ‘granted right’ together with the
granted rights to private property in the earth and other means of produc-
tion (section 1 above): the core ‘capitalist economic rights’ granted by the state.
This is what constitutes the state as ‘capitalist state’ (6D2). For doing so the
state must seek legitimation in the compliance of the vast majority of actors.
The first, yet abstract-general, condition for this legitimation is that the state
posits its (non-)action in terms of the (putative) general interest, and that it
posits granted rights in the form of legal rights. The state so posits itself as an
‘impartial’ extraordinary institution above and outside the opposing particular
economic interests. However, given that the state de facto grants the core capit-
alist economic claims in the form of rights, it constitutes vis-à-vis the capitalist
economy a separation-in-unitywithin the capitalist system (6D3).
The concretisation of the seeking of this legitimation is the key continu-
ous theme throughout the exposition of the capitalist state (Chapters 6–10).
standard MPE. Firstly, I introduce the rate of integral profit early on in the exposition –
because it is the major general criterion for capitalist production. Secondly, I take distance
from any (remnants of) a homogeneous labour value-productivity approach (whence I have
Lα and hence – depending on the size of labour’s productive power α – diverging rates of
surplus-value). Thus I have from beginning to end dimensionally a so-called ‘single system’
approach (or, in the standard terminology, any ‘transformation’ in this respect is redundant
from Chapter 1 onwards). In fact this is an aside. The substantial point is not only that the
productive power of labour is always based on a going technique of production, but also and
foremost that technology and its application in specific techniques is inevitably the result of
social labour (it is not something that capitalists dream up).
Whereas Marx in his 1864/65 draft manuscript for Part Two of Capital III posits in effect
sector-wise diverging rates of surplus-value (that is, after the transformation), I start with
diverging rates – not as a matter of distribution, but as a matter of labour’s productive power.
(On these and other differences, see the addenda 1§14-c and 1§15-a.)
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Analogously, the production and validation of surplus-value (integral profit) is
the key continuous theme throughout the exposition of the capitalist economy
(Chapters 1–5).
Throughout Part Two of the book, themain systematic clusters of the state’s
legislation are named ‘frameworks’ of legislation and other regulation. In terms
of conditions of the capitalist economic rights granted (6D2), the three ‘prox-
imate’ frameworks of legislation are those of, now, legal capitalist economic
allowance rights (6D4), of legal allowance rights to existence (6D5), and of pub-
lic security as including the upholding of the law (6D6). (‘Proximate’ conditions
are – at that and each further point of the exposition – the immediate andmost
general conditions for that whichwas posited before. ‘Allowance right’ refers to
the duty of non-obstruction of a right. It does not impose the duty of provid-
ing the allowance right holders with the means to exist or with property in the
earth and in other means of production, in which case there would be a ‘posit-
ive right’ – 6§17.)
3 Accumulation of capital and its furthering by the state (Chapters 2
and 7)
The rationale of the enterprises’ production for the sake of one-dimensional
profit (1D5 above) is to acquire more of the same. This is reached by the invest-
ment of profit as accumulated capital (2D1). Within the limits of the intensity
of labour and of technical change, there are threemajor conditions for the con-
tinued accumulation of capital.
The first condition: expanding labour-capacity. At each state of technology,
the continuous accumulation of capital requires an expanding labour pop-
ulation such that the expanding production is fed. However, the quantitat-
ive labour population growth is beyond the control of enterprises. The same
applies for its qualitative level: the scope of technical change is limited by the
prevailing degree of formal education. At a given growth in labour popula-
tion, the rate of accumulation of capital is ultimately determined by the rate
of unemployment – thus, in face of wage pressures, the accumulation of cap-
ital requires unemployment.10 (2D2.)
Given the labour-capacity available, themanagement of the enterpriseman-
ages what I call the ‘enterprise–labour relation’. This is the employment rela-
tion at the point of production through which surplus-value is extracted from
labour (cf. 1D5 above), as constrained by, first, the technique of production,
10 Thus we have before us a mode of production that requires not only growth of labour-
capacity, but so much growth that there is continuous unemployment.
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second, the rate of unemployment, and third (in face of that rate), the man-
agement of the compliance of labour during production, as assisted by the
managerial devise of a wages ladder that optimises this compliance. (2D3.)
The second condition: expansion of money. The accumulation of capital
equally requires an accommodating expansion of money. This could be accom-
plished by an economy-immanent fragmented banking system, based on a
separation-in-unity between enterprises and banks. Banks concretely create
quantities of money, based on a reciprocal credit relation with their clients.
Banks thus ‘pre-validate’ the future production of enterprises. (No state – or
no state-instituted Central Bank – is required for this creation of credit money.
This is what commercial banks do, andwhat they also predominantly do when
there is a Central Bank). Nevertheless, the domain of operation of such banks
tends to be limited. Limited also are the means, between these banks, for the
enforcement of sound security and liability conventions. (2D4–2D5.)
The third condition: incorporation. Small enterprises can comeand go as non-
incorporated firms. However, the continuity of the accumulation of capital
by medium and large-scale enterprises generally requires their incorporation.
Incorporation is driven by perils around succession, by limitation and spread
of risk and uncertainty, and by limits regarding the scale of production. The
corporate form of the enterprise entails a layered form of its ownership. The
shareholders are the owners of the enterprise’s equity, which is ‘passive capital’,
and with it the owners of the enterprise. However, the enterprise as corporate
body is the owner of the ‘active capital’, which is administered by the executive
management of the corporation. (2D6.)
The last division of Chapter 2 posits the corporate enterprise in the perspect-
ive of the exposition’s starting point of privately owned enterprises (cf. 1D1
above). Along with the shareholder’s objective to limit and to spread its risk
and uncertainty, we have a detached form of passive capital ownership. The
ownership of a particular enterprise is not the capital owner’s object, but
rather an instrument for its passive capital ownership in general. Although for
an individual enterprise the ‘active capital’ (assets) and the ‘passive capital’
(liabilities) are inherently inseparable, the detached form of passive capital
ownership makes the accumulation of passive capital into a separate motive,
whence the accumulation of capital (2D1) now appears as a disunited two-
fold accumulation of capital. Nevertheless some enterprise must be the neces-
sary instrument for the detached capital ownership. This way the concrete
directly exploitative ‘enterprise–labour relation’ (2D3 above) is reflected in
the actually abstract indirect exploitative relation between the passive cap-
ital owner and labour, that is, the actually abstract ‘capital–labour relation’.
(2D7.)
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The next paragraphs turn to the state’s furthering of the accumulation of
capital (Chapter 7).
The state’s carrying out its ‘functions’ (Chapter 6) is predicated on its mater-
ial existence. This requires taxation, whence it is, paradoxically, compelled
to override property right in name of its definition of the (putative) general
interest. Because the (potential) action radius of the state is determined by the
tax base, it must seek to increase that base – so as to reach feasible tax rates –
by furthering the conditions for the accumulation of capital and along with it
the conditions for economic growth (7D1). The following three legislative and
regulative frameworks are geared to this.
Monetary framework. Limiting banking to licensees, the major concern of
this framework is to bind banks to sound security and liability rules (‘pruden-
tial regulation’), the ultimate penalty for deviation from those rules being the
withdrawal of the licence. A second major concern is achieving ‘price stabil-
ity’ (in fact ‘creeping inflation’). The state can try to influence the interest rate,
but it has virtually no means to control the quantity of money and credit. It is
the commercial banks that predominantly undertake the money creation, and
hence accommodate the accumulation of capital and economic growth. This
poses the main dilemma of the state’s monetary policy: tight prudential regu-
lation affects the banks’ accommodation of economic growth. This is also the
main dilemma regarding the phenomenon that became manifest in the early
twenty-first century: monetary-system-shaking banks that are ‘too big to fail’
and moreover organisationally too complex to supervise micro-wise. (7D2.)
Labour-capacity framework. Enterprises cannot control the quantity and
quality of the labour population (cf. 2D2). The state attempts to regulate the
quantity through a minimum wages policy (one sufficient for population
growth), through child benefits and through unemployment payments that
tide over business cycle recessions. It regulates the qualitymainly through pub-
lic education. (7D3.)
Infrastructural framework. A third condition for the accumulation of capital
that ‘the capitalist economy’ could secure only poorly relates to the infrastruc-
ture. (7D4.)
A final key framework is that of social security transfers (regardingmainly old
age, health and incapacity). This is no direct condition for the accumulation of
capital, but rather a condition for the legitimation of the state in the compli-
ance of the vast majority of actors (cf. 6D3 above). Because the legitimation
of the state is a sine qua non for the existence of the capitalist system, these
transfers are an indirect condition for the accumulation of capital. (7D5.) (The
easiest way to illustrate the systemic necessity of these transfers is to anticipate
8D5 where it is shown that without these transfers – in 2010 at least – on aver-
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age 30% of the population of the 21 most advanced capitalist countries would
live below the poverty line.)
Conflicts and conflict modification. This completes the exposition of the
seven main legislative frameworks: those of legal economic rights (6D4), legal
existence rights (6D5), public security (6D6), money and banking (7D2), la-
bour-capacity (7D3), infrastructure (7D4), and social security (7D5). All these
frameworks are necessary for the existence of the capitalist system, as well as
conflicting.
A theme running throughout the exposition of the state that I have not
emphasised so far is the state’s continuous effort to ‘purify’ its core adminis-
trative body from conflict. It does so by delegating conflicting regulation and
supervision to ‘independent’ authorities including the Central Bank and a large
variety of inspectorates and councils. These bodies like to be called ‘independ-
ent technocratic’. However, in the face of conflict resolution, it is foremost in
the interest of the state to ‘advertise’ these bodies as being independent.
The settlement of major conflicts is further grounded in two major insti-
tutional ‘assigning separations’ (rather than ‘delegations’) within the state,
between on the one hand the state’s coreAdministrative body, and on the other
hand the bodies of a legitimising Judiciary and a legitimising Deliberative.
With the necessary arbitration and sanctioning of deviations from the law
(cf. 6D3 and 6D6), the state gets involved with conflicting claims to right that
erode both its reference to the general interest and its self-imposition as an
extraordinary impartial institution. This is resolved by assigning the arbitra-
tion and sanctioning to a separated off judiciary, whence the state purifies itself
from the conflicts concerned. (7D6.)
The Deliberative is the necessary political arena of conflict and so a mode
for recurrent conflict settlement.11 Through this assigning separation, the core
of the state is equally purified from conflict, so that it can execute the granting
of the core economic entitlement claims in the form of law, and execute the
frameworks of furthering the conditions for economic growth and so for the
accumulation of capital. (7D7.)12
11 ‘Deliberative’ is a general notion. All of the current OECD-21 countries practice forms of
parliamentary representative democracy – the character of the assignation differs. A com-
mon and equal suffrage (also called universal suffrage) for the election of parliamentswas,
on average for these countries, introduced in 1899 for men, and in 1929 also for women.
12 In general the exposition is not about desirability or undesirability, but rather about insti-
tutions and processes in their effect, which in these cases is the ‘shielding’ of the main
body of the state.
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4 The finance of enterprises, the expenditure and finance of the state,
and their effect on themacroeconomic validation of surplus-value
and on the distribution of income andwealth (Chapters 3 and 8)
The first section of Chapter 3 guides the reader through this chapter, distin-
guishing between ‘active capital’ (enterprises’ assets) and ‘passive capital’ (the
finance of the assets). Along with it surplus-value (the result of production) is
qua distribution decomposed into ‘internal profit’ (the sum of dividends and
retained profit) and ‘interest’ (as distributed to banks and other financiers).
(3D1.)13|14*
Amain requirement for the accumulation of capital and economic growth is
that banks ‘pre-validate’ the future production of enterprises by their creation
of credit money (cf. 2D4 above). Through it, banks are also inevitably and con-
tinuously the initial macroeconomic financiers of enterprises. The banks’ ‘pre-
validating finance’ (PVF) of enterprises is not only unconditionally necessary
to the capitalist system; it is also fundamentally different from any other type
of finance. It is a pure ex-nihilo accounting money operation, which requires
no saving – neither prior to the investment that it accommodates, nor after it.
Generally, therefore, saving is not necessary to the capitalist system. In fact sav-
ing is a nuisance for enterprises because it hampers the redemption of their
debt with banks. If there would be no saving, the banks’ PVF could simply be
redeemedout of the proceeds fromproduction.Thiswould thenbe followedby
a new sequence of PVF, production, validation of production and redemption
of the PVF and so forth. (3D2.)15
In practice enterprises are confronted with ubiquitous savings, which ham-
per the PVF redemption. These savings may substitute ex post for the non-
redeemed part of the PVF, whence there are, ex post, types of finance other
than the banks’ PVF, such as shares and bonds. Froma systematic point of view,
all other types of finance derive from the bank-provided PVF. All these non-PVF
types finance already accumulated capital, or ready investments on the basis of
the PVF. Therefore, generally, saving does not precede investment; investment
is not financed ‘out of ’ saving.Macroeconomically, only the bank-provided PVF
finances the accumulation of capital. (3D3.)
13 See the summary in Figures 3.2a and 3.2b.
14 * From the perspective of marxian political economy, ‘rent’ seems to be missing here as a
separate category (cf. Marx’s Capital III, Part Six). Appendix 3C sets out why and how any
rent that enterprises pay is a share in their surplus-value (as is interest).
15 The exposition in 3D2 and in the following 3D3 is based on the Monetary Circuit theory.
The exposition takes distance from the loanable funds view of banking. (See Addenda
3§2-e. and 3§6-a.)
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The previous results (3D2 and 3D3) apply to existing enterprises as well as to
newly founded ones. Division 3D4 briefly sets out how the foundation of banks
themselves also proceeds by a PVF, now to the founders of banks. This division
thus provides the systematic (rather than historical) grounds for the starting
point’s capital accumulated (cf. 1D1 above).16*
Whereasmacroeconomic investment is independent of saving, thepurchase
of financial paper (often misleadingly called portfolio ‘investment’ rather than
finance) is not independent of saving. Not only is there no macroeconomic ex
ante equality of saving and investment, nor is there a macroeconomic ex post
equality of saving and investment (the positing of such an equality in most of
economics is a categoricalmistake, confusing expenditure and saving). (3D5.)17
The sequential character of the interconnected processes of pre-validation,
production, validation and distribution of output and surplus-value is essential
to a capitalist economy.Thedegree of redemptionof thepre-validating finance,
as well as the validation of surplus-value (integral profit), is conditioned on
the macroeconomic effective demand. In line with a Kalecki type of approach
it is posited that – at the stage of exposition of Chapter 3 (abstracting from
the state and international relations) – the macroeconomic validation of the
surplus-value produced is determined by investment (positively), the con-
sumption by capital owners (positively), and the saving by labour (negatively).
(3D5.) Taking the state into account, the macroeconomic validation of the
surplus-value produced is additionally determined by the total of the state
expenditure (positively) and the saving out of the state’s wages and transfers
(negatively). (8D3.) The distribution of surplus-value (to banks, capital owners
and as retained profits) inevitably follows after the validation, whence there is
no investment out of a pre-existing surplus-value. This is how the investment–
saving dynamic is connected to the investment–surplus-value dynamic.
(3D5.)
I now turn to state expenditure and its finance in more detail (Chapter 8).
16 * At the end of Capital, Volume I, Marx has a famous and interesting chapter on, what he
calls, the initial accumulation of capital – describing the historical transition from feud-
alism to capitalism. That chapter has been interpreted as providing the grounding for his
starting point in Capital. In my view, however, a systematic exposition should endeavour
to provide its grounds systematically rather than historically (allotting the history to an
addendum).
17 Thus I posit thatmacroeconomicallywe have generally I ≠ S. On this inequality I challenge
a broader spectrum thanmerely the mainstream orthodoxy. The conventional I = S defin-
ition is ultimately based on the view that the investment equivalent of ex post retained
profits is a saving rather than an expenditure! (3§9 and 3§-a.)
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Economically the state ‘produces’ the content of the economic rights frame-
work and the frameworks furthering the accumulation of capital as presented
in Chapters 6–7. For it, the state employs wage labour (i.e. civil servants) and
purchases inputs from enterprises, but it tends to make no profits. Moreover,
it distributes its produce for free as collective goods and services. Next to the
state’s expenditure on its production, its expenditure includes transfers in the
form of, mainly, social security and interest. (8D1.)
Taxation is a necessary, and main, form of finance of the state. Next to this
finance, the state may contingently collect social security contributions, and
it may contingently collect other receipts (mainly) from royalties, sale of state
services, and dividends of state-owned enterprises. Finally, the state may con-
tingently borrow to finance any budget deficit (or lend in case of a surplus).
The state’s finance, in its particular forms, grounds the state’s expenditures and
hence the moments prior to it. (8D2.)
As already indicated, all of the state’s expenditures – though apart from the
savings out of the state’s wages and transfers – end up as expenditures with
enterprises, and so also realise a major part of their surplus-value. Increases
of state expenditure increase the production and validation of surplus-value –
vice versa for expenditure decreases. (8D3.)
Part of this state-accommodated surplus-value is distributed to the state
via taxation of surplus-value (or narrower, taxation of profit). Thus, for enter-
prises in macroeconomic perspective, the benefits from state expenditure are
in part offset by these taxes. These taxes are the enterprises’ costs of the state’s
granting and upholding of their legal core economic rights to property and to
employ labour, as well as its accommodation of the accumulation of capital
(that is, the costs of the seven legislative frameworks as presented in Chapters
6–7). Thus, these are the costs for the state’s accommodation of the enterprises’
employment (use) of labour in general – notmerely those that stem from extra
surplus-value along with extra state expenditure.
In principle all state expenditure might be financed by taxation of surplus-
value. From the perspective of labour it is immaterial where the taxes on
surplus-value are levied (either at the point where it is generated within enter-
prises, or at the point where it has been distributed to financiers). In practice
the state acts such that enterprises and capital owners ‘share’ the taxation with
taxation of the wages income of labour. (8D4.)
The final division of this chapter is an exposition of the particular forms of
taxation in their effect on the distribution of the income and wealth of house-
holds. Households as such are, without further specification, not directly iden-
tified as workers’ or capital owners’ households, but rather as households that
have some share in the income from wages or from surplus-value.
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The main forms of taxation include taxes on profits, on property value and
property income, on labour income, and on products. In principle the state
might choose between these forms or combinations thereof. Some form of
taxation being necessary, it is contingent which particular form or forms are
actually applied, and to what extent. Taxation has inevitably non-neutral dis-
tributive effects on income and wealth. This applies for the particular form of
taxation and also for the design of tax rates (regressive, flat, progressive). More
specifically, a flat tax rate is not more neutral than a non-flat one. Any actual
form and design of taxation is inevitably based on a normative stance. This
has no effect on the fact that with a more skewed households distribution of
income,more savings press downprofits. Thus progressive taxes support enter-
prises: their rate of profit and so investment and employment. This puts on the
state’s agenda the dilemma as to whether it is primarily concerned with the
interests of enterprises or rather with the privileges of the high-income cat-
egories. The ideological supposition that investment would require saving is of
key importance here. (8D5.)
This completes the exposition of the conditions of existence of the capit-
alist economy and state. From the point of view of the systematic-dialectical
method adopted, it is only at this point – that is, when all earlier pre-positions
have been grounded endogenously – that we can concretely reflect on the cap-
italist system in its entirety. In fact the last division (8D5) is literally on the edge
of it. The next chapters are an exposition of the capitalist system’s concrete
manifestations.
5 The concrete modes of manifestation of the enterprises’ market
interaction (Chapters 4 and 9)
So far the exposition focused on the extraction of surplus-value from labour
as grounded in the state-accommodated enterprise–labour relation and the
derived capital–labour relations. Enterprises are first of all interconnected in
their unity as entities that go for the same aim, that is, the production of
surplus-value as measured by the rate of integral profit. The focus in Chapter 4
is on the manifestation of this unity of enterprises in their rivalry for more
surplus-value (4D2–4D3), and next on the manifestation of this unity in tend-
encies sublating that rivalry through cartel formation, oligopolisation and
monopolisation (4D4–4D5). Each of these modes of market interaction is pre-
dicated on particular – technical change related – stratified structures of pro-
duction in particular sectors (4D1).
Regarding the competition apart from the sublating tendencies just men-
tioned, a distinction is made between ‘price competition’ (4D2) and ‘structural
overcapacity competition’ (4D3). The combination of price competition and
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generalised fast technical change tends to engender generalised price deflation
and stagnation. However, there are no economy-inherent forces to get out of
such stagnation or to prevent generalised price deflation.
Chapter 9 presents the state’s concrete manifestation in its imposing a
framework of constraints on the modes of market interaction of enterprises
and banks.
The chapter’s first division sets out the state’s engagement in constraints of
market interaction that is ‘conventionally’ regarded as ‘competition policy’ as
encoded in competition law. This conventional competition policy is paradox-
ical. In its prohibition of free contracts of cartel formation and of a category
of take-overs and mergers (cf. 4D4–4D5), the state teaches enterprises what
‘proper’ market interaction is.With the state’s imposition of its view on proper
market interaction, the unity of the capitalist economy and state reaches its
most concrete manifestation regarding the functioning of ordinary markets.
Nevertheless this is so conflicting that the state sets out the framework in gen-
eral terms, leaving its details and execution to ‘independent’ market authorit-
ies. (9D1.)
The chapter’s seconddivision sets out twomain effects of market interaction
that, when left unconstrained, would generate vulnerabilities for the repro-
duction of the capitalist system. Firstly, so as to prevent a market constella-
tion associated with generalised price deflation and the concomitant potential
stagnation (cf. 4D2), the state ordains a monetary policy resulting in creeping
inflation (which the state labels ‘price stability’). It tends to delegate its con-
cretisation and execution to the ‘independent’ Central Bank.18
The second vulnerability regards ‘too big to fail banks’. The gradual move-
ment to ‘too big to fail’ is an effect of market interaction that was only thrown
into relief with the emergence of the 2008 financial crisis. The complex internal
structure of big banks has evolved such that effective regulation and super-
vision is practically unachievable. Therefore the occurrence of ‘too big to fail
banks’ can be countered only by putting a cap on the accumulation of capital
such that entities become small enough to fail. However, this would be highly
conflicting, as it would castigate the success in the accumulation of capital,
which in fact clashes with the economic rights granted by the state. (9D2.)
18 For systematic reasons this matter – and the following one – is briefly treated in its mon-
etary policy aspect in 7D2, andmore extensively in its aspect of ‘enterprises market inter-
action’ in 9D2.
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6 The concrete manifestations of the capitalist economy and state
(Chapters 5 and 10)
Chapters 5 and 10 present the most concrete manifestations of the capitalist
system reached in this book.
Abstracting from the state, Chapter 5 presents the concrete manifestation
of the capitalist economy in the macroeconomic cyclical movement of the
accumulation of capital. The actual investment of enterprises is determined
by their ‘internal profit’ and ‘rate of internal profit’, each of which accounts for
the external finance of enterprises and its (de)leverage effect. (Internal profit
= surplus-value minus interest distributed to financiers.) Investment being
the main locomotive for the cyclical movement, the rate of internal profit as
bounded by the rate of overcapacity are presented as the core macroeconomic
determinants of investment decisions. These apply on the macroeconomic
sequence of: (1) production predicated on bank finance; (2) validation of pro-
duction by expenditure; (3) distribution of part of the validated surplus-value
to external financiers; and (4) the resulting rate of internal profit, as determin-
ing (1) and so forth. (5D1.)19
Series of these sequences cyclically develop from phases of expansion into
phases of crisis and contraction. In this cyclical movement, the capitalist sys-
tems’ immanent expansive forces generate over-accumulation of capital. In
the crisis and recession this is violently cured by destruction of capital that
prepares the conditions for a renewed expansion and again contraction. That
is, inwardly bifurcated productive activity is cyclically destroyed. With it the
applied natural resources are destroyed – those that are accounted for in
the monetary-value dimension, as well as those that are not. Along with the
destruction of productive activity and productive capacity, employment of
labour is destroyed. The misery so gets concentrated with those that are ex-
pelled into unemployment. Predominantly these, and their children, are sacri-
ficed for the bifurcated process of ‘creation and destruction’. Even if along this
Sisyphean process the average real-income per head may increase, the heads
are not equal and especially the unemployed are ‘hors catégorie’ in this respect.
Thus whereas labour is the prime mover of the production of value and
capital (Chapter 1), capital itself is the prime mover of its cyclical course of
19 Thus (and in reference to footnote 9) throughout Chapters 1–5 surplus-value is the ab-
stract-general as well as the most concrete determinant of production (throughout in
singlemonetary dimension). In other words, workers see all of the surplus-value that they
produce being appropriated by ‘their’ enterprise and its financiers. This is economically
relevant. Relatedly it is relevant (although the exposition does not emphasise this) for the
capital–labour struggle at the point of production.
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accumulation and again the partial annihilation of this accumulation – labour
is passively confrontedwith the ups and downs of employment and unemploy-
ment. (5D2.)20
Chapter 10 presents three key manifestations of the state, which together
determine its reach.
The firstmanifestation applies on the cyclicalmovement of capital accumu-
lation.Without affecting the cyclical movement itself, state expenditure mitig-
ates the amplitude of ‘regular’ economic cycles – the degree of this automatic
stabilising effect depends on the structural size of state expenditure in compar-
isonwithprivate expenditure.However, for the ‘irregular’ economic downturns
triggered by financial crisis and bank failures, the mere state expenditure floor
and ‘normal’ restructuring destruction of capital may not be sufficient for a
recovery. Recovery then also requires a substantial discretionary state policy.
(10D1.)
The second manifestation regards the character of the state’s regulation
of the capitalist economy. The mere quantity of regulation-in-force increases
over time, as driven by new, or re-perceived, social-economic problems. For
one part these stem from legitimation problems. For another part these stem
from changes in the economic structure and product and process innovations,
including process fusions. These affect the ‘coverage’ and the ‘intensity’ of reg-
ulation, and so the density and quantity of regulation. The more convoluted
the social-economic problems, the more complicated regulations tend to be.
This results, together with the interweaving of regulations, in an increasing
complexity of regulation. However, changes of regulation are prominently also
determined by unintended loopholes in regulation, that is, gaps and ambigu-
ities – as tested byway of profit-driven borderline (non-)compliance. The legis-
lative and other regulative reparation of these loopholes by amendments of
the regulation increases the complication of single regulations, and in connec-
tion with the interweaving of regulations, multiplies into further complexity
of regulation. This results in inevitable continuous cycles of loopholes being
sought, amendments being made, leading to further complication and com-
plexity. In sum we have a (hardly counteracted) diachronic tendency to not
only the quantity of regulation, but also its increasing complication and com-
plexity. (10D2.)
The third manifestation regards the content of state expenditure. For many
people the ‘hard core’ of the capitalist state – in brief the property and exploita-
tion rights that it grants and the legislation about them– is not part of their con-
20 The second part of the Summary and Conclusions of Chapter 5 indicates in more detail
how this chapter synthesises Chapters 1–4.
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scious experience. The majority of employed actors primarily experience this
‘hard core’ indirectly via their everydayworkplace, whence the state’s hard core
operates as a ‘hidden hand’. Formost people the state’s reach is rathermanifes-
ted in thematerialisation of its expenditure, especially in the supervision of the
safety of production and products, in public education, in infrastructure, and
in social security provisions.
Among themain expenditure categories of the state, those on social security
transfers (SST) is the quantitatively dominant category and it tends to increase
over time. SST is a main factor through which the state gains the vast-majority-
legitimation that it requires. However, trends in the SST do not stand on itself.
Widespread information (knowledge and its communication) about the dis-
tribution of income is a key catalyst for SST. This information correlates, on
the one hand, with public education, and, on the other, with means of com-
munication. These two again correlate with the development of themacroeco-
nomic accumulation of capital. Thus the capital accumulation requirements of
increasing public education and of the communication parts of infrastructure
engender SST.
Whereas the thus catalysed increasing SST as a percentage of GDP is neces-
sary for the vast-majority-legitimation of the state (this regards the large bot-
tom part of the income distribution), the bearing of its burden (by the large
upper part of the distribution) implies that the increases’ fading off is equally
necessary for the state’s vast-majority-legitimation. (10D3.)
The final part of the chapter (10D4) reviews the four main vulnerabilities
of the reach of the capitalist state and that are so potential impediments to
the continued reproduction of the capitalist system. The first one is the inevit-
ably increasing amount and complexity of regulation. Thus the so-called ‘free
market economy’ will become unlimitedly further constrained by the capital-
ist state’s necessary steering. The second vulnerability regards the ‘too big to
fail’ entities – especially banks. Possibly this vulnerability can be resolved by
rounds of complex regulation, but for the time being this is insecure. The third
vulnerability regards the deterioration of the environment. This is in fact the
most momentous one. But perhaps a recuperation is possible by, again, rounds
of complex regulation – rounds that will have to be far more stringent than the
regulation in prospect (at the time of writing). The fourth vulnerability regards
the required state expenditure on social security transfers. Whilst increasing
transfers as a percentage of GDP is necessary for the vast-majority-legitimation
of the state, the increases’ fading off is equally necessary for the state’s vast-
majority-legitimation.
For the continued reproduction of the capitalist system the state inevitably
has to deal with these vulnerabilities. The second and third vulnerabilities are
592 part four – summary and additions
‘imaginably’ resolvable.However, for the first and last ones the capitalist system
is moving to a constellation of, what I call, ‘necessities that are impossible’.
7 The international mode of existence of the capitalist system
(Chapter 11)
The systematic exposition of Chapters 1–10 is about each single full-fledged
capitalist nation (country). Part Three of the book (consisting of the single
Chapter 11) makes explicit that these nations are different regarding: (1) their
geographical location; (2) the historical point in time at which they became
full-fledged capitalist – as conditioned by their state’s granting of capitalist
‘hard core’ rights as concretised in the hard core legislative frameworks (cf.
Chapter 6); (3) the degree of intensity of their legislative ‘accumulation of
capital frameworks’ (cf. Chapter 7);21 (4) the degree of intensity of their legis-
lative ‘social security framework’ (cf. Chapter 7); (5) given the population of
a country, the degree of the reached accumulation of capital – that degree
being co-determined by the legislative ‘accumulation of capital frameworks’.
This chapter makes further explicit that capitalist enterprises, for profit reas-
ons, seek to expand across national borders.
The chapter sets out the capitalist system’s ‘internationalmode of existence’
merely insofar as it affects the earlier exposition of the conditions for the repro-
duction of the capitalist system (Parts andTwo – sections 1–6 above). Abstract-
ing from contingencies – as in the earlier exposition – this regards mainly ‘the
tendency to the international migration of production’ (one form of the inter-
nationalmovementof capital), andoneaspect of ‘the tendency to international
trade’. (11D1.)
In much of its impetus international trade is no fundamentally different
from intra-national regional sector-wise specialisation of production.However,
much of the international trade has uneven effects between nations.
International trade affects the degree of versatility of the national sector-
structures of production. This implies that once a nation ‘freely’ decided to
engage in international trade, voluntary (‘free’) trade turns into enforced trade,
together with the concomitant terms of trade. Any intended re-increase of ver-
satility, if possible at all, will takemuch time; and along with it the establishing
of (selective) trade barriers will meet counter measures.
21 The ‘hard core’ frameworks are those of ‘granted legal capitalist economic rights’, ‘granted
legal allowance rights to existence’, and ‘public security’ (Chapter 6). The ‘capital accumu-
lation frameworks’ regard the ‘monetary’, ‘labour-capacity’ (including formal education)
and ‘infrastructural’ frameworks (Chapter 7).
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International trade has a positive effect on the world average surplus-value
of enterprises because this trade presses down – directly or indirectly – the
price of the real-wage bundle. However, the less versatile a nation’s production
structure has grown, themore it is forced to import at whatever the worldmar-
ket price is. This means, or may mean, that the international trade effect on
surplus-value is an internationally uneven one for national enterprises.
Finally, because of the concomitant transport, international trade reinforces
environmental damages. Given the developed international sector-structures
of production, this could be resolved only in a distant future (via rounds of ‘gen-
eral non-trade agreements’). (11D2.)
The ‘internationalmigrationof production’ (IMP) is, next to the ‘international
centralisation and concentration of capital’ (ICC), one of the two main forms
of the ‘international movement of capital’. On a substantial world scale these
are fairly recent phenomena. (Until about 1990 the international movement of
capital, measured as ‘foreign direct investment’, stayed within bounds of 1% of
world GDP.)
Whereas ICC greatly affects the degree of economic power as concentrated
within single enterprises, the latter as a tendency force and its results is not
specifically an international phenomenon affecting the reproduction of the
capitalist system. This is different for the tendency to international migration
of production (IMP).
The world’s nations can be categorised as ‘capitalistic mature’ and ‘capital-
istic developing’ countries (briefly ‘mature’ and ‘developing’ countries).22More
specifically these can be pictured as a stratification of nations characterised by
the following factors that are most relevant in terms of IMP: (1) average wages
levels; (2) taxation of wages (tax receipts being dependent on the wage levels);
(3) levels of the state ‘accumulation of capital frameworks’23 (the state’s means
for it being tax-dependent); (4) the degree of legitimation of the state and
hence of the capitalist system in face of the structure of marketwages (cf. factor
1) as articulated with taxation-requiring social security transfers. The degree
of widespread information within a country’s populace about the skewedness-
structure of wages levels, and of incomes generally, is a catalyst for the required
level of social security transfers (SST).24
22 The main text adopts the World Bank classification into ‘high income’ countries (for
‘mature’) and ‘upper-middle income’, ‘lower-middle income’ and ‘low income’ counties
(together ‘developing’).
23 See the first paragraph of the current section.
24 As indicated in section 6 in reference to 10D3.
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The profit-driven IMP (movements along the stratification) is – given the
required ‘hard core’ framework – primarily determined by the (potentially
migrating) enterprises’ weighing up of factors (1) and (3): wage levels against
‘accumulation of capital frameworks’. Actual IMP pushes up the growth of
factors (1) through (3) in the country of immigration, and down in the coun-
try of emigration. For each of these countries – on a larger scale country
groups – the (1) through (3) effects are self-reinforcing.Thisway the tendency to
IMP, regarding these factors, engenders a very gradual process of convergence
between the ‘mature’ and ‘developing’ countries.
This gradual convergence also affects factor (4) above. For the IMP immig-
rant nations (especially the ‘developing’ countries) not only wages but also SST
levels tend to be pushed up. This is so because the accumulation frameworks
encompass the components of public education and of the communications
part of infrastructure (especially ICT); these affect the degree of widespread
information in general, and so also the SST-catalysing widespread information
about the skewedness-structure of wages and other income levels. This implies
that also a gradual convergence of international SST levels is on the (far) hori-
zon. Coming from a relative low, each of the gradual increases in averagewages
and in SST will contribute to the vast-majority-legitimation in the ‘developing’
countries.
Qua tendency the legitimation effects are opposite for IMP emigrant nations
(foremost the ‘mature’ countries). For these the wages convergence implies
the dampening of their increase, and in the end perhaps even their decrease.
This by itself affects their vast-majority-legitimation. Alongwith the downward
pressure on wages and the concomitant taxation revenue, the finance of SST
squeezes (affecting either the transfers to the broad bottom, or their burden
for the broad top of the distribution of income) – see also 10D4, to which IMP
adds a new dimension. This means that with further increasing IMP the vast-
majority-legitimation in these countries tends to become increasingly under
pressure. (11D4.)
8 General conclusions (Chapter 11 in reference to Chapter 10)
Chapter 10 (10D4) summed up the four main vulnerabilities of the reach of the
capitalist state and hence of the reproduction of the capitalist system.The con-
clusions of Chapter 11 return to these in international context – given that the
latter chapter merely focused on the capitalist system’s ‘international mode of
existence’ insofar as it affects the earlier exposition.
(1) The inevitably increasing quantity and complexity of regulation. For many
‘developing’ countries thismay not be acute as yet, but as for the ‘mature’ coun-
tries they will increasingly be confronted with it.
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(2) The insecurities regarding the sufficient regulation of ‘too big to fail’ entit-
ies – especially banks. Here the same applies as under (1).
(3) The insecurities regarding environment restoration. The ‘mature’ coun-
tries have been the prime movers of the damage. The ‘developing’ countries
can claim that the ‘mature’ ones have to take the lead in a major degree, the
‘developing’ countries themselves having other priorities. In any case, for the
survival of the capitalist system (and humankind in general), a vast restructur-
ing of at least the ‘mature’ economies is inevitable (68% of world GDP in 2015).
Chapter 11 makes explicit that, in face of long-distance transport, international
trade engenders the snare of decreasing versatile national sector-structures
of production and hence of enforced international trade and enforced long-
distance transport.
(4) The increase in the level of the social security transfers in percentage of
GDP. It was concluded that whereas increasing social security transfers (SST)
as a percentage of GDP is necessary for the vast-majority-legitimation of the
state, the increases’ fading off is equally necessary for the state’s vast-majority-
legitimation. The 11D3 outline of the ‘tendency to the international migration
of production’ adds to this the tendential downward pressure on the ‘mature’
countries’ average wages, and conversely for the ‘developing’ countries. Given
the world nations’ uneven GDP per capita levels, the tendency-convergences
of average wages and of SST tend to be associated with a process of conversely
uneven vast-majority-legitimation.This adds to the future system-reproductive
vulnerability of the (yet) ‘mature’ countries. In the (very) long-run, however,
these mirror the (yet) ‘developing’ ones: ‘De te fabula narratur’ (of you the tale
is told).
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chapter 13
Synopsis of the mainmoments of ‘The unity of the
capitalist economy and state’
Note: ‘c.o.e.’ abbreviates conditions of existence and ‘manif.’ manifestations
This text complements the Summary and Conclusions of the book. It shows
how the book’s division-wise ‘moments’ are interconnected. The moments of
Chapters 1–3 and 6–7 are necessary conditions of existence for the capitalist
system – and qua exposition these ground the starting point (1§1 of 1D1, and
1§6 of 1D6). The moments of Chapters 4–5, 9–10 and 11 are concrete manifest-
ations of the former moments.
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scheme 13.1 Synopsis of the main moments of ‘The unity of the capitalist
economy and state’ ( for explanation of the symbols and abbre-
viations see the legend on page 600)
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Introduction
The General Introduction sketched some elementary principles of themethod
of Systematic Dialectics (SD) as it is adopted in this book. Other aspects and
principles of themethod were briefly set out in the Explanations and Addenda
of the various chapterswhen these aspects and principleswere first introduced
into the systematic exposition.The advantage of this proceeding is the immedi-
ate connection of method and content.The disadvantage is that the SDmethod
is explained in fragments. I aim to correct this in the current Appendix, which
presents themethod in an integrated way. For the elementary parts this means
that there is some repetition of the General Introduction and the Explanations
or Addenda mentioned above.
‘Systematic Dialectics’ is the dialectical method pertaining to the study of
an object totality characterised by a systematic structure. Authors adopting
this method have enough in common that they themselves characterise their
method as systematic-dialectical. Having said this, it should benoted that there
are often different emphases between authors. Often these pertain to their
object totality. My own variant of SD is focused on the capitalist system as
including not only the capitalist economy but also the capitalist state. The
exposition of such a comprehensive system poses problems of composition
that may be less, or differently, articulated for narrower systematic structures
(e.g. the capitalist economy). Therefore, when in this Appendix I refer to SD,
this refers to SD in general, although especially to the SD adopted in this book.
The text of this Appendix is divided into four divisions. Division 1 provides
a synopsis of the method. Division 2 sets out the concepts and principles of
research prior to an SD exposition. Division 3 discusses several general prin-
ciples of an SD exposition. Division 4 is the substantial part of the text, and sets
out the principles and method of the systematic-dialectical exposition itself.
Internal references to chapters of thebookare as indicated in sectionEof the
General Introduction. Internal references to this Appendix appear as A§1 etc.
for sections and as AD1 etc. for divisions. The General Introduction is referred
to as GI.
Although the format of this Appendix is different from the main chapters
(the Appendix is no part of the systematic exposition), I will include a number
of Amplifications and Addenda (below indented) that go into historical details
of the method or locate it in the literature. Addenda are for the specialists and
may be skipped by the main reader.
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scheme 14.1 Division-structure of the text
Amplification. Historical roots of the Systematic-Dialectical
method (SD)
Generally the SD method springs from a development of, first, Hegel’s
systematic dialectical method and, second, Marx’s appropriation of that
method for his critique of the political economy of capitalism as set out
in his Capital. The interest in this influence of Hegel on Marx is fairly
recent. Equally recent is the impetus that this has given to the applica-
tion of this method to current social science. One commentator, Chris
Arthur, has called it the turn to a ‘new dialectic’.1 My impression is that
most authors engaged in this turn started by discovering the potential
power of SD through their renewed SD interpretation of Marx’s method
in Capital. Some of them then took inspiration from this to develop the
method for the investigation of current society.2
1 Arthur 2002, pp. 1–11.
2 With this is mind the following authors provide, in various aspects, other accounts of the SD
method: Eldred 1984, pp. xiv–xxiii [general]; Reuten and Williams 1988, pp. 3–54 [general];
Reuten andWilliams 1989, pp. 3–36 [general]; Smith 1990, pp. 3–18 [Hegel], pp. 19–42 [Marx];
Arthur 1993, pp. 63–73 [Hegel–Marx]; Smith 1993, pp. 15–36 [Hegel–Marx]; Arthur 1997 [Marx:
Systematic-Dialectical versus Linear Logic]; Arthur 1998, pp. 110–18 [Hegel–Marx]; Reuten
1998, pp. 103–7 [general];Murray 2000, pp. 36–41 [marxianSD/general]; Reuten2000, pp. 140–
52 [general] (cf. Murray’s reply, 2002, pp. 156–67); Murray 2003, esp. 152–8 [general]. For a
generaloverviewof Hegel’s influenceonMarx seeMurray 1988and the contributions inMose-
ley and Smith (eds) 2014.
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Division 1. The method of systematic-dialectical exposition in brief
A§1 Aim and synopsis
In principle themethod of Systematic Dialectics (SD)may apply, with qualific-
ations, to natural and social object realms. For brevity, in this appendix I will
refer mainly to the capitalist system, or capitalism, especially as set out in this
book, from which I also take examples.
SD has in common with other scientific methods that it seeks to reliably
knowwhat can be known. Onemain distinction frommost other approaches is
the SD claim that the key to the reliability of that knowledge lies in the intercon-
nection of all relevant knowledge about some object totality. SD is sceptical of
any partial knowledge, including model building, although it does not dismiss
this knowledge (see A§3 and A§8). Wider perspectives can show the limits, or
the falsity, of partial knowledge. (See theGeneral Introduction, C§1, on the lim-
itations of mainstreammethods.)
A secondmain distinction from all other approaches is themethod through
which the interconnection of the relevant knowledge is found (A§10–A§14).
The remainder of this section provides a synopsis of the method (cf. the Gen-
eral Introduction, C§4), which is fleshed out in further divisions.
Figure 14.2 shows the, by now familiar, systematic of the exposition of the
capitalist system in this book. For the purposes of this Appendix I adopt the
in fact rigorous order of the exposition, which is the zigzag one, that is, the
chapter order of the expositional levels [1;6], [2;7], and so on. This is the rigor-
ous one in terms of ‘proximate’ conditions of existence (GI-C§4 andA§11, point
3).
Its analogue, Figure 14.3, was already presented in the General Introduction,
but I can now properly introduce the term ‘abstract’ and its meaning.
The starting point, denoted in the figure by ‘α’, is an all-encompassing con-
ception of the object totality (i.e. the capitalist system) that abstractly cap-
tures the essence of that object totality: ‘dissociated bifurcation’ (1§1, 1§6). This
concept is abstract, because at the point of its introduction it is a non-grounded
concept. (On thismeaning of the term, all themainstreameconomicsmodels –
to my knowledge – are, and remain, abstract. The game is played on the basis
of assumptions that remain non-grounded.)3
The next layers, denoted by β1 … βn, are called ‘grounding moments’ and
these set out the interconnected conditions of existence of the starting point.
(Chapters 1–3 after 1§1 and Chapters 6–8 after 1§6.) Each stage of this dialect-
3 Nevertheless, these models can be useful to the extent that the assumptions are realistic.
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figure 14.2 Exposition of the capitalist system as unity of the capitalist eco-
nomy and state
Note: ‘c.o.e.’ abbreviates conditions of existence and ‘manif.’ manifestations
figure 14.3 Systematic investigation and exposition
ical exposition increasingly shows how the system, initially posited abstractly
(α), can exist. The connection of two or more moments has a synthetic char-
acter, and the more we move down the pyramid, the more synthesis we reach.
Necessary conditions of existence – and again their necessary conditions of
existence – are a leading methodological principle. This ensures that we get
to the exposition of the interconnected totality of the capitalist system. For the
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same reason it is essential to abstain from assumptions because these would
open the way for gaps (A§7 expands on assumptions).
The structure of these conditions (β) culminates in the interconnected syn-
thetic exposition of the ‘concrete manifestations’ of the system (γ). (Chapters
4–5 and 9–11.) Along the process of the exposition (from starting point to
manifestations) we each time extend our grasp of the capitalist system. In the
end, this grasp will be appropriate to fully comprehend its essential working as
appearing in empirical reality. Division 4 sets out these three stages in more
detail.
Division 2. Research prior to systematic-dialectical exposition
A§2 Object totality
A condition for an SD investigation is that its object realm, in our case capital-
ism, is inherently systemic, that is, it consists of interacting constituent parts
forming an integrated whole. This is an ontological matter. Without wanting
to make a divorce between these, an epistemological requirement is that the
object realm can also be exhibited systematically as a ‘totality’. The received SD
view, stemming from Hegel, is that an object realm can be exhibited as a total-
ity only when a unifying all-encompassing conceptualisation can capture the
abstract essence of the totality (α in A§1), such that this can successfully lead
to the comprehension of reality (γ).
A§3 Research prior to SD exposition: analysis versus synthesis
As indicated in the General Introduction, much of the mainstream science
proudly casts its endeavours in terms of ‘analysis’, whereas systematic dialectics
stresses its endeavour in terms of ‘synthesis’. Consider the following descrip-
tions (rather than definitions) of the terms analysis and synthesis. Analysis: to
scrutinise by way of the division of wholes into their elements, or the decon-
struction of initial knowledge. Synthesis: to connect, assemble, or unite know-
ledge; the combination of often diverse concepts into a whole by indicating
their interconnections.
SD enquiry encompasses twophases: researchprior to the SDexposition, and
systematic-dialectical investigation and exposition. Only the systematic exposi-
tion is reported – this is thematerial that one finds in a SD text, as in the current
book. This A§3 is about the research prior to that exposition.
In principle, the SD method critically appropriates the relevant existing
knowledge about an object totality. This is generally considered to be a condi-
tion for science in general. In the SD pre-systematic research phase, the results
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of existing analysis and empirical research are critically appropriated.4 The
systematic investigation thus builds on this knowledge (this point will be qual-
ified later). I indicated that one condition for an object realm to be an object
totality is that it can be successfully captured by a unifying concept (A§2).
Which concept this could or should be is not straightforward – it is the res-
ult of an enormous creative research process involving a great deal of trial and
error. Within this pre-systematic research phase, the reaching of this unify-
ing concept has the character of a ‘preliminary synthesis’ – Marx called this
‘abstract determination’ (abstract constitution).5
figure 14.4 SD enquiry: from pre-systematic research to systematic investiga-
tion and exposition
The left pyramid in Figure 14.4 is a metaphoric image of the past and contem-
porary research. (Start reading at its bottom, supposing that this past research is
4 Tony Smith (1990, pp. 4–5) calls this the ‘stage of appropriation’; Patrick Murray (1988, 2000,
2003) calls it ‘phenomenological inquiry’.
5 Marx 1973b [19031]{ms1857}, p. 101. ‘Determination’ is the standard translation for theGerman
‘Bestimmung’ (see Inwood 1992, pp. 77–9on the complexities of the term). ‘Delineation’ is one
of its connotations; instead of determination, ‘constitution’might be another approximation.
In the current context, one major aspect of this abstract determination is the subsumption
of phenomena under more general phenomena, as a species under a genus. Note that sub-
sumption does not constitute their actual interconnection (see A§11).
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based on an assimilation of empirical phenomena.) The bottomof the pyramid
represents analytical research and past empirical studies, which developed
through the process of making conceptual distinctions between phenomena
and of partial analyses, in both everyday cultural history and scientific history.
The ‘preliminary synthesis’ is the research process of getting to the left pyr-
amid’s top α. The convoluted character of the process is indicated by the kinked
line. This unity-in-diversity (α) is then the starting point for the SD investiga-
tion and exposition, represented by the right pyramid of the figure.
However, there is a distinction but no divorce between these two phases.
During the SD investigation (right pyramid) the investigator will often return
to this existing knowledge (left pyramid) in order to re-appropriate it in the
detailed systematic exposition.
A§3-a Addendum. Pre-systematic research: Hegel versus Marx
We have good reasons to believe that pre-systematic research along these
lineswas also the path takenbyHegel andMarx, to arrive at the respective
starting points of their systematic dialectics.6
There is, however, a crucial difference between Hegel and Marx con-
cerning the critical appropriation of existing relevant knowledge at this
research stage, which then fed the content of the systematic exposi-
tion. The philosopher Hegel drew on the received views of contemporary
empirical sciences, for data on the natural and social realms; his task was
to gain holistic knowledge from his synthetic systematisation of these
received views. He was hesitant about speculating on the fate of know-
ledge at the research-frontier: ‘The owl of Minerva spreads its wings only
with the falling of the dusk’.7
For Marx this was very different. His study of the then-influential
political-economic writings made him sceptical of the received view.
Therefore, although he often drew on these writings, he felt compelled
to carry out conceptual and empirical analysis of his own.8 In Capital
this analysis is set out alongside and during his systematic exposition.
Although this analysis is systematically placed at the appropriate points
(by chapter), this givesMarx’s systematic-dialectical exposition a very dis-
tinctive complexion, particularly since he usually does not clearly distin-
6 See also Smith 1993, p. 18. Marx describes this research in the Introduction to the Grundrisse,
one of his few methodological writings. (Marx 1973a [1903;1857ms].)
7 End of Preface to the Philosophy of Right (Hegel 1967 [1821]).
8 See also Murray (2003, pp. 157, 160) who calls this Marx’s phenomenological inquiry, as dis-
tinct from his exposition.
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guish between his analytical and synthetic texts. This often complicates
the detection of the systematic order.9 (In the current book I solved this
problem by relegating any critical analysis to Explications or Amplifica-
tions.)
A§3-b Explication. Some provisional analytical definitions for
‘social system’
The definition of concepts is central to analysis. An SD exposition does
not fix definitions of concepts. Later on we will see why (A§6). Never-
theless, in working up the results of analysis it may provisionally adopt
analytical definitions.Merely to provide an idea of the terrain of the social
realmwithin which the object totality of ‘the capitalist system’ is located,
I outline a number of provisional (non-rigorous) analytical general social
system definitions. (Themark *indicates that the term is defined later on
in this Explication.)
(a) System. A system is an interconnected composite of structures* and
driving forces* such that the system is, in principle, continuous. (Think
of an economic structure and a state structure that together constitute
a social formation, in our case the capitalist social formation.) The con-
tinuous existence of a system always requires at least temporary modes
for resolving any fundamental conflicts.
(b)Structure. A structure is a static,more or less coherent set of institu-
tions*. (For examples of institutions, think of: enterprises, trade, markets,
taxation, courts, verdicts.) Coherence does not imply that a particular
institution by itself, or a set of institutions, is free of conflict or contra-
diction. Structures have a more or less determinate character in that – at
the risk of loss of coherence – they cannot be changed at will. However,
this does not imply that – at that risk – there could not be change.
(c) Institution. An institution is a more or less enduring pattern of
behaviour that may but need not be established in a formal organisation
(e.g. an enterprise or a court). Institutions are an expression of norms
(for example, profit making by enterprises or conflict resolution and
administration of justice by courts). For the object totality at hand these
are primarily capitalist norms. Institutions (and/or their norms) may but
9 The insight that the distinct complexion of Marx’s text is due to this mixture of analysis and
synthesis, I owe to Damsma (2015 and 2019, Ch. 1, Section 3). As with all good ideas, this is
obvious in hindsight. Forme at least, this at once clarifiedmany of the puzzles of the system-
atic structure/ordering of Capital. Further, Tony Smith’s 1990 book has been most important
in the detection and delineation of Marx’s analytical and synthetic work.
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need not be codified in laws or in ‘self-regulating’ rules. Institutions may
endure byway of, firstly, education. That is, education in the narrow sense
and in the broad sense of education into discourses (Foucault), includ-
ing education into the capitalist culture or education into the culture of
an organisation. Secondly, institutions may endure by way of social sanc-
tions (generally: approval and disapproval). In the economic domain of
enterprises, important direct economic sanctions are profits and losses,
which have an indirect counterpart in the status of the management.
Stable endurance correlates with the internalisation of, in our case, capit-
alist economic norms. Stable endurance is one important constituent of
a structure.
(d) Driving forces. Like institutions, driving forces are the dynamic
ingredients (processes) of structures. These are basically institutions (sanc-
tioned patterns) that have gained the character of ‘force’, ‘compulsion’ or
‘coercion’ because of their interconnectedness (coherence) within struc-
tures (for example, profit making and accumulation of capital).
Division 3. Systematic-dialectical exposition – general principles
Before I set out themode of systematic-dialectical exposition inDivision 4, this
division briefly sets out some general SD principles.
A§4 Systematic in contrast with historical order
The relative significance of a contemporary phenomenon does not necessarily
pertain to its historical emergence. Although history is important in explain-
ing how the existent came into being, it cannot explain why it is ‘what it is’,
nor how the existent is reproduced as an interconnected whole.10 Therefore
the systematic order of SD has nothing whatsoever to do with the historical
emergence of institutions and processes. For example, the fact that commod-
itymarkets developed before labourmarkets does not imply that a commodity
market is more important than a labour market in terms of the functioning
of the capitalist system – both are absolutely necessary. The fact that forms of
commodity money (such as gold) evolved long before ‘bank account money’
does not imply at all that a systematic treatment of money should start with
commodity money, or even refer to it.
10 Reuten andWilliams 1989, p. 34. See also Smith 1990, pp. 8–9, Arthur 2002, p. 75 andMur-
ray 2003, pp. 152–3.
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A§5 Dialectical ‘moments’
The term ‘moment’ refers to the constituents of each progression of the SD
exposition. Generally, a moment is a composition of concepts that belong
together; these concepts are thus posited as immediately connected – for
example, ‘money expansion’ (2D4) or the state’s ‘monetary framework’ (7D2).
In other words, a moment is a more or less cohesive institutional make-up, or
a more or less cohesive set of entities, that can be analysed in itself (some-
times like a model) but that nevertheless derives its full meaning from the
interconnection with other moments, and ultimately from its interconnected-
nesswithin thewhole exposition.11 Thusmoments derive fullmeaning through
synthesis.
In a text, systematic ordering is inevitably sequential. Nevertheless ontolo-
gicallywe always have the simultaneity of all moments.
A§6 Definition and conceptual progress
The definition of concepts is an inherent part of analysis (A§3), and is useful
for that endeavour. To the extent that conceptual development is central to the
development of science generally, however, the positing of concepts as ‘defin-
itive’ can hamper this development, even within non-dialectical discourses.
Starting from an abstract concept of a totality (α), SD sets out interconnections
in a layered movement of setting out, first, the starting point’s conditions of
existence (βi) and next its concrete manifestations (γ). Along with this, espe-
cially key concepts such as ‘money’ and ‘production’ acquire a continuously
enriched meaning. Therefore ‘the’ concept of, for example, money, cannot be
meaningfully defined in, say, Chapter 1, as it acquires new meanings (in the
exposition of this book) in Chapters 2, 7 and 3. SD therefore eschews fixed
definitions. Nevertheless, at each dialectical level, or moment (A§5), it delin-
eates concepts ‘for the moment’. Even so, in the way this book is written, early
concepts and their delineations are claimed to be true, and are (if I made no
mistakes) not inconsistent with the later more enriched concepts. Indeed, the
early concepts are claimed to be true, but only so abstractly (in the sense of
‘encompassing’). Their truth is contained in the newly developed concept.
A§7 Presumptions and pre-positions (contrary to assumptions)
This section is almost identical to C§3 of the General Introduction.
SD not only eschews definitions (A§6), it also eschews assumptions. How-
ever, the exposition in this book adopts three ‘presumptions’. Firstly, a cultur-
11 See also Reuten andWilliams 1989, p. 22.
612 part four – summary and additions
ally determined language (in our case, specifically ‘English’). Along with it goes
an episteme.12 We can, to a degree, be aware of this, but no scientific endeav-
our can escape this far-reaching presumption. (Sometimes it is believed that
mathematics does. However, mathematics requires at least ‘initial translations’
from cultural language into mathematics.) Secondly, it is presumed that our
object of investigation exists. In our case, that is, capitalist social formations
and especially capitalist economies and states. Empirically these are exempli-
fied in OECD countries as well as all other countries with a similar structure,
independently of their level of development in terms of GDP per capita and of
state expenditure. Thirdly, it is presumed that this object of investigation is sys-
tematic (A§2 above). This is a precondition for any scientific study of an object
of investigation beyond mere descriptions.
Next to these three presumptions I adopt ‘pre-positions’ in Chapters 1–3 and
6–8. I adopt these merely because all the constituent elements of a ‘system’
cannot be presented at the same time. I use the term ‘pre-position’ (instead
of ‘assumption’) so as to indicate that these have a temporary status. (In mod-
elling approaches many ‘assumptions’ have a permanent status.) Thus in the
course of the dialectical exposition, I introduce entities that at the stage of
their introduction are not, or not fully, ‘grounded’. (For example, when I intro-
duce ‘money’ in Chapter 1, the creation of money by banks in Chapter 2 is
pre-posited.) A major difference between systematic-dialectical pre-positions
and the assumptions of a standardmodel-building approach is that systematic-
dialectical pre-positions must always be grounded within the exposition – an
SD exposition is never complete until all determinations relevant for the object
realm have been determined endogenously, that is, when no pre-positions (or
assumptions) are required, and all earlier (temporary) pre-positions have in
fact been eliminated. In the main systematic text of this book, I never used
assumptions – if I have made no mistakes (in Explications I sometimes used
an assumption, merely to simplify an example).
When, in a modelling approach, some assumption is dropped, earlier state-
ments (based on the dropped assumption)may no longer hold. This is different
for pre-positions. All the statements formulated at each level (e.g. at the expos-
itional level of Chapter 1 or 2) are claimed to be true, and still to be true when
we have reached Chapter 5 or 11.
12 Foucault (inTheOrder of Things) uses the term épistème to refer to the ‘unconscious’men-
tal arrangements that underpin the production and the possibility of the production of
scientific knowledge, in a long-term era (think of theMiddle Ages versus ‘modernity’). An
épistème is much more far-reaching and inescapable than Kuhn’s notion of paradigm.
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All the remarks above about pre-positions pertain to the object realm we
study here (‘capitalism’ – A§2). Although capitalism cannot exist in a void, it is
hardly opportune to begin a book about the capitalist system by an exposition
of natural-scientific entities (if I could).
A§8 Synthesis and the role of analysis
SD investigation is the process of enquiry from a systematic starting point (Fig-
ure 14.3). This investigation results in the systematic exposition that one finds in
an SD text (such as this book). An SD exposition is synthetic.
In A§3, I indicated that SD investigation requires sufficient conceptual and
empirical analysis for its synthetic exposition. It selects from this analysis and
neglects what is considered deficient. However, if the existing analysis is lack-
ing or poor regarding some moment, then the author of an SD work will need
to undertake the appropriate analysis.13 (In the current book, and if required, I
have relegated any such analysis to ‘explications’ or ‘amplifications’, so that the
systematic exposition proper in the main sections is purely synthetic.)
A§9 Immanency and immanent critique
The SD exposition of a social totality is an immanent one. That is, it sets out the
system fromtheperspectiveof theobject totality’s principles, normsand stand-
ards.This is aprinciple adopted fromMarx. Even if the system ispresented from
within itself, this does not imply the absence of any evaluation or assessment.
When the norms and standards are taken to their logical conclusions, we may
detect possible inconsistencies, which an immanent critique makes explicit.
(See the General Introduction, C§6, for some more clarification.)
Division 4. Systematic-dialectical exposition
In this last division I discuss the systematic exposition proper. Strictly, the
‘exposition’ is the text of an SD work. However, it should be emphasised that
alongside the actual writing process, the author is engaging in a complicated
SD investigation.
13 In A§3-a I noted that Marx was confronted with this exact problem, so that he had to
engage in analysis himself. In my 2000 paper on systematic dialectics I neglected the pos-
sible requirement for analysis along with the systematic investigation and Guido Starosta
(2008) rightly criticised me for this.
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A§10 The systematic starting point
Thepre-systematic research (A§3) leadsup to the startingpoint of an SDexpos-
ition.This starting point is an all-encompassing conceptualisation of the object
totality. It is abstract in the sense of it being an as yet non-grounded concep-
tualisation. At the starting point we merely have the appropriation of analysis
as an abstract determination (α in Figure 14.4). Or, we have ‘merely’ posited a
unity-in-difference. In Hegel’s work on society (1967 [1821]) this is ‘free will’, for
Marx (1976 [1867]) ‘commodification’, and in the current book ‘dissociated out-
ward bifurcation’ (on the latter two see also 1§1-h, 1§5-b).
At the beginning it is unclear how the starting point can have existence. At
the beginning it is, as yet, unproven that the starting moment (α) indeed is
the unifying concept of the object totality. This has to be shown in the pro-
cess of setting out its conditions of existence, along which the starting point
appears progressively less abstract. Thus we have a process of progressive con-
cretisation and differentiation (β). As Hegel says, at the beginning ‘difference is
still sunk in the unity, not yet set forth as different.’ Only on completion of the
exposition, he continues, will we know that ‘[t]he truth of the differentiated
is its being in unity. And only through this movement is the unity truly con-
crete’.14 Once the exposition is complete – and thus when the initial unifying
concept is shown to be inherent in the object totality, in its full concreteness
(γ) – we will have come full circle, confirming the truth of the abstract starting
point.15 Thus the ultimate test of a starting point is the success of the exposition
itself.
A§10-a Addendum. Hegel’s Systematic Dialectic
Throughout this division I refer in footnotes to the work of Hegel, and
especially his Encyclopaedia Logic.16 However, my own SD is not the same
as Hegel’s. I rather build on Hegel – the footnotes acknowledge this –
in a way that often deviates from him. I especially mention that in my
exposition I have no analogue for his ‘subjective logic’.17 Instead I move
to ‘concrete manifestations’ (A§12 below), which in Hegel’s terminology
would be a further development of his ‘actuality’.18
14 Hegel 1985 [1833], p. 83.
15 Compare Murray 2003, p. 157 and Arthur 1997, p. 31.
16 Encyclopaedia Logic (1991 [18171; 18303]). This book is composed of threemain divisions: I.
The doctrine of being; II. The doctrine of Essence (also referred to as the Essence Logic);
III. The doctrine of the concept (also referred to as the Subjective Logic).
17 See the previous footnote.
18 The last part (C) of the Doctrine of Essence.
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In Reuten and Williams 1989 (pp. 26–30), we indicated why an SD
of the capitalist system could not reach beyond Hegel’s Essence Logic.
Tony Smith (1990) made this point in a far more sophisticated manner
(unfortunately, at that time we did not know each other and the print-
ing of the books coincided). See also Smith 1993 and 2014. Chris Arthur
takes a very different position in his SD project (elements of which are
outlined in Arthur 2002, 2011 and 2016). He highlights the dominance
of capital within the system (we agree on this) and therefore considers
Hegel’s Subjective Logic to provide an adequate framework for presenting
that dominance. Riccardo Bellofiore (2014), without explicitly endorsing
Hegel’s Subjective Logic, posits that fetishism empowers capital in a way
that is similar to it being a Subject in the Hegelian sense.
A§11 Groundingmoments (conditions of existence)
1 Exposition of ‘how’ the system can exist
Systematic-dialectical ‘exposition’ refers to the SDmode, orway, of conceptual-
ising an object totality characterised by a systematic structure. The main body
of an SD exposition consists in the presentation of the ‘conditions of existence’
of the starting point. (In this book Chapters 1–3 and 6–8 after the starting point
in 1D1 and 6D1.) This way the exposition shows how the system can exist. This
is the same as showing how the starting point – which captures the essence of
the system– can exist. In reference to the starting point of ‘dissociated outward
bifurcation’ (1D1 and 6D1), the ‘how’ regards exposition of how the bifurcation
is bridged such that the capitalist system can exist.
2 Concretisation of the starting point
Even if the starting point can be phenomenally interpreted and understood, it
is abstract to the extent that its conditions of existence have not been set forth
(these are either yet pre-posited, or as yet implicit).With the exposition of each
condition of existence, the starting point, and hence the existence of the sys-
tem, is gradually concretised. This is the same as the existence being further
grounded. Therefore a condition of existence is, alternatively, indicated by the
term ‘grounding moment’.19 (Metaphorically, and referring to the metaphoric
pyramid of Figures 14.2 and 14.3, we reach each time more concrete ground as
19 The terms ‘condition of existence’ and ‘groundingmoment’ are used interchangeably. The
first term has the advantage of focusing on existence, and is perhaps initially more trans-
parent. The term ‘groundingmoment’ has the advantage of focusing in on themomentary,
therefore emphasising its incompleteness.
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the dialectic unfolds. The ‘foundation’ is not in the top, but rather in the move-
ment towards the concrete bottom.)
3 Systematic order
The systematic ordering of these conditions/moments is central to the ‘art’ of
SD investigation. At each stage of the exposition it has to be determined what
is the necessary proximate condition of existence of what was posited earlier
on. Beginning from the starting point, an SD exposition must pose its proxim-
ate grounding moment, that is, the immediate and most general conditions
for that what was posited before. To the extent that the proximate grounding
moment cannot exist by itself, that moment requires new proximate ground-
ing moment(s). This way we have a series of grounding moments.20 At each
point, the dialectical exposition is driven forward by the insufficiency of a pos-
ited moment. The grounding moment at a new level (say, Chapter 2) sets out a
still (relatively) abstract existence that cannot yet actually exist, which drives
the exposition forward as described.21 This goes on until all conditions of exist-
ence have been determined, and so are endogenous to the exposition.
‘Insufficiency’, above, refers to the cohesive limits of amoment (A§5). Never-
theless there is a truth claim for the conceptualisation of each single moment,
one that will not be withdrawn in a later moment. Rather, the truth of earlier
moments is contained in later moments (cf. A§6). Thus the more we move
down in the metaphorical pyramid, we have ‘a concentration of many determ-
inants’, as Marx put it.22
4 Systematic interconnection
Along the process just set out, the exposition posits the interconnection of the
grounding moments, and hence the interconnection of the phenomena that
necessarily constitute the system. (We reach interconnection because ground-
ing moments are again grounded in further grounding moments.) This is the
great merit of the SD method. Each proximate grounding moment posits fur-
ther interconnections, and therefore further comprehension of the system. (We
may perhaps ‘understand’ the starting point and the capitalist system that we
had phenomenologically before us. It is through comprehension of the inter-
connections that we gradually move towards grasping it.)
20 This, in my view, is the core of Hegel’s Essence Logic (i.e. the Second Part of his Logic) –
Hegel 1991 [1817].
21 Cf. Hegel 1991 [1817], §120–§124; 1985 [1833], pp. 81–3.
22 Marx 1973a [1903; 1858ms], p. 101.
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In order to guarantee that indeed all the necessary interconnections are pos-
ited, it is indispensable that SD abstains from any assumptions. Assumptions
would open the way for gaps in the interconnections, hence gaps in the com-
prehension of the system.
5 Necessary conditions
It was indicated above (point 3) that the ‘art’ of SD investigation consists in
the determination of the necessary proximate condition of existence of what
was posited earlier on. Part of this art is to indeed determine what is a ‘neces-
sary’ condition, and thereforewhat aspects of thephenomenological reality are
merely contingent (meaning that these phenomena could be either absent or
different without changing the essential reproduction of the system).23 As the
necessity–contingency distinction is also relevant for Manifestations (A§12), I
amplify on this distinction in A§13.
6 Necessary forces and enforcements
The result of the exposition of grounding moments is a structure of intercon-
nected conditions of existence of the starting point. All these have the status of
necessary forces and enforcements for the continuity of the capitalist system.24
Muchof this structure is pervadedby twonecessary forces that, inevitably,were
presented early on in the exposition: those of, first, the production and appro-
priation of surplus-value (1D5) and, second, the legitimation of the state (6D3)
for upholding the first force in the form of granted rights to production and
appropriation of surplus-value.
Other necessary forces and enforcements ground the former two. (For eco-
nomic agents that, in their self-perception, consider capitalism as the embodi-
ment of freedom, these enforcements must be thought-provoking – cf. 6§2-a.)
7 Systematic-dialectical synthesis, and the end-point of its first stage
The SD exposition of systematic interconnection (point 4) is inherently a syn-
thetic exposition (cf. A§3 for the distinction between analysis and synthesis).
Analysis aims to gain knowledge through the deconstruction and decompos-
ition of phenomena – or of phenomenological realms – into their elements.
SD, as indicated in A§3, uses the results of analysis. However, SD exposition is
the opposite (or counterpart) of analysis in that it posits interconnection and
hence synthetic knowledge – synthetic comprehension. Nevertheless the SD
23 ‘Reproduction of the system’ refers to its continued existence.
24 Hegel sets out this connection in Division B (subdivision C, on Relationship), of his
Essence Logic (1991 [1817], §135–§141).
618 part four – summary and additions
synthesismay not be the analogous opposite of analysis. Analysismust assume
that the phenomena, or phenomenological realms, that it deconstructs relev-
antly belong together.This assumptionmaybe right, but itmay also bewrong.25
Therefore synthetic conclusions may, qua content, be opposite to analytical
conclusions.
The completion of the exposition of the interconnected conditions of exist-
ence of the starting point completes the first part of the SD synthesis. With it,
all the groundingmoments have beenpresented.However, thesemaynot reach
the moments that, without requiring further conditions of existence, are nev-
ertheless substantial to the SD synthetic exposition. The next section turns to
these.
A§12 Manifestations: synthetic moments of concrete manifestation
The final phase of the exposition is that of the ‘concrete manifestations’ of the
capitalist system (Chapters 4–5 and 9–11).
It might have appeared to the reader that in the earlier chapter texts (1–
3 and 6–8), I presented manifestations of the capitalist system all along the
exposition of the grounding moments (A§12). In a particular way this is the
case; however, these could be no more than ‘abstract manifestations’ (which
is a rather contrived terminology). This is so because prior to the completions
of all the grounding moments (A§12), it is not shown how the capitalist sys-
tem can concretely exist. Hence prior to that point we still have merely multi-
interpretable phenomena, rather than the manifestations of the capitalist sys-
tem that we can concretely comprehend: ‘concrete manifestations’.
Therefore all the empirical graphs that I presented at the level of grounding
moments could be no more than pre-positions or illustrations. I always releg-
ated these to the non-systematic Amplifications rather than to the systematic
main sections.26
These concrete manifestations take the exposition further, without (I re-
peat) introducing any additional conditions of existence. Not being grounding
25 For example, the analysis of unemployment by considering the realm of the employed
and unemployed labour may result in the reduction of unemployment to the shortcom-
ings of unemployed individuals. On the other hand, if the analytical starting point would
have been the realm of the accumulation of capital, then the analytical conclusion might
havebeen that accumulation requires unemployment,whatever the characteristic of indi-
viduals. Generally analysis is more reliable to the extent that its realm is wider, and to the
extent that it minimises its assumptions, and to the extent that the assumptions it does
use are realistic.
26 In fact I experimentedwith presenting all that stuff in a very longChapter 10. I ‘fired’ this to
my students in 2015/16, but that did not work. (I thank them for their polite criticism of it.)
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moments, these are nevertheless necessary moments that are the culmination
of the synthetic exposition, building on that of the groundingmoments. Those
grounding moments – posited in their proximate sequence (A§12, point 3) –
reveal the reproductive strength of the capitalist system.However, the concrete
simultaneous interaction of these grounding moment’s forces (A§12, point 6)
is also expressed in concrete manifestations that reveal not only reproductive
strength, but also reproductive vulnerability.27 I recall in amost condensedway
the core of these manifestations.
Whereas enterprises constitute a unity as (in brief) appropriators of the
surplus-value produced by labour, they are in their market interaction mani-
fest in their difference. On the one hand, this takes the form of antagonistic
competition, but on the other, it takes the form of escaping competition and
‘practising unity’ through cartels and the centralisation of capital (Chapter 4).
Given the economic rights granted by the state, the state’s position regard-
ing this practising unity is inevitably ambivalent and paradoxical (Chapter 9).
The accumulation of the enterprises’ active capital is concretelymanifest in its
cyclical over-accumulationandpartial destructionalongwith superunemploy-
ment (Chapter 5).The state is concretelymanifest in its increasing expenditure,
not least on social security transfers, and in the increasing size and complexity
of regulation (Chapter 10).
The concrete manifestations are a combination of strength and vulnerab-
ility. The latter reveal how the walls of the grounding moments (A§12) are
perhaps not ‘crumbling’ (to use Schumpeter’s metaphor in his 1943, ch. 12), but
nevertheless shaking.
A§13 Necessity and contingency
1 Contingency
The reach of SD is restricted to the interconnected exposition of phenomena
(entities, institutions and processes) that are necessary to the reproduction of
the capitalist system(A§11–A§12).28Thus it generally abstains fromthepresent-
ation of contingencies (some qualifications are pointed out later on in this
section). The provisional delineation of contingencies as being ‘accidentals’ is
insufficient, as contingencies may have grounds. However, contingencies and
27 Major vulnerabilities are absent from Hegel’s systematic dialectic. Smith (e.g. in his 2014)
therefore calls Hegel’s dialectic a system ‘affirming’ dialectic.
28 InReuten andWilliams 1989,we endeavoured to present a number of contingencies in the
light of necessities. In the present book I refrained fromdoing this, whilstmaintaining the
presentation of the type of contingencies set out in the next subsections.
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their possible grounds are external to the essential reproduction of the sys-
tem. Phenomena are contingentwhen these could be either absent (e.g. gender
discrimination or military expenditure and wars) or different (e.g. retail open-
ing hours or bankers’ dress codes) without changing the essence, the essential
functioning and potential reproduction of the system.29
There is in principle ‘an endless sea’ of contingencies (‘it could be this way,
or that way’) whence it is not opportune to list contingencies and to argue why
these have not been dealt with in the exposition. Therefore the implication
of the exposition is that everything that is not dealt with is contingent. The
implication is also that contingencies are ‘in principle’ changeable within the
system.30
However, the statements above do not imply that all contingency can be
abstained from. This is the subject of the following subsections.
2 System necessity of moment versus individual contingency
Themoments of the capitalist economy are predicated on capitalist economic
forces (A§11, point 6; amplified in A§14). However, even if the moments and
these forces are necessary for the totality, a force almost never has such an
absolute character with regard to any individual constituent part of that total-
ity. For example, whereas a profitable individual enterprise could deliberately
interrupt its capital circuit, cease accumulation and liquidate – in spite of the
various constraints that will usually act upon it not to do so – the collective
group of enterprises must necessarily accumulate in order to reproduce capit-
alism.
3 Necessity of moment, contingency of intensity
All moments of the exposition are necessary; however, their intensity might
be contingent. Regarding the capitalist economy this applies first of all for the
degree of accumulation of capital. Thus whereas the accumulation of capital
is necessary to the system, its expression in a rate of accumulation of three or
six percent is contingent, and each structurally positive rate is compatible with
the system’s reproduction.
29 For example, gender discrimination and retail opening hours do have a social and eco-
nomic impact – huge for gender discrimination; however, these are contingent in the
sense that their absence (in case of discrimination) or their variety (in case of discrim-
ination or opening hours) are, in principle, compatible with the capitalist system.
30 Cf. Reuten and Williams 1989, pp. 35–6. Without referring to the methodical necessity-
contingency distinction, Smith 1990, pp. 38–40 and 1993, p. 28 casts this in terms of ‘fun-
damental’ and ‘non-fundamental structures’.
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Apart from this main moment of accumulation, the contingency of intens-
ity applies also for other moments of the capitalist economy, especially the
degree of incorporation of enterprises (2D6), the degree of the ex post sub-
stitution for the pre-validating finance provided by banks (3D3) and the degree
of over-accumulation of capital (5D2). The contingency of intensity applies for
almost all moments of the capitalist state apart from the Hard Core moments
(Chapter 6). In fact, the history of full-fledged capitalism reveals this contin-
gency (10D3). However, this again does not imply that this contingency of
intensity is an indeterminate contingency. Quite a few of these have a tendency
character, and this category is separately dealt with in the next section (A§14).
4 Necessity of moment, contingency of form
Some necessary moments may take on a contingent form (or mode). For ex-
ample, whereas themoment of taxation is necessary (8D2), the particular form
of taxation (i.e. the content of that moment) is contingent (8D5). This never-
theless means that at least one form is necessary, whence the exposition must
treat a variety of forms. Another example is the quamoment necessarymarket
interaction of enterprises (4D1). This interaction may take a variety of forms
(or modes), amongst which at least one form is necessary (4D2–4D5). Regard-
ing the particularly competitive formof interaction, we have seen that thismay
take a deflationary or an inflationary form (4D2–4D3).
5 Becoming necessary
A particular SD exposition, such as the one in this book, cannot be definitive
because the dynamics of the system may evolve in such a way that the con-
tent of a particular moment posited may no longer be sufficient. This means
that a specific content of a moment (or part of it) posited in this book may at
some historical point have become necessary. Note that this is due not to an
epistemological defect (a defective exposition at the time of its presentation),
but rather to new ontological developments. I mention the three cases of this
in the current book.
First, the corporate enterprise (2D6). For full-fledged capitalist economies
around 1870 the corporate enterprise was prevalent, but it was no dominant
necessity.However, given the growthof the enterprises’ sizewithin the category
of medium and large enterprises, the corporate form for the latter is generally
necessary in 2015.31Thus the corporate formof the enterprise has becomeneces-
sary for this category.
31 This is expressed in both a generalised increasing concentration of capital within enter-
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Second, generalised price competition in combination with vast technical
change tends to lead to generalised deflation and economic stagnation (4D2).
The structural combination of the two may not have been prevalent prior to
the 1930s, and not actual in the later decades when the structural overcapacity
form of competition was dominant. However, because generalised price com-
petition in combination with speeded up technical change remains lurking, a
monetary policy, or an expenditure policy, generating a creeping inflation has
become necessary (7§8 of 7D2 and 9§5 of 9D2).32
Third, banks that are ‘too big to fail’ are a fairly recent phenomenon, though
onewith enormous consequences for the reproduction of the capitalist system.
Therefore the regulation and finally the prevention of this phenomenon have
become necessary (7§9 of 7D2 and 9§6 of 9D2).
The protection of the environment might be considered a fourth candid-
ate. That protection is certainly necessary for the reproduction of the capitalist
system. However, that protection has been necessary throughout the history of
full-fledged capitalism. The fact that many states did not much care about it
until around the beginning of the twenty-first century is another matter.
6 Necessity versus contingency: a matter of content of the exposition
Phenomena (entities, institutions and processes) are contingent when these
could be either absent or differentwithout changing the essential reproduction
of the system. The decision to qualify phenomena as either necessary or con-
tingent is a continuous major ingredient of the SD investigation: it is a matter
of the content of the SD investigation and exposition. I indicated at the end of
the first subsection (‘contingency’) that it is not opportune to list contingencies
and to argue why these have not been dealt with in the exposition. Therefore
the implication of the exposition is that everything that is not dealt with is con-
tingent. Ultimately Imust leave it to the reader to show that an instance of what
I implicitly consider contingent is in fact a necessity (that is, a necessary condi-
tion of existence or a manifestation of forces behind these conditions). If one
is found, then it should be included within the systematic of necessary condi-
tions or of necessary manifestations.
prises, and a generalised continued centralisation of capital among enterprises, which
would be impossible without the corporate form of enterprise (i.e. with limited liability).
32 Cf. Reuten 2003, On ‘Becoming Necessary’ in an Organic Systematic Dialectic; the case
of creeping inflation. The idea of ‘becoming necessary’ was first developed in this paper
(pp. 43–4 and 52–3). In the same book in which that paper appeared, Tony Smith (2003,
pp. 26–8) takes a similar view about moments becoming necessary.
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A§13-a Addendum. Hegel and Marx on necessity and contingency
The concept of ‘necessity’ is central to Hegel’s Essence Logic.33 In his
lectures, not published by him, Hegel is quoted as saying: ‘The sole aim
of philosophical enquiry is to eliminate the contingent. Contingency is
the same as external necessity, that is, a necessity which originates in
causes which are themselves no more than external circumstances.’34 In
his Encyclopaedia Logic, Hegel begins the exposition of this issue with
the category of ‘possibility’, in the sense that everything that we perceive
is possible (he means ‘determinate possibility’, not fictional possibility
by assumption). Next he introduces the category of ‘contingency’ (acci-
dental) in order to contrast it with necessity.35 The point here is that these
contingencies (for example, bankers’ dress codes) may have grounds (or
perhaps must have grounds), though these grounds are not a part of, or
are not essential to, the object totality at hand. Hegel’s third category is
that of ‘necessity’. Necessities posit the object totality as an interconnec-
ted whole (as set out in A§11 above). A ‘necessary’ moment contains the
antecedent moment transcended in itself.36
This makes sense as far as it goes. As we have seen above (A§13, sub-
section 3–4), necessary moments can be of contingent intensity or be
expressed in contingent form. ‘Normally’ this poses no problem in the
systematic exposition to the extent that, firstly, this has no consequences
for the systematic interconnection of moments, and, secondly, we com-
prehend these contingent intensities/expressionswithin a totality, that is,
when we have reached the end-point of the exposition.
While Hegel is explicit about necessity and contingency, in his scant
methodological writings Marx is not, and we must use the content of
his texts to make inferences. These inferences are complicated by the
fact that Marx expounded analysis alongside his synthetic exposition,
without clearly separating the two (A§3-a). Often his (apparent) analysis
does introduce contingency. Even so, considering the general structure of
his exposition throughout Capital I–III (and considering the preliminary-
draft character of especially Parts Four to Seven of Capital III), I think that
Marx’s synthetic exposition mainly addresses necessity. (I cannot sub-
stantiate this issue here, as it would require an extensive study).
33 In his Encyclopaedia Logic it is the most substantial element of the Essence Logic’s last
Division C: ‘Actuality’.
34 Hegel 1984 [1837], p. 28; cf. 1991 [1817], §143–§145.
35 See also Damsma 2015 and 2019, Ch. 1, Section 2, footnote.
36 Hegel 1991 [1817], §142–§149; cf. 1985 [1833], p. 80.
624 part four – summary and additions
A§14 Tendencies: dynamic constituents
Tendencies are important dynamic constituents of an object totality, in our
case the capitalist system. A tendency should be distinguished from an empir-
ical ‘trend’. A tendency is a process working in a certain direction, such that an
entity takes a certain form or a certain quantitative expression. A tendency is
alwayspredicatedononeormore forces or compulsions. Inotherwords, a tend-
ency sets out the potential effect of one ormore forces. Therefore an alternative
formulation is: A tendency is the generation of a particular form of an entity or
the particular quantitative expression of an entity, this generation being pre-
dicated on one or more forces or compulsions. For example, the tendency for
enterprises to take the corporate form (2§12) or the tendency for average inter-
sector rates of profit to equalise (4§2, 5§1, 8§7, 8§7-a) – predicated on the forces
indicated in 2§12 and 4§2.37
Tendenciesmay be counteracted by other tendencies, or by other lower-level
complexities. For example, the tendency for average inter-sector rates of profit
to equalise is counteracted by ‘the tendency to centralisation of capital’, that is,
the tendency to oligopolisation and monopolisation (4§14).
A tendency is a determinant whose actualisation might not always pre-
dominate in any individual case (for example, enterprises that do not take
the corporate form because of their finance structure or for taxation reasons).
However, for it to have the status of a tendency (in this book), it must apply to
a significant enough number of cases such that, when abstracting from coun-
teracting tendencies, it has a predominant character for the totality.
Even if some tendency would not be counteracted, this does not mean that
the form or the quantitative expression at hand is actually reached (empiric-
ally). A tendency is indeed a process, a generation ‘in force’, ‘in operation’. Thus,
taking the rate of profit case, we are never in an ‘end-state’ of equalised rates of
profit (as neoclassical general equilibrium theory would have it);38 rather we
are in a never-ending movement towards equalisation.
Tendencies can be posited at the level of conditions of existence or at the
level of manifestations. The most important example of the first (namely con-
ditions) is the tendency to incorporation of enterprises. This regards a strong
drive generally, but a necessary one for medium-sized and large enterprises.
However, tendencies are most often posited at the level of manifestations.
37 The concept of tendency is not found in Hegel’s work. Marx does posit tendencies in Cap-
ital, without, however, elaborating on themeaning of his conception of tendency in this or
his other works. In Marx’s Capital it is often not clear whether his term tendency refers to
a force or its expression, or perhaps both (I discussMarx’s use of the term in Reuten 1997).
38 See Blaug 2001 on the notion of ‘end-state competition’.
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MVD monetary value dimension 1§4
M money (amount) 1§4-c








CPE Classical Political Economy 1§5-b
K active capital (value in terms of MVD): assets of balance sheet total 1§13
Kt′ idem, at beginning of year t 1§13
Kt idem, year average 1§13
Πt surplus-value (= integral profit) produced per year 1§13 pi
ω rate of integral profit (Πt / Kt′) 1§13 omega






L labour-capacity (amount of in going fte per year, unless specified as
per hour)
1§14
w wage rate (wage in going fte per year, unless specified as per hour) 1§14
wL wages sum 1§14
δ fraction of the total assets K, equivalent to the used up fixed assets 1§14 delta
μ fraction of the total assets K, equivalent to the used up floating means
of production (usually a larger sum than the sum that appears on the
balance sheet)
1§14 mu
Xt output of production per year (realised) 1§14
Lα actual labour (labour-capacity exerted at a power α) [the unique
source of valorisation]
1§14
α production power of labour (in terms Lα) [Lα = Lά ϊ] 1§14 alpha
ά technique-associated productive power of labour (in terms Lά) 1§14 alpha,
with tonos
ϊ intensity of labour (in terms Lϊ) 1§14 iota, with
dialytika
m actual unit monetary value of labour (per year, unless specified as per
hour); more specifically: the realisation constraint resulting in the unit
monetary value labour
1§14
mLα actual monetary value of labour (realised) = net value-added 1§14
YG gross value-added (macroeconomically this would be GDP) 1§14
Y net value-added (macroeconomically this would be NDP) 1§14
GDP Gross domestic product 1§14
NDP Net domestic product 1§14
Chapter 2
Δ change [see also x] 2§3






å ratio of capital accumulation out of surplus-value (a variable;
amplified in 3§11 and 5D1)
2§3 a, ring
xt rate of growth [of any variable underlined] = (xt-1 – xt) / (xt-1) 2§4, fn.
x rate of growth [of any variable underlined] = (xt-1 – xt) / (xt-1) = Δx/x
[time indices omitted]
2§4, fn.
τ capital-labour ratio [τ = K/L] 2§4 tau
U unemployment (number) [reserve of labour-capacity] 2§4
u rate of unemployment in % [u ={U/(L+U)}*100] 2§4
e rate of surplus-value (or profit per labour-year-compensation) [e =
Π/wL]
2§5
|ϊ| limited intensity of labour (physical or compliance limit) 2§5
|α| limited production power of labour (because of limited intensity of
labour)
2§5
|x| limited value of a variable (x) 2§5
ClB Clearing Bank 2§9
CB Central Bank 2§9-a
Chapter 3
PVF pre-validating finance (of enterprises by banks) 3§2
CG consumer goods 3§2-b
MP means of production 3§2-b
RPVF remaining PVF (pre-validating finance of enterprises by banks) 3§6
Σ summation 3§6-c
I investment by enterprises (net) 3§9
S saving 3§9






W wages sum enterprises (W=wL) 3§10
xP planned production value of a variable (x) 3§10
E macroeconomic net expenditure 3§10
C consumption by households (Ck+Cw) 3§10
Xd desired (current) production 3§10
Ck consumption by capital owners 3§10
Cw consumption by wage earners (enterprises) 3§10
Sw saving out of wages (wage earners enterprises) 3§10
Chapter 4
TERP tendency to equalisation of average inter-sector rates of integral profit 4§2
ROC restructuring of capital 4§2-b
TUP tendency to uniform prices within a sector or market 4§3
Chapter 5
ε share of ‘external’ finance in capital (banks plus other financiers) 5§1 epsilon
i [in italics] average rate of interest for enterprises: the weighted average
of the rates paid to banks and to other financiers
5§1
εK external capital (passive capital furnished by external financiers) 5§1
iεK surplus-value distributed to external financiers 5§1
R internal profit (surplus-value after interest payments) 5§1 cf. 3§1,
Fig. 3.2b
ρ rate of internal profit on the internal capital 5§1 rho
sw fraction saved out of wages (non-constant) 5§3
PD sum of dividends and interest distributed to capital owners 5§3, fn.










general for ‘state’: symbols G (g), instead of S (s) to avoid confusion with notation
for savings
Wg wages sum paid by the state (g for government) = wages of civil
servants (before their taxes)
8§1
Fg state expenditure on floating inputs, including replacement
investment
8§1
GCOL state expenditure on collective goods and services 8§1
Yg net value-added (net product) of the state 8§1
Ig investment expenditure by the state (net) 8§2
Zg social security transfers 8§2
Qg interest payments on the state debt 8§2
Ag amenities (sum of subsidies to enterprises, to households and to
cultural institutions)
8§2
G sum of state expenditure (net) 8§2
CFg current finance of state expenditure (net) 8§4
T sum of taxes 8§4
SSC sum of social security contributions 8§4
OR other receipts of the state 8§4
B net current borrowing flow of the state (B < 0 in case of a fiscal
surplus)
8§4
Ie [italics] net investment by enterprises (after the state domain being
explicit)
8§6






We [italics] wages sum paid by enterprises (after the state domain being
explicit)
8§6
Cwe [italics] consumption by enterprises’ wage earners (after the state
domain being explicit)
8§6
Cwg consumption by the state’s wage earners 8§6
Cqg consumption out of interest paid by the state 8§6
Czg consumption out of social security transfers 8§6
Swg saving out of wages paid by the state 8§6
Sqg saving out of interest paid by the state 8§6
Szg saving out of social security transfers 8§6
Smg state mediated savings (Swg + Sqg + Szg) 8§6
Swe [italics] saving out of wages sum paid by enterprises (after the state
domain being explicit)
8§6
Π [italics] surplus-value (= integral profit), after the state domain being
explicit
8§6
Y [italics] net value-added total economy (after the state domain being
explicit)
8§6-b
Ye net value added enterprises (after the state domain being explicit) 8§6-b
Ee final expenditure of the non-state sector with the enterprises sector 8§6-b
Eg direct and indirect expenditure of the state sector with the enterprises
sector
8§6-b
R [italics] internal profit (after the state domain being explicit) 8§6-c
Qe net interest paid by enterprises to their external financiers 8§6-c
Tsv taxes paid by enterprises, with surplus-value being the tax base 8§7






To all other taxes, next to Tsv (the latter being enterprises’ taxes on
surplus-value)
8§7
Πat surplus-value, after taxes on surplus-value (after the state domain
being explicit)
8§7
Tr taxes on the internal profit (R) 8§7-a
To* all other taxes, next to Tr (the latter being enterprises’ taxes on internal
profit)
8§7a
Rat internal profit, after taxes on internal profit (after the state domain
being explicit)
8§7a
TH ‘hybrid taxes’ (simplifying notation: TH = Tsv + To + SSC + OR) 8§8
THo ‘other hybrid taxes’ (simplifying notation: THo = To + SSC + OR) 8§8
Sg current saving of the state (the fiscal surplus TH– G) 8§8
Chapter 11
HIC high-income country (World Bank definition) 11§2-a
UMC upper-middle-income country (World Bank definition) 11§2-a
LIC low-income country (World Bank definition) 11§2-a
LMC lower-middle-income country (World Bank definition) 11§2-a
FDI foreign direct investment 11§10-b
Throughout
LHS left hand side (of an equation)
RHS right hand side (of an equation)
SNA System of national accounts
Unusual signs in equations
🢔 right hand side to left hand side determination 1§12






🢔 = equality with right to left hand determination 1§12
Unusual signs in texts
↓ decrease (e.g. I↓)
↑ increase (e.g. I↑)
→ results in / gives rise to
x – → y negatively related effect of x on y 2§4
x ← – y negatively related effect of y on x 2§4
x +→ y positively related effect of x on y 2§4
x ←+ y positively related effect of y on x 2§4
List of symbols and abbreviations in alphabetical
order
General notation 659
Roman symbols and abbreviations 659
Greek symbols 664
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x rate of growth [of any variable underlined] = (xt-1 – xt) / (xt-1) = Δx/x
[time indices omitted]
2§4, fn
xt rate of growth [of any variable underlined] = (xt-1 – xt) / (xt-1) 2§4, fn
| x | limited value of a variable (x) 2§5
xP planned production value of a variable (x) 3§10
Roman symbols and abbreviations
å ratio of capital accumulation out of surplus-value (a variable;
amplified in 3§11 and 5D1)
2§3 a, ring
Ag amenities (sum of subsidies to enterprises, to households and to
cultural institutions)
8§2
B net current borrowing flow of the state (B < 0 in case of a fiscal
surplus)
8§4
C consumption by households (Ck+Cw) 3§10
CB Central Bank 2§9-a
CFg current finance of state expenditure (net) 8§4
CG consumer goods 3§2-b






Ci [in italics] any commodity (other than commodity j) [used in this
Explication only]
1§4-c
Cj [in italics] any commodity (other than commodity i) [used in this
Explication only]
1§4-c
Ck consumption by capital owners 3§10
ClB Clearing Bank 2§9
CPE Classical Political Economy 1§5-b
Cqg consumption out of interest paid by the state 8§6
Cw consumption by wage earners (enterprises) 3§10
Cwe [italics] consumption by enterprises’ wage earners (after the state
domain being explicit)
8§6
Cwg consumption by the state’s wage earners 8§6
Czg consumption out of social security transfers 8§6
e rate of surplus-value (or profit per labour-year-compensation) [e =
Π/wL]
2§5
E macroeconomic net expenditure 3§10
Ee final expenditure of the non-state sector with the enterprises sector 8§6-b
Eg direct and indirect expenditure of the state sector with the enterprises
sector
8§6-b
FDI foreign direct investment 11§10-b
Fg state expenditure on floating inputs, including replacement
investment
8§1
G sum of state expenditure (net) 8§2
GCOL state expenditure on collective goods and services 8§1
GDP Gross domestic product 1§14






HIC high-income country (World Bank definition) 11§2-a
I investment by enterprises (net) 3§9
i [in italics] average rate of interest for enterprises: the weighted average
of the rates paid to banks and to other financiers
5§1
Ie [italics] net investment by enterprises (after the state domain being
explicit)
8§6
Ig investment expenditure by the state (net) 8§2
iεK surplus-value distributed to external financiers 5§1
K active capital (value in terms of MVD): assets of balance sheet total 1§13
Kt idem, year average 1§13
Kt′ idem, at beginning of year t 1§13
L labour-capacity (amount of in going fte per year, unless specified as
per hour)
1§14
LHS left hand side (of an equation)
LIC low-income country (World Bank definition) 11§2-a
Lα actual labour (labour-capacity exerted at a power α) [the unique
source of valorisation]
1§14
LMC lower-middle-income country (World Bank definition) 11§2-a
M money (amount) 1§4-c
m actual unit monetary value of labour (per year, unless specified as per
hour); more specifically: the realisation constraint resulting in the unit
monetary value labour
1§14
mLα actual monetary value of labour (realised) = net value-added 1§14
MP means of production 3§2-b
MVD monetary value dimension 1§4






NDP Net domestic product 1§14
ø rate of undesired overcapacity (undesired overcapacity/production
capacity)
5§5 o stroke
OR other receipts of the state 8§4
PD sum of dividends and interest distributed to capital owners 5§3, fn.
PVF pre-validating finance (of enterprises by banks) 3§2
Qe net interest paid by enterprises to their external financiers 8§6-c
Qg interest payments on the state debt 8§2
R internal profit (surplus-value after interest payments) 5§1 cf. 3§1,
Fig. 3.2b
R [italics] internal profit (after the state domain being explicit) 8§6-c
Rat internal profit, after taxes on internal profit (after the state domain
being explicit)
8§7a
RHS right hand side (of an equation)
ROC restructuring of capital 4§2-b
RPVF remaining PVF (pre-validating finance of enterprises by banks) 3§6
S saving 3§9
Sg current saving of the state (the fiscal surplus TH– G) 8§8
Smg state mediated savings (Swg + Sqg + Szg) 8§6
SNA System of national accounts
Sqg saving out of interest paid by the state 8§6
SSC sum of social security contributions 8§4
Sw saving out of wages (wage earners enterprises) 3§10






sw fraction saved out of wages (non-constant) 5§3
Swe [italics] saving out of wages sum paid by enterprises (after the state
domain being explicit)
8§6
Swg saving out of wages paid by the state 8§6
Szg saving out of social security transfers 8§6
T sum of taxes 8§4
TERP tendency to equalisation of average inter-sector rates of integral profit 4§2
TH ‘hybrid taxes’ (simplifying notation: TH = Tsv + To + SSC + OR) 8§8
THo ‘other hybrid taxes’ (simplifying notation: THo = To + SSC + OR) 8§8
To all other taxes, next to Tsv (the latter being enterprises’ taxes on
surplus-value)
8§7
To* all other taxes, next to Tr (the latter being enterprises’ taxes on internal
profit)
8§7a
Tr taxes on the internal profit (R) 8§7-a
Tsv taxes paid by enterprises, with surplus-value being the tax base 8§7
TUP tendency to uniform prices within a sector or market 4§3
U unemployment (number) [reserve of labour-capacity] 2§4
u rate of unemployment in % [u ={U/(L+U)}*100] 2§4
UMC upper-middle-income country (World Bank definition) 11§2-a
w wage rate (wage in going fte per year, unless specified as per hour) 1§14
W wages sum enterprises (W=wL) 3§10
We [italics] wages sum paid by enterprises (after the state domain being
explicit)
8§6






Wg wages sum paid by the state (g for government) = wages of civil
servants (before their taxes)
8§1
wL wages sum 1§14
Xd desired (current) production 3§10
Xt output of production per year (realised) 1§14
Y net value-added (macroeconomically this would be NDP) 1§14
Y [italics] net value-added total economy (after the state domain being
explicit)
8§6-b
Ye net value added enterprises (after the state domain being explicit) 8§6-b
YG gross value-added (macroeconomically this would be GDP) 1§14
Yg net value-added (net product) of the state 8§1
Zg social security transfers 8§2
Greek symbols
α production power of labour (in terms Lα) [Lα = Lά ϊ] 1§14 alpha
ά technique-associated productive power of labour (in terms Lά) 1§14 alpha,
with tonos
|α| limited production power of labour (because of limited intensity of
labour)
2§5
δ fraction of the total assets K, equivalent to the used up fixed assets 1§14 delta
Δ change [see also x] 2§3 delta
(capital)
ε share of ‘external’ finance in capital (banks plus other financiers) 5§1 epsilon
εK external capital (passive capital furnished by external financiers) 5§1
ϊ intensity of labour (in terms Lϊ) 1§14 iota, with
dialytika






|ϊ| limited intensity of labour (physical or compliance limit) 2§5
μ fraction of the total assets K, equivalent to the used up floating means
of production (usually a larger sum than the sum that appears on the
balance sheet)
1§14 mu
Πt surplus-value (= integral profit) produced per year 1§13 pi
Π [italics] surplus-value (= integral profit), after the state domain being
explicit
8§6
Πat surplus-value, after taxes on surplus-value (after the state domain
being explicit)
8§7
ρ rate of internal profit on the internal capital 5§1 rho
Σ summation 3§6-c sigma
τ capital-labour ratio [τ = K/L] 2§4 tau
ω rate of integral profit (Πt / Kt′) 1§13 omega
Unusual signs in equations
🢔 right hand side to left hand side determination 1§14
🢔 = equality with right to left hand determination 1§14
Unusual signs in texts
↓ decrease (e.g. I↓)
↑ increase (e.g. I↑)
→ results in / gives rise to
x – → y negatively related effect of x on y 2§4
x ← – y negatively related effect of y on x 2§4
x +→ y positively related effect of x on y 2§4
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Glossary of field-specific terms
• This is a glossary of some of themain terms that are specific to the field of this book.
It should assist especially the reading of the first few chapters of Parts One and Two
(Chapters 1–2 and 6–7). It also covers most of the field-specific terms used in the
‘General Summary and Conclusions’.
• Because the interconnection of concepts is core to this book, it is inevitable that the
reader looking up an entry is often referred to other entries.
• Some lemmas start with a brief dictionary definition (in brackets; ‘a.o.’ is an abbrevi-
ation for: ‘amongst other’ definitions). This is followed by the particular usage of the
term in this book in case this (somewhat) deviates from the dictionary definition.
• The sign → means: see the lemma (as indicated after the arrow).
• In the references to sections of the book, ‘sub #’ refers to a sub-section of the section
indicated.
• GI-C§# refers to a section in the General Introduction. A§# refers to a section in the
General Appendix, Outline of Systematic Dialectics.
abstract. In this book this term is used in reference to a →‘moment’ (in brief a ‘stage’)
of the exposition that has not yet been fully →‘grounded’ (its concrete conditions of
existence have not yet been determined). The starting point of the book (1D1 and
6D1) has a special status. It is ‘abstract’ in the sense above, whereas it is at the same
time a (not yet grounded) reference to the essence of the totality. The starting point
is therefore referred to as ‘abstract-general’. To the extent that all of Chapters 1 and
6 are starting points in a wider sense, these have also been referred to as ‘abstract-
general’ moments. [A§11.]
abstraction from x (or bracket). This term is sometimes used so as to emphasise that
a statement made at that point yet abstracts from x, that is, a →‘moment’ x (in brief
a ‘stage’) presented later on. This phrase occurs in sentences such as: ‘the state yet
being abstracted from’. This refers to a stage of the systematic dialectic when some
moment (such as the state in the example) is still →‘pre-posited’ (i.e. not yet presen-
ted). Instead of ‘abstraction from x’ an alternative used is: ‘with x bracketed’.
abstraction in practice →‘trans-abstraction in practice’.
accumulation of capital. The process of the growth of →‘capital’. [2§3 sub 1, 2§6.]
active capital →‘capital’.
actor. The term ‘actor’ or ‘social actor’ is used in a very general sense of ‘activity’. An
actor may be an individual (that is, an individual in a particular role, for example
that of labourer, entrepreneur, manager) or a (corporate) ‘person’ in the legal sense,
hence also an institution such as an enterprise, or the agent of a particular institu-
tion (e.g. enterprise). [2§7-a.]
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allowance rights and positive rights. An allowance right held by a person – e.g.
the allowance right to property of means of production – entails the duty on all
other persons to respect that right (‘person’ denotes person in the juridical sense,
including, for example, a corporation). That is, the duty of non-interference, non-
obstruction or non-action. Thus a full allowance right to property entails that once a
person possesses property, the possession ought not be obstructed and, more spe-
cifically, the possessor ought not be expropriated. Similarly, a full allowance right
to existence imposes the duty on other persons to not interfere with or obstruct
this right, e.g. by violence. An ‘allowance right’ contrasts with a ‘positive right’. The
latter entails duties that go much further: requiring ‘positive action’. (Positive rights
require a specification as towhether the duty of positive action falls on all other per-
sons, or on a specific category, or perhaps on the state or some other institution.) A
positive right to property, for example, to the earth, might more specifically entail
that everybody is granted the right to possess some portion or perhaps an equal
proportion of the earth; it might impose the duty on others to transfer their dispro-
portionate share in the earth to the other right holders. Similarly a positive right to
existence, for example, specified as the positive right to decent work, or the positive
right to a decent living (all to be specified further), imposes the duty on others of
sharing the available decent work or to share other means of decent living. Again,
the required duty might fall on the state or some other institution. [6§17.]
articulation (dictionary: the act of joining or the state of being joined). Structured
interrelationship/interconnection within the totality of the exposition.
banks versus banking entities. A distinction is made between ‘banks’ and ‘banking
entities’. Banks are conceptualised purely as creators of money and as financiers.
Any labour that this might require is outsourced to a separate ‘production branch’
of the banking entity. These production branches are subsumed under the enter-
prises sector. This means that the (pure) banks are not producers. [3§1, sub 2.]
bifurcation →‘outward bifurcation’; →‘inward bifurcation’.
bracket →‘abstraction from’.
capital. The term capital without adjective refers to ‘active capital’, that is, the bal-
ance sheet assets of a→‘production enterprise’. Adistinction ismadebetween ‘active
capital’ and ‘passive capital’ (or passive finance capital). Active capital is the ideal
→‘monetary value’ (ideal value or book value) of, first, the enterprise’s investment
in inputs for production and, second, the running →‘valorisation’, each measured
at one point in time, and reported on the enterprise’s balance sheet as assets. The
running valorisation is co-materialised in the ideal monetary value of semi-finished
products and not yet →‘validated’ output stocks. [1§13.] ‘Passive capital’ (or passive
finance capital) is the equivalent of the various liabilities of an enterprise. [2§15; 3§1,
summarised in Fig. 3.2a.]
capital as a form of wealth →‘wealth’.
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capital–labour relation. Shorthand for the indirect exploitative relation between
→‘passive capital ownership’ and labour, the counterpart being the directly exploit-
ative→‘enterprise–labour relation’. As passive capital growson thebasis of the direct
appropriation and next the distribution of surplus-value, passive capital owners are
indirectly involved in the exploitative relation. [2§15, sub 3.]
capital accumulation frameworks of the state. This term is a shorthand for the three
legislative (or regulative) frameworks of the state that are geared at its furthering
of the accumulation of capital, that is: the monetary framework (7D2); the labour-
capacity framework (7D3); and the infra-structural framework (7D4). This short-
hand term is used in Ch. 11 and in the General Summary and Conclusions. [11§12,
summarised in Fig. 11.16.] It is contrasted with the term→‘hard core (frameworks) of
the state’.
capitalism. The term capitalism refers to ‘full-fledged capitalism’. This is a social form-
ation in which the dissociated →‘outward bifurcation’ (i.e. divide) between house-
holds and privately owned enterprises is dominant [1§1; 6§1] and in which the eco-
nomy (the capitalist economy) and the state (the capitalist state) constitute a unity
(→‘separation-in-unity’). The following are the further main characteristics of this
social formation. Economic characteristics: (1) economic entities and processes are
expressed and measured in the →‘monetary-value dimension’ (MVD); (2) labour-
capacity predominantly takes the form of wage labour (whence there is a labour
market); (3) production (the production process) is equally expressed and meas-
ured in theMVD; (4) the production of →‘surplus-value’ (integral profit) is the driving
force of production; (5) the surplus-value is appropriated by the owner(s) of the
enterprise [Ch. 1, passim]. Legal economic rights characteristics: Owners of enter-
prises make the following core claims: (1) claims of entitlement to private property
in the earth; (2) claims of entitlement to private property in means of production
other than for production by the claimant; (3) claims of entitlement to employ
labour as combined with the appropriation of the surplus-value produced by that
labour. The state grants these claims in the form of legal rights – the granting of
these claims makes the state a ‘capitalist state’. [6D2.] (Capitalism emerged from
about 1800, first in the UK and France [1§0-a].)
capital ownership, passive. Passive capital ownership refers to the ownership of the
liabilities of production enterprises. This includes, first, the loans from banks and
other external financiers and, second, the internal financiers’ equity (the latter for
corporations; ‘own capital’ in case of firms). [2§15 and 3§1.]
capitalist andmanagerial class (CMC) and subordinatedworking class (SWC). These
are two broad class ‘categories’, or ‘objective classes’ that derive different (dis)advan-
tages from the capitalist system in terms of their decision-making power and of their
shares of income and wealth. These are called ‘objective classes’ in terms of these
two measures, and in contradistinction to any notion of ‘subjective class’, that is, of
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class-consciousness. SWC: Subordinated workers are defined as workers who have
no decision-making power (in the USA between 1930 and 2010 this category covered
between 73% and 90% of the relevant population). Their average income is con-
siderably lower than the average CMC income (2§15-a, Graph 2.14). CMC: Capitalists
have direct or indirect decision-making power. The size of their non-labour income
is such that they are not forced to engage in an employment contract – that is, to
be employed themselves (although typically they do engage in such employment
contracts). Managers have decision-making power and benefit from ‘super-wages’.
[6§12.]
‘capitalist economic rights’ granted by the state →‘capitalist state’.
capitalist state. Private enterprises and their owners claim to be →‘entitled’ to: first,
private property in the earth; second, private property inmeans of production other
than for production by the claimant; third, employment of labour as combinedwith
the appropriation of the surplus-value produced by that labour [6§2]. The capitalist
state grants these claims in the form of ‘rights’ (this is what makes the state a ‘cap-
italist’ state) [6§4]. These three together are referred to as the ‘capitalist economic
rights’ granted by the state.
clearing bank (ClB). In this book this term has the specific meaning of a dominant
bank that clears interbank debts and credits for other banks. It imposes its standard
of money and it imposes a standard for securities and liability rules on the banks
for which it clears. It has no legal powers. The ClB is a concept introduced prior to
the introduction of the state and a Central Bank, though it may be thought of as
foreshadowing a Central Bank. [2§9 and 2§9-d.]
CMC →‘capitalist and managerial class’.
commensuration in terms of money →‘trans-abstraction in practice’.
compliance (dictionary: the act of conforming, acquiescing, or yielding; a tendency
to yield readily to others, especially in a weak and subservient way). Voluntary or
involuntary conformation (see further Bay [2§7-b]). Labour’s compliance with the
requirements of the enterprise during production is one of the main conditions
for the existence of a capitalist economy [2§5; 2§7] →‘enterprise–labour relation’.
Regarding the state, a vast-majority compliance of the actors (a vast majority of all
actors) to the state’s actions – and at least its granting of the core →‘capitalist eco-
nomic rights’ is the main condition for the →‘legitimation of the state’.
condition of existence →‘ground’.
constellation (dictionary: a.o. a group of objects, etc. related in some way). In this
book this termhas themeaningof: interconnectedorganisational units and/or inter-
connected processes and/or structures (often called configurations). The termmay
also refer to what in ordinary language is called a ‘subsystem’ (such as the ‘banking
system’). Most often the term is used when, for methodological and sometimes for
stylistic reasons, I want to avoid the term ‘system’. [GI, C§2, fn.]
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contingent/contingency. A distinction is made between phenomena that are pre-
dicated on →‘necessary’ moments (Chs. 1–3 and 6–8) or on →‘manifestations’ (in
brief: implications) of thosemoments (Chs. 4–5, 9–10 and 11). Phenomena (entities,
institutions and processes) are contingentwhen these could be either absent or dif-
ferent without changing the necessarymoments and theirmanifested implications.
Hence these could be absent or different without changing the essential function-
ing and potential →‘reproduction’ of the system under consideration. [A§13, sub 1.]
The exposition abstracts from contingent phenomena and their determinants. Nev-
ertheless the degree of intensity of the forces engendering necessary moments and
their manifestations is often contingent. [A§13, sub 3.]
contradiction. Refers to an entity, institution or process that is both necessary to the
reproduction (that is, the continued existence) of the subject matter and impossible
to it. It therefore inevitably requires some kind of →‘sublation’. [1§1-j.]
deliberative (dictionary: having the function of deliberating, as a legislative assembly:
as deliberative body). The existence of ‘a deliberative’ is a condition of existence of
the →‘legitimation of the state’. This deliberative may, but need not, be associated
with a parliamentary democracy. The (degree of) legislative power of a deliberative
is contingent. [7§23.]
diachronic. A diachronic process refers to one that gains force through time (if not
counteracted, the same applies for its effect). A synchronic process refers to a pro-
cess that has force within each period of time (if not counteracted, the same applies
for its effect). In this book each of these processes refer to the history of full-fledged
→‘capitalism’.
differentia specifica. Specifics that differentiate a particular configuration (or a par-
ticular entity) within a general category of configurations (or a general category of
entities).
dissociated outward bifurcation →‘outward bifurcation’.
devalorisation. A decrease in →‘valorisation’. Devalorisation is due to the actual
→‘monetary value of labour’ (mLα) for any one capital lagging behind that in the
previous period. This applies not on the Lα, but on a decrease in the ‘m’ (the →‘unit
monetary value of labour’). Devalorisation refers to the value-added, and should be
distinguished from depreciation, i.e. the (calculated) normal returns for the wear
and tear of means of production (δK). [4§6, sub 2.]
enterprise–labour relation. Shorthand for the employment relation through which
labour, as determined by its →‘productive power’, produces the value-added and
hence also the surplus-value, the surplus-value being appropriated by the enter-
prise. In its quantitative aspect (the rate of surplus-value or the degree of exploita-
tion of labour →surplus-value, rate of) this relation is constrained by, first, the tech-
nique of production, second, the rate of unemployment and, third (in face of that
rate), the management of the compliance of labour during production, as assisted
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by the managerial device of a wages ladder that optimises this compliance. [2§7.]
The ‘enterprise–labour relation’ is contrasted with the →‘capital–labour relation’.
entity (dictionary: something that exists as a distinct, separate, independent, or self-
contained unit). ‘A something’ that has not, or not yet, been (fully) identified con-
ceptually. [1§0, fn.]
entitle/entitlement (dictionary: a.o. to give (a person) the right to do or have some-
thing).
epistemology and ontology (dictionary for epistemology: investigation of the origin,
nature, methods and limits of human knowledge; dictionary for ontology: study or
a theory of the character of being or the kinds of things that have existence.) Much
of traditional philosophy makes a (preliminary) distinction between the following
fields.Ontology: the study of being or existence (what ‘is’); epistemology: the study of
knowledge (what and howwe ‘know’); phenomenology: the study of our experience
(how we experience). In line with Hegelian views in this respect, the exposition in
this book recognises that whereas we can distinguish these fields, they cannot be
divorced.
exposition →‘systematic-dialectical exposition’.
finance capital →‘capital’ (especially ‘passive capital’ or ‘passive finance capital’). [3§1,
sub 1; summary Fig. 3.2; 3§2, sub 1; 3§5.]
framework →‘legislative framework’.
full-fledged capitalism →‘capitalism’.
generally/in general. Something that is predominantly the case.When I use the term
‘generally’ I explicitly or implicitly refer to contingencies that are compatible with
capitalism, whilst if those contingencies were to be generalised, there would no
longer be capitalism [1§1-e].
ground. The entity, institution or process that is necessary for the existence of an
entity, institution or process posited earlier in the systematic exposition. Thus the
ground is a condition of existence of a →‘moment’ presented earlier on. [GI-C§4;
A§11.]
See also: ‘proximate moments and proximate conditions’.
grounding. The positing of a →‘ground’.
hard core of the state | hard core frameworks of the state. These terms are used in
Chs. 10–11 and in the ‘General Summary and Conclusions’. The term ‘hard core of
the state’ is shorthand for, in brief, themoments presented in Ch. 6. These are espe-
cially the state-granted rights of: (1) claims of entitlement to private property in the
earth; (2) claims of entitlement to private property in means of production other
than for production by the claimant; (3) claims of entitlement to employ labour as
combined with the appropriation of the surplus-value produced by that labour; (4)
claims of entitlement to existence (in the sense of →‘allowance’) and the two legis-
lative frameworks in which these four are concretised (6D4 and 6D5); as well as (5)
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the state’s public security framework (6D6). The term ‘hard core frameworks of the
state’ refers more specifically to the legislative frameworks just mentioned (6D4–
6D6). It is contrasted with the term →‘capital accumulation frameworks’.
idealpre-commensuration (dictionary for commensurate: a.o. having the samemeas-
ure). At the market, commodities are constituted as commodities (→‘market trans-
formation of entities’), whence these are commensurated in terms of money, that
is, in terms of the money-form of →‘monetary value’. ‘Ideal pre-commensuration’
refers to the anticipation of this process during production, whence the elements
of the →‘production process’ (that is, the stocks and the commodities in process of
production) are accounted in terms of monetary value. [1§10.]
integral profit. Identical to →‘surplus-value’.
integral profit rate. The year flow of →‘surplus-value’ validated, calculated over the
stock of the capital assets at the beginning of the year (cf. →‘validation’). [1§13, sub
3; 1§14, sub 6; 5§1, sub 1.]
internal profit. Internal profit is the ‘integral profit’ (identical to →‘surplus-value’)
that remains for the enterprise after the distribution of interest to banks and other
external financiers. The concept of internal profit is introduced in 3§1 (cf. Fig. 3.2b)
and amplified in 5§1 and 5§2. Internal profit includes ‘rent’ (explained in Appendix
3C). Next to the distribution of interest, another part of the surplus-value (or of the
internal profit) is distributed to the state in the form of taxes (8§7 and 8§7-a; cf.
Fig. 8.10).
internal profit rate. The year flow of the →‘internal profit’ validated, calculated over
the stock of the capital assets at the beginning of the year. (cf. →‘validation’). [5§1,
sub 1.]
investment. ‘Investment’ alwaysmeans investment inmeansof production. For thepur-
chase of financial paper the terms ‘portfolio investment’ and ‘portfolio investor’ are
avoided; for the latter, instead, the terms ‘finance’ – be it primary or secondary fin-
ance – and ‘financier’ are used. [3§8; 5§5.]
investment versus saving. For this lemma the state is not relevant. Abstracting from
the state, only enterprises invest (→‘investment’). This is the enterprises’ form of
expenditure. As it is an expenditure, it is not a →‘saving’. FromAdamSmith onwards,
mainstream economics posits saving as a precondition for investment – moreover,
saving is considered to be a justification for private profits including interest. The
mainstream notion of a macroeconomic equality of investment and saving (I=S)
can only be defended by way of an utterly strange definition, that functions as an
assumption. This is to define the (→‘PVF’ accommodated) expenditure of investment
as saving (!), thus an expenditure is defined as a non-expenditure. More specific-
ally, the investment expenditure equivalent of retained profits is defined as a saving.
This is utterly odd categorially, though it ideologically does the job of providing the
alleged justification mentioned. [3§9.]
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inward bifurcation (dictionary for bifurcation: to fork or divide into two parts of
branches). A particular duality, of which one pole is sensuous and the other super-
sensuous. The sensuous pole refers to an entity or process. The super-sensuous pole
refers to the →‘monetary-value dimension’ that in empirical reality is ascribed to the
entity or process via a →‘trans-abstraction’. This book presents three inward bifurca-
tions: that of the commodity [1§5]; that of commodified labour-capacity [1§6]; and
that of the capitalist production process [1§10]. These inward bifurcations impli-
citly refer to the →‘outward bifurcation’ for which these inward bifurcations provide
major solutions (that is, →‘sublations’).
labour; labour-capacity. Labour-capacity is thepotential capacity to exert ‘labour’, the
latter being a particular manifestation of the former. ‘Labour-capacity’ is traded at
the labourmarket at a certain →‘wage rate’. [1§6; 1§6-c.] ‘Labour’ is employed within
enterprises, the actual labour being exerted at a certain →‘productive power’, which
is a composite of the ‘technique-associated productive power of labour’ and the
‘intensity of labour’. [1§14.] (Marx, and current marxian political economy, uses the
term ‘labour-power’ for the term ‘labour-capacity’ above [1§6-d].)
legislative framework / regulative framework. The term ‘framework’ in reference to
legislation/regulation denotes that I present a very general categorisation of legis-
lation instead of detailed specifications (in the end those that one finds, depending
on the field, in the hundreds or thousands of pages of the legislative codes).
legitimation of the state. There are two main conditions for the legitimation of the
state. The first, yet abstract-general, condition is that the state posits its (non-)action
in terms of the (putative) general interest [6§6], and that it posits granted rights in
the formof legal rights [6§8]. The state so posits itself as an ‘impartial’ extraordinary
institution above and outside the opposing particular economic interests. However,
given that the state de facto grants the core claims to →‘capitalist economic rights’
indeed in the form of ‘rights’, it constitutes vis-à-vis the capitalist economy a →‘sep-
aration-in-unity’ within the capitalist system [6§7]. The adjective ‘putative’ in the
phrase ‘putative general interest’ is to be taken as denoting that the state pro-
poses its actions to be in what the state itself considers to be the general interest.
Thus, rather than defining what constitutes the ‘general interest’, the state in fact
defines its actions to be in the general interest. Other actors may have different
views about what the general interest would be. The second main condition for
the legitimation of the state is that it must gain a vast-majority →‘compliance’ for
its (non-)actions [6§5]. (The requirement of a ‘vast’ majority is specified in 6§18
on the state’s ‘public security framework’.) The state’s seeking of this vast-majority
compliance, and hence ‘legitimation’ is a core theme throughout Part Two of the
book.
macroeconomic sequence. The interconnected macroeconomic succession of: (1)
production predicated on →‘pre-validating bank finance’, (2) →‘validation’ of pro-
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duction by expenditure, (3) distribution of part of the validated surplus-value to
external financiers, and (4) the resulting →‘internal rate of profit’, as determining (1)
and so forth. [5§6.]
manifestations. In this book ‘manifestations’ denote the final stage of the →‘system-
atic-dialectical exposition’. Manifestations are presented in the last two chapters
of Parts One and Two and in the single chapter of Part Three; that is, at the point
when the exposition of the →‘necessary’ →‘moments’ (the necessary conditions of
existence) of the capitalist system has been completed (Chs. 1–3 and 6–8). Mani-
festations have three main characteristics. First, they are implications of the neces-
sary moments – implications that havemost often a →‘tendency’ character. Second,
manifestations are the culmination of the synthetic exposition – building on that of
the groundingmoments.Third,whereas those groundingmoments reveal the repro-
ductive strength of the capitalist system, the implications of the simultaneous inter-
action of these grounding moments are expressed in concrete manifestations that
reveal not only reproductive strength but also reproductive vulnerability. [A§12.]
market transformation of entities. The →‘trans-abstraction in practice’ at themarket,
throughwhich entities are constituted as commodities, that is, as dual entities in the
aspects of, on the one hand, sensuous →‘usefulness’, and on the other, non-sensuous
→‘monetary value’. [1§5.]
metabolism (dictionary: a.o. basic process of organic functioning or operating). [1§9.]
moment (dictionary: a.o. an aspect of a thing; an essential or constituent factor).
The term ‘moment’ refers to the constituents of each progression (stage) of the
→‘systematic-dialectical exposition’. A moment is a composition of concepts that
belong together; these concepts are thus posited as immediately connected, or con-
nected by amediating concept. In other words, a moment is a more or less cohesive
institutionalmake-up, or amore or less cohesive set of entities, that can be analysed
by itself (sometimes like a model) but that nevertheless derives its full meaning
from its interconnection with other moments, and ultimately from its interconnec-
tedness within the whole exposition. Thus moments derive full meaning through
synthesis. [1§1-d; A§5.]
monetary value. Monetary value is a concretisation and a necessary condition of
existence of →‘value’. Like value in general it is non-physical and thus super-sen-
suous, and like value in general it is ascribed to entities, without comprising part
of the bodily form of those entities. However, monetary value refers to either a
past transaction (→‘validation’) in terms of sensuous money, or to an anticipation
of a future transaction in terms of sensuous money. In this perspective (of past
and anticipation), current monetary value is always both super-sensuous and ideal
in the sense of non-actual – entities in their physical guise are actual. (‘Sensuous’
money includes pure ‘account money’ or bookkeeping entries by banks [2§8, sub
2].) Thus ‘monetary value’ must be distinguished from→‘money’. (For example, usu-
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ally only aminor fraction of enterprises’ assets exists in the form of money; all other
assets are valued in terms of the super-sensuous monetary value, and moreover of
anticipations of this super-sensuous monetary value.) [1§4; 1§10 for the anticipa-
tion.]
monetary-value dimension (MVD). The super-sensuous dimension of capitalist eco-
nomic entities. It is the result of the mundane practice of identifying →‘value’ with
→‘monetary value’. [1§4.]
monetaryvalueof labour, actual. The actualmonetary-valueproduct of labour (mLα),
which is the →‘value-added’. [1§14, sub 6.] In 3§10 (sub 2) a distinction is made
between this ‘actual monetary value of labour’ and the prior and during produc-
tion ‘planned’ monetary value of labour (that is, prior to the →‘validation’ (the sale)
of the output of production). See also ‘unit monetary value of labour, actual (m)’.
money. The unity of measure andmedium of one-dimensional value. Unlike the entit-
ies that money measures, money has no inherent content (even if some particular
form of money may be more adequate than another). Money has no inherent value.
Money is inherentlymerely a quantifier of one-dimensional value. [1§4.] Concretely
money is created ‘ex nihilo’ (out of nothing) by banks, on the basis of a reciprocal
credit relationship between the bank and a client. [2§8.]
necessary / necessity (dictionary: being essential, indispensable, or requisite). In this
book this term refers to phenomena (entities, institutions, processes) that are re-
quired for the existence and reproduction of the capitalist system. A distinction
is made between necessary grounding →‘moments’, that is, moments presenting
necessary conditions of existence (Chs. 1–3 and 6–8) and moments presenting
implications of those grounds as revealed in their →‘manifestations’ (Chs. 4–5, 9–10
and 11). Necessity is implicitly or explicitly always counter-posited to→‘contingency’.
[A§11–A§13, sub 1.]
‘OECD-21’. A sample of 21mature capitalist countries currently organised in the OECD,
for which relevant more or less homogenised data go back to 1870. (Australia, Aus-
tria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy,
Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland,
UK, USA. In 2015 their share in the world population is 13% and their share in world
GDP 56%.) [Appendix 6A.] In Amplifications throughout the book the average of
these is used as an empirical ‘exemplary’ for the capitalist system from 1870–2015.
[6A-2 for the notion of ‘average’ in this context.]
ontology (dictionary: study or a theory of the character of being or the kinds of things
that have existence). →‘epistemology and ontology’.
outward bifurcation (dictionary for bifurcation: to fork or divide into two parts of
branches). A main institutional separation. In this book the only outward bifurc-
ation is that between households and privately owned enterprises [1§1, 1§1-c, 6§1,
6§1-a]. Outwardly bifurcated entities are generally each driven by different object-
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ives. In contradistinction, the different institutional entities of a ‘separation-in-
unity’ are (ultimately) each driven by the same objective (→‘separation-in-unity’).
passive capital →‘capital’.
passive finance capital →‘capital’.
passive capital ownership →‘capital ownership, passive’.
positive right →‘allowance right’.
pre-commensuration →‘ideal pre-commensuration’.
pre-position (dictionary: to position in advance or beforehand). [Hegel’s German:
Voraussetzung ≠ Annahme = assumption.] An entity or constellation that is pos-
ited without the grounds of its existence – that is, the conditions of its existence –
having yet been (fully) posited. The term ‘pre-position’ (instead of ‘assumption’) is
used so as to indicate that these have a temporary status. It is claimed that all entities
or constellations pre-posited can and will be grounded at a later stage of the expos-
ition, whence at that stage these are no longer pre-positions. Distinguished from
→‘presumption’. [GI-C§9 and A§7 – these two sections are almost identical.]
presumption (dictionary: something presumed: taken for granted). The exposition in
this book adopts three presumptions: (1) language; (2) the existence of the object of
enquiry, that is, capitalist economies and states (as empirically exemplified by the
current OECD countries as well as all other countries with a similar structure); (3)
the object of investigation is systematic – which is a precondition for any scientific
study of an object of investigation beyond mere descriptions. Distinguished from
→‘pre-position’. [GI-C§9 and A§7 – these two sections are almost identical.]
pre-validating finance of production by banks (PVF). The flow of money newly cre-
ated in a reciprocal relation between bank and enterprise is an anticipation of pro-
duction and realisation of that production in the future. The bank that creates this
new money on the basis of a loan performs a private pre-validation of production,
which is socially validated when the anticipated production is sold – the loan can
then be redeemed. [2§10; expanded in 3§2.] Contrasted with the stock of →‘remain-
ing pre-validating finance by banks’. Bank provided pre-validating finance (PVF) for
enterprises is not only unconditionally necessary to the capitalist system; it is also
fundamentally different from any other type of finance. One fundamental aspect is
that this PVF is a pure ex nihilo accounting money operation, and another is that it
requires no saving, neither prior to the investment that it accommodates, nor after
it. Generally, saving is not necessary to the capitalist system. [3D2.]
production enterprise. This is a term that at times (when the preciseness of the text
requires it) is used in contradistinction to →‘banks’ and other ‘pure’ financial enter-
prises. The latter (non-production enterprises) do not produce surplus-value and
are, for the growth of their finance capital, dependent on the production and dis-
tribution of surplus-value from production enterprises (in the form of interest and
dividend). [2§11; 3§1.]
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production process, capitalist. The capitalist production process is a dual process of,
on the one hand, a multifaceted physical-technical process, using a →‘technique
of production’ [1§9], and, on the other, a one-dimensional ‘monetary valorisation
process’ (→‘valorisation’). As duality the capitalist process is →‘inwardly bifurcated’
along the two poles indicated above [1§10]. The profit drive of enterprises means
that this dual process is dominated by the valorisation process [1§11].
productive power of labour. The productive power of labour goes along with the
exertion of labour. Within the agreed amount of labour-time, labour-capacity (L)
operates means of production, and so exerts labour at some productive power
(Lα). The duality of the capitalist →‘production process’ implies that this product-
ive power is a dual one. First, that of labour’s physical working up the plant and
equipment to something qualitatively different (the physical gross and net output,
for which there are no commensurate measures within and between processes).
Second, that of the →‘valorising’ exertion of labour (measured as →‘value-added’,
mLα). As the poles of this duality are commensurately inseparable, the productive
power of labour regards both these aspects. [1§14.] The productive power of labour
is the unique source of →‘value-added’, and hence also of →‘surplus-value’ (= integral
profit). [1§14.] The productive power of labour covers two components (α=(ά) (ϊ)).
First, the technique-associated productive power (ά), which usually diverges between
sectors of production. Technology and techniques are creations by labour. Their
commodification implies that these are themselves the result of the productive
power of labour (perhaps in sectors different from where these are applied). The
second component of labour’s productive power is the degree of intensity of labour
(ϊ). At zero intensity (in effect a strike) there is no physical production and no pro-
duction of value. [1§14.] This intensity is inevitably physically limited [2§2].
profit. A distinction ismade between ‘integral profit’ (= →‘surplus-value’) and→‘intern-
al profit’ (in brief, surplus-value after the payment of interest to financiers). The term
profit is used eitherwhen this distinction is not relevant, orwhen this distinctionhas
not yet been introduced. InChapter 1 (its 1§8–1§11) the termprofit refers to the every-
day casual meaning of this term: the quantitative difference between the monetary
value of the commodity inputs and the commodity outputs. Profit is the monistic
driving force of enterprises. Monistic refers to one-dimensional →‘monetary value’.
The term profit is introduced in 1§8 as a transitional concept, until the introduction
of the concept of →‘surplus-value’ in 1§12.
profit rate →‘integral profit rate’; →‘internal profit rate’.
proximate moments and proximate conditions (or proximate grounds). The imme-
diate andmost general conditions, at that point of the exposition, for thatwhichwas
posited before. The exposition is not complete before all the conditions of existence
of the starting point have been presented endogenously. ‘Proximity’ determines the
order of their exposition. [GI-C§4; A§11, sub 3.]
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PVF →‘pre-validating finance of production by banks’.
rate of integral profit →‘integral profit rate’.
rate of internal profit →‘internal profit rate’.
regulative framework →‘legislative framework’.
remaining pre-validating finance by banks (RPVF). Banks necessarily provide credit
to enterprises, which is a flow of →‘pre-validating finance of production (PVF)’. This
flow returns to the banks on aggregate spending, so cancelling the pre-validating
credit. However, anynon-spending of income interfereswith this, and it implies that
the bank is (continues to be) the enterprises’ financier for this amount not spent
(3§3). The non-redeemed part of the PVF, which equals the saving by labour and
capital owners, is called the remaining pre-validating finance (RPVF). Hence banks
provide, in effect, next to a money-creating flow of finance (PVF), a non-money-
creating stock of finance (RPVF) – the latter being based on previous money cre-
ation, and now being based on a triadic debt-credit relationship between the bank,
the saver of money and the enterprise (3§6, cf. 3§3). At the same time, the non-
spenders are potential ex post financiers. To the extent that the latter explicitly enter
into a (additional) finance relation with the enterprises – thus substituting for the
bankRPVF– theybecomeactual expost financiers, or owners of (additional) finance
capital. A ‘loanable fund’ of current and past saving is no precondition for investment.
Ex post substitution for the bank’s RPVF by capital owners contributes to the banks’
ongoing accommodation of the accumulation of capital via their PVF. [3§6.]
reproduction of the capitalist system. The continued existence of the capitalist sys-
tem.This requires a series of interconnected ‘conditions of existence’, that is, a series
of interconnected →‘grounds’.
restructuring of capital (ROC). There are two main manifestations of ROC. The first
one goes along with a process of (gradual) movement of a (conglomerate) enter-
prise from one sector of production to another (Part One, Ch. 4) or within the same
type of sector from one country to another one (Part Three, Ch. 11). This process
encompasses two phases. The first one involves the liquidation of existing plants or
divisions of an enterprise – either by selling them and/or by the non-replacement
of depreciated means of production. The second phase is that of a gradual invest-
ment in a new sector of production, or that of taking over an enterprise (or a division
of it) in a new sector, whence we have conglomerate take-overs, followed by invest-
ment in the new sector of production. The two phases may also be combined in
processes of conglomerate merging of enterprises, together with a shift in invest-
ment from the one to the other part of the conglomerate. [4§2-b and 11§11.] The
second manifestation is associated with the cyclical over-accumulation of capital
(Ch. 5). It occurs either just before (big enterprises) or during the recession (big and
other enterprises) as a reaction to falling profit rates. In brief this ROC involves the
(partial) violent cyclical destruction and so cyclical devaluation of capital via the
glossary of field-specific terms 689
closing or the reorganisation of production plants. Hence part of the capital pro-
duced and accumulated in the previous phases of the cycle is annihilated. This may
involve intra-enterprise reorganisation and inter-enterprise centralisation of cap-
ital. [5§9; 5§9-b sub 6.]
RPVF →‘remaining pre-validating finance by banks’.
saving. Non-expenditure of an income flow. Saving is contingent. Whereas the →‘pre-
validating finance of production by banks’ is a precondition for investment, saving
is no precondition for investment [3§2]. →‘investment versus saving’.
seeming/seemingly (dictionary: external appearance as distinguished from true char-
acter; appearing to be true but not being true or certain).
separation-in-unity. Amain institutional separation. In contradistinction to an→‘out-
ward bifurcation’, the different institutional entities, or components, or poles, of a
‘separation-in-unity’ are (ultimately) eachdrivenby the sameobjective,which artic-
ulates their unity. The core separation-in-unity (s-i-u) presented in this book is that
of the capitalist economy and the capitalist state (6§7). Of the four other s-i-u’s,
two are presented at the end of Chapter 2 and two at the end of Chapter 7. These
are the s-i-u of enterprises and banks (2§11); the s-i-u between the shareholders –
or more broadly the ‘passive capital owners’ – and the executive management of
the enterprise (2§14); the s-i-u’s between the state’s administrative and judiciary
branches (7§18); and between the state’s administrative and deliberative branches
(7§23). [2§11-a and 6§7-a.]
sociation. Abstract minimum conditions that any imaginable society must meet, in
order for it to be a ‘potentially continuous’ social whole [1§0].
stratification of enterprises and enterprises’ plants: the stratified structure of pro-
duction. Within most sectors of production, the enterprises (and their plants in
case of multi-plant enterprises) are not homogenous. These are rather heterogen-
eously stratified according to the characteristics indicated at the end of this entry.
The enterprise that successfully initiates a new technique of production secures a
rate of profit above that of the existing enterprises (plants) in the sector. Because
each enterprise is burdened with the fixed costs of its already accumulated capital,
it will only scrap old plants when a new technique offers net profits (‘net’ that is,
taking into account the costs of scrapping old plants) greater than the profits on its
existing plant. Therefore, plants embodying new techniques will in general not be
immediately adopted by all enterprises, whence each sector of production tends to
be composed of a stratification of plants dated according to technique, cost of pro-
duction, value-productivity of labour and a resulting stratification of rates of integral
profit. [4§4.]
sublate/sublation (MW dictionary: to negate or eliminate – as an element in a dia-
lectic process – but preserve as a partial element in a synthesis; see also Inwood 1992,
pp. 283–5.) In this book sublation refers foremost to a (partial) supersession/resolu-
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tion of the shortcomings of the starting point’s →‘outward bifurcation’, without that
bifurcation itself being undone. In other words, sublation refers to a derived mode
of existence of the starting point’s outward bifurcation, a mode that when posited
at that stage of the dialectic (without further grounds) may or may not be stable.
In this book a sublation has always the character of the (partial) grounding of the
starting point’s outward bifurcation. Grounding is the same as the determination
of a (partial) condition of existence of the outward bifurcation. The term is used in
Chapters 1 and 6only. Generally, however, any other grounding of an earliermoment
in these and other chapters can be considered as a sublation.
subordinated working class (SWC) →‘capitalist and managerial class (CMC) and sub-
ordinated working class (SWC)’.
surplus-value; identical to integral profit. The component of →‘value-added’ that is
appropriated by enterprises (the other component being wages) – all in monetary
dimension. The concept is used either microeconomically or macroeconomically.
[1§12.] Surplus-value is independent of the contingent way in which the enterprise
is financed. In 3§1, and more detailed in 5§1, surplus-value is decomposed as the
sum of internal profit (retained and distributed) and interest, the latter being the
enterprises’ external financiers share of the surplus-value.
surplus-value, rate of. A measure for the degree of exploitation of labour as reflected
in the capital–labour distribution of income, defined as the capital income share
(surplus-value, Π) over the labour income share (wages, wL). [2§5.]
SWC, subordinated working class. →‘capitalist and managerial class (CMC) and subor-
dinated working class (SWC)’.
synchronic →‘diachronic’.
systematic-dialectical exposition. In this book ‘systematic-dialectical exposition’ (in
brief ‘exposition’) refers to the systematic presentation of a constellation (the object
totality) that is →‘ontologically’ systematic (in case →‘capitalism’). The exposition
is about the constellation’s constituents (more precisely its →‘moments’) that are
necessary for its continued existence (Chs. 1–3 and 6–8) as well as about the latter’s
implied→‘manifestations’ (Chs. 4–5, 9–10 and 11).The exposition thus abstracts from
→‘contingencies’. The core of the exposition lies in the interconnection of the con-
stellation’s constituents. These constituents (moments) are presented stage-wise
(the book’s consecutive divisions and sections) as proximate conditions of exist-
ence of the constellation (→‘proximate moments and proximate conditions’). The
focus is indeedon interconnection, rather thanonmerely thepartial analysis of con-
stituents (moments) treated separately. Contrasting ‘analysis’ with ‘synthesis’, the
systematic-dialectical exposition results in a synthetic outline of the constellation
and functioning of the capitalist system. [GI, C§4; A§10–A§14.]
technique of production. A qualitatively and quantitatively specific combination of
nature,means of production and labour togetherwith a qualitatively specific labour
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process [1§9]. The particularly capitalist →‘production process’ means that tech-
niques and the technical productionprocess (rather thanbeing ‘pre-given’ andneut-
ral) are devised to be geared to →‘valorisation’. [1§11.]
tendency. A tendency should be distinguished froman empirical ‘trend’. A tendency is
the generation of a particular form of an entity (e.g. the corporate form of the enter-
prise) or the particular quantitative expression of an entity or process (e.g. equalisa-
tionof inter-sector rates of profit), this generationbeingpredicatedoncertain forces
or compulsions (see 2§12 or 4§2 for examples). A tendency may be counteracted by
other tendencies, or by other lower-level complexities (see 4§14 for an example).
A tendency is a determinant whose actualisation might not always predominate in
any individual case. However, for it to have the status of a tendency (in this book),
it must apply to a significant enough number of cases such that, when abstracting
fromcounteracting tendencies, it has apredominant character for the totality. [2§12-
a and A§14.]
trans-abstraction in practice. Upon the actual market trade, heterogeneous entities
are commensurated in terms of money, that is, something that is no partwhatsoever
of their concrete physical bodily form or concrete constitution. Along with it the
alien dimension of →‘monetary value’ is ascribed to the entity, or rather vested in the
entity – it now being a ‘commodity’. The ‘trans-abstraction in practice’ is described in
the previous sentence. ‘Trans’ refers to transcendental (in the sense of a move bey-
ond the ordinary limits of entities); ‘abstraction in practice’ refers to the fact that
this is not ameremental abstraction (behind the writing desk, so to speak), but one
that is executed in the everyday practice of market trade. Indeed we are ‘doing’ it all
the time. [1§4; 1§4-b.]
unit monetary value of labour, actual (m). The component ‘m’ in the →‘monetary-
value product of labour’ (mLα). Practically ‘m’ measures the validation, the sale, of
the net product of labour [1§14, sub 8]. (See also 3§10, 4§6 and 4§11.)
usefulness (dictionary: being of use or service). The specific characteristics of the
physical input andoutput of enterprises, alongmultifaceteddimensions. (The terms
‘use-value’ and ‘utility’ are avoided because in Marginalist and Neoclassical dis-
courses these terms refer to ‘subjective use-value’ – which anyway is not applicable
as such for the inputs and outputs-supply of enterprises – and in some strands of
these also refer to an assumed one-dimensionality.) [1§3-b.]
use-value →‘usefulness’.
validation (dictionary: a.o. to make valid). The turning of the output of enterprises
into money, that is, the sale of the output [1§10]. Validation may also refer to the
realisation of a component of the output, especially surplus-value [3§10].
value. Shorthand for ‘abstract general one-dimensional value’, which is a homogenous
common denominator, which absorbs concrete specificity [1§3 and 1§3-a]. Value
is non-physical and thus super-sensuous [1§4]. Money is a necessary condition of
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existence of value (→‘monetary value’). ‘Value’ is distinct from →‘usefulness’, ‘use-
value’ and ‘utility’. Each of the latter three refers to physical qualities of a good or of
a commodity.
value-added. Value-added is the value product of labour (mLα) as resulting from the
→‘productive power of labour’. It is equal to the sum of wages and →‘surplus-value’,
all in monetary dimension. The concept is used either microeconomically or mac-
roeconomically. [1§12; 1§14, sub 8.]
valorisation (translation of the German noun Verwertung). The production of ideal
→‘monetary value’. (See also →‘ideal pre-commensuration’.) This monetary value
remains ‘ideal’ until the output of production is actually →‘validated’. [1§10 and
addendum 1§12-b.]
valoro-technique. A term making explicit that the applied →‘techniques of produc-
tion’ are not neutral, but rather geared to valorisation and profit making. [2§2-c;
2§4; 2§5.]
wage rate. A sum of money per unit of labour-time – the unit being specified as, for
example, one hour or one year, the latter in the going ‘full-time equivalent’. More
specifically, commodified labour-capacity is bifurcated into ‘capacity rented out for
a certain amount of time’ and ‘rent in monetary value for a certain amount of time’
the name for the latter being the ‘wage for a certain amount of time’ or, briefly, the
‘wage rate’. [1§6.]
wealth (dictionary: a.o. all things that have amonetary value).Wealth refers to all dur-
able entities or claims that have a monetary value. →‘Capital’ is a form of wealth.
However, this does not mean that any wealth is ‘capital’. Capital is a form of wealth
geared to production, with the purpose of selling that production so as to make a
profit. [8§12; Appendix 3C-1 (sub 6).]
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inward bifurcation Glos, 1§5, 1§6, 1§10
of entities (constitution as commodity) 1§5
of labour-capacity (commodification) 1§6
see also commodity and commodification
of the production process 1§10, 1§11
its potential threat 1§11-a
see also ideal pre-commensuration
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judiciary: separation-in-unity with state’s main body 7D6
arbitration and sanctioning, conflicts of 7§18
tends being assigned to separate institution of state: the judiciary 7§18
purification from conflict for the main body of the state 7§18
separation of powers versus purification from conflict 7§18-b
see also assigned separation versus delegation by the state
see also separation-in-unity
labour and profits
Smith, Marshall and Keynes on 1§14-b
labour; labour-capacity Glos, 1§6, 1§14
enforcement to sell labour-capacity 1§6
enterprises as employers of labour 1§6
‘labour-capacity’ (L) versus ‘labour’ (Lα) 1§6-c, 1§14 (sub 4)
terminology of labour-capacity and labour-power 1§6-d
labour as the unique source of valorisation 1§14 (sub 4 and sub 6)
labour as essentially producing capital 1§14 (sub 7)
labour-capacity, created within households 1§14 (sub 3), 2§4 (sub 1)
market and production related concepts of 1§14-a
see also productive power of labour
labour-capacity framework (state)
1. Quality of labour-capacity (7§14)
public education (state-funded education) 7§14
reasons for state-funded education 7§14-b
contingent ways of organising it 7§14-b
2. Quantity of labour-capacity (7§10–7§13)
labour population growth 7§13
labour participation
length of the working day (or week)




aspect of accumulation of capital 7§10
aspect of legitimation 7§10
in common interest of capitalist and managerial class 7§10
in interest of subordinated working class 7§10
potential conflict about the minimumwage level
delegation to wage commissions or councils 7§11
temporary unemployment benefits
cyclical (temporary) unemployment benefits 7§12
sickness benefits 7§12
quantity of labour-capacity regulation: state expenditure 7§13-b
lease as a particular (contingent) way of finance Appendix 3C-1 (sub 3)
legislation and regulation: terminology 10§3
see also legislative frameworks
see also regulation (…)
legislative frameworks Glos,
(8 frameworks in order of the exposition)
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A. hard core frameworks (1–3)
1. capitalist economic rights 6D4
legal rights to property 6§10
legal right to employ labour and to appropriate surplus-value 6§11
2. existence rights (allowance rights) 6D5
labour protection (labour time, occupational safety and health) 6§15
protection of the consumer and the environment 6§14
purification from conflict 6§16
delegation of specific regulation and of supervision 6§16
3. public security 6D6
upholding of legal rights and of the institution of the state 6§18
components 6§18
state’s legalised violence and its limits 6§18
requirement to seek vast-majority-legitimation 6§18
B. Capital accumulation frameworks (4–6)
4. monetary 7D2
seemonetary framework




C. Framework of legitimation in vast-majority compliance (7)
7. social security transfers 7D5
see social security framework
see also social security transfers: dynamics
E. Framework of constraints on the modes of market interaction (8)
8. competition and the mode of capital accumulation 9D1, 9D2
see also imposition of competition by the state
see also regulation change of the general price level
see also regulation ‘too big to fail’ banks (and other entities)
legitimation of the state Glos,
legitimation in vast-majority compliance 6§5
at level of Chapter 6 successively grounded in:
1. positing its actions in terms of the putative general interest 6§6
the undefined general interest 6§6-b
2. putative impartiality of the state 6§7
contrast with separation-in-unity economy–state 6§7, 6§7-a
see also separation-in-unity
3. positing rights in the form of law 6§8
4. arbitration and sanctioning 6§9
see also judiciary …
non-normative character of the exposition 6§5-a
contrast with ‘social contract theory’ 6§5-a
see also social security framework
see also social security transfers: dynamics
see also vast-majority-legitimation, requirement of
lending by banks to labour and to capital owners: contingencies App. 3B
lending power banks: money dealing and interest paid by banks App. 3B-1
generalisation of the form of money lending Appendix 3B-2
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lending to capital owners: finance doubling Appendix 3B-4
as allocation lending power of banks away from enterprises App. 3B-4
finance doubling Appendix 3B-4
self-reinforcing inflationary boosting of the shares market App. 3B-4
leverage of margin buying Appendix 3B–4a
lending to labour Appendix 3B-3
ex ante substitution for pre-validating finance of production by banks App. 3B-3 (sub
1)
see also pre-validating finance of production by banks
interest as share in surplus-value or as share in wages App. 3B-3 (sub 2)
loanable funds (LF)
erroneous notion of conceiving LF as a pre-condition for investment 3§6
erroneous notion of conceiving banks as intermediaries of LF 3§6-a
see also pre-validating finance of production by banks
macroeconomic after-tax surplus-value 8D4
effect of state expenditure and taxation on surplus-value 8§7
taxation along with benefits that expand surplus-value 8§7
effect fiscal deficit on enterprises’ after-tax surplus-value 8§8
positive effect of fiscal deficit on the after-tax surplus-value 8§8
counteracted by savings of state bondholders 8§8
Kalecki on the state budget deficit effect on profits 8§8-a
see alsomacroeconomic validation of surplus-value: state bracketed
see alsomacroeconomic validation surplus-value: effect state expenditure
macroeconomic sequence Glos
of pre-validation, production and validation of output and surplus-value
elements 3§10 (sub 1), 3§10 (sub 5)
dynamic interconnection 5§6, Fig. 5.2
see also pre-validating finance of production by banks, redemption of
see also validation
see alsomacroeconomic validation of surplus-value: state bracketed
see alsomacroeconomic validation of surplus-value: state explicit
macroeconomic validation of surplus-value: effect state expenditure 8D3
state expenditure and state-mediated savings (transfers) 8§6 (2nd bullet)
state expenditure effect on surplus-value:
positive effect; moderated by state-mediated savings 8§6, 8§6-a
surplus-value effect and pre-tax internal profit effect 8§6-c
see alsomacroeconomic validation of surplus-value: state bracketed
macroeconomic validation of surplus-value: state bracketed 3§10
actual and planned variables 3§10 (sub 2)
especially actual and planned unit monetary value of labour 3§10 (sub 2)
planned macroeconomic production 3§10 (sub 2)
by macroeconomic expenditure
investment–saving determinants 3§10 (sub 3)
investment–saving dynamic of the validation 5§5 (and Fig. 5.2)
distribution of validated surplus-value 3§10 (sub 4)
summary 3§10 (sub 5)
see alsomacroeconomic sequence
see alsomacroeconomic validation surplus-value: effect state expenditure
see alsomacroeconomic after-tax surplus-value
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macroeconomic varieties: categorisation 3§2-a
management
seemanagerial labour
managerial labour (‘management’) 2§7
internalisation of the norms of the enterprise 2§7 (sub 1)
function of reaching the compliance of ordinary labour 2§7 (sub 2)
as achieved by wage rate differentials (wages ladder) 2§7 (sub 2)
management of the enterprise–labour relation 2§7 (sub 3)
management of the productive power of labour
of the intensity of labour 2§2 (sub 1)
of technological and technical change 2§2 (sub 2)
see also productive power of labour
executive management of the corporate enterprise 2§13
potential conflict with shareholders 2§13-a
manifestation of the state’s reach 10D3
‘hidden hand’ of the capitalist state 10§8
experience of the state in its expenditure 10§8, 10§9–10§12
legitimating social security transfers
see social security transfers: dynamics
see also vulnerabilities of the capitalist state’s reach
manifestations Glos, A§12
(presented in Chs. 4–5 and 9–11 and in 8D5)
market
high degree of similarity of the commodities traded 4§3
ultimately a relative notion 4§3 (fn)
product differentiation (monopoly or losing notion of market) 4§3 (fn)
market interaction 4§1
inter-market interaction
tendency equalisation average inter-sector integral profit rates 4§2
concretised as a ‘restructuring of capital’ 4§2-b
see also integral profit rate
intra-market interaction
price setting in reaction to that interaction 4§3
tendency to uniform prices in a market 4§3
reinforcing compulsion to accumulate capital in new techniques of production 4§4 (sub
1)
see also stratified structure of production
market transformation of entities Glos, 1§5
Marx’s Capital (comparisons with current book)
(this entry is in chapter rather than alphabetical order)
starting point 1§1-h, 1§2-b
duality of the commodity 1§5-b
money as the measure of value 1§5-c
concept of valorisation 1§12-b
monetary value of labour (mLα) and concrete and abstract labour 1§14-c
field of this book’s Chapter 1 and various fields of Capital 1§15-a
productive power and intensity of labour 2§2-d
initial accumulation of capital:
historical (Marx) versus systematic (this book) 3§7-c
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stratified production:
and Marx’s unfinished theory of the cycle App. 5B (see als0 5§9-a)
implicit in Marx’s technique associated ‘productive power of labour’ 4§4-d
means of production
fixed and floating 1§14 (sub 1)
stocks and flows 1§14 (sub 1)
fixed, used up (δKt) 1§14 (sub 1)
floating, used up (μKt) 1§14 (sub 1)
technical coefficients versus fractions of K 1§14 (sub 1)
providing no new value-added 1§14 (sub 2, sub 4)
representing previous value-added 1§14 (sub 2)
inherently static elements in the production process 1§14 (sub 4)
metabolism
of human beings with nature Glos, 1§9
moment Glos, 1§1-d, A§5
see also proximate moments and proximate conditions
monetary circuit theory 3§2-e
monetary framework (state) 7D2
imposition of the monetary standard of the Central Bank 7§4
interconnection of clearing banks and ‘the’ Central Bank 7§4
monetary legislation: concrete grounding of money 7§5
conflicts thereof 7§6
delegation of conflict dealing to the Central Bank 7§7
dealing with banking crises 7§9
‘too big to fail’ banks 7§9
see also regulation ‘too big to fail’ banks
objective of creeping inflation 7§8
see also regulation change of the general price level
no monopoly of money creation for the Central Bank 7§4-b
monetary value Glos, 1§4, 1§10
monetary-value dimension Glos, 1§4
monetary value of labour, actual Glos, 1§14 (sub 6)
actual monetary value of labour (mLα) 1§14 (sub 6)
see alsomonetary value of labour, planned
see also unit monetary value of labour (m), actual
monetary value of labour, planned 3§10 (sub 2)
see alsomonetary value of labour, actual
money Glos, 1§4
as measure of value 1§4
as mediator of value 1§4
commensuration in terms of 1§4
having no inherent content 1§4
having no inherent value 1§4
standard measure(s) of money 1§4
see alsomoney creation by commercial banks
money creation by commercial banks
creation ex nihilo 2§8 (sub 1)
based on a separation-in-unity of enterprises and banks 2§11
see also separation-in-unity, distinguished from outward bifurcation
index of subjects 715
reciprocal credit relation between banks and their clients 2§8 (sub 1)
bank account money 2§8 (sub 2)
economy-endogenous money 2§8-c
interconnection between banks 2§9 (sub 1)
as mediated by a Clearing Bank 2§9 (sub 2)
vulnerabilities of a multi-bank constellation
optimism and over-optimism of enterprises 2§10 (sub 3)
over-crediting by banks 2§10 (sub 3)
see alsomonetary framework (state)
monopolisation
see centralisation of capital, tendency to
necessary/necessity Glos, A§13
oligopolisation and monopolisation, tendency to
see centralisation of capital, tendency to
OECD-21 Glos, Appendix 6A
strong version of capitalism 6A-1
reference to the unweighted average (arithmetic mean) 6A-2.
ontology
see Glos ‘epistemology and ontology’
outsourcing of state functions 8§3-b
outward bifurcation, dissociated Glos, 1§1, 1§1-c, 6§1
twofold grounding of the starting point 6§1-a, Fig. 6.2
overcapacity
desired and undesired 5§5
determinant of (cyclical) investment 5§5
rate of undesired overcapacity 5§5
see also cyclical over-accumulation of capital
see also inflationary structural overcapacity competition









see ‘capital ownership, passive’
pension funds, contingency Appendix 3A-2
positive right
see allowance rights and positive rights
pre-commensuration
ideal pre-commensuration Glos, 1§10
pre-position Glos, GI-C§9, A§7
presumption Glos, GI-C§9, A§7
pre-validation of enterprises’ future production by banks 2§10 (sub 1)
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condition for the accumulation of capital
as requiring expansion of other enterprises 2§10 (sub 2)
see also pre-validating finance of production by banks
pre-validating finance of production by banks (PVF) Glos, 3§2 (sub 1)
a finance ex nihilo 3§3
see alsomoney creation by commercial banks, creation ex nihilo
accumulation of capital necessarily initiated by 3§2 (sub 1)
unconditional and continuous necessity 3§2 (sub 1), 3§6, 3§6b
flow of, influx 3§2 (sub 1), 3§6-b
for payment of wages and means of production 3§2 (sub 2–3)
for payment of wages, means of production and dividends 3§2 (sub 4)
input–output connection: a two-enterprises-sector model 3§2-b
fundamental difference from any other type of finance 3§6
partial redemption of
due to saving by capital owners and labour 3§3
payment of interest on 3§4
‘banking entities’ and enterprises’ payment of interest 3§4-a
saving no pre-condition – neither prior nor after the PVF 3§2, 3§2-c, 3§6
see also saving
see also remaining pre-validating finance by banks
price competition
see deflationary price competition
price leadership, rotating 4§6 (sub 2), 4§12 (sub 1 and sub 3),
production
gross production, defined 1§14 (sub 8)
gross value-added produced, defined 1§14 (sub 8)
net value-added produced, defined 1§14 (sub 8)
production by the state 8D1
economically producing the content of legislative frameworks 8§1
see also legislative frameworks
employment of wage labour (civil servants) 8§1, 8§3
purchase of inputs from enterprises 8§1, 8§2
product of the state: collective goods and services 8§1
production related expenditures 8§1
tending to make no profits 8§1
non-surplus-value producing character of civil servants 8§1
implicit production of a surplus distributed for free 8§1-a
wages sole component of state’s value-added 8§1
transfers by the state: transfers expenditures 8§1
not related to the state’s own production 8§1
see also state as economic actor
product differentiation
seemarket, product differentiation
production enterprise Glos, 2§11, 3§1
production process, capitalist Glos, 1§9–1§12
as physical-technical process 1§9
contingency of its time span 1§13 (sub 2)
singular physical production process 1§13 (sub 2)
as monetary valorisation process 1§10
see also valorisation
index of subjects 717
anticipating market commensuration:
ideal pre-commensuration 1§10, 1§10-a
inward bifurcation of production process 1§10
see also valorisation
dual process dominated by monetary value and valorisation 1§11
inputs and input costs of the production process:
summed up and defined 1§14 (sub 1)
see also enterprise–labour relation
see alsomanagerial labour
management of the enterprise–labour relation
management of the productive power of labour
see alsomeans of production
see also productive power of labour
productive power of labour (PPL) Glos, 1§14
component of technique associated PPL 1§14 (sub 5)
component of intensity of labour associated PPL 1§14 (sub 5)
limits of 2§2-b
management of PPL 2§2
parameter of the PPL (α) 1§14 (sub 5)
usually diverging between and within production sectors 1§14 (sub 6)
see also surplus-value, rate of, sector-wise diverging due to diverging PPL
see alsomonetary value of labour, actual
profit Glos
preliminary definition 1§8
see also surplus-value, as identical to integral profit
see also internal profit
profit rate
see integral profit rate
see internal profit rate
proximate moments and proximate conditions Glos, A§11 (sub 3), GI-C§4
see alsomoment
PVF
see pre-validating finance of production by banks
quasi dividends 3§2
range of the stratification of production
determinant of 4§13 (sub 1)
range and density of the stratification of production 4§13-a
see also range of the stratification
rate of integral profit
see integral profit rate
rate of internal profit
see internal profit rate
regulation and legislation: terminology 10§3
execution of delegated regulation: ‘orders’ 10§3-a
see also legislative frameworks
see also regulation (…)
regulation change of the general price level: creeping inflation 7§8, 9§5
target of creeping inflation at close to 2% 9§5-b, 9§5-c
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regulation of enterprises’ market interaction
see imposition of competition by the state
regulation: increasing quantity, complication and complexity
conceptual outline 10§4, Fig. 10.3 (summary)
1. quantity and density of regulation 10§5
examples of increasing mere quantity of regulation 10§5-a
2. complexity of regulation 10§6
combination of complication, interweaving and field fusion 10§6
degree of complication 10§6 (sub A)
paradox of equity of simple regulation 10§6 (sub A)
interweaving of regulation 10§6 (sub B)
fusion of fields of regulation by economic actors 10§6 (sub C)
3. tendency to increasing complexity of regulation 10§7
driven by new social-economic problems 10§7 (sub A)
driven by unintended loopholes in regulation 10§7 (sub B)
enterprises search of gaps and ambiguities 10§7 (sub B)
repair resulting in increasing complication 10§7 (sub B)
complexity-increasing cycles of loopholes amendments 10§7 (sub B)
regulation ‘too big to fail’ banks (and other entities) 7§9, 9§6
centralisation and concentration within the banking sector 9A-1
effective supervision of big banks practically unachievable 9§6, 9A-2
social costs of an encompassing banking crisis 9A-3
imposing a cap on the accumulation of capital in single banks:
highly conflicting 9§6, 9§6-a
regulatory discrimination of ‘systemic risk’ banks 9§6
Basel III proposals 9§6-c
tight(er) reserve ratios:
reliability depending on unreliability of assets valuation 9§6
resulting in lower credit potential and economic growth 9§6
regulative framework(s)
see legislative frameworks
remaining pre-validating finance by banks (RPVF) Glos, 3§6
being the non-redeemed part of the PVF 3§6
non-money creating stock of finance 3§6, 3§6-b
and the rate of interest 5§4
see also pre-validating finance of production by banks (PVF), flow
see also saving
ex post substitution for RPVF by non-bank actors 3§6, Circuit 3.13
ex post: finance of already accumulated capital (via banks PVF) 3§6
deferred substitution (illusion of loanable funds) 3§6-d
summary: connection between the PVF and the RPVF 3§6-c, Fig. 3.14
rent paid by enterprises, contingency of
defined Appendix 3C (introduction)
share in the production enterprises’ surplus-value Appendix 3C-1
reproduction of the capitalists system Glos
restructuring of capital (ROC) Glos
restructuring of capital, two modes of, associated with:
cyclical over-accumulation of capital 5§9 (sub B-1)
tendency equalisation of average inter-sector rates of integral profit 4§2-b
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re-substitution trade in financial paper, contingencies of Appendix 3A-3
substitution for the banks’ remaining pre-validating finance (RPVF)
the primary market’s flow of shares and bonds Appendix 3A-3
see also remaining pre-validating finance by banks, ex post substitution
re-substitution for the banks’ RPVF
the secondary market’s trade in the stock of shares and bonds App. 3A-3
revaluation of capital, derived 4§11
(the term ‘revaluation of capital’ tout court is not presented)
see also devaluation of capital, derived
rights
see allowance rights and positive rights
see also capitalist state, capitalist economic … in form of granted rights
risk versus uncertainty 2§10 (sub 3)
RPVF
see remaining pre-validating finance by banks
saving(s) Glos
contingency of 3§3
no precondition for investment 3§2 (sub 3)
not necessary to the capitalist system 3§3, 3§3-a
nuisance for enterprises 3§3
practice of ubiquitous saving
saving by capital owners 3§3
determinants of 5§3
saving by labour 3§3
determinants of 5§3
saving actors may substitute ex post for bank provided finance
see remaining pre-validating finance by banks, ex post substitution
triadic debt-credit relationship 3§3
see also investment versus saving
see alsomacroeconomic validation of surplus-value: state bracketed
see alsomacroeconomic validation surplus-value: effect state expenditure
saving versus investment





distinguished from outward bifurcation 2§11-a
s-i-u of capitalist economy and state (the core s-i-u) 6§7, 6§7-a
s-i-u of enterprises and banks 2§11
s-i-u of corporations’ shareholders and the executive management 2§14
s-i-u of the state’s administrative and judiciary branches 7§18
s-i-u of the state’s administrative and deliberative branches 7§23
singular physical production process
contingent time span of 1§13 (sub 2)
see also production process
social security framework (state) 7§17
categories of social security transfers 7§17 (sub 2)
legal forms of social security transfers 7§17 (sub 3), Fig. 7.8
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alternative of protection of the poor 7§17 (sub 3)
alternative of generalised social security transfers 7§17 (sub 3)
seeking legitimation in the compliance of the vast majority 7§17 (sub 1)
social security transfers and surplus-value 7§17 (sub 4)
indirect condition for the accumulation of capital 7§17 (sub 4)
return to labour of a part of the surplus-value distributed 7§17 (sub 4)
see also social security transfers: dynamics
social security transfers: finance of 8§9
in the OECD-21, 1970–2015 8§9-a
social security transfers (SST): dynamics
A. Context of single state
compliance dependent: vast majority 7§17, 10§12
income deciles shares of social security transfers 8§11-a (table 8.17)
necessary intensity SST catalysed by stage of capital accumulation 10§12
stage correlate of communications part of infrastructure 10§12
stage correlate of public education (knowledge) 10§12
widespread information about distribution of income 10§12
affecting vast-majority-legitimation 10§12
see also vast-majority-legitimation, requirement of
SST as a percentage of GDP cannot feasibly increase forever 10§12
B. Context of international migration of production (in face of sub A)
balance of forces, single nations 11§15 (sub 1)
role information about distribution income and wealth 11§15 (sub 1)
connection SST and wages structure 11§15 (sub 4)
pressure on legitimation in high-income countries 11§15 (sub 4)





(all ‘state’ lemmas refer to the capitalist state)
see capitalist state
see legitimation of the state
state as economic actor 8§1
1. state production related expenditures
see production by the state
2. transfers related expenditures
contingent subsidies to:
enterprises, households and cultural institutions 8§2, 10§13
interest payments on the state debt 8§2
social security transfers 8§2
see also social security framework
see also social security transfers: dynamics
3. total state expenditure: sum of 1 and 2
state receipts
see finance of the state
stratification of enterprises and enterprises’ plants
see stratified structure of production
stratification of production
see stratified structure of production
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stratified structure of production Glos, 4§4 (visualised in Fig. 4.2)
its core determinant of technical change 4§4 (sub 2)
its core determinant of preservation of capital already accumulated
checking immediate investment in new techniques 4§4 (sub 2)
stratification and scrapping of plants 4§4-a
see also deflationary price competition
see also inflationary structural overcapacity competition
see also range and density of the stratification of production
structural overcapacity
see inflationary structural overcapacity competition
sublate/sublation Glos
subordinated working class (SWC)
see class, subordinated working class
super-sensuous dimension of ‘value’ 1§4 (sub 7)
money as medium (mediator) of 1§4 (sub 3, sub 7), 1§4-b
see also super-sensuous dimension of ‘monetary value’
super-sensuous dimension of ‘monetary value’ 1§4 (sub 7), 1§4-b
as affecting the sensuous being of things and capacities 1§11
see also super-sensuous dimension of ‘value’
surplus-value Glos, 1§12, 3§1, 5§1
as identical to integral profit 1§12
terminology of surplus-value and integral profit 1§12 (and fn)
compared with the SNA concept of ‘operating surplus’ 1§12-a
see also System of National Accounts (SNA 2008)
production of surplus-value explained 1§14 (esp. sub 2–6)
source of the growth of capital
see capital, active capital, growth of
see also distribution of surplus-value
surplus-value, rate of Glos, 2§5
(productive power of labour = PPL)
sector-wise diverging due to diverging PPL 1§14-c and 1§15-a
(rather than as an effect of inter-sector distribution)
see also productive power of labour
see also integral profit rate, varying (cet. par.) with the PPL
SWC
see class, subordinated working class
synchronic
see Glos ‘diachronic’
systematic-dialectical exposition Glos, GI-C§4, A§10–A§14
systematic-dialectical method
see systematic-dialectical exposition
System of National Accounts (SNA 2008)
comparison ‘surplus-value’ and SNA ‘operating surplus’ 1§12-a,
imputation of rent to households (SNA) Appendix 3C-1 (sub 6)
imputation value-added to banks (interest margin) (SNA) 3§10-b
ordering differences SNA and this books exposition 8§6-d
taxation, broad (independently of the various forms of taxation)
fundamental conflict of 7§2
722 index of subjects
see also action radius of the state
see also deliberative: separation-in-unity …
taxation: forms and design 8§11
design of taxation: tax rates and the tax base for these rates 8§11 (sub 1)
tax base(s) and tax rate(s) 7§2
forms of taxation 8§10
potential for changes income and wealth distributions 8§11 (sub 2)
inevitably takes a stance
no neutral taxes or neutral tax rates 8§11 (sub 1)
notion of redistribution of market income
neglect production and appropriation of surplus-value 8§11 (sub 4)
tax rates
flat, progressive, regressive 8§11 (sub 2)
personal income taxes
progressive tax rates support enterprises 8§11 (sub 3)
interests enterprises versus high-income earners 8§11 (sub 3)
see also distribution of income
see also distribution of wealth
technique of production Glos, 1§9, 1§11
distinguished from technology 2§2-c, 7§16, 7§16-a
non-neutrality of 2§2-c
technology and its application in specific techniques
as inevitably the result of social labour 1§14 (sub 6)
non-neutrality of 2§2-c
tendency (concept) Glos, 2§12-a, A§14
tendency to (subjects, main ones):
cartel formation 4§13
centralisation of capital 4§14 (sub 1)
counteracts the following two tendencies 4§14 (sub 5)
equalisation of average inter-sector rates of integral profit 4§2
form of (…) inter-sector after-tax rates of integral profit 8§7
equalisation of average inter-sector rates of internal profit 5§1
incorporation 2§12
increasing complexity of regulation 10§7
international trade 11§3
international migration of production 11§11
international movement of capital 11§9
uniform prices in a market 4§3
see also theorem of tendency of the rate of profit fall
(as such no part of this book’s exposition)
theorem of tendency of the rate of profit fall
as posited within one main strand of marxian political economy
context of generalised price deflation and fast technical change 4§9-b
trans-abstraction in practice Glos, 1§4, 1§4-b
uncertainty versus risk 2§10 (sub 3)
unemployment
as requirement for the accumulation of capital (2§6, last paragraph)
unit monetary value of labour (m), actual 1§14 (sub 6)
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dynamics of
deflationary constellation 4§6 (sub 3), 4§6-a (visualised Fig. 4.5)
inflationary constellation 4§11, 4§12 (sub 3 – visualised Fig. 4.8)
related to ‘the monetary expression of the working hour’
as a ‘monetary constraint’ (Aglietta) 1§14-c
versus the ‘monetary expression of labour-time’ (Lipietz, Foley)
fundamental difference in the terms L versus Lα 1§14-c




validation Glos, 1§10, 3§01
see alsomacroeconomic sequence
see alsomacroeconomic validation of surplus-value: state bracketed
see alsomacroeconomic validation surplus-value: effect state expenditure
value Glos, 1§3, 1§4
abstract character of 1§3, 1§3-a
as mediated and measured by money 1§4
value-added Glos, 1§12, 1§14 (sub 8)
defined 1§12
articulation value-added and surplus-value 1§12
explanation of value-added 1§14
measures of 1§14 (sub 8)
value-form theory
from value-form to monetary-value dimension 1§5-d
valorisation Glos, 1§10, addendum 1§12-b
valoro-technique and -technology Glos, 2§2-c
see also technique of production, distinguished from technology
vast-majority-legitimation, requirement of 6§5, 6§5-b, 6§18, 7§22, 10§12, 11§15 (sub 4)
see also social security framework
see also social security transfers: dynamics
vulnerabilities of the capitalist state’s reach 10§14
vulnerabilities and impossible necessities 10§14
wage (rate) Glos, 1§6
determinants of 2§4, Fig. 2.3 (summary)
beliefs about superiority/inferiority of work and wages 2§7-c
see also accumulation of capital, determinant growth labour-capacity
see also international migration of production: various sub-lemmas
see also international trade, effect of IT on surplus-value
see also pre-validating finance of production by banks, for wages
see also production by the state, employment of wage labour
see also labour-capacity framework, minimumwage
see alsomanagerial labour, wages ladder
wealth Glos
distinction between capital and wealth 8§12 (sub 2), App. 3C-1 (sub 6)
see also distribution of wealth: households
Index of main empirical graphs and tables
Subdivision of the index
I OECD-21 averages 724
A State receipts 724
B State expenditure 724
• Single expenditure categories (alphabetical) 724
• Total expenditure, and total expenditure with single component
shares 725
• Total expenditure and receipts 725
C Distribution of income and wealth 725
• Distribution of income 725
• Distribution of wealth 725
D Other subjects (alphabetical) 725




Total state receipts (general government), % GDP; average of up to 21 current OECD countries,
1870–2015 (1965–2015: tax receipts and social security receipts) [graph 8.4] 8§4-b
State receipts (general government) from estate, inheritance and gift taxes in % of GDP; aver-
age of OECD-21, 1965–2015 [graph 8.25] 8§12-e
B State expenditure
• Single expenditure categories: state expenditure (general government), % GDP;
average of up to 21 current OECD countries, 1870–2015 (unless otherwise indicated)
Formal education (1870–2014) [graph 7.6] 7§14-d
General amenities, and subsidies and other direct assistance for enterprises (1995–2015) [graph
10.12-a] Appendix 10.A (re 10§13)
Hard core (up to 19 countries; 1995–2015) [graph 10.19-a] Appendix 10.A (re 10§9)
Infrastructure (1995–2013), with infrastructure indicator of state gross investment [graph 7.7-a]
Appendix 7A, re 7§15-a
Interest (net) [graph 10.9-c] Appendix 10.A (re 10§9)
Investment (gross) [graph 7.7] 7§15-a
Military [graph 10.9-b] Appendix 10.A (re 10§9)
Social security transfers, total (1880–2015) [graph 7.10] 7§17-a
Social security transfers, categorised into 7 subcategories (1980–2010) [graph 7.9] 7§17-a
idem, decade changes per category [table 7.9-a] Appendix 7A (re 7§17-a)
Subsidies for enterprises: explicit direct (1960–2010) [graph 10.12-b] Appendix 10.A (re 10§13)
Subsidies and other direct assistance for enterprises, and competition policy (1995–2015)
[graph 10.12-c] Appendix 10.A (re 10§13)
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• Total expenditure, and total expenditure with single component shares: state
expenditure (general government), % GDP; average of up to 21 current OECD
countries, 1870–2015 (unless otherwise indicated)
Total [graph 8.2] 8§2-a
Total and interest and military [graph 10.9] 10§9-a
Total and infrastructure and public education [graph 10.10] 10§11-a
Total and social security transfers (1880–2015) [graph 7.11] 7§17-a
Total and infrastructure and public education and social security transfers [graph 10.11]
10§12-a
Total and all components (‘general amenities’ and ‘subsidies and other direct assistance for
enterprises’: 1995–2015) [graph 10.12] 10§13-a
• Total expenditure and receipts
Total state expenditure and total current receipts (general government), in % GDP; averages of
up to 21 current OECD countries, 1870–2015 [graph 8.5] 8§4-b
C Distribution of income andwealth
• Distribution of income
Distribution of household income: deciles Market, Gross and ‘Equivalised disposable’ income,
UK 2015 [graph 8.13] 8§11-a
Distribution of household income: decile shares in Market, Gross and ‘Equivalised disposable’
income, UK 2015 [table 8.14] 8§11-a
Distribution of household income (equivalised): Gini indices of (a) market income; (b) income
post social security transfers; (c) income post direct taxes; averages of 4–20 OECD-21 coun-
tries, 1975–2015 [graph 8.15] 8§11-a
Distribution of household income: poverty rate before and after transfers and taxes; averages of
9–21 OECD-21 countries, 1985–2015 [graph 8.16] 8§11-a
Distribution of household income: all household share (%) and deciles share (%) of social
security transfers in gross income: UK 2015, Netherlands 2014 and Norway 2015 [table 8.17]
8§11-a
{OECD-21 income rank of the UK, Netherlands and Norway in 2015 [table 8.18] 8§11-a}
Distribution of income tax units: shares of the top 10% and the top 5% in the total personal
income; averages of up to 14 current OECD countries, 1910–2010 [graph 8.19] 8§11-b
• Distribution of wealth
Distribution of household wealth: shares of deciles and of top 5% and top 1%; average of
OECD-21, estimate for 2015 [graph 8.20] 8§12-a
Distribution of household wealth: total wealth and wealth components, shares of deciles; the
Netherlands 2015 [graph 8.21] 8§12-b
Distribution of household wealth: top wealth shares; 19 OECD-21 countries in or around 2014
[table 8.22] 8§12-c
Distribution of wealth: top wealth decile as share of total private wealth; averages of up to 8
current OECD countries, 1910–2010 [graph 8.23] 8§12-d
Distribution of wealth: the share of the top wealth decile as connected with total taxes; aver-
ages of 7–8 current OECD countries, 1910–2010 [graph 8.24] 8§12-d
D Other subjects (OECD-21) (alphabetical)
Banking sector, centralisation: assets of the five and three largest banks, as % of the assets of all
banks; average of the OECD-21, 1996–2015 [graph 9.3] Appendix 9A-1
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Banking sector, concentration: assets of one bank (top-3, or range 4–5) as a proportion of GDP;
average of the OECD-21, 1996–2015 [graph 9.4] Appendix 9A-1
Banking sector: bank rate of profit on equity, before and after tax; average of the OECD-21,
1996–2015 [graph 9.5] Appendix 9A-3
Classes: three main classes in terms of number of tax units and in terms of income shares,
USA 1918–2012 [graph 2.14] 2§15-a
education, see formal education
Formal education, years of, and its distribution (Gini); average of 21 current OECD countries,
1870–2010 [graph 7.5] 7§14-c
GDP growth: real-GDP per capita, growth rate per year; average of 20–21 current OECD coun-
tries in 2011 US$, 1870–2010 [graph 7.13-a] 7§3-b
Idem, average growth rate per decade [graph 7.13-b] 7§3-b
GDP growth amplitudes: measured by growth rate of real-GDP per capita in 2011 prices; USA,
1870–2015 [graph 10.2] 10§1-a
Macroeconomic income and expenditure shares in GDP; EU-15 and USA, 1960–2010 [graph 5.8]
Appendix 5A-1
public education, see formal education
Recessions and change GDP; USA, 1950–2015 [graph 5.3] 5§6-b
Recessions; average number per decade and per country; sample of 14 current OECD countries,
1870–2008 [graph 10.3] 10§2-a.
Recessions associated with financial crises; average number per decade and per country;
sample of 14 current OECD countries, 1870–2008 [graph 2.11] 2§10-b
Regulation, quantity: number of laws in force, the Netherlands 1980–2015 (central government,
exclusive delegated and EU regulation) [graph 10.5] 10§5-a
Regulation, quantity: number of total delegated regulations issued each year, and cumulative
total of the delegated general regulations without expiry date; European Union 1967–2012
[graph 10.6] 10§5-a
Regulation, quantity: delegated regulation in force at the federal state level in the US; total
number of pages, 1950–2015 [graph 10.7] 10§5-a
Social security transfers, finance of – shares of social security contributions (SSC) and taxes;
average of OECD-21, 1970–2015 [graph 8.11] 8§9-a
State employment as a percentage of total employment in comparison with total state
expenditure (each general government); averages of up to 21 current OECD countries, 1870–
2015 [graph 8.3] 8§3-a
II World country group averages (alphabetical)
(high, upper-middle, lower-middle and low income)
Classification characteristics: World Bank definitions of four country income categories from
high to low income in 2015 [table 11.3] 11§2-a
Classification characteristics: world country income groups: shares of world GDP and average
per capita income in 2015 [table 11.4] 11§2-a
Classification characteristics: indicators measuring lack of most elementary conditions of live:
high-, middle- and low-income countries around 2015 [table 11.7] 11§2-a
Formal education: state expenditure on formal education as % of GDP; high-, middle- and low-
income countries, 1970–2015 [graph 11.17] 11§12-b
Formal education: average years of, and spread of education in the total population aged 15
years and older (Gini index); averages of high-, middle- and low-income countries, 1950–
2010 [graph 11.18] 11§12-b
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GDP, shares of world GDP: shares of the high-, middle- and low-income categories, 1960–2015
[graph 11.5] 11§2-a
GDP, shares of world GDP: shares of the upper-middle-income category and of China, 1960–
2015 [graph 11.6] 11§2-a
International movement of capital: FDI inflows and outflows as % of GDP, world average, 1970–
2015 [graph 11.11] 11§10-b
International movement of capital: FDI inflows and outflows as % of GDP, average of high-
income countries, 1970–2015 [graph 11.12] 11§10-b
International movement of capital: FDI inflows and outflows as % of GDP, average of upper-
middle-income countries, 1970–2015 [graph 11.12-a] Appendix 11A (re 11§10-b)
International movement of capital: FDI inflows and outflows as % of GDP, average of lower-
middle-income countries; 1970–2015 [graph 11.12-b] Appendix 11A (re 11§10-b)
International movement of capital: FDI inflows and outflows as % of GDP, average of low-
income countries; 1970–2015 [graph 11.12-c] Appendix 11A (re 11§10-b)
International movement of capital: netted FDI inflows and outflows as % of GDP of the coun-
try group, averages of the high-, middle- and low-income countries, 1970–2015 [graph 11.13]
11§10-b
International movement of capital: total FDI inflows and announced greenfield FDI inflows,
world and developing economies, 2003–16 [table 11.15] 11§11-a
International trade: sum of world exports and imports in % of world GDP, 1870–2011 [graph
11.8] 11§4-a
International trade: world exports, high- and low-income countries exports, as % of their GDP,
1960–2015 [graph 11.9] 11§4-a
International trade: external balance on goods and services in % of GDP;WB income categor-
ies, average per year 1960–2015 [table 11.10] 11§7-a
International trade: exports and external balance of high-, middle- and low-income countries,
as % of their GDP, 1960–2015 [graph 11.8-a] Appendix 11A (re 11§4-a)
Internet: individuals using the Internet (% of population); averages of high-, middle- and low-
income countries, 1990–2015 [graph 11.19] 11§12-c
Labour: wage-labour as a share of wage-labour plus self-employment, world regions and
developed economies, 1999–2013 [table 11.22] 11§13-a
Social security expenditure (state) in % of GDP: averages of World Bank country income cat-
egories, 2000–11 [table 11.20] 11§12-d
Wages: average annual real-wage growth, world and country groups, 2006–13 [table 11.23]
11§14-b
